Triple Identity (27 page)

“For Guttmacher, too, meeting DeLouise was a blessing. Not only did this new client bring a potentially huge fortune to his bank, he also brought his personal business savvy Guttmacher was doing business with DiMarco, the Italian purchasing agent for the Iranians. Doing business Guttmacher-style meant moving some of the transactions through Bankhaus Bäcker & Haas as well as hiding DiMarco's fat commissions both from the Iranians and Italy's internal revenue service. Apparently the Iranians didn't realize that in addition to the hefty fees they were paying DiMarco, he was collecting commissions from the suppliers. Their contract with him specifically forbade that.”

Benny continued. “DiMarco complained to Guttmacher that he was
having difficulty supplying the Iranians with the missile technology and the nuclear machine tools and materials they ordered. Many vendors in Europe were reluctant, for various reasons, to deal with the Iranians. There were significant trade restrictions imposed by the U.S. government and many European manufacturers had subsidiaries in the U.S. Therefore, fearing they would have to explain their ties with Iran, they simply gave up. When after a tedious search the Iranian agents found a good source of supply they negotiated the transaction, and then DiMarco was brought in to do the actual placing of the order, masking the identity of the real purchasers. But nothing went smoothly, and the Iranians were blaming DiMarco for the delays caused by bureaucracy. The export-control laws of some of the industrialized nations made it difficult to purchase and ship what the Iranians wanted to the places where they wanted it to go. This wasn't the kind of stuff you'd buy out of catalogues or off the shelf. These were materials and machinery that were complex, expensive, heavily regulated, and easily detectable in border crossings.

“Hearing DiMarco's gripes, Guttmacher suggested two solutions to help the Iranians and DiMarco. To answer the growing need for suppliers who'd look the other way when Iranians orders were placed, he suggested they look for contacts in the Soviet Union. The shake-up of the Soviet empire during the previous year had opened new opportunities if you knew where to look for them, he told him. Another possibility was North Korea or China, but Guttmacher told DiMarco to concentrate on the Soviet Union first. The second piece of advice was to use private businessmen to front all the nonnuclear orders, to distance Iran even further from the transactions. The Iranians were impressed with Guttmacher and suggested he locate the kinds of businessmen he'd described. When Guttmacher met DeLouise and sized up both his international business experience and his flexibility, he asked DeLouise whether he was available to participate in some ‘interesting business transactions.’ DeLouise, smelling money and needing the available cash, said yes without knowing what he was getting into. How long could he live on the meager $250,000 he carried with him and the one or two million he managed to extricate from Switzerland? That was small potatoes for him.”

Benny paused to take a drink and I answered for him. “Not too long if you're living the lifestyle to which DeLouise was accustomed.”

“Exactly,” said Benny. “His big bucks were stuck in Switzerland, where the Colombians, disgruntled minority shareholders of his collapsed bank, were still looking for him. He also needed to remove his money from Switzerland as quickly as possible, before the U.S. government found it.”

“At this point Guttmacher threw out the bait. He told DeLouise that the government of Iran needed to buy machinery and spare parts for its oil and pharmaceutical industries but the West was giving it a hard time. Therefore, said Guttmacher, the Iranians were looking for private businessmen to front and ‘facilitate’ these transactions. Many of the products and machinery had dual purposes and could pass as benign. If the government of Iran buys steel with military specs, it's a suspicious transaction; if Raymond DeLouise, a private businessman, buys it, it's legitimate business.

“Also, the Iranians needed U.S. computer technology for the development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons; their shopping list included graphics terminals to design and analyze rockets, and U.S. law prohibited export of this hardware to Iran and other nations known to sponsor terrorism. But it looks as if DeLouise thought that he could at least order the terminals, supposedly for end users in an acceptable country but actually for clandestine transshipment to the Iranians.”

Ron said, “I've handled parts of some of these cases. European law can be far more accommodating than U.S. law about shipment of dual-use equipment and materials to nations on the State Department's list of states sponsoring terrorism — which of course includes Iran.”

“They forget their morals when it's time to do business. But that will change,” said Benny. “Terrorism knows no political borders, and terrorists, like extortionists, know how to identify weakness and use it for their own benefit.”

