Unthinkable (4 page)

What we do know is helpful, but not hopeful. First off, the evidence
suggests that Khamene'i takes a relatively rigid and doctrinaire view of the ideological underpinnings of the Islamic Republic. He opposed the liberalizing tendencies of former presidents Rafsanjani and (especially) Khatami.
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He even disowned former president Mahmud Ahmadinejad for deviating in small but important ways from his dogma and the system he enforces.
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The respected Iran scholar Ali Ansari writes, “There is a tight and highly dependent relationship between Khamenei and the [hardline] faction. This is not simply an ideological relationship, but a partnership in the consolidation of power, and it is important to recognize this as one of mutual dependence.”
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Khamene'i is also determined to make Iran strong, independent, and self-sufficient, in part to eliminate the foreign influences that have been the bugbear of every Iranian leader for more than a century. Like many Iranians, Imam Khomeini was obsessed with foreign influences, believing that they were responsible for all the ills bedeviling Iran. His successor has followed suit, even taking actions that represent the national equivalent of cutting off one's nose to spite one's face. At times, Khamene'i has even claimed that the international sanctions against Iran were a blessing as they forced Iran to further shed its dependence on foreigners and more ardently embrace self-sufficiency. Indeed, only the hermit kingdom of North Korea shares Khamene'i's appreciation of autarky and willingness to suffer to achieve it.
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The foreign state that Khamene'i fears and despises most, of course, is the United States. The Supreme Leader has indicated that he sees the United States as determined to remove the Islamic Republic and install a submissive Iranian regime to re-create the relationship the U.S. once had with the Shah. That appears to be the touchstone of all of his thinking about the United States.
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Karim Sadjadpour, a brilliant expert on Iran, writes that “Khamenei's contempt for the United States has been remarkably consistent and enduring. In over three decades of speeches—first as president and later as Supreme Leader—he has very rarely spoken favorably, in public at least, about the United States or the prospect of restoring relations with the U.S. government. On the contrary, whether the topic
of discussion is foreign policy, agriculture, or education, he seamlessly relates the subject matter to the cruelty, greed, and sinister plots of the ‘Global Arrogance' [as he calls the United States].”
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In recent years, he has increasingly articulated his conspiratorial fears of the United States as an American “soft war” being waged against Iran. He argues that the U.S. government employs all aspects of Joseph Nye's famous conception of “soft power”—propaganda, cultural influence, prestige, media power, political sway, even trade and investment—to undermine the Iranian state. This fear has been a major component of Khamene'i's objection to any agreement with the United States on any issue, including the nuclear standoff. He insists that such agreements would only further American “soft war” subversion while denying Iran the tools it needs to fight back against that threat.
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Ray Takeyh, one of the most insightful Iran analysts of his generation, writes, “For the supreme leader, the United States was always devious and arrogant, and its policies were mere cover designed to advance its nefarious purposes. To preserve the integrity and authenticity of Iran's Islamic path, one had to resist America's blandishments and forego the rewards that resumed relations might offer. Khamenei made his suspicions clear: ‘America appears with a deceitful smile but has a dagger behind its back and is ready to plunder. That is its true nature.' In the end, Khamenei perceived that Iran ‘has nothing to talk to them about and no need for them.' ”
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When it comes to America's allies in the region, Khamene'i's views have tended toward greater moderation, at least by the standards of the Islamic Republic. He seems to share Khomeini's view that the United States implanted Israel into the Middle East to fight the Islamic world, and wishes for the latter's destruction—a commonplace among Tehran's power brokers. He has also repeatedly indicated his willingness to support groups working for the destruction of Israel. But Khamene'i has also gone to some lengths to insist that Iran is not actively and
