The Theory of Moral Sentiments (72 page)

6
Smith’s locution may be inspired by La Rochefoucauld, who writes of “un désir de rendre notre condition meilleure” (
Maxims
82), or Mandeville, who writes of our “indefatigable desire of meliorating our condition” (
Fable
, Remark V) and of man’s “restless desire of mending their condition” (
Enquiry into the Origin of Honour
, Dialogue 1). The idea would play a principal role in Smith’s political economy; see, e.g.,
Wealth of Nations
2.3, 3.3.

7
Smith’s discussion of vanity is an intervention in a contemporary debate over the moral status of luxury and the love of esteem. The roots of that debate lie in the writings of the principal seventeenth-century French moralists (e.g., La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyère, La Fontaine, and Fénelon); important eighteenth-century interventions include, among others, those by Hume (“Of Refinement in the Arts”) and Voltaire (e.g., “The Worldling”). Particularly relevant in the present context are Mandeville’s theory of “self-liking” (esp.
Enquiry into the Origin of Honour
, Dialogue 1), Rousseau’s conception of
amour-propre
(esp.
Discourse on Inequality
2 and n15), and Hume’s conception of “our esteem for the rich and powerful” (esp.
Treatise
2.2.5).

8
Charles’s indignation at his trial, together with the posthumous circulation of the
Eikon Basilike
(purportedly his final statement), generated a popular sympathy that grew during the Interregnum and culminated in the restoration of the monarchy and the proclamation of his martyrdom; Hume describes his trial as exciting “contagious sympathy,” his execution as a scene of “grief, indignation, and astonishment,” and the
Eikon
as exciting a “general compassion” (
History
59).

9
On obsequiousness, see also 4.1 (p. 209) and the accompanying note on Rousseau.

10
James’s first flight attempt ended in failure when his escape boat was captured. Returned to London under guard, he was welcomed by the crowds. Hume remarks that “the populace, moved by compassion for his unhappy fate, and actuated by their own levity, had received him with shouts and acclamations” (
History
71).

11
Louis XIV’s historian was Voltaire; the passage Smith here quotes is drawn from Voltaire,
Siècle de Louis XIV
24.

12
coxcomb: “a fop; a superficial pretender” (Johnson).

13
Smith’s account of the triumph is derived from Plutarch,
Lives
, “Aemilius Paulus,” 33-34.

14
Smith quotes
Maximes
490; see also the note below on Mandeville.

15
The first five editions of
TMS
here included a separate chapter with the title “Of the stoical philosophy”; some material from that chapter was incorporated into the discussion of Stoicism at 7.2.1 (p. 318).

16
Smith may have in mind a notorious incident concerning the future Frederick II (Frederick the Great) and his father, Frederick Wilhelm I. In June 1730, both were present at a parade given at the camp at Mühlberg in honor of the Elector of Saxony. While there, Frederick’s tyrannical father, who had long been given to humiliating his son for his effeminacy, caned him in view of the assembled regiments. Frederick was by then an officer, having received the commission of lieutenant-colonel and the command of two battalions in 1728; see David Fraser,
Frederick the Great
(2000), pp. 24, 28.

17
See Cardinal de Retz,
Mémoires
(p. 110 in the modern Pléiade edition); Smith also cites this passage in
Rhetoric
2.42.

18
This chapter was an addition to the sixth edition of 1790. For Smith’s views on corruption and the obligation to remedy it, see esp.
Jurisprudence
B 328-333.

19
Having established the economic utility of vanity and the propensity to worship the rich and powerful (see 1.3.1 and 4.1 below), Smith in this chapter examines the moral effects of such a disposition. Among the “moralists” who take up the question of the best form of life, see, e.g., Plato,
Republic
10, 613b-621d; Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics
1.5, 1095b14-1096a10; Cicero,
De officiis
1.116-18.

20
The quotation is drawn from the “Supplement” to the
Mémoires
of the Duc de Sully (vol. 8, pp. 338-39 in the 1752 London edition that Smith owned).

