The Tender Soldier: A True Story of War and Sacrifice (40 page)

That was the vision, at least:
Hurlbut told me: “When we got here, we expected we’re going to do one month of driving everywhere for the first time meeting everybody, another month of some security ops where we’re going to kill all the bad guys and let ’em know who’s in charge of the neighborhood. Do a quarter of building up some government structures so we can get that working and then the last quarter we’re going to bring a whole bunch of money in and build roads and projects. Not happening. It took six, seven and a half months for the district leader to start hugging me. That’s just one example. So the people I’m not talking to on a weekly basis out there in no-man’s-land, their time horizons are much longer than we can conceive of.” Hurlbut, interview by author, March 26, 2009. See also Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Troops Face New Tests in Afghanistan,”
Washington Post,
March 15, 2009.

The flat earth over which they sometimes walked:
This description of the bombs is based on my interview with an Explosive Ordnance Device team leader in Panjwaii District, just east of Maiwand, September 24, 2009. In addition to explaining how bombs were made in that part of the country, he showed me the remains of several explosives his team had unearthed in recent months.

Every day, it seemed, someone got hit:
Don Ayala, interview by author, August 19, 2009. Ayala told me that during the time he and his teammates spent in Maiwand, there were “IEDs like crazy every day. The wreckers would have to go pick up one of our vehicles because it was blown on the side of the road every day. We got hit by IEDs every day. Even our wreckers and the sweep team from Darkhorse would go out, and their vehicles would hit an IED.”

A Humvee blew up, killing a soldier:
A private was killed and four other soldiers were hurt in the attack on September 4, 2008. The burned lieutenant was Sam Brown, a platoon leader and West Point graduate. Major Trevor Voelkel, interview by author, February 12, 2013, and Jay Kirk, “Burning Man,”
GQ,
February 2012.

For a time that fall, more buried bombs:
Brown, interview by author, March 22, 2009: “There was a stretch up through December [2008, when] we were averaging an IED find or an IED strike at least every other day. Significant. We crunched the numbers in December and we were, like, ‘We’re the most heavily IED’d place in Afghanistan, and not just Afghanistan, but Iraq, too.’ ” This statistic was widely known in the battalion, and several other soldiers and officers mentioned it to me, including Lieutenant David Ochs, interview by author, April 6, 2009.

Their mission was to win Afghans away from the insurgency:
Ochs, interview by author, April 6, 2009. Observations in this section are based on interviews and patrols with soldiers from the 2–2 in March and April 2009, especially a mission to Zhari on April 6, 2009, when we saw the man cleaning his teeth, glowering and spitting, and overheard insurgents talking about us on the radio.

But Maiwand was so far from being controlled by U.S. forces:
Ayala, interviews by author, May 4 and August 19, 2009.

“She didn’t necessarily feel that the protection was as good”:
Stacy Crevello, interview by author, December 17, 2012. Ayala told me that Loyd agreed that Maiwand was rough and insecure, but that didn’t keep her from wanting to be out there. “We did have our disagreements,” Ayala told me. “She was so excited about getting projects ready to go for this area, her vision was optimistic, but also very futuristic. I was just a little disappointed with [the 2–2]. They were focused on doing a wheat seed program, and I’m going, ‘It’s not going to work, this is going to get into the hands of the merchants, who are going to sell it for profit.’ ” In Ayala’s view, “the military need to come [into Maiwand with the] Afghan army, Afghan police, kick out the [Taliban] shadow government, then bring in Human Terrain and civil affairs. But these decisions are made not in the field, but in the Pentagon, back in D.C., where people eat good and sleep warm at night.” Ayala, interview by author, May 4, 2009.

She wanted to teach farmers about drip irrigation:
At Loyd’s suggestion, the 2–2 was building a sample farm to showcase the results of drip irrigation and other progressive farming methods, Hurlbut told me. Hurlbut, interview by author, March 26, 2009. “She’d been in the country a long time, and she was an absolutely phenomenal asset,” Hurlbut told me. “The other thing she brought to the table was the development piece. . . . She opened our eyes to how you [have to] give the people other ideas [about how] to do things.”

