The Whale Has Wings Vol 3 - Holding the Barrier (24 page)

The Japanese now had only 6,000 men ashore on Java, with only limited equipment and ammunition.

March 23rd - 24th continued.

As night drew on the two cruiser forces were continuing to manoeuvre for position. The Japanese commander was trying to close on the Allied force for a night torpedo attack. The original orders to the Allies, to get behind the Japanese and shell the invasion convoy, had been rescinded when the Colossus was hit, and on the report that the southern air strike was in progress. So both forces were moving westward, the Allies trying to stay between any enemy force and the burning carrier.

The engineers' report on Colossus was not good; the combination of underwater damage, loss of power and the fires were overwhelming the light carrier, and now only damage control parties remained onboard. It was in this condition that the Japanese cruisers found her. As the enemy force closed, the Allied cruiser force moved to intercept. Not all the Allied cruisers were equipped with radar, or used to working together in night actions, and it had been hoped to draw the Japanese cruisers away so they would be vulnerable in the morning - Somerville had a surprise waiting for them come daybreak. However, the light from the fires burning in the carrier's hanger deck had been spotted, and to allow the remaining crew to be evacuated, the cruisers moved in to the attack.

The first hits were obtained by HMS Exeter at 0030 - her radar had allowed her to be targeting the Haguro for some time, and her third salvo scored on the heavy cruiser. Fires broke out on the Japanese ship, allowing the USS Houston to also target her. The Allied force was roughly equal in gun power, even without the Perth (ordered to Singapore with two destroyers as escort after the heavy torpedo damage she had taken), but the Allies were short of destroyers. Two had been ordered to help take off the Colossus's remaining crew, leaving only five destroyers to the Japanese thirteen. This allowed the Japanese destroyers to close in on the Allied cruiser line and make a torpedo attack (the Japanese ships carried reload torpedoes, allowing them to replace the ones used earlier). They also split off a force of five destroyers, which headed for the Colossus.

The night torpedo attack was from a closer range than the earlier daytime attack, and was more successful. One of the Japanese destroyers was sunk, intercepted by the defending ships, but the remainder managed a launch against the cruisers. The cruiser line was by now heavily engaged in a gun battle with the Japanese cruisers - the Haguro was burning heavily with three turrets out of action as a result of fire from HMS Exeter and USS Houston, and the light cruiser Naka was also in trouble, being targeted by HMS Danae, HMS Dragon and HMAS Hobart, although Danae had also taken a number of hits. HMS Exeter was hit by two of the Long Lance torpedoes, the cruiser hit aft and in her engine spaces. Without propulsion or power, she slowed to a stop, although the forward turrets were still firing manually. USS Houston was barely missed by another torpedo which passed forward of her by a matter of feet. But the small cruiser Danae, the fire from her shell hits making her an easier target, was hit by three of the large torpedoes. She rolled over and sank in less than two minutes, taking most of her crew with her.

While this had been happening, the other Japanese destroyers had closed the carrier. Her damage control parties had been taken off, and the British destroyers watched from a distance as huge plumes of water shot up into the night sky from the stricken carrier, blood red in the light from her fires. Hit by five torpedoes the ship's end was fast, and ten minutes later she had slipped under the waters of the Java Sea.

After the torpedo attack on the cruisers, the Japanese force had no reloads left. Not realising how much damage they had done, they collected their destroyers and headed east. However the night action had drawn them well west of their earlier position, and as they regrouped the captain of the Nachi (now the leader due to damage to the Haguro) was shocked to see four huge waterspouts erupt close to his ship, gleaming white in the moonlight. HMS Warspite had arrived.

The Warspite had used the cover of darkness and her radar to close, and even as the Nachi's commander ordered star shells to be fired, her second half-salvo arrived, straddling the cruiser. The third salvo from Warspite landed a hit from a 15" shell on the Nachi. The heavy shell was barely slowed by the cruiser's armour, smashing through it to wreck her forward engine room. More were to follow, as the Warspite showed just why she was considered one of the best gun ships in the Royal Navy. In less than 15 minutes, Nachi was a helpless burning wreck, already sinking into the Java Sea.

Meanwhile the Allied cruisers had been exchanging fire with the Haguro and the Naka, both of which were already damaged. With only star shell to help either side, fire was inaccurate although Houston took one 8" hit, which temporarily knocked out her A turret. Neither Japanese cruiser was able to retire, and once the Nachi was helpless, Warspite turned both her main and secondary batteries on them. Neither cruiser lasted long.

