The Third World War (36 page)

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feature in the balance of power. This placed a high premium on maintaining the.Allied technological lead. It also demanded attention to methods of improving the effectiveness of the amalgam of national air forces through better standardization of their weapons and tactics and of their engineering and logistic support. These were not easy aims to achieve, for a variety of national reasons, and progress—though happily considerable by 1985—had been slow and painful.

The
NATO
air forces in the Central Region were made up of two tactical air forces, 2
ATAF
associated with the Northern Army Group and 4
ATAF
with the Central Army Group. This structure was a hangover from the occupation of Germany after the Second World War. Its appropriateness came into question in the late sixties and early seventies. The problem was resolved in 1974, when an overall United States Air Commander(
COMAAFCE
) was established, with his own headquarters, to exercise central control of Allied air power at the highest level of air command in order to exploit the flexibility and concentration of the numerically inferior Allied air forces.
COMAAFCE
was responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, Central Region (ClNCENT).and his two immediate subordinates were the commanders of 2 and 4
ATAF
who retained, in peacetime at least, the same close contact with the army groups.

On the other side of the Iron Curtain we have seen how, during the 1970s, the Russians had developed a more sophisticated concept of air power. What had once been an air arm with very narrow aims, and an almost exclusively battlefield role, had evolved into an air force as the West understood the term.
COMAAFCE
saw the need to organize his air forces so as to counter this increased threat, while still being able to support the defensive land battle in the critical phase before full reinforcements arrived. He also saw the difficulties. Land and air commanders were agreed on the immediate, full-blooded use of air power in the first hours of an offensive. They saw it as a strategic task of the first importance to identify and slow the enemy^s main thrusts on the ground. At the same time,
COMAAFCE
realized better than anyone that the success or failure of this plan would depend on the security of his air bases. In particular, his mind often dwelt on the fact that the bases from which 2
ATAF
operated were uncomfortably far forward.

On the other hand, he felt confident about his assessment of the enemy’s air objective, in a surge offensive with the initiative, and with an overall advantage in numbers of more than two to one, it was dangerous and misleading to think much in terms of what the enemy’s priorities might be—the Warsaw Pact would probably do everything they could do in the air, and would do it all at once. They would want to neutralize the Allied nuclear strike capability in the theatre; they would aim to ward off interference with the land battle and to establish a tolerable, and if possible favourable, air situation; they would need to protect their own air bases;

and they would want to put all the weight of air power they could behind their forces on the ground. The prospect was one of air effort, at every level, of an intensity hitherto never experienced.

In the last fifteen years the development of the Soviet Air Forces had stimulated hard thinking and debate among the Allied air commanders and their staffs. This thinking had reinforced the three classic counters to the threat: offensive counter-air operations against the enemy’s bases; engagement in the air; point and area defence.

There had been general agreement among Allied airmen for many years that the most effective way of countering the Soviet air threat lay in ‘taking it out’ at its point of origin—but this, never an easy task, had become steadily more formidable as Soviet defences had advanced. The airfields would be hardened and very well defended. But major developments in fire-suppression missiles, in precision-guided stand-off munitions, and in airfield-crate ring and area-denial weapons gave
COMAAFCE
cause for sober confidence, though he knew that losses would be high. Great improvements had been made in air-to-air capability since the late seventies. Ground-controlled long-range interceptions would still be possible and necessary, especially in the air defence of the United Kingdom and adjacent areas of sea, but the pressure of geography in Central Europe and the short warning time that this would allow, together with the confusion of electronic countermeasures that would reign in the battle zone, pointed to the need for a less rigid and more general air combat capability.
COMAAFCE
was well satisfied that the introduction of the F-15s and F-16s to supplement the F-4 Phantoms had gone a long way to meet the requirement. These were not only very potent aircraft, but had once more the agility and manoeuvrability that had marked the earlier generations of fighters, in addition, attention had been focussed on the need for far more
SAM
and gun defences with a rapid rate of engagement around the air bases, while passive defence measures such as provision of concrete aircraft shelters, command bunkers, and hardened fuel and weapon storage were seen as essentials. Happily, a NATO-wide programme of such improvements had been brought to an advanced state by the spring of 1985.

bers of bomblets. Fortunately, after the improvement programmes of the eighties they had such munitions in abundance.