21
See Cicero,
Pro Marcello
25.

PART II , SECTION I

1
See 1.1.3 (p. 21).

2
Smith’s discussions of gratitude here and esp. 3.6 are indebted to several previous discussions of gratitude; see esp. Hutcheson’s claim that there is “no obligation more sacred than that of gratitude” in
Short Introduction
2.4.6 (which cites Cicero; see
De officiis
1.47); as well as Hutcheson,
Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue
2.5.2.

3
Hume describes James I as “little enterprising” and “inoffensive,” emphasizing that his pacifism bordered on mere “pusillanimity,” and his efforts to “acquire the good will of all” through neutrality enabled him to garner “the esteem and regard of none” (
History
49).

4
Their “actions of proper and beneficent greatness” can be read in the histories of Herodotus (8.79-81 on Aristides); Polybius (10, 14-15 on Scipio); Cornelius Nepos (who wrote lives of Timoleon and Aristides); Livy (5.19-6.27 on Camillus; 26-30 on Scipio); Diodorus Siculus (16.65-90 on Timoleon); and Plutarch (who wrote lives of Camillus, Timoleon, and Aristides). Smith’s observation is an intervention in a contemporary debate over the grounds of our admiration of virtue in distant ages; he returns to this debate in 7.3.1 below.

5
For Borgia’s cruelty, see, e.g., Machiavelli,
Prince
7 and 17; Nero’s vices were condemned by Tacitus, Suetonius, Pliny, and Cassius Dio.

PART II , SECTION II

1
Smith’s contrast below of the negative duties of justice with the positive duties of beneficence is anticipated in several accounts of the social virtues; see Cicero,
De of ficiis
1.20; and Hume,
Enquiry Concerning Morals
1.11.

2
Smith has in mind Kames,
Essays on Morality and Religion
1.2.3-4. Kames’s comments on duty, conscience, sympathy, consciousness of merit, and virtue as benevolence in these passages also merit comparison to Smith’s comments here and elsewhere.

3
Smith’s discussion here of the “duties of a law-giver” is tied to his broader conception of the “science of the legislator,” a key concept of his political philosophy; see esp. 6.2.2 (p. 268) and
Wealth of Nations
4.2, and Rousseau, “Geneva Manuscript,” 1.4, 2.1-6. Smith’s emphasis here and elsewhere on moderation in statesmanship is anticipated by several other thinkers; see esp. Montesquieu,
The Spirit of the Laws
19.5-6, 19.14 and 26.23; and Hume, “Of Commerce” and “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth.”

4
See, e.g., Leviticus 24:19.

5
That our primary regard is to ourselves rather than to others (which is also Smith’s point of departure in Part 6) was commonly accepted by all parties to the debate over self-love and benevolence. In antiquity it was shared by both Stoics and Epicureans among others (see Cicero,
De finibus
5.24-30;
De officiis
1.11); in the Enlightenment the primacy of the concern for self-preservation is reiterated by such prominent advocates of benevolence as Shaftesbury (
Inquiry Concerning Virtue
1.2.2) and Hutcheson (
Short Introduction
1.6.3).

6
Smith uses this location on three separate occasions in
TMS
; see his accounts of the earthquake in China in 3.3 (p. 156), and of patriotism in 6.2.2 (p. 268).

7
Smith borrows the race metaphor from Cicero (see
De officiis
3.42), perhaps as reported by Pufendorf (see
Of the Law of Nature and Nations
2.3.16n).

8
On the anguish of remorse, see esp. Hutcheson,
Essay with Illustrations
1.5.5 and
Short Introduction
1.2.9; and Kames,
Essays on Morality and Religion
1.2.3 and 1.3.

9
Smith here intervenes in an ancient debate over the question of whether human beings are by nature self-sufficient or dependent on others—a prominent theme in Marcus Aurelius (see, e.g.,
Meditations
2.1, 5.16, 8.59) and Cicero (see, e.g.,
De officiis
1.22, 2.15), and revived by both Rousseau in his
Discourse on Inequality
and the thinkers reviewed in 7.2-3 in their debates over self-love and benevolence. Smith’s own understanding of human interdependence is central to his political economy; see esp.
Wealth of Nations
1.1-2.

