The Third World War (24 page)

Even a minute quantity of a highly toxic agent such as
HCN
. either inhaled or absorbed through the skin, was capable of causing death within a few minutes unless prompt medical attention was available-Medical services soon overloaded with battle casualties were severely taxed to cope with casualties caused by chemicals as well.

Constant precautions and the wearing of appropriate personal protective equipment had been available to 1 British Corps since the middle 1970s and had been rushed into service by other European
NATO
countries just in time to prove its value. Without it, very heavy casualties would have resulted from chemical agents delivered against forward troops not only by rocket launcher and
FROG
missiles but also by conventional artillery and from spray tanks mounted on ground-attack aircraft.

The Warsaw Pact attack had also been preceded by very extensive
ECM
and anti-radar activity from the Eastern side-This was initially by no means ineffective, but was very soon seen to be quite dramatically inferior to the resources in electronic warfare available to the West. In rather less than an hour after the opening of initial preparations for the land offensive, four powerful armoured thrusts, each on a divisional front led by an advanced group of mixed arms in regimental strength, had moved through swiftly prepared gaps in the frontier defences into the territory of the Federal Republic. The form of the attack, when it came, was by no means unexpected. Preceded by light forces operating as far ahead as the terrain allowed, the first wave in the main assault on each axis was made up of the T-72 tank regiments of the armoured divisions, operating on divisional fronts never more than eight kilometres wide and sometimes as little as two, depending on the nature of the ground. The leading tank battalions were closely followed by motor-rifle companies in their
BMP
armoured combat vehicles (sometimes no more than 100 metres or so in rear), whose chief purpose was known to be to suppress the opposing anti-tank defences. Following closely behind the tank divisions were the motor-rifle divisions, each consisting of one armoured regiment and three motor-rifle regiments, which were prepared to exploit the breakthrough which such a heavy concentration of armour in the lead could hardly fail to achieve. Turning off the line of march into encounter battles their purpose was to sweep opposition out of the way and thus allow the tank and motor-rifle- divisions in the next echelon, piling on into the battle, to maintain the impetus of the advance.

The general offensive in Europe opened in accordance with the subsequently recovered plan whose substance has been given on pages 119-22. Though this plan was not, of course, known to Allied intelligence in detail until after the war. the pattern of the offensive caused no great surprise.
SHAPE
expected, for example, that heavy pressure would initially develop along the whole front, followed by major concentrations to break through at selected points as well as very numerous probing operations to find and exploit opportunities for deep penetration. It was realized that the verification by
NATO
commanders of the main axes of thrust at a very early stage would be of the greatest importance. Where, for example, would 3 Shock Army be directed? South-west, to follow through behind the initial onslaught by 8 Guards Army, in a drive for Frankfurt? This would tax
CENTAG
severely. Or westwards against NORTHAG? This could be more dangerous still. The considerable loss of satellite surveillance was a severe blow, even if in part offset by intelligence from other sources. Reconnaissance in any depth in such a hostile environment was difficult enough for special unmanned air vehicles relying on their small size and radar reflection to evade enemy defences. For manned aircraft, operating singly on deep penetration missions without the benefits of defence suppression and adequate electronic countermeasures, it was an extremely difficult and dangerous task. But the strategic importance of identifying the main axes of the thrust was such that it had to be tried, tried, and tried again, no matter what the cost.

The Allied tactical air forces and air defences, already on full alert, had responded to the opening of the offensive at once. They concentrated initially on both defensive and offensive counter-air operations to reduce Soviet air activity, and to strive for a tolerable air situation over the battle and behind the battle area in
AFCENT
airspace. COMAAFCE’s (Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe) assessment of priorities in the first few hours of the conflict is discussed in detail in Chapter 20 on the air campaign.

The picture that began to be clarified in HQ
AFCENT
on the late afternoon of 4 August, out of the flood of information coming in, can be described as follows.

