Unthinkable (60 page)

• If air strikes succeed, they will do so quickly, allowing the United States to turn to other problems.

THE DISADVANTAGES OF AIR STRIKES.
I see eleven potential disadvantages to air strikes. I have again highlighted those I believe most salient in
bold italic
.

• 
It is more likely that the Iranians would rebuild their nuclear program than not
. In the event that they rebuild, they would most likely withdraw from the NPT and banish the inspectors to be able to rebuild unfettered and without the IAEA reporting on their efforts to the world. They might even announce their intent to deploy actual weapons to prevent another American strike. A determination to rebuild is both far more in line with this regime's past behavior and rhetoric, and is more consistent with the limited historical evidence. The Iraqis rebuilt their nuclear program (or tried to do so) after the successful Israeli air strike in 1981 and the partially successful American air campaign in 1991. Syria does not seem to have tried to rebuild the al-Kibar facility after the 2007 Israeli air strike, but the unclassified evidence is paltry; we do not know if Damascus had started to reconstitute elsewhere, or what might have happened had the Arab Spring not intervened in 2011.

• 
It is far more likely that Iran would retaliate than not
. Moreover, the available evidence strongly indicates that they would try to retaliate here in the United States itself with both cyber and terrorist attacks. How much damage they would inflict would depend on how good our homeland and cyber defenses are compared to how good their attacks would be. The Iranians might retaliate over the course of months or years, during which time they could improve on their tactics if early attacks failed. The Arbabsiar plot suggested that their capability to mount terrorist attacks in the United States was negligible in 2010, but according to press reports, the U.S. intelligence community believes that Iran has been working hard to expand it. In addition, Iranian retaliation could further drive up the price of oil, potentially keeping it high for many months.

• 
It is highly likely that Iran would retaliate against Israel and probably the GCC states
. There is a reasonable probability that Hizballah would participate in such retaliation, and a significantly lower probability that Hamas would join as well. Again, depending on the balance between Israeli/American/GCC defenses and Iranian/Hizballah/PIJ
offensive capabilities at the time that the air strikes were launched (and for potentially a long period of time afterward),
the damage from such retaliation could range from the utterly inconsequential (a few rocket attacks and a few tourists killed) to the truly catastrophic (crippling the Israeli economy for weeks or months and cutting Gulf oil production)
. The Iranians might also ramp up their efforts to subvert American Arab allies, although this would unfold over a much longer period of time.

• Iran might try to close the Strait of Hormuz. This seems unlikely as long as the Iranians can tell that the air strikes are not the start of an invasion or a decapitation campaign, but it is not impossible.

• 
As a result either of highly damaging Iranian retaliation or an Iranian decision to rebuild its nuclear program, the United States could be forced to invade and occupy Iran—or live with a nuclear Iran that will be hostile, intent on revenge, and in possession of nuclear weapons
.

• Air strikes might fail. Either because we are not aware of all of Iran's nuclear facilities, Iranian defenses prove tougher than we expect, our own forces experience unexpected problems, or some combination of all of the above, we may do much less damage than we expect. I think this probability low, but not zero.

• It is more likely that air strikes would either stoke Iranian nationalism and rally people around the regime, or turn them against the United States, than it is that they would cause the people to turn more against the regime. Historically, that is just how air campaigns work.

• Air strikes would totally consume our attention in the run-up, the execution, and for some time thereafter. If we were forced to invade, that would consume far more of our attention (and resources) for far longer than either the air strikes on their own or possibly even containment.

• Even if the air strikes are highly successful, except in the unlikely circumstances in which the regime opts not to rebuild its nuclear program (and it is very clear to the outside world that this is their decision) or is
overthrown by the Iranian people as a result of them, air strikes would leave the United States still relying on containment—albeit containment of a non-nuclear Iran.

• 
If the air strikes are unsuccessful
—meaning either that they failed to set back the Iranian program by much or that Tehran announced afterward its determination to rebuild and build weapons—and the United States opts not to invade,
we would be forced back onto a policy of containing a nuclear Iran anyway
. Moreover, it would be containing a much more dangerous nuclear Iran, one that would almost certainly be implacably hostile, bent on revenge, and uninterested in any agreements with the United States. It could also mean containing a nuclear Iran
without the invaluable help of the NPT and the IAEA inspectors to constrain Iran
.

• Air strikes would likely deepen anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world, although it would be unlikely that this would have any concrete, near-term effects.

THE ADVANTAGES OF CONTAINMENT.
I see seven potential advantages from containment.

• 
It would have a much lower risk of involving the United States in a war with Iran than air strikes
(where the risk is 100 percent since attacking Iran with air strikes
is
going to war). Under containment, crises could get out of hand and result in a war, so the probability is not zero. However, one of the goals of containment would be to try to avoid a war and there are numerous steps the United States could take to try to minimize the probability of inadvertent escalation.

• 
It would have a much lower risk of involving the United States in an invasion and occupation of Iran along the lines of what the United States mounted in Iraq and Afghanistan
. It is hard to the point of impossibility to imagine circumstances in which the United States would invade a nuclear Iran. At most, we might feel compelled to mount
limited incursions to secure Iranian nuclear weapons in the event the regime were to collapse and we became concerned about the status of its nuclear weapons. That could be difficult and ugly, but would be nothing like an invasion and occupation.

