The War Within (36 page)

It was a true cry from the heart from one of the old Bush senior handsóone that Jim Baker no doubt felt but could not make publicly. Noonan wrote of the current President Bush: "If he suffers, they might tell us; it would make him seem more normal, which is always a heartening thing to see in a president. But maybe there is no suffering. Maybe he outsources suffering. Maybe he leaves it to his father."

Chapter 26

B
ob Gates headed to the Senate on Tuesday, December 5, for his confirmation hearing.

"Mr. Gates," asked Senator Carl Levin, the Michigan Democrat who would soon take over as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, "do you believe that we are currently winning in Iraq?"

"No, sir," Gates said, realizing he was going out on a limb.

Soon, it was John McCain's turn. "Do you agree," he asked, "that at the time of the invasion, we didn't have sufficient troops to control the country, in hindsight?"

"I suspect, in hindsight," Gates said, "some of the folks in the administration probably would not make the same decisions that they made. And I think one of those is that there clearly were insufficient troops in Iraq after the initial invasion to establish control over the country."

When I later asked the president whether he should have sent more troops earlier, he said only that history would have to judge and that "I haven't spent a lot of time analyzing whether more troops in 2003" would have changed the situation.

In the confirmation hearing, McCain pointed out that while the situation continued to deteriorate, Abizaid and Casey kept insisting that there were a sufficient number of troops. How could that be?

"Senator," Gates replied, "I was a part of the Iraq Study GroupÖI would tell you that when we were in Iraq that we inquired of the commanders whether they had enough troops and whether a significant increase might be necessary.

And I would say that the answer we received was that they thought they had adequate troopsÖthe response that we received in Baghdad was that they had enough troops."

Later, Senator Hillary Clinton, on the verge of announcing her presidential bid, asked Gates, "Can you tell us when and how you came to the conclusion that you expressed in your testimony, that we were not winningóa conclusion different from the president's?"

"I think that, frankly, if the president thought that the current tactics and strategy that we were employing were successful, he wouldn't be looking for fresh eyes and looking for new approaches and new tactics in our situation in Iraq," Gates said. "I suppose that I came to that conclusion during my service on the Iraq Study Group, which was really the first time I'd had the opportunity to look at some of these circumstances in detail."

"We have this conundrum," Clinton continued. "We have a president and a vice president who will ultimately decideóas the president is fond of saying, he is the decideróabout the direction to pursue going forward in Iraq. And it is quite frustrating to many of us to see the mistakes that have been madeósome of which you have enumeratedóand to wonder whether there is any change that will be pursued by the president. Do you have an opinion as to how and when the process will occur that might lead to some changes in options and strategies?"

"My sense, Senator Clinton," said Gates, "is that that this process is going to proceed with considerable urgency."

* * *

Their report complete after eight months of work, the Iraq Study Group members met privately with President Bush just after sunrise on Wednesday, December 6, in the Cabinet Room of the White House.

Baker and Hamilton summarized the unanimous report, subtitled "The Way ForwardóA New Approach," which urged a drawdown of troops with the goal of having all combat brigades not necessary for protecting a smaller U.S.

contingent out of Iraq by the first quarter of 2008. In addition, the group recommended a diplomatic initiative, including talks with Iran and Syria.

"Mr. President," Panetta said, "you've got the work of five Democrats and five Republicans who've tried to come to a consensus here, and it's really important to look at these recommendations. I don't know of any president that can conduct a war with a divided nation. This gives you at least the opportunity to try to begin to repair the divisions that have taken place and try to unify the country."

Bush nodded but didn't say anything.

When Chuck Robb had a chance to speak, he noted that the report said, "We could, however, support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad."

After all the members had spoken, reporters and photographers were ushered into the Cabinet Room at 7:58 A.M.

"I just received the Iraq Study Group report, prepared by a distinguished panel of our fellow citizens," the president said. "We will take every proposal seriously." He noted that he probably would not agree with all of its 79

recommendations. "It, nevertheless, is an opportunity to come together and to work together on this important issue.

The country, in my judgment, is tired of pure political bickering that happens in Washington, and they understand that on this important issue of war and peace, it is best for our country to work together.

"This report will give us all an opportunity to find common ground, for the good of the countryónot for the good of the Republican Party or the Democrat Party, but for the good of the country." It was perhaps the strongest bipartisan statement Bush had made since the invasion of Iraq. He was effusive in his praise of the study group members. "You could be doing a lot of other things. You could have had a lot more simple life than to allow your government to call you back into service, but you did allow us to call you back into service, and you've made a vital contribution to the countryÖ. We applaud your work."

He's going to accept our ideas, Perry thought.

As Bush was leaving the Cabinet Room, Robb again urged that he consider the provision supporting a "surge." A smile stretched across Bush's face, and he promised that he indeed would.

Bush said later that he understood that it was Robb who had first voiced the concept of the surge months earlier.

Robb, he recalled, "was very encouraging, and during the meetings, he would sayóhe's a kind guyó'Hang in there, Mr. President.' He was the kind of person that was hoping we'd succeed."

The news media treated the release of the Iraq Study Group report as if it might mark a turning point in the war. "Iraq Panel Proposes a Major Strategy Shift,"
The Washington Post
said. "Panel Urges Basic Shift in U.S. Policy in Iraq,"

read the headline in
The New York Times.

"This was such a sobering report!" said Tim Russert, NBC News Washington bureau chief. "Powerful, passionate, bipartisan, unanimousóI think it's not only a wake-up call for the Bush White House, but I think for the whole country."

"There's almost a biblical thing about wise elderly people," added Representative Frank Wolf, the Virginia Republican whose idea it had been to create the study group. "They can speak truth."

