The Transfer Agreement (73 page)

The only group available to lead any antitransfer crusade, however, was the discredited Revisionists. The Revisionists knew that while they were indeed voted
persona non grata,
they retained immense popular Jewish support on the question of resisting deals with Germany. The Eighteenth Zionist Congress would disband the next night, September 3. Within hours of the final session, many delegates would have to rush to Geneva in time for Stephen Wise's Second World Jewish Conference. However, there was now such widespread hostility to the reported deals with Germany, there was indeed a strong possibility that in the final hour of the final session a Revisionist-led minority resolution rescinding the Transfer Agreement could be voted through. The likelihood of that actually happening would be forecast at the upcoming Political Committee meeting, where final party positions on the transfer would be outlined.

The Political Committee was called to order at eight-thirty that evening, September 2
Transfer opponents were not disappointed. Dr. Israel Wald-mann of the Radical Zionists said that his party had concluded the agreement was "dangerous" and had to be rescinded. But the Radicals insisted rescission be handled in a way that would not disgrace the Zionist movement. "In view of all the complications," Waldmann said, "we would be satisfied if [a secret] internal resolution were passed asking the Actions Committee at its next meeting to instruct the Anglo-Palestine Bank to withdraw from the agreement." Meir Grossman countered, "We will insist on an open resolution at the Congress against the agreement, and disavowing ... negotiations with the German government."
¹¹

Mapai members of the committee staunchly defended the transfer. They maintained that the boycott, even the German crisis itself, was secondary to the needs of Palestine. Palestine represented a historic obligation. The boycott and the German crisis were transient. Berl Katznelson summed up this way: "We must save Jews of Germany, and their property, and arrange their transfer to Palestine. Therefore, all the discussion and excitement about the Transfer Agreement is misplaced. The anti-Hitler boycott is a means to a goal-not a goal in itself."
¹²

Rabbi Cziransky, from Poland, supported Grossman's view: "In addition to thinking of German Jewry, we must also consider Jews in other countries, where Hitlerism may develop. Therefore, the Transfer Agreement and the negotiations with the present German government must be condemned by the Congress in the strongest possible manner. Polish and world Jewry will regard this as a national betrayal!"
¹³

Stephen Wise declared that world opinion was absolutely hostile to the agreement and adamantly for the boycott, and this could not be disregarded.
He absolutely rejected Mapai's position that the need to settle Palestine took precedence over every other facet of Jewish life, including the boycott. Wise warned that this was only the beginning: "We have opened the door." The Agreement would be "followed up by all kinds of filth, and advantage will be taken of the
abmachung
[deal]." It would divide the very integrity of the anti-Hitler "Jewish front." Wise insisted the Congress pass a "definite and unequivocal resolution against the Agreement."
¹⁴

Hoofien answered the critics, especially those who blamed Anglo-Palestine. He emphatically denied that the bank or manager George Halperin were even indirectly involved with the orange deal. As for the Transfer Agreement,
It is not true that the bank negotiated with the German government on its own account. The initiative was taken by representatives of German Zionism and various Palestinian interests. The bank did not wish to be involved in a political issue." But ultimately, Hoofien conceded, he was willing to get out, if only someone could get him out without embarassing condemnations.
"If
the proper organ did decide against the Agreement," Hoofien said, "the bank would certainly withdraw, but it would be inadvisable to refer to the bank in any resolutions put to Congress."
¹⁵

Dr. Ruppin protested,
If the Congress does revoke the agreement, it will be assuming a very heavy responsibility; it will endanger the existence of many German Jews. The Transfer Agreement in no way interferes with the boycott movement, since no new currency will flow into Germany as a result of the agreement .... Abolition ... would also endanger the existence of the Zionist institutions in Germany, as well as facilities for emigration from Germany." Everything would be lost, he tried to explain.
¹⁶

The tide suddenly turned when Ruppin dropped the cover story they had all been maintaining that kept the Zionist Executive out of the picture, and thereby avoided the question of Congress approval. He finally admitted it: "The negotiations were conducted with the knowledge of the Executive. Senator was fully aware of all that had been done." This disclosure now placed the agreement squarely within the authority of the Congress.
¹⁷

Then came Professor Selig Brodetsky's turn. Brodetsky, the transfer liaison in London, was finally prepared to make a difficult statement. He tried to re-create how the best of motives had been in all their hearts as the Zionist movement was torn between the instinct to fight Hitler and the need to negotiate. "Many people [in April 1933] were anxious to involve the Zionist Organization in the boycott movement," he recalled. "But all parties held different opinions as to the advisability of the boycott.
If direct negotiations could be entered into with the German government with regard to the position of German Jews, very few people would object."
¹⁸

Brodetsky then explained how the Zionist Executive had been overtaken by events. "When Mr. Cohen visited London in May, the draft agreement was nearly completed, and the question was not whether he
should
or
should not
go on, but whether it should remain an agreement with a private plantation organization, or whether wider interests should be included." He then admitted, "The responsibilitiy of the Executive was therefore somewhat different from that which could be implied from our earlier speeches.
¹⁹

"[We] had to face the dilemma as to whether it was more important to enable more Jews to leave Germany with some of their property for Palestine, or whether on balance the agreement should be revoked in view of its conflict with the boycott movement." And then he said it: "On the whole, it would be best if the bank would withdraw from the agreement."
²⁰

Meir Grossman, having heard Brodetsky's solemn words, declared the Revisionists would move that the Congress adopt an explicit resolution of nullification. He and Stephen Wise presented the text: "As long as the Jews of Germany have not received their former legal rights again, and as long as the German government does not ... enable Jews the right of free emigration including taking all their property, the Zionist Congress considers it inadmissible that . . . the Zionist Organization or its subordinate institutions (such as the Anglo-Palestine Bank] sign any agreement of any kind with the present German government."
²¹
The resolution drafted by Grossman and Wise incorporated the quintessential strategy of Moses: "Let my people go, with all their possessions, and the plagues shall not stop until you do."