At the northern end of the Central Region Bremen airfield, so recently, ironically enough, protected by a US brigade, was in Soviet hands. It had been seized by one of the very few fully successful fifth-column actions, followed up by airborne infantry. A Soviet air-portable division, under very strong air cover, was now building up on the airhead thus formed. Three divisions out of 2 Guards Tank Army, slowed down but not stopped by the action of covering forces which had been furnished by the Americans to strengthen the forward defences of the Dutch, were fighting their way towards the Bremen airhead through 1 Netherlands Corps. One Soviet division out of 2 Guards Tank Army had turned up northwards in thedirection of Kiel, followed, itappeared. by two Polish divisions, one armoured, one motorized. The 6 Polish Airborne Division was also known to be concentrated in the north, with special deep penetration troops from Neuruppin, units from the East German Willi Sanger Special Services organization and naval specialists.

The city of Hamburg, masked by a strong Red Army force to the south of it across the Elbe, was apparently being bypassed for the present. The Hamburg Senat had urged strongly that the Allies declare Hamburg an open city, which meant that no troops of any origin would be allowed to enter and, since its use was denied to both sides it would not be attacked by either. Under strong pressure from the
FRG
, this was soon agreed to by the
NATO
Council. The Soviet attitude was not made known.

Refugee movement from the relatively thinly populated areas of north Niedersachsen was already considerable. There was here an unwelcome foretaste of what lay in store further south.

In the centre of the
NORTHAG
area a strong armoured column from what was almost certainly 3 Shock Army had been launched on a two-divisional front, with four more divisions in the follow-up. It was moving westwards, in the direction of Hannover. Movement behind it along the same axii. was observed from 20 Guards Army.

On the Central Army Group front to the south of
NORTHAG
an armoured column from 8 Guards Army with two divisions up was driving at Frankfurt, which lay only 100 kilometres Horn the Demaicatiuii Line, but with difficult country in the Thiiringer Wald to be crossed on the way. Four more Soviet divisions were known to be following up the first two.

Further south on the
CENTAG
front another column, again with two divisions up and four following, almost certainly from I Guards Tank Army, was pressing towards Niirnberg.

Chemical attack, heavy in
NORTHAG
, not-used in
CENTAG
, had a varying impact: the Americans, who did not have to face it, were, with the British, technically best prepared to meet it, the Germans and the British stood it best, the effect on the Belgians was mixed and that upon the Dutch on the whole rather bad.

The main result of chemical attack was less the infliction of casualties, which were never intolerably high after the initial attacks, than the severe constraint on physical activity occasioned by defensive precautions, particularly the wearing of respirators and cumbrous protective clothing. The performance of combat infantry was degraded under full precautions by as much as 60 per cent. Mobility was reduced in avoiding contaminated areas. The requirement for chemical reconnaissance took time and units were frequently forced for tack of it to fight in a contaminated environment. Similar constraints applied to headquarters. Staff officers under threat of attack had to work in protective equipment, including gloves and respirators, with a significant degradation in command and control.

On the opening day of the -offensive Soviet ground-attack aircraft also used napalm against forward Allied units. Fortunately most were well spread out and casualties, where they occurred, although gruesome, were small in number. Attacks were also mounted against tanks and some tank losses resulted. Allied tank commanders had been taught to drive straight through any napalm attack and, generally speaking, tanks which continued to motor on in this way drove themselves out of trouble. The target against which napalm was used to greatest effect was soft-skinned, that is, unarmoured vehicles, which stood a poor chance of survival against it. Quite heavy casualties were sustained in soft-skinned transport in the opening days of the offensive.

Although Allied formations had no answer to napalm attacks other than to redouble their vigilance against low-flying aircraft, such attacks tended to lessen in frequency and intensity as the Russians found that the damage being caused, particularly against Allied tanks, did not warrant the high cost in aircraft. Although sporadic attacks continued throughout the following days the use of napalm was not regarded by the allies as offering a major hazard.

No nuclear weapons, by the end of the first day, had as yet been used on either side. The Soviet declaration notwithstanding, SACEUR had felt obliged by the uncertainty of the situation to withhold some of his strike aircraft—chiefly F-llls, Buccaneers and Tornados— from the battle for possible nuclear action. Their absence resulted in -a slight but significant increase in Soviet numerical superiority in the air.