Don’t treat the locals badly:
Ayala told me that the soldiers “were so frustrated that their guys were getting hurt, but they can’t find the bad guys. . . . We came up with a solution for these frustrated soldiers and educated them. [We] said, ‘Listen, guys, you’re not going to see them. They’re going to blend in. They’re playing the game. They know what your rules of engagement are. They’re taking advantage of that.’ I said, ‘They’re going to be right there in broad daylight looking in your eyes with no weapons in their hands. They know that you can’t touch them.’ But in the meantime, we advised them, ‘Do not create more enemies. Don’t get frustrated where you’re just going to treat everybody like shit.’ I go, ‘Build rapports. Be patient. They’re going to start pointing out to you who the enemy is once they trust you, because they want them out of their villages, because they know it’s going to be trouble later on. So build rapports, have patience and they’ll give us the enemy.’ That’s the advice we’d give them. You know we discussed it with Paula, discussed it with Clint.” Ayala, interview by author, August 19, 2009.

Tim Gusinov:
Gusinov was born in what is now Azerbaijan but moved to Moscow with his mother when he was a toddler. Unless otherwise noted, quotes and biographical information about him in this section are from Gusinov, interview by author, June 18, 2011.

Trained as an Afghan area specialist and Persian linguist:
At the military academy, Gusinov and other students were assigned to master a pair of languages. His were Farsi, of which Afghan Dari is a dialect, and English. He spent his first tour attached to an Afghan army division in Ghazni and began his second tour with another Afghan unit in Gardez until the Spetsnaz poached him.

When a Human Terrain System recruiter called:
The recruiter was actually from BAE, the defense contractor that handled recruitment and hiring for the Human Terrain System.

Observing that the Americans:
Gusinov, interview by author, June 18, 2011; Hurlbut, interview by author, March 26, 2009; Cooper, interview by author, April 22, 2010.

“He’s like a rock star”:
When he first met Gusinov, Hurlbut’s impression was different: “We’re, like, ‘Dude, I can tell you’re a Soviet by your accent. There is no way we’re going to put you in front of any Afghan,’ ” Hurlbut told me. But Gusinov’s Dari and his ease with Afghans ultimately impressed Hurlbut and his fellow officers. Hurlbut, interview by author, March 26, 2009.

Indeed, Gusinov had been trained by the Soviets:
Gusinov’s Soviet training prepared him for work as a “linguist-area specialist,” a job he described as “much more intel and targeting, especially when you are attached to a Special Forces unit.” Gusinov knew that as a member of a Human Terrain Team he wasn’t supposed to actively seek out intelligence, but the distinction struck him as theortetical. “On one occasion we captured a young guy who was suspected of putting IEDs on the road, and he was scared to death,” Gusinov told me. “He thought he would be killed. And I spoke to him, like, ‘Calm down. If you’re frank to me I might be able to help you.’ And he told me, ‘I’m a young man. I want to have nice clothes. I want to have a radio. I want to smoke nice cigarettes. A phone. There are no jobs, and I’m not Taliban but they paid me two thousand Afghani for planting an IED on the road.’  . . . I spoke with him when he was back in the base. . . . I was always giving this information or I was even writing a short note to our S2 [intelligence] officer.” Gusinov, interview by author, June 18, 2011.

Since they’d met in Kansas:
Cooper, interview by author, April 22, 2010, and Gusinov, interview by author, June 18, 2011. Cooper told me that he and several others, including Loyd, had been so offended by Gusinov’s crass comments during training that they had unsuccessfully petitioned program administrators to fire him.

Gusinov thought it was no place for a woman:
Having reported in Maiwand, Kandahar, and other parts of the south since 2003, I disagree with Gusinov. Loyd’s Afghan experience had also been primarily in the south, in and around Kandahar after the invasion and later in Zabul before she went to work in Kabul. Don Ayala, who worked with her often, recalled only two occasions out of about twenty interviews they conducted together when he felt moved to step in and stand at her side: one involved an irate village elder; another time, he felt that “some of the males were uncomfortable speaking to her” and “she didn’t feel comfortable.” But “most of the time, she had people going, people willing to talk to her.” Ayala, interview by author, August 19, 2009. Nevertheless, many American troops and even some of Gusinov’s fellow Human Terrain teammates shared his view that “Paula was the wrong person in the wrong time and space. Kandahar and Maiwand District is not a place for a lady to go around and ask questions. I understand everything about diversity and equal opportunity,” Gusinov told me, “but there are some things that you never ever do in Afghanistan. She would be perfect somewhere up north
with Tajiks, Uzbeks, in Bagram, in Mazar-i-Sharif. In those places she would be absolutely fine.” Gusinov, interview by author, June 18, 2011.