But Mapai's top echelon stiffened. Mapai political leader Moshe Shertok (Sharett), who later became Israel's foreign minister, decried the entire conversation. "It has been suggested that negotiations were conducted with the consent of the Executive. This is not true," rebutted Shertok. "The Jerusalem Executive certainly never considered the question, and it was officially informed only on the very eve of the close of the agreement." He deplored even the suggestion of a conflict between the interests of Palestine and the Diaspora. Shertok declared that if the agreement could in fact facilitate the transfer of German Jewish property to Palestine, and enable Jews to settle in Eretz Yisrael, then it could not be interfered with.
²²

A Mapai resolution was set forth: "The Congress refers to the Actions Committee for careful examination the question of the Agreement with the German government for the transfer of Jewish capital to Palestine, with an instruction that nothing shall be done . . . contrary to the attitude of the Congress on the German Jewish question."
²³
The "attitude of the Congress" was the majority resolution passed the night of August 24 that declared Zionism and emigration to Palestine as the appropriate reaction to the Hitler regime.

With Stephen Wise and Brodetsky against the transfer, a large sector of the General Zionists were now ready to renounce the agreement. The Radi
cal
Zionists were on record as desiring the agreement's abolition if it could be done discreetly. The Revisionist and Mizrachi antagonism toward the agreement was well known. And even such notables as Leo Motzkin had finally decided the agreement was bad. In fact, Motzkin was now determined to attend Wise's boycott conference in Geneva as soon as the Prague Congress ended.
²⁴

Mapai knew they were becoming isolated on the issue. The Transfer Agreement could indeed be repudiated the next day at the final Congress session. In the absence of a Transfer Agreement, there could only be boycott, and boycott meant the return of Revisionism.
It could not be allowed.

Mapai had one more resolution they could wield.
It was introduced that Saturday night, September
2,
at the
9:00 P.M.
general session. The new resolution stated that as part of Zionist discipline, no individual or group within the Zionist Organization would be permitted to conduct foreign policy, contact foreign governments or the League of Nations, or engage in any activities of a political nature that infringed on the prerogatives of the Zionist Executive. This outlawed all forms of anti-Nazi protest, including campaigning against the Transfer Agreement. Under the resolution, all those who broke the discipline provisions would be suspended and tried by a special tribunal. Upon a guilty verdict, the tribunal would
be
empowered to expel the person or party from the Zionist Organization.
²⁵

The delegates reacted to Mapai's discipline resolution with a storm of outrage. Members of all other parties filled the hall with loud protests and accusatory declarations. The battle raged for hours as the Revisionists and others tried to prevent a vote. But Mapai held on with their
44
percent and with a few allies in other parties.

At some weary moment during the night, Mapai called for a vote. Some said it was
3:00 A.M.
Some said it was after dawn. The delegates had been without sleep, they were hungry, they were worn out. No one could tell how many delegates even knew the vote was being taken. Mapai's discipline resolution was carried. Out of
300
delegates,
152
voted for the resolution,
13
against.
²⁶
Mapai won.

On September
3, 1933,
at
4:30 P.M.,
the final session of the Eighteenth Zionist Congress began for
300
delegates plus alternates, disputed representatives, special participants, and observers. They had train and boat tickets in their pockets, too much bloodshot in their eyes, and precious little patience in their dispositions. Many came from Zionist strongholds in the United States, Poland, and France. But many also came from remote Zionist enclaves in Chile, Yemen, and Hong Kong. In the hall, the delegates spoke twenty or thirty different languages, often all at once. Even the official proceedings were conducted in at least three languages. The delegates had varying levels of sophistication. Some were true believers. Some were skeptics. Some demanded to lead. Some wanted only to follow. But whether dark-skinned or fair, Asian or European, powerful or inconspicuous, they all had one thing in common. Each had one vote.

On this last day, all the untied strings had to be knotted. The Congress was more than a forum for debate about the Hitler crisis. Russian anti Semitism, immigration certificates for Yemenites, land prices in Palestine, dialogue with Arab leaders, training facilities for halutzim, agricultural experiments on kibbutzim, loan agreements with London banks, reorganization of the Jewish Agency, relations with non-Zionists, the Palestinian school system, Sabbath enforcement —there were a hundred pressing emergencies. Most delegates concerned themselves with one or two or five or six of the emergencies, and merely voted in blocs on other issues.

On this last day, the many special commissions and committees that had been deliberating for days on each and every pressing issue would finally present their recommendations to the plenum. The custom was for these voluminous resolutions to be read in rapid succession for lightning votes designed to get the overworked, overspent delegates out of the hall and back to wherever was home.

As in other years, the various commission, committee, and subcommittee chairmen read their long, complicated resolutions on everything from budget allocations to religious questions. With record impatience, the delegates ayed and ayed, sending resolution after resolution into the statute books. However, even the debate-battered Zionist delegates in their last hours could not help but withhold their vote and demand discussion when strange and unexpected resolutions began appearing. The first unexpected resolution was a subtle change in the Zionist Organization's constitution that permitted the Actions Committee to convene subsequent congresses at three-year intervals instead of biannually. The assembly argued this radical change long and hard, but in the end Mapai's votes carried the resolution.
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