10
See, e.g., Hume,
Enquiry Concerning Morals
4.15.

11
Here and in 2.3.3 (p. 125) Smith invokes the doctrine of “final causes” originally associated with Aristotelian teleology, which referred to the end or purpose (
telos
) specific to a given action or organism. In the Scottish Enlightenment the debate over final causes ranged from those who incorporated final causes into their providentialist conceptions of cosmology and ethics (such as Hutcheson) to those skeptical of our capacity to apprehend such ends (such as Hume). For commentary, see Alvey.

12
Smith’s account of our approbation of the punishment of injustice (mirrored in his account at
Jurisprudence
A 2.90ff) refers principally to the theories of punishment developed by those he associates with natural sociability (esp. Grotius, Pufendorf, and Hutcheson). For their views on natural sociability, see the notes to 7.3 (p. 485); for their theories of punishment (including capital punishment), see Grotius,
Rights of War and Peace
2.20.1- 9; Pufendorf,
Law of Nature and Nations
8.3.1-12 and
Duty of Man and Citizen
2.13; Hutcheson,
Short Introduction
3.8.9-10 and
System
3.9.10-15. On the general claim concerning the indispensability of justice to the preservation of society, see esp. Hobbes,
Leviathan
15; and Hume,
Enquiry Concerning Morals
4.

13
See Polybius 6.36-37.

14
This final sentence was an addition to the sixth edition, replacing a longer passage on the relationship of humanity to divinity. Smith’s study of the wise and virtuous man in 6.3 (p. 280) also treats this theme. More broadly, Smith’s argument in 2.2.3 is an intervention in the debate over the relationship of a belief in the afterlife to justice (e.g., Plato,
Republic
10, 613b-621d; Rousseau,
The Social Contract
4.8), revived in terms anticipating Smith by Hutcheson (e.g.
Essay With Illustrations
1.6.4). Smith returns to this question, see esp. 3.5, 6.2.3.

PART II , SECTION III

1
The Dryads were ancient Greek tree nymphs, and the Lares ancient Roman household gods responsible for protecting households and localities.

2
The punishment of the ox is drawn from Exodus 21:28; the same example reappears at
Jurisprudence
A 2.118-19. Rules for punishing animals formed a significant component of jurisprudential treatments of negligence; see 2.3.2 (p. 116) and the sources there cited. The story of the officer and his horse is drawn from an anonymous epistolary collection,
Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy
, vol. 4, book 3, letter 10.

3
For elaboration see
Jurisprudence
A 5.61-62 and B 80.

4
See, e.g., Alexander Bayne,
Institutions of the Criminal Law of Scotland
(Edinburgh, 1730), which reports it to have been “general custom and practice of courts” to attribute to natural causes the death of any victim of attempted homicide who expires 40 days after the injury (p. 89).

5
See Plutarch,
Lives
, “Lucullus” 25.

6
police: “the regulation and government of a city or country, so far as regards the inhabitants” (Johnson).

7
Smith’s distinction of three species of negligence is an intervention in an ongoing debate in natural jurisprudence over negligence and compensation; see, e.g., Grotius,
Rights of War and Peace
2.17; Pufendorf,
Duty of Man and Citizen
1.6.9; Hutcheson,
Short Introduction
2.15.1-3. Smith reiterates the distinction at
Jurisprudence
A 2.78 and 2.88-89.

8
Smith reiterates the lack of distinction between murder and man-slaughter in
Jurisprudence
A 2.112 and B 187.

9
The
Lex Aquilia
of the third c. BC was a Roman private law statute governing compensation for damaged or destroyed property. It was included as part of the
Corpus Iuris Civilis
(Justinian’s
Institutes
4.3.8); it emphasizes the negligence of one unable to control his horse by “weakness or lack of skill,” clarifying Smith’s discussion here.