As a result of the earlier torpedo actions, the only Japanese ship left with torpedoes was one of the destroyers. She had three left, as a result of a failure which had stopped them being launched earlier. As the battleship and cruisers were ignoring the destroyers (they were incapable of doing much damage without torpedoes), she managed to get into position behind the burning Nachi and attempted to launch all three at the Warspite. One torpedo failed to launch again, but the other two were successful. The Warspite was busy engaging the cruisers, and did not see the approach. One of the heavy torpedoes missed her, combing the water ahead of the ship, but the other hit her alongside the bridge. And failed to explode.

With his cruiser force being sunk from under him, the Japanese commander ordered the remaining destroyers to withdraw while the cruisers tried to buy them time - even so the Warspite, firing under radar control, sank one of them as they made their escape.

Somerville's carrier force had been preparing to launch a new strike at the remaining Japanese light carrier. Just before midnight, the British fleet was sighted at long range by one of the Japanese patrol submarines. Although she was too far away to attempt an attack, she radioed a sighting report of 'two large carriers steaming east'. As a result of this, the Taiyo was ordered to turn back and head north - one light carrier, some planes already destroyed, was no match for two fleet carriers, and the reports from the landing site were already indicating there was no invasion fleet left to support.

March 24th

The Japanese begin an intense air and artillery bombardment of Bataan. Luzon-based Japanese Army and Navy aircraft begin a heavy bombardment of Corregidor in support of this, and night air attacks are conducted for the first time.

On Java, the Dutch forces, supported by Stuart tanks and with an Australian brigade in reserve behind them, attacked the Japanese landings. The Japanese fought fiercely but with little hope - they were outnumbered 4:1 and had little heavy equipment or supplies. The situation for them worsened that morning as the Warspite sailed close to the landing areas and started to drop salvoes of 15" shells on their positions. The shock caused by these was so great that many of the infantrymen under bombardment were stunned enough to surrender. The rest of the landing force fought almost to the last man, charging with bayonet and sword when they ran out of ammunition - a foolhardy waste, as the Dutch armour dealt with them easily. It did take two days to clear the landings, but after the morning of the 24th, the final result was never in doubt.

While the landings were being destroyed, the Royal Navy was trying to save its damaged ships. The Exeter had been badly hit by two torpedoes, and even with HMS Dragon aiding her to pump the water out, she was slowly sinking even as she headed for Java. Luckily for her the weather was calm, but she finally limped into Surabaya with her rear deck awash. Sadly, although she had managed to make land, the damage to the small cruiser was so severe that she was declared a total constructive loss. She was however kept manned for some time in case her 8" guns would be needed in defence or to support the army, but this proved unnecessary.

In Malaya, the Japanese advance was still moving south, although slowing fast. Alexander and Blamey were happy with this - the further the Japanese pushed their head into the noose being created for them, the more of them they could destroy. By now virtually the entire Imperial Guards division was through the Australian lines, and an Indian division as well as the 1st Armoured, heavily supported by artillery, was waiting to engage them. Blamey estimated he would close the trap the following day, and hoped that as well as destroying a considerable part of the Japanese force facing him would be in position to drive through the opening and take at least part of the Japanese lines from the rear.

The US and Japanese forces in the Solomon Sea had been searching for each other for some time, both carrier forces having sent out search planes throughout the day, but no contacts were made until late in the afternoon when a Japanese seaplane sights the Lexington. Due to broken clouds, she missed the Enterprise, and only one carrier was reported to Nagumo.

March 24th

North East of New Guinea, the Battle of the Solomon Sea

The US cryptographers had not yet decoded enough of the Japanese signals to decide on the aims of the carrier force northeast of New Guinea. The most likely possibilities were either another attempt at an invasion (covered by carriers) while the Allies were occupied with the simultaneous invasion of Java, or a feint. Given the previous Japanese operations, the most likely option was considered to be invasion, and as a result considerable reconnaissance assets were used to try and locate a transport force. In fact, while such an invasion had indeed been the preferred Japanese plan, a shortage of transport ships had made this impossible. Their plan was to use their carriers to draw off forces that might have been used to attack their Java invasion. Ideally they would degrade them in the process, then after Java was secured, invade New Guinea again.

Although the Allies had more search planes available, the need to search for a supposed second force meant that the Japanese were the first to spot their enemy. A search seaplane from one of the cruisers accompanying the carrier force had spotted the USS Lexington on the afternoon of the 23rd. By the time this had been reported and plotted, it was considered too late (and too far) to make a successful strike that day. Admiral Nagumo therefore ordered any Japanese submarines close enough to intercept the US force to attack, while changing course and speed ready for a dawn attack on the US carriers. Additional search planes would be flown off before first light in order to spot them and lead in the carrier planes.

The US carriers had spotted the Japanese plane on their radar, but the seaplane had manoeuvred cleverly to take advantage of the cloud cover, and the US carriers were unable to vector fighters onto the plane by radar alone (at this stage of the war, US tactical control was still not well practised). The US tactic was to be to send out a wide-ranging patrol before dawn, and be ready to conduct a strike as soon as the Japanese force had been spotted. They were still not certain if the plane that had found them had come from a carrier force or a surface force - seaplanes were known to be carried on the Japanese cruisers, which could be accompanying anything.