On the morning of 3 August, as he mused on the characteristics of air power and the battles his aircrew might soon be fighting.
COMAAFCF
came back again and again to a major area of uncertainty. Twenty years earlier, as a squadron commander in Southeast Asia, he had learned about electronic warfare at first hand, and he knew the sort of influence this could exert on all aspects of air war. The Allies were confident of their technological superiority, and especially so in this direction, but their closed society had enabled the Russians to shroud their electronic warfare methods and developments in such secrecy that positive identification of the best ways of countering them might not be available until hostilities were well under way.

These reflections led to thoughts on the past difference between the US and European (primarily British) approaches to the use of tactical air power. In the seventies the US, with great resources in technology and the experience of the Vietnam War behind them, had stressed the importance of suppressing the defences and of elaborate electronic command and control and communications systems. In the European view, however, this was prodigiously expensive, overdependent on technology, and dangerously vulnerable to countermeasures. The US had seen tactical air poweras acentral force for the delivery of massive firepower on clear-cut targets. European airmen, on the other hand, saw it as more important to integrate the tactical air with the land battle, and they thought flexibility would be gained not by close control of aircraft at medium altitudes but from more autonomous and self-reliant procedures with very high sortie rates at very low level.

These divergences sprang naturally from differences in experience and resources, but it had latterly been seen, as in a blinding light, that this diversity in doctrine in fact had a very positive merit in compounding the problems facing the Soviet defences. Moreover, if the Europeans were wrong, they could still ride on the coat-tails of US technology, supplementing the US aerial task forces. And the Americans, realizing that they might be overdependent on one thesis, started to pay more attention to autonomous and low-level operations as a re-insurance without departing from the main theme for the bulk of their air force.

Finally, as he thought about the human equation,
COMAAFCE
felt confident that, in the high standards of their training, his air and ground crews, if put to the test, would be second to none. The stringent tactical evaluation test of the
NATO
air forces over many years of hard practice and training gave him every cause for confidence.

The
RAF
Air Marshal who commanded 2
ATAF
was also reviewing the state of his command—and in the main with satisfaction. The improvements in the last few years had been impressive, and nowhere was this more evident than in the
RAF
elements of his command. In the late 1970s Gordon Lee wrote in the Economist (17 December 1977): ‘Man for man the
RAF
is the finest air force in
NATO
, perhaps even in the world. The finest, that is, in the sense of being the best trained and most professionally skilled.’ If members of the
RAF
, on reading that, had felt, with justification, some pride and even a little compla-cency, it was short-lived; for in the next few lines he went on to say that the same unstinting praise could not be bestowed on all its aircraft and equipment. In fact, there was nothing wrong with the
RAF
in those days that money could not put right. Some money had been made available, and rightly the first tranches had gone to the improvements of the UK. air defence. But by 1982 substantial improvements had also been made to the
RAF
in Germany.

At the time much political capital was made of the intention to increase the front-line strength of
RAF
Germany by 30 percent. Butasan immediate measure the air staff devoted some of the resources to the improvement of current equipment. In this way they had an eye to the likely difficulties of increasing the aircrew numbers.

Jaguar and Harrier aircraft were extensively modified and improved; hardened accommodation with filtered air was provided for all airfield personnel. Six regular and six auxiliary squadrons of the Royal Air Force Regiment were raised to increase the level and quality of ground defences of the main air bases and the Harrier force in the field. The air bases and their aircraft throughout 2
ATAF
would be a much harder nut to crack than would have been the case five years earlier.