“Anyway,” Eric stepped in, trying to distance himself from politics, “Guttmacher's deal sounded like a good business opportunity to DeLouise. He was no fool, and with his education and background he immediately understood what kinds of deals the Iranians were trying to
make in Europe and why they wanted advanced U.S. computer technology. He thought he could bilk the Iranians while also gaining access to their covert activity in Europe and the U.S.”

Once an agent, always an agent, I thought. But was DeLouise working only for himself?

“So DeLouise took a step forward, showing Guttmacher he understood what the transactions were really about, and offered his contacts in the Soviet Union,” Eric said.

“Did he have any?” I asked.

“Apparently not. But he read the papers and saw what was going on in the Soviet Union, and that gave him an opportunity to take a lead in a transaction rather than simply lend his name to a shady deal and collect a limited commission. He wanted more than that. Instead of being just a straw man, with no influence or knowledge of the ins and outs of the Iranian purchasing frenzy, he wanted to play center stage. It was riskier but more lucrative, and the leverage he expected this to give him with the U.S. government would be commensurate with the risks: he hoped to trade intelligence on the Iranians’ nuclear program, and their attempts to get prohibited U.S. computers, for a sweetheart deal on his criminal charges.”

“I would think that DeLouise would have needed a viable U.S. criminal case against someone else, which he could then give up to a federal prosecutor in exchange for a plea bargain,” said Ron.

“He had it,” answered Eric. “There was an Iranian attempt to acquire proscribed U.S. computer technology.”

“I don't know who gave him that idea,” said Ron. “Certainly a defendant could trade intelligence data for a plea bargain, but, from my own experience, it seems far-fetched. For one thing, the CIA wouldn't let the federal prosecutors know how good the defendant's intelligence had been, so the prosecutors could not make representations to the court about the usefulness of the defendant's cooperation — thus, there'd be no adequate basis for the court's acceptance of the plea. The prospective plea bargainer almost certainly would have to give up persons whose activity clearly contravened U.S. criminal law.”

“I don't think it's the case here,” said Benny, “but DeLouise had his
hopes; he must have thought that the information he was willing to trade was so valuable that his case would be the exception. In any case, DeLouise's words were music to Guttmacher's ears. But he demanded proof that DeLouise had the right connections before he agreed to discuss anything with him. DeLouise had to deliver, and the nuclear materials were first on the list. So DeLouise made a few phone calls and went to Berlin. Berlin is heavily populated with Russians who have escaped the Soviet Union and are hungry for any kind of business, legal or not. It took DeLouise only a week until he came across Vladimir Tkachenko, a wheeler-dealer in everything, who promised that he had the right contacts in the Soviet Union. DeLouise challenged him to prove it, asking for trace residues of lithium-6. Within two weeks Vladimir delivered the goods wrapped in a plastic bag, stored in a lead container. Happy, DeLouise went back to Munich with the proof. From then on, things moved quickly.”

“Was it that simple?” I asked, finding it hard to believe you could buy nuclear materials so easily on the open market.

“No,” said Benny, “not quite. Let's take one step back. First DeLouise wanted to see if Guttmacher was for real — to make sure his offer wasn't a scam, or worse, a sting operation by a law-enforcement agency. So he hired a retired agent of BND, Bundesnachrichtendienst, the German federal intelligence service, to do a background check for him on Guttmacher.”

“Do you have his name?”

“Yes, Kurt Hansa. He operates out of,” Benny looked at his pad, “Kaiser Wilhelm Strasse number 311, Munich.”

I jotted down the name and address. Benny continued. “Hansa reported to DeLouise that Guttmacher's bank was legitimate but that Guttmacher himself had been under increased attention from Germany's federal police over his connections with the Iranians.”

“I guess Hansa reported to his former employers, the federal police, about DeLouise's inquiries, and from there the information flowed to the CIA and the Mossad,” I said.

Eric and Benny smiled the kind of a giveaway smile that says I ain't talking.