Both sides sent off their search planes before dawn. The Japanese were concentrating their effort in the area they expected the US carrier (they still assumed only one carrier was present), while the US search had to cover a wider area (but involved more planes). Nagumo was reluctant to use potential strike planes to supplement the search, and so the Japanese did not find the US carriers again until 1000. In the meantime the US planes were conducting their own search, and spotted a single carrier (the Shokaku) at 1030. This was reported as a fleet carrier. The Japanese were operating the Ryuju some distance away from the main carrier group, and this ship was at the time hidden under some rainsqualls. The two fleet carriers were operating in open order, and as the spotting plane had to dodge into clouds to evade the Zeros protecting the force it is possible both fleet carriers were never seen at the same time. As a result of these successful searches both sides started to ready their strikes; in addition to the extra half hour of warning, the Japanese were again to prove much faster at getting their planes armed and into the air.

The Japanese strike formed up and headed for the US carriers at 1115. It would take them an hour to reach the US ships. Although the Lexington and Enterprise were operating notionally together, they would in fact conduct two separate strikes, as they had not had a chance to train together. Both strikes were on their way before noon, just as the US radar spotted the wave of Japanese aircraft heading towards them.

The Japanese strike consisted of 18 Zero fighters, 36 dive bombers, and 24 torpedo planes. The radar detection allowed the US carriers to clear their decks and hangar decks of explosive and as much inflammable material as possible, in preparation for the coming attack. Eighteen Wildcats had been retained for defence, and all of these were in the air by the time the Japanese closed the carriers. The weather was variable, rainsqualls making it difficult to keep track of both the incoming planes and the manoeuvring carriers, and the Japanese planes (following their earlier reports of only one US carrier being present), missed the Enterprise under one of these squalls. While this was good news for the Enterprise, this meant that the full force of the Japanese attack would fall on the Lexington. The highly experienced Japanese planes split up into their attack formations, allowing the US fighters to attack some of them before their protecting Zeroes could get into position. While this was happening the USN ships had formed their close defensive formation, allowing them to concentrate their fire on the incoming planes.

The defending fighters managed to shoot down five Zeros and eight of the torpedo planes (as well as disrupting the torpedo planes' attacks), however twelve of the Wildcats were lost in this and the following dogfights. As a result of these actions, and the heavy AA gunfire from the mutually supporting US warships, only one torpedo hit the Lexington. The large carrier absorbed the damage without too much obvious effect, the torpedo damage fortunately forward of her machinery spaces.

Unfortunately concentrating on the torpedo planes meant that the dive bombers had been able to make their attack opposed only by the US AA fire. While the AA suites of the USN ships had been increased from some years ago, it was still considered light by RN standards, and only three dive bombers were destroyed during the attack. The remaining planes launched their 250kg bombs from near-vertical dives onto the Lexington. While the carrier's size had helped her absorb the torpedo damage, her poor manoeuvrability made it more difficult to evade the bombs. The Lexington was hit by four of them, and took serious underwater damage from a number of near misses. The planes left the carrier burning fiercely and covered in a huge plume of black smoke.

The cautious Nagumu had been holding the Ryuju's small air group in reserve; his intention had been to use it to finish off any US carrier that had survived his first strike. However even as his orders to send the planes off to attack the US carrier force were being sent, the first of the US planes arrived.

The US carriers had sent out a total of 93 planes - 18 Wildcat fighters, 53 dive bombers and 22 torpedo bombers. Due to their inexperience at conducting multiple carrier strikes, the planes had become separated into three groups. This proved unfortunate for the Ryuju; if the planes had been on course, they would have missed her. But as it was, the light carrier was just readying her planes on deck for launch when an alert lookout spotted 18 dive bombers and 22 torpedo planes heading straight for her. The Ryuju only had six fighters airborne to stop them, and although the US planes had lost their fighter escort, sheer numbers of attackers had already doomed the carrier. Although her defenders shot down six of the torpedo planes and three dive bombers for the loss of two fighters, the rest of the attack force simply overwhelmed her. Unlike the newer fleet carriers, the Ryuju was not fast enough to steam away from the US aerial torpedoes, especially when they were delivered in a hammer and anvil attack. Hit by three of the underwater missiles, her machinery rooms already flooding, the carrier slowed to a dead stop as the dive bombers swept down onto her. Five minutes later, hit by three bombs in addition to the torpedoes, the ship was already on fire and listing heavily. She would sink some 30 minutes later.

