The War Within (28 page)

The former president said he didn't want Gates to leave Texas A&M. But at the same time, he said, "This would be a great thing for you to do."

* * *

In the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon, the Council of Colonels was aggressively chipping away at the Iraq riddle, pulling 12-hour workdays, usually heading home long into the evening darkness. Greenwood drove back to his house in Arlington. Mansoor headed north to the spare bedroom in Silver Spring. McMaster took the Metro subway to a hotel in downtown Washington.

The colonels eventually pieced together slides to present to the chiefs. One dealt with "understanding the operating environment." Among the bullet points: There was a layered, hydra-headed insurgency; sectarian violence remained on the rise in the form of ethnic cleansing; Sunnis often regarded the Iraqi army as a Shia militia; and the Iraqi government was plagued by corruption, ineptitude and sectarian bias.

The presentation included a hard look at the strategy of the various enemies. Their goals, the colonels had concluded, were to expel coalition forces, weaken the fledgling Iraqi government, prevent political reconciliation, attack symbolic targets in order to incite sectarian violence, and make ordinary Iraqis feel perpetually insecure.

As their next tank meeting with the Joint Chiefs approached, the colonels drew up a list of "trends and impediments"

in Iraq. While some members of the group saw more hope than others, the overall sense was that the United States was facing a quandary. They agreed that Greenwood would brief the group's solemn findings to the chiefs. Some of his peers seemed nervous for him. "They're going to skewer you," one told him.

"They wanted the truth," Greenwood replied.

The time allotted for the Monday, November 3, session in the tank was shorter than usual. Greenwood knew he would have to speak fast.

The chiefs sat silently as he pulled up a slide on the screen behind him: "Six major trends." Each was negative.

1. Our current strategy is not working.

2. The government of Iraq is unable to produce tangible and credible results in the eyes of the Iraqi people.

3. Iraqi security forces remain weak and ineffective.

4. Ethnic and sectarian conflict is increasing.

5. The rule of law is lacking.

6. Economic progress is lacking.

Greenwood moved quickly on to the three major impediments to progress the colonels had identified. They were direct and harsh.

First, he said, until we acknowledge that we are in the middle of a complex insurgency and a low-level civil war, our nation will not come to grips with the true character and nature of the conflict. This was necessary, Greenwood said, to promote and facilitate an honest discourse.

Second, we have a short-war mentality and a short-war strategy that are ill matched to the long war that we are in.

And finally, after three years of sacrifice the United States is running out of time. As the invading foreign power, the burden is on us to win or at least show credible progress in Iraq.

Because this is not happening at a rate that is convincing to the Iraqi people, the American people or the international community, Greenwood said, "Our group thinks we are losing in Iraq today."

He had typed a final phrase in capital letters across the bottom of the last slide:

"WE ARE NOT WINNING, SO WE ARE LOSING"

The chiefs looked on in silence. None of them suggested anything different.

Chairman Pace had an unusual sullen look on his face, almost crestfallen, as if to say, "How could I have not realized this?"

* * *

On Sunday, November 5, Bush welcomed Gates to his ranch in Crawford, Texas, for a one-on-one meeting. Gates arrived quietly and met the president in his private study adjacent to the main house, where a crowd of guests had gathered to celebrate Laura Bush's 60th birthday.

Gates had met the president only in passing during the first Bush administration and he had once had his picture taken with Governor Bush at the Texas Capitol.

He was an obvious and yet surprising choice for defense secretary. With nearly three decades of experience in the CIA and on the National Security Council staff, he was very much a government man. But he also had an independent and irreverent streak.

In his 1996 memoir,
From the Shadows,
written when it seemed his days in public life were over, he wrote, "I would ultimately work in the White House for four presidents, and I saw it allÖ. Intrigue. Back-stabbing. Ruthless ambition. Constant conflict. Informers. Leakers. SpiesÖ. Egos as big as the surrounding monuments. Battles between Titans. Cabinet officers behaving like children. High-level temper tantrums."