Whether in the air or on the ground, it was chiefly forces of the Soviet Union which had been so far engaged. Three Polish divisions with some East German specialists were known to have moved into Denmark. One tank and two motor-rifle divisions of the East German Army had been in action against
NORTHAG
. No troops from any country other than Poland and East Germany in the Warsaw Pact had yet been identified in action.

Without any doubt the most important development of that first morning of open hostilities in Europe was the declaration by the French government of its intention to carry out to the full its obligations under the Atlantic Treaty. France was now, therefore, in a state of war against the Soviet U nion and its allies in the Warsaw Pact.

II French Corps in Germany, some 50,000 strong, when assigned to Allied Command Europe and placed by
SACEUR
under command to the Commander-in-Chief, Central Region (
CINCENT
), was in the first instance put into regional reserve, with a warning to be in readiness for a move forward in Bavaria. Three further French divisions, of the smaller size which had resulted from a reorganization at the end of the seventies (8,200 men in armoured divisions, 6,500 in infantry), were under orders to move in from France forthwith, the mobilization operation, which would in due course produce fourteen divisions more, was already under way. Particularly welcome was the addition of the eighteen fighter-bomber squadrons of the French Tactical Air Force, even if only to be used—on the first day at any rate—in support of French formations. More important than anything else for the immediate future, however, was the availability of French ports and airfields and the massive and quite invaluable increase to the theatre’s depth, particularly in the matter of airspace.

The French nuclear capability was retained firmly and exclusively in French hands.

Though the intervention of the French gave a degree of encouragement to the Allies whose importance it would be hard to overestimate, the situation on the ground in the Central Region at nightfall on the first day was far from promising (see Situation Map p. 200). The covering forces along the entire forward edge of the battle area, with the exception of those to the east of Frankfurt between Alsfeld and Bamberg. had been driven back. In the north, sheer weight of numbers had enabled the enemy to push regiment-sized groups of all arms, very strong in tanks and armoured infantry, almost invariably.moving mounted, with powerful tactical air support, round centres of
NATO
opposition that had been effectively pinned down south of Hamburg. These groups were now driving on to link up with the air-transported Soviet units which were deploying out of the Bremen airhead. Soviet airborne infantry units with light support were in their turn feeling forward to seize crossing points over the River Weser, against determined but not always well co-ordinated opposition from units of I Netherlands and II British Corps.

In the North German plain armoured units from I German and I British Corps, extricated with some difficulty from encirclement, were now regrouping north of Hannover to face the main threat pressing down upon them from the north and east.’The North German plain was no longer the wide open tank-run it had still been held to be (perhaps even then no longer correctly) a decade or so before. Villages had become townships, offering opportunities for anti-tank delaying action which the Germans and the British had been quick to seize, developing tactical practices already referred to which had much in common. Operating in small and inconspic-uous detachments, with Milan
ATGW
and the recently introduced (and long overdue) replacement for the Carl Gttstav recoilless rifle, the British had shown a special aptitude for what they called ‘sponge’ tactics. It was remarkable how regularly distributed the villages and small townships of Niedersachsen were, with groups of habitations separated from each other by some 3,000 metres. The British practice, which was very like that of the German Jagd Kommandos, was to install a platoon of infantry, organized to man two Milan
ATGW
and otherwise armed only to protect itself, in the last houses of the village, with another village similarly garrisoned, very little further away than the effective range of a Milan missile, which was about 2,000 metres. The leading tanks of a Soviet column would be allowed through unmolested. The third, or fifth, or seventh would be attacked and destroyed with the first shot. If
BMP
were far up with the leading tanks, several of these would be sent up in flames as well. Before an effective clearance operation could be mounted against it the
NATO
platoon would then be withdrawn, perhaps by a previously reconnoitred route, for similar action in the next village. It was here that the German Jagd Kommandos were particularly effective, for most of the men in them were locally resident reservists.