“Anyway, Hansa's report to DeLouise that the bank was a genuine institution and that there was no conclusive negative business information about Guttmacher was all DeLouise needed. Apparently Hansa never told DeLouise about the secret ongoing investigation of Guttmacher. DeLouise called Guttmacher and told him that he had the samples that Guttmacher had requested earlier as proof. Now it was quid pro quo time: DeLouise demanded that Guttmacher show his hand and bring his clients in for a meeting. Guttmacher called DiMarco in Italy and quickly arranged a meeting with DiMarco, plus Cyrus Armajani and Farbod Kutchemeshgi, the Iranian agents.”

“Here in Munich?”

“Yes, in Guttmacher's office. At the meeting DeLouise gave them the proof: a detectable trace of lithium-6. The Iranians were apparently gratified.”

“So the meeting ended with DeLouise having the deal he was hoping would extricate him from his problems with law enforcement?”

“Not exactly,” said Eric. “The Iranians wanted to make sure that they weren't walking into a trap of some sort. They knew that every Western intelligence service was snooping around them. They interrogated DeLouise about his personal background, his business and family connections. They asked him to prepare a family tree, telling him bluntly that they'd first check the accuracy of his family tree and if DeLouise didn't deliver or was discovered to be an agent of any foreign government, they would kill his relatives.”

“DeLouise couldn't give them his family tree,” I said. “He has family in Israel, and that would have revealed his Israeli background.”

“Precisely,” said Benny.

“So what did DeLouise do?”

“We don't know exactly,” said Eric, “but we think that DeLouise told them to forget the whole thing if they wanted to become so personal with him. Apparently he managed to persuade them to lower their level of suspicion.”

“How?” I asked.

“I don't know,” conceded Benny. “We know that he suggested that the
delivery of whatever he could arrange be made to a country friendly to Iran. That was one way of insulating the Iranians from the transactions. I'm sure there were other guarantees.”

“Did they agree?” I asked, finding it hard to believe that they were so unsophisticated.

“I guess so,” said Benny, “since apparently there was some sort of an agreement. DeLouise received a list of materials and equipment the Iranians needed, and an advance of two million dollars.”

“Without collateral?” I asked.

“No,” added Eric. “Guttmacher's bank guaranteed the advance to the Iranians, and in return DeLouise gave Guttmacher a letter of assignment, through two correspondent banks acting as intermediaries, for a deposit of $2,050,000 that a company named Triple Technologies and Investments Ltd. had in a Swiss bank. I guess Guttmacher was satisfied with that guarantee.”

I felt like I'd been hit by lightning. I tried to hold my composure.

“Do you have further details about this company, the deposit, or the bank's name?”

“I guess we might have it somewhere,” said Eric, indifferently.

Was he a complete idiot, or was he so self-centered that he didn't see the obvious even when it was right under his nose? I needed that information. Triple Technologies and Investments was the name of the company on DeLouise's American Express card.

I said, “It might tell us where the DeLouise money is hidden.” I wrote the details on my pad and asked, “How long have you known about this?”

“About what?” asked Eric.

“About the bank account.”

“I don't know. We developed the information the Mossad gave us, and the results are somewhere in the file,” said Eric, tossing it off. “I wasn't really interested in the financial details.”

I looked at Eric, trying to decide if he was pretending, or if he was indeed the dumbest CIA agent I'd ever met. “I repeat,” I said at a snail's pace. “I'm here to find DeLouise's stolen assets. The U.S. government took over his collapsing bank and paid the depositors. The government
sent me to recover that money. What you've just told me indicates that DeLouise had control over a company called Triple Technologies and Investments Ltd. that had at least two million dollars in its bank account. Do you get it?”

I took a gulp of beer because my throat was dry, but it didn't calm me down.

Eric still didn't seem to grasp the significance of what he'd just told me. I continued, “You know everything but understand nothing. Guttmacher is not a fool; he wouldn't have given the Iranians his bank's written guarantee unless he was sure that the letter of assignment DeLouise gave him was valid. That means he checked the Swiss account first. Banks do that, you know. He must have received the Swiss bank's written consent for the assignment of the deposit. So that brings the level of certainty concerning this information to a new high. Pay attention also to the fact that there were two intermediary banks. That shows that DeLouise must have insisted on using them as a buffer between the Swiss bank and Guttmacher's bank to avoid detection of the ultimate beneficiary.”