Of the remaining two group of US planes - one consisting of nine Wildcats and seventeen dive bombers, the other of nine Wildcats and eighteen dive bombers - the second missed all of the Japanese carriers, having either misunderstood or misapplied the directions. The final group however found the Shokaku and Zuikaku - as well as eighteen Zero fighters. Seeing the heavy CAP, the planes decided to concentrate their attacks on the Shokaku. Outnumbered by the Zeros, this was a very difficult task, not aided by the radical manoeuvring of the ship. The result was that only two bombs hit the carrier. One did light damage to her stern, hitting well aft (indeed it almost missed). The other hit her dead centre on her flight deck, penetrating it and exploding on her hangar deck. Fortunately for the carrier nearly all her planes were airborne, as the explosion caused a serious fire and left her unable to operate aircraft. However this carrier class was the only one the Japanese had built with serious hanger deck armour (indeed in this respect they resembled the RN Formidable class), and while it took time to extinguish the fires, the carrier was never in serious danger.

With only one flight deck left to them, not all of the returning Japanese planes were able to fit onto the Zuikaku, and a number of the more seriously damaged planes had to be ditched over the side. Meanwhile Nagumu was trying to decide if there were any US carriers left. Only one had been seen, and that had been left burning and sinking fast, according to reports (this misapprehension was ironically aided by the missed US strike - the planes encountered could, just, have come from one carrier. He had lost a light carrier, and the Shokaku would need repairs before she could again operate aircraft. Also, a considerable number of planes and pilots had been lost. With the US carrier force presumably eliminated, there was no likelihood of any interference in the Java campaign from the east, and so he decided that he would withdraw north, escorting the damaged Shokaku.

The Americans likewise thought they had defeated their opponents. One carrier was certainly sunk, and a second had been reported as 'burning heavily from multiple bomb hits'. As a result, there seemed no chance that the Japanese could land forces on New Guinea, and there was a badly damaged carrier to get back to Pearl Harbor. The US force therefore split into two parts. The undamaged Enterprise, carrying the aircraft from both carriers, would head back to Pearl, keeping between the likely position of any Japanese force and the damaged Lexington. The Lexington, escorted by two cruisers and four destroyers, would hopefully be able to make it back. By late afternoon the worst of her fires were out, and she was able to make 8 knots, increased to 15 by the night.

Sadly for the Lexington, although her engineers had performed a miracle of damage control, she would not make it back home. The Japanese had deployed a line of submarines prior to the fleet actions. They had missed the US force on their way out, as their deployment had not been made fast enough, however they were now in position to intercept the Lexington as she withdrew. At 0200 on the 25th the carrier was hit by two torpedoes, which caused serious flooding and finally put her already damaged machinery out of action for the final time. With no power to fight the flooding, the giant carrier slowly took on an increasing list. It was obvious there was no chance now of getting her back to Pearl, and so her crew was taken off and she was torpedoed by one of her escorting destroyers.

24th March

In Malaya Blamey has decided that the Japanese pocket has been pushed far enough south. While allowing it to deepen will trap more troops, he is concerned that the Japanese might break out if his defence is stretched further. He informs Alexander that the planned envelopment and counterattack will begin tomorrow. Alexander agrees, and also issues instructions for the 17th Indian Division (currently under the command of General Slim in Burma) to attack across the Three Pagoda Pass and down the coast towards Malaya. This operation will expose the troops to counterattack, however Alexander thinks that the Japanese will be busy with other things tomorrow.

25th March

The Japanese submarine HIJMS I-9 launches a Yokosuka E14Y1 Reconnaissance Seaplane to reconnoitre Kiska and Amchitka Islands.

The Allied counterattack and envelopment starts in northern Malaya, aided by every available RAF and RAAF aircraft. The plan is simple; the Japanese have pushed south to form a pocket, but that pocket is contained by the 8th Indian Division, supported by part of the 1st Armoured. The 'neck' of the pocket is now attacked by the Australian 7th and 9th Divisions, again supplemented by tanks. The Japanese have no weapon capable of countering the British infantry tanks, and the counterattack is supported by all available artillery. Attempts by the Japanese to counter with fresh troops were frustrated by the Allied air support and artillery. By the evening, the Australians had nearly closed the neck of the pocket. Yamashita is in a quandary. His instinct is to pull as many as possible of his troops out of the trap, but his orders are to push south as hard as possible. Unable to manage these two conflicting ideas, he compromises - fatally, as it turns out. He orders the troops at the neck of the pocket to hold and counterattack while he tries to reinforce them, but the British armour keeps forcing them back with very heavy casualties. The main problem the British armour has is running out of machine gun ammunition, although a number of tanks are overrun when they break down. Meanwhile Slim is pushing a Brigade group south along the coast, hoping to catch the Japanese while they are preoccupied with the Australians, and Ghurkha units are moving east through Three Pagoda pass.