directly
seeking to destroy Israel, especially after Ahmadinejad's various suggestions to the contrary.
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Moreover, Khamene'i has also intimated that enmity toward Israel is a secondary consideration of Iranian foreign policy, especially
compared to its enmity toward America, going so far as to say that “the Palestine issue is not Iran's jihad.”
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Khomeini's pan-Islamic revolution famously rejected Saudi Arabia's brand of Salafiyya Islam (literally “fundamentalist” in Arabic, but also known pejoratively as “Wahhabi” Islam, for Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, who introduced the concept to the Arabian peninsula in the eighteenth century). Khomeini blasted it as a “baseless and superstitious cult” in his final testament.
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However, his successor has been far more circumspect with the Kingdom. Khamene'i has repeatedly signaled that he is open to improved relations with Riyadh, and portrays aggressive Iranian moves against the Kingdom as having been provoked by Saudi aggression against Iran or Iranian interests, including Saudi support for American policies. He was notably mute after Saudi forces helped crush the mostly Shi'i uprising against the Sunni royal family of Bahrain in 2011. Nevertheless, on his watch, Iran has attempted to help Shi'i revolutionaries overthrow the Bahraini government in 1996; and in 2012, after Saudi Arabia proposed a union with Bahrain,
Kayhan,
a conservative newspaper that frequently reflects the views of Khamene'i, called instead for Iran to annex it.
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Although Khamene'i's approach to foreign policy is antithetical to American interests both by ideological design and diplomatic circumstance, he has typically pursued it in a calculated, pragmatic fashion. Khamene'i has repeatedly approved terrorist plots, and has tolerated some considerable risks. But he has also tried hard to avoid recklessness, pulled in his horns when he overstepped, and emphasized defending Iran over attacking its enemies whenever the two have been in conflict. He has never acted irrationally, or even with the same irresponsible belligerence and willful denial of reality as Saddam Husayn. As Israel's greatest scholar of Iran, David Menashri, puts it, “With few exceptions, whenever ideological convictions have clashed with the interests of the state—as prescribed by the clerical ruling elite—state interests ultimately have superseded revolutionary dogma in both foreign relations and domestic politics. The change, noticeable already under Khomeini, became even
more discernible following his death in 1989. Although national considerations were alien to Khomeini's stated desire to expand Islamic influence throughout the Middle East, his regime chose to conduct its policy primarily from a perception of Iran's state interests. . . . An analysis of Iran's policies toward its neighbors demonstrates the degree to which actual policies have been primarily shaped by pragmatic, national interests, rather than ideological convictions.”
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PRAGMATISM AND FREELANCING.
On March 23, 2007, while British forces were still in Iraq as part of the U.S.-led occupation, fifteen British sailors and marines were searching a ship suspected of smuggling in the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which divides southeastern Iraq from southwestern Iran, when a large force of Iranian Revolutionary Guard naval boats surrounded them. The IRGC personnel boarded the British boats and, because the local British commander was under orders from London not to fight back, the Iranians took the British boats and the fifteen personnel back to Iran. Although this incident could have provoked a war between Iran and the United Kingdom (and its American ally), the operation apparently was the decision of the local Iranian IRGC navy commander, Captain Abol-Ghassam Amangah. He acted without conferring with Tehran. No captain in the U.S. Navy—or any other worth its salt—would risk provoking a war without first checking with his chain of command. Remarkably, Tehran rewarded Amangah for his initiative.
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Similarly, at various times during the Iran-Iraq War, Iranian naval and air commanders conducted provocative actions and even opened fire on American armed forces in the Persian Gulf without permission from higher Iranian political authorities.