His attention was drawn to the edges:
That Gusinov paid special attention to insurgent areas and advised the commander to do so as well, Ayala, interview by author, August 19, 2009, and Gusinov, interview by author, June 18, 2011. For the weapons, supplies, and other paraphernalia found in the Garmabak and Band-i-Timur, Captain Michael Soyka, interview by author, April 5, 2009, and Voelkel, interview by author, February 12, 2013.

When the Maiwand district governor quoted:
Ayala, Cooper, Gusinov, and Warren, “HTT Patrol Report: Maiwand District Governor Meeting,” October 25, 2008.

Loyd, Ayala, and Cooper accompanied soldiers:
Ayala, Loyd, and Cooper, “HTT Patrol Report: Kashk E Nokhowd,” October 24, 2008, and Loyd, “HTT Patrol Report: USPI Compound,” October 26, 2008. USPI is a private security company that was working for the Americans at the time. This report also includes interviews from residential compounds.

Loyd, Ayala, and Cooper lived together:
The description of their working lives in Maiwand in this section is drawn from Ayala, interviews by author, August 19, 2009, and April 17, 2010, and Cooper, interview by author, April 22, 2010.

Understanding the connections:
“Everyone in the villages [was] very standoffish. . . . It would have taken time. You had to build relationships. . . . then start asking personal questions: ‘How are you related to this person? Do you know anybody in this village over here? Do you have any family over there?’ Once you got to know them, you would have realized if they were telling the truth or not.” Ayala, interview by author, August 19, 2009.

They moved between Comanche and Darkhorse:
Ayala, interviews by author, May 4 and August 19, 2009.

Sometimes Loyd asked Cooper:
Cooper, interview by author, April 22, 2010.

A woman gave Loyd her baby to hold:
“HTT Patrol Report: Kashk E Nokhowd,” October 24, 2008, includes a photo of Loyd sitting with a group of Afghan women and children and holding a baby. Her popularity among children was legendary among soldiers of the 2–2 and her teammates.

Sometimes the kids were useful:
For Ayala, the incident with the fake name “proved that the adults couldn’t be trusted and the kids were very truthful.” Ayala, interview by author, August 19, 2009.

Afghan police stationed along the highway:
Ayala, Cooper, Gusinov, and Warren, “HTT Patrol Report: Maiwand District Governor Meeting,” October 25, 2008, and Cooper, interview by author, April 22, 2010. Several of the team’s reports from this period include accounts of Afghan police corruption. At least one person also complained of Taliban taxes on the roads. See Ayala, Loyd, and Cooper, “HTT Patrol Report: Khaki Chopan,” October 27, 2008.

One day in October:
Ayala and Cooper, “HTT Patrol Report: ‘Hotel’ Police Station,” October 26, 2008.

When Loyd’s interpreter overheard:
Loyd, “HTT Patrol Report: USPI Compound,” October 29, 2008.

A widow told Loyd how much she hated ‘the motherfucking Taliban’:
Loyd, “HTT Patrol Report: USPI Compound Interviews,” October 26, 2008.

She suggested mapping tribal affiliations:
Information in this paragraph comes from Loyd, “HTT Patrol Report: USPI Compound Interviews,” October 26, 2008. Loyd wrote: “It would be useful to map tribal affiliations of individual compounds and villages in the AO. The unit would have a better understanding of relationships among the local populace and could utilize this information for COIN operations.”

That October, insurgents stopped a bus:
Carlotta Gall and Taimoor Shah, “Taliban Behead 30 Men Pulled from Bus,”
New York Times,
October 19, 2008, and Hurlbut, interview by author, March 26, 2009.

An Afghan told the Human Terrain Team:
Ayala, Loyd, and Cooper, “HTT Patrol Report: Khaki Chopan,” October 27, 2008. According to Ayala, the checkpoint was never built.

Insurgents taxed villagers and common bandits waited:
On Taliban taxes, see ibid. For the known holdup point where bandits waited, see Ayala, Cooper, Gusinov, and Warren, “HTT Patrol Report: Maiwand District Governor Meeting,” October 25, 2008.