• It holds out the prospects for a negotiated resolution to our problems with Iran at a later date. Détente is a distinct possibility under containment and it is not inconceivable that by pursuing this course rather than going to war, we could eventually work out confidence-building measures and even arms control agreements with Iran that would diminish or eliminate many of the problems of containment. It might even set us on the road to an eventual rapprochement with Iran.

• It seems more likely that containment would exacerbate the divisions between the Iranian regime and so many of its people than would air strikes. Again, air strikes appear to have a higher probability of helping the Iranian regime to hold power than undermining their control because of the visceral reaction that accompanies any act of war against a people. In contrast, the constant pressure and isolation of the international community against Iran has undeniably contributed to the regime's unpopularity. It is impossible to know how much foreign pressure was responsible for this popular disillusionment compared to factors wholly internal to Iran, but they unquestionably had a positive impact. Thus, the more likely
negative
impact of air strikes has to be compared to the more likely
positive
impact of continued containment.

• It would probably garner international sympathy, especially in the short term. At least for some period of time—varying based in large part on how well we handle ourselves—we could count on a fair degree of international support for our containment efforts. The key would be to invest that support in building a durable containment regime, one that can last for the long term.

• It would probably require less attention and resources concentrated on Iran than even successful air strikes, at least in the short term. Successful air strikes would mean a high expenditure of both attention and
resources for some period of weeks or months, diminishing markedly over the long term. In contrast, containment would mean lesser commitments throughout but paid out regularly for potentially much longer. Then again, unsuccessful air strikes would likely mean both large outlays in the short term and significant commitments over the long term, too.

• It could result in increased arms sales to the GCC.

THE DISADVANTAGES OF CONTAINMENT.
I see nine potential disadvantages from containment.

• Iran will continue to try to subvert the governments of American regional allies; it will back terrorist groups, insurgencies, militias, and other violent extremists. There is a strong probability that it will do so even more than it has in the past, although its ability to do so successfully and the likelihood that this support will produce the outcomes Iran seeks will be determined by a range of factors beyond its control.

• 
Deterrence may fail. The combination of Iran's likely aggressive behavior and the potential for the GCC states or Israel to respond in equally assertive fashion will probably spark crises. Either as a result of deliberate action or inadvertent escalation, one or more of these crises could lead to a war, and potentially even the use of nuclear weapons by one side or both
.

• 
It is highly likely that the GCC states will seek to balance a nuclear Iran rather than bandwagon with it
. That could help produce crises with Iran.
It could also produce nuclear proliferation, particularly on the part of Saudi Arabia
, but potentially by the UAE as well. Proliferation by Turkey and Egypt seem far less likely, but not impossible.

• There are a number of increased costs attendant on containment, although most are modest: possibly modernizing our strategic nuclear forces, adding a mid-course missile defense system to the Middle East's defenses, possibly augmenting slightly our conventional forces in the region, and probably increasing military aid to Israel, but the costs pale
in comparison to the potential costs of a war with Iran, especially an invasion and occupation.

• 
The price of oil would almost certainly be affected by fears related to a nuclear Iran. However, that impact could range from marginal to disastrous
. The actual impact is likely to be determined heavily by how early crises with a nuclear Iran work out—whether the United States involves itself early, whether the crisis results in a war, whether it results in any actual cuts to oil production or exports, and whether Iran is seen as having been emboldened by the outcome or chastened by it.

• Iran will continue to attack the United States with cyber weapons and possibly some forms of terrorism at least for as long as we continue to do similar things to them. Again, they might be so emboldened by their acquisition of nuclear weapons that they might try to increase the severity of these attacks and/or continue to pursue them even if we desist. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that, even if Iran adopted this pattern of behavior early on, the United States could not mitigate the impact and convince them to modify or discontinue it by our own actions—as we have done at various points in the past.

• Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons could convince other countries outside the Middle East that the NPT has lost its bite, the norm against nuclear proliferation is breaking down, and therefore that they would suffer less if they pursued a nuclear capability. Of course, Iran has already suffered for its pursuit of such a capability in defiance of the international community to an extent greater than almost any other country (except North Korea) would tolerate, which would be an important check on this problem.

• It is most likely that Supreme Leader Khamene'i will be replaced by another weak figure unlikely to deviate significantly from Iran's current course (or possibly by a committee that would probably do the same). However,
there is a lesser probability that a more dangerous man might take his place, one far more aggressive and reckless
—Saddam Husayn in a turban. Such a leader would be more likely to provoke crises with the United States, the GCC, Israel, and other American allies.
He might also be far more difficult to deter than Khamene'i, which would call into question the central premise of containment.

• At some point, the Islamic Republic is likely to pass from history.
There is a risk that this will occur with a bang, rather than a whimper—the state will fracture and collapse. If that happens, there is also a risk that elements of its nuclear arsenal could be used or transferred to some of Tehran's vicious terrorist friends
. While this is certainly a real concern, it is worth noting that historically a nuclear state has never fractured and collapsed into chaos; the Soviet Union fractured, but it never collapsed into chaos and the issue of “loose nukes” from the USSR was handled without tragedy, albeit not without some drama.

This brief comparison should reinforce the ultimate point that both of the options, air strikes and containment, are pretty rotten. For both paired lists, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. There should be little doubt that if we have other options, like the carrot-and-stick or even regime change, we ought to try them rather than going with either of these two.