This is one of the few instances in which the United States has good evidence that local commanders took provocative actions on their own. There may well be others. For instance, in August 1998, Iran deployed roughly two hundred thousand troops to the Afghan border after the Taliban government (which then still ruled most of Afghanistan) killed eleven Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e Sharif.
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At the time, reports indicated
that the IRGC military leadership wanted to invade Afghanistan to punish the Taliban and deployed six divisions to the Mashhad area on its own—only to have Tehran dispatch eight regular army (Artesh) divisions to prevent the IRGC forces from moving on their own. The story is still unconfirmed.

These incidents point to an important and somewhat unique aspect of Iranian governance: the ability of actors to freelance or push the edge of the envelope on important and sensitive policy matters. Throughout his time in office, Khamene'i has often ruled by remaining aloof and not clarifying his edicts, allowing subordinate entities to interpret them as they like, having them take actions, and then deciding which course to take based on how those initial moves pan out. Likewise, he allows some personnel and organizations—particularly his favorites and the powerful Revolutionary Guards, upon whose support his power depends—the ability to take some actions that he has not necessarily sanctioned.

SUCCESSION.
The last aspect of Khamene'i's role in the Iranian nuclear saga that bears discussion is his mortality. Khamene'i was born in 1939, at a time when Iran was desperately poor and underdeveloped. He grew up without the benefit of the most advanced health care or nutrition. He is believed to be in good health, and there is no reason to expect that he will die anytime soon. But he will not live forever. The Islamic Republic may outlive him, and if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold on his watch, that capability will live on beyond him. Consequently, the question of who succeeds him as Supreme Leader is also of importance when considering how the United States should treat Iran's potential nuclear capability.

Unfortunately, when it comes to succession, once again, we don't know and it depends. Khamene'i has not identified a successor. The current Iranian constitution does not include provisions for an obvious successor. Khamene'i has probably avoided giving any indication of who his successor might be both to avoid creating a rival to his own authority and to prevent infighting among various Iranian factions over who it should be. His successor might not be chosen until after he is dead, in which case
the choice will likely be determined by whichever factions are most powerful at that time. The list of candidates stretches from dangerous ideologues such as Ayatollah Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, to opportunistic moderates such as Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, to middle-of-the-road types such as Guardian Council member Mahmoud Hashemi Sharoudi, to innocuous figureheads like former judiciary chief Mohammad Yazdi.

The first constitution of the Islamic Republic provided for a committee to serve in the capacity of Supreme Leader if no suitable candidate were available. Although that constitution was superseded in 1989, Iran's fragmented political leadership may not be able to agree on a single candidate and may look for a way to revert back to this earlier alternative. Although this may prove difficult, the current constitution provides for a council of the president, the head of the judiciary, and a member of the Guardian Council chosen by the Expediency Council to act “temporarily” in place of the Supreme Leader until a successor can be chosen.
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In the event of protracted political deadlock—often the norm in Iran, especially on issues of such import—that council might remain in power for some time, possibly even in perpetuity.
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Although less likely, this outcome does not appear impossible and it is worth considering as a possibility. Committees have different patterns of behavior from individuals. They tend to be more prone to inertia, caution, and compromise than most individuals. However, committees are not immune to aggressive, dangerous, and even risky behavior, and may be especially prone to them if that is the compromise position among the different members. Committees can sometimes make it easier for a group to compromise with a foreign adversary as no individual is wholly responsible for the blame, but may be unable to summon the courage of a strong leader to compromise when doing so would buck a trend, public desire, or ingrained interests. In short, arguments can be made on both sides regarding Khamene'i's succession and which outcome would be best or worst for American interests as they relate to Iran and its nuclear program.

In June 2009, Iran and the rest of the world received some unhelpful clarity concerning Iranian decision-making and policy. That month Iranians went to the polls to vote for president, and the incumbent—the infamous Mahmud Ahmadinejad—won reelection with a surprising 63 percent of the vote.

We may never know if Ahmadinejad's election was fair or fraudulent, and if the latter, by how much.
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There are a lot of reasons to be skeptical—from the uniformity of his vote count across Iran's disparate voting districts to irregularities in several aspects of the vote to the rapidity with which his victory was announced. Indeed, many of the most highly regarded Iran experts are certain that Ayatollah Khamene'i and the hardliners rigged the vote to ensure that they would not face another Mohammad Khatami, the reformist who won the presidency in 1997 and threatened the autocratic rule of the Supreme Leader and the conservative base of the Islamic Republic. Although Ahmadinejad has proven an erratic statesman who has often shot off his mouth in foolish and unhelpful ways, the Supreme Leader saw him at the time of the 2009 election as a committed hardliner who would not challenge his authority or his overarching policies for Iran.
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