* * *

Hadley realized that the president was going to go with the surge. It was the only option that seemed to offer a bold change. Talk of an exit seemed absurd to Bush. The Iraq Study Group's ability to turn the tide in any other direction was neutralized because the members unanimously agreed that they could support a "short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces." So Hadley continued his deliberate strategy to bend the Iraqi and U.S.

governments to Bush's will. But there were obstacles.

First, Maliki wasn't on board. His most recent position, at his November 30 meeting with the president in Amman, Jordan, had been "I don't need your forces. We can do it ourselves. We should do it ourselves."

A second obstacle was the military. With Rumsfeld finally out, they would have to make sure Gates continued to support a surge. But Casey remained opposed. He and Abizaid would have to be replaced. The Joint Chiefs and their Council of Colonels were a problem, but Hadley knew he could sway General Pace by making it clear to the chairman what the commander in chief wanted.

A third obstacle, a formidable one, was Rice. In Hadley's view, she had fallen under the spell of her advisers, Zelikow and Satterfield, and their idea of stepping back. Both he and the president would have to work hard to get her to drop her resistance.

* * *

On December 7, Pace came to the White House for a private meeting with Hadley. Gates had been confirmed by the Senate the day before by a vote of 95 to 2 but would not be sworn in for about ten days so he could attend a graduation ceremony at Texas A&M before resigning as university president. Hadley was acting as the de facto secretary of defense.

"We have a strategy to win," Pace said defensively. "Most of the military actions we need to execute this strategy to win are already going on. They've come from our review. And they will look different to the American people."

He knew that the president wanted something different and visible. "But a lot of them are already going on in things that George Casey is already doing," he said. "They just haven't gotten the visibility, and they haven't been part of an integrated whole." For example, they are going to transition more of the provinces to Iraqi control, he said. Casey has been identifying U.S. brigades already in Iraq that could be moved to Baghdad for "an internal surge." All of this

"has been approved by George [Casey] up through the chain and approved at the top. On the military side, we need to factor in what the Iraqis must do and what we need to do to support them if they're going to succeed."

More than three and a half years into the war, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs felt he needed to tell the president's national security adviser that he was not a naysayer.

"We are in it to win. We are not in it for a draw," he said, apparently still stung by President Bush's earlier statements that he didn't want the military playing for a tie. Pace said that much of this would depend on the Iraqi political leaders, adding, "Absent Iraqi leaders prepared to step up and do hard things, we can't succeed."

About the proposed surge, Pace said, "It's a military mission. It's got to have an impact. It can succeed. It'll have to be time-limited," meaning they could supply more troops for only a year or so. "It can't go on forever.

"If we can do something in Baghdad, it will have a good impact for both countries. But it must be accompanied by political and security steps. People need to step up. If we do it all together, we have a chance to succeed. And we also need to look at the surge requirement to support the Maliki assault on the Mahdi Army. Five brigades need to move forward. Some are going to have to be kept more than a year in theater."

The Army rotation policy was a one-year tour followed by a year at home. That policy would have to be changed.

Soldiers would have to serve longer tours, and in addition, some brigades would not get a full year at home. "We can't have the active force take the full weight," Pace said. The Reserves would have to do more. "All 34 National Guard brigades have been mobilized. They're supposed to be home for five years before they go back. We may have to break that compact." He said it would take four months to get five more brigades there. "We don't have five equipment sets for five brigades lying around. So they will have to bring the equipment along and some of the equipment now is showing the toll of these deployments. Some of the equipment's broken."

* * *

"How'd it go?" Bush asked Hadley after the meeting with Pace.

"Mr. President, it went pretty well," Hadley said. "They're working the problem."

Bush and Hadley had managedóquite artfully, they thoughtóto circumvent the normal chain of command and get the idea of a five-brigade surge on the table. After all, for all practical purposes, they didn't have a secretary of defense.

Rumsfeld was on his way out, and Gates hadn't yet arrived.

* * *

O'Sullivan was in her element, churning out memos, PowerPoints, charts and options. One SECRET document, circulated to the principals on December 7, showed what Hadley considered an emerging consensus. It still said the goal was "accelerating the transfer of security responsibility to Iraqis"óthe old Casey goalóbut that the United States would have to help the Iraqis quell sectarian violence.

Another five-page SECRET document, "Iraq, the United States and Sectarian Violence," said the agreed-upon facts included a statement that "the Iraqi security forces do not yet have the capability to handle the mission of quelling Iraq's sectarian violence" and if it were turned over to them, even with increased U.S. forces embedded with the Iraqis, the mission "is likely to fail."

Through a maze of "bullish assumptions" and "bearish assumptions" and risk analysis, the issue got down to two propositions. Proposition one was that the United States needed to help Iraqis quell the sectarian violence.

Proposition two was that "the United States should limit its interventions to stop sectarian violence only when the violence threatens to reach Srebrenica-type proportions or greater."

* * *

At the NSC meeting December 8, Rice argued in favor of the second, more limited "proposition two," saying that they should intervene only in extreme cases of sectarian violence. "The Iraqis have to have responsibility. The U.S.

should minimize its role in punishing sectarian violence."

"We need to mitigate the risk so this doesn't become a gamble," the president said.

"Iraq needs to be responsible," Rice went on. "Get them to the point where our role is diminishing."

"Well, it needs to be a slow-motion lateral," Bush said, "as opposed to a fast lateral. Look, the Iraqis need to be responsible. We all agree with that. But the issue is, responsible under what time frame?"

General Pace said that the military could not accept option twoóintervening only in major genocidal actions. They couldn't sit and watch from the outside as sectarian violence raged. From a practical point of view, how would they know what constituted major violence during the middle of a combat situation? Where do you draw that line? We don't work that way, he said. That's not how our folks operate.