One of Gates's closest associates was Brent Scowcroft, who had served as national security adviser to the first President Bush from 1989 to 1993. Gates had been Scowcroft's deputy for two of those years, and together they oversaw a pragmatic, nonideological foreign policy. To invite Gates into the inner circle now was a nod to that old school of foreign policy, practiced by the president's father and by Scowcroft, a fierce critic of the Iraq War. Theirs was a more rigorous, cautious style in which war had been the last resort.

"He worked in, you know, Dad's administration, but I didn't know him that well," the president later told me.

"Anyway, we sat down and just visited. And I like to, you know, talk to people about their background and just get a sense for who they are as a personÖwhen you ask them questions about their families, how they react to the questions."

He said that he told Gates, "We're in the middle of a war, and I need your leadership. What we have been doing is not working. We're going to change our strategy. I need a new face. Would you be interested?"

Gates said he was interested.

"We've got to make some changes in our strategy," the president said of Iraq. "We've got to change our approach."

Gates agreed. But he told the president he had several concerns beyond Iraq. First, the Army was too small for the missions being required of it. Second, he felt they had pulled a bait-and-switch on the National Guard; many of its members had signed up as part of the strategic reserve for national emergencies, but it had been transformed into an operational force with regular deployments. Third, the Pentagon was buying equipment suited to the Cold War, when what the U.S. military needed was equipment for the kind of antiterrorism and counterinsurgency conflicts it was facing now.

"After a little more discussion," Bush recalled, "I said, 'Fine. I'm offering you the job.'"

Gates accepted on the spot. "I think he was intrigued by the opportunity," Bush said.

The president asked Gates what he thought about the idea of a surge in forces to Iraq. Gates told him that he could support an increase, though he believed it should be tied to Iraqi performance.

"He said he thought that would be a good idea," Bush recalled. "So what I'm beginning to get is a man who is competent, who has a track record, knows Washington, recognizes we need a new strategyÖbecause at this point in time, in November, I'm beginning to think about not fewer troops, but more troops. And, interestingly enough, the man I'm talking to in Crawford feels the same way."

Bush said he told Gates that day in Crawford, "Life may be hard" as defense secretary, "but this is a chance to make history."

* * *

In the Pentagon the next week, the 16 colonels and Navy captains continued to grapple with Iraq. They debated a list of possible strategic options, which Colonel Greenwood would later brief to the chiefs. Among them: 1.
Go Big/Full Court Press.
A large increase in troops, perhaps several hundred thousand, in order to "overmatch"

the enemy and break the cycle of sectarian and insurgent violence. Colonel McMaster was an outspoken advocate of the option, though many colonels rejected the idea on the grounds that there were not enough available U.S. forces and that the Iraqi forces were not effective enough.

2.
Go Long/Extended Presence.
Commit to keeping a sizable number of troops for years, perhaps even a decade, in order to create a stable and competent Iraqi army. Colonel Mansoor and a few others strongly backed this option.

3.
Go Home.
A swift withdrawal of U.S. troops. Though a few colonels leaned toward this option, most agreed it could leave Iraq in a full-blown civil war.

4.
Enclave Strategy.
Walling off and separating certain areas to control comings and goings and to maintain peace.

5.
Partitioning.
Splitting up the country into distinct regions based on ethnic/sectarian identity.

6.
Gradual Withdrawal.

7.
Combinations of the Above Strategies.

* * *

"With 10 Iraqi divisions and 15 U.S.-coalition brigades," said General Schoomaker, the Army chief, "it is hard for me to imagine that we don't have enough troops."

"Can we shopping-cart the options?" Pace asked, suggesting that they pick parts from several of them.

But there wasn't a lot of enthusiasm for that, considering that the current strategy seemed to have been cobbled together in much the same way.