But Air Marshal Broadwood, AOC-in-C 2
ATAF
, had one matter on his mind that caused him great anxiety. In the late seventies, for reasons that have been explained elsewhere (see Chapter 19). the aircrew strength of the
RAF
had fallen very low. It had not been possible to recover entirely from that situation by 1985 because of the years it takes to turn suitable young men into combat-ready pilots. As a result, the ratio of aircrew to aircraft in
RAF
Germany in 1985 was still the lowest for any of the national air forces in the Central Region. The essential aggressiveness and skills were there in abundance; the worry was how long they could be maintained in intensive operations with high losses and insufficient rest.

The steadily increasing tension in the Alliance, followed by general mobilization, had given sufficient time for the air forces to reach a full war posture. By midnight on 3 August. 90 per cent of the aircraft of the Allied Air Forces Central Europe (
AAFCE
) were clocked up on the operations centre tote boards as serviceable. armed, and protected in their concrete aircraft shelters. During the previous week the US bases in continental Europe and the UK had received a continuous stream of reinforcement aircraft flown across the Atlantic. As a
USAF
general.
COMAAFCE
was delighted that the American reinforcement of Europe via the Atlantic air bridge had gone so smoothly. All the same, he still had much to ponder. He was well satisfied with the rate of aircraft generation and reinforcement, but the numerical advantage still lay with the Warsaw Pact by something in the order of two to one; and although the Pact could not now achieve tactical surprise, it could still enjoy the great advantage of calling the first shots. Moreover,
SACEUR
had ordered that 20 per cent of the nuclear-capable aircraft should be held in reserve. Clearly this had to be done, but it did not help him in the numbers game.

For the previous four days,
NATO
early warning had been affected by electronic interference from the other side of the German border. This was not unusual. It had been experienced increasingly during the current Warsaw Pact military manoeuvres and the early hours of 4 August showed no change. At 0345
COMAAFCE
was woken from a fitful sleep in his command bunker in the Central Region’s war headquarters to be told of threatening developments on the other side of the border. Minutes later he reached his war room where the German Air Force (
GAF
) general on duty had positive information of a major Warsaw Pact penetration of
NATO
airspace under cover of heavy
ECM
. The general on duty reported that he had taken the initial war measures and aircraft were already being scrambled. Within another few minutes, reports of attacks on the Alliance missile belts, air defence radars and air bases began to come in. The war had begun.

Looking back when it was all over. surviving aircrew of both sides agreed that the first hours in the air over the Centra! Region had been indescribably chaotic. With the exception of a few grey-haired American colonels-veterans of Southeast Asia—few had ever fired a shot in anger or even heard one. The excitement, the danger and the general confusion of the air battle during the course of 4 August all contributed to what seemed utter chaos. Nevertheless, thanks to years of planning and thought there was in fact a coherent pattern underlying what was happening. A preliminary look at the records suggests that at 0800 hours on 4 August there were no less than 3,000 tactical aircraft airborne over the Central Region. Although the full story of the war must await a detailed analysis of combat reports and assessments, it is possible to describe the general trends at least in outline.

The counter-air offensive on Warsaw Pact airfields was launched the instant
SACEDR
gave authority for Allied aircraft to cross the border. The first aircraft to do so were
USAF
F-Uls and
GAF
and
RAF
Tornados, flying at tree-top level from bases in the United Kingdom and West Germany. The effort was concentrated against airfields in East Germany, and a gratifyingi) high percentage of the aircraft got to their targets Confidence in their ability to get through heavy defences at very low level was immediately established among aircrew and commanders alike, and the very high speeds ot the attacking aircraft at heights often below sixty metres undoubtedly achieved tactical surprise. The few engagements by Warsaw Pact fighters suggested a lack of confidence at ultra-low level and possible some short-comings in their look-down radars. It was also evident that the Russians had not solved the vexing problem of operating missiles and fighter aircraft in the same airspace.