* * *

On November 6, the day before the election, Rumsfeld sent a SECRET memo to the White House. "In my view it is time for a major adjustment," he said, stating what had become almost a consensus within the administration. "Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough." He listed some possible options: "an accelerated draw-down"; a withdrawal of U.S. forces from vulnerable positions and patrols; or providing money to key political and religious leaders, as Saddam had done. He added, "Announce that whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is doing so on a trial basis. This will give us the ability to readjust and move to another course, if necessary, and therefore not 'lose.'"

Rumsfeld wrote that the "less attractive options" included continuing on the current path, moving "a large fraction of all U.S. forces into Baghdad to attempt to control it," increasing U.S. forces "substantially," or finally setting a "firm withdrawal date." He was all over the map.

* * *

That same day Bush asked Cheney to stay behind after an Oval Office meeting. They walked down the little hallway to the president's private dining room.

"I've decided to replace Rumsfeld," the president said.

With whom? Cheney asked, knowing that Bush wouldn't make such a move without a replacement lined up.

"It's going to be Bob Gates," Bush said. He wanted Cheney to know, but the vice president was not to talk about it or say anything to anybody.

"Well, Mr. President," Cheney said. "I disagree, but obviously it's your call."

Cheney was disappointed. Rumsfeld certainly was carrying a lot of baggage, he thought, but hell, so was he. But he could tell the president's decision was final.

Cheney knew the president's style. He would call Rumsfeld "a good guy," a "friend" and a "professional" with vast experience who worked tirelessly. Bush wouldn't want anyone to "dis"ódisrespectóRumsfeld or portray him as the villain. They would dress up the matter carefully, giving the secretary a dignified send-off at the Pentagon with as much pomp and ceremony as could be mustered. Cheney would be able to declare publicly that Rumsfeld had been

"the finest secretary of defense this nation has ever had." It would be another soft landing. The focus on Rumsfeld's accomplishment would also spare the president. There would be no assigning blame or speaking of failure.

* * *

On Tuesday, November 7, the Democrats won the midterm congressional elections, taking control of the House and Senate. The next afternoon, the president dropped his bomb: Rumsfeld was out, and Gates was taking his place.

Republicans in Congress, who had just lost their long-held leadership positions, were furious. "I wanted to throw the breakfast dishes through the TV," said Representative Peter Hoekstra, the Michigan Republican who lost the chairmanship of the House Intelligence Committee. Like many Republicans, although they would not say so publicly, he felt that if Bush had fired the unpopular Rumsfeld weeks before, it would have helped Republicans in tight races. Some Republican stalwarts began looking for a way to jump ship on Bush's Iraq policy, though it was unclear where or to whom they might jump.

When I asked the president two years later, he said he had thought his party would retain control of the Senate in the midterm elections. But he did not attribute the losses to the Iraq War alone. Rather, he said, the rash of Republican scandals had played as big a role. "I considered it as much a vote on people not being honest. Some of our members were being indicted. Some of our members went to jail. Some of our members resigned from the House for a variety of reasons.

"And I'm out there campaigning in safe seats."

* * *

On November 8, Hadley reported on his firsthand look at Iraq. In a five-page SECRET memo, which later leaked to the press, Hadley wrote, "The reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action."

One course of action Hadley recommended was "Ask Secretary of Defense and General Casey to make a recommendation about whether more forces are needed in Baghdad."

* * *

The colonels met again with the chiefs on Thursday, November 9, a session designed to prep Pace for a White House meeting the next day with Bush, to discuss what Pace described as "an unscripted way ahead" in Iraq. Rumsfeld and Hadley were expected to present memos. Pace said he was inclined to show some of the colonels' strategic options.

But he tossed out several, including Go Home. Everyone knew the president wouldn't consider anything that suggested losing, or cutting and running.

* * *

On the morning of Friday, November 10, Bush called Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, Hadley, Pace, thenñDirector of National Intelligence John Negroponte and Hadley's deputy, J. D. Crouch, into the Oval Office. They were to begin a formal review of Iraq strategy, the president said.