Voices of Islam (90 page)

Following Karbala, groups in opposition to the Umayyads routinely used the memory of this battle as a rallying cry. Some of these movements were explicitly Shiite, while others were simply hostile toward the Umayyads and looked favorably upon the family of the Prophet. In fact, the Abbasids, who overthrew the Umayyads in 750
CE
and established a new Sunni caliphate, made extensive use of the memory of Karbala to gain popular support during their rebellion. However, once they came to power, they ruled over their empire as a Sunni dynasty for the next five centuries.

Mourning for Husayn and the martyrs of Karbala began almost immedi- ately after the massacre, starting with the laments of Husayn’s surviving rela- tives and supporters. As part of the long-term trend toward the development of mourning rituals based on commemoration of Karbala, popular elegies of the martyrs were composed during the remainder of the Umayyad period and the first two centuries of Abbasid rule (ca. 750–930
CE
). The following is a short excerpt from one of these elegies:

Now listen to the story of the martyrdom and how [the Umayyads] deprived Hussein of water, and when he was fi on the plain of Kerbela how they behaved meanly and unjustly. They cut off the head of a descendant of the Prophet in that fiery land! But the Imam lives, his foot in the stirrup and mounted upon his horse! He will not be killed!...The angels in heaven bewailed their deaths and have wept so copiously that water flowed from the leaves of the trees and plants. Thus, you too must weep for a while; for after this tragedy of

Taff, laughter is unlawful.
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Voices of the Spirit

The earliest reliable account of the public mourning rituals that Shiites now call
Muharram
processions concerns an event that took place in 963
CE
during the reign of Mu‘izz al-Dawla, the Buyid Sultan of southern Iran and Iraq. The Buyids were military commanders from the Caspian Sea region of Iran that ruled in the name of the Sunni Abbasid caliphs. The Buyids, who were Shiites themselves, promoted Shiite rituals, including the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s designation of ‘Ali at Ghadir Khum, in order to promote their legitimacy and to strengthen the sense of Shiite identity in and around Baghdad. The famous fourteenth-century Sunni historian Ibn Kathir states, ‘‘On the tenth of Muharram of this year [963
CE
], Mu‘izz al-Dawla ibn Buwayh, may God disgrace him, ordered that the markets be closed, that the women should wear coarse woolen hair cloth, and that they should go into the markets with their faces unveiled and their hair disheveled, beating their faces and wailing over Husayn ibn ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib.’’ He goes on, somewhat apologetically to say, ‘‘The people of the Sunna could not prevent this spectacle because of the large number of the Shiites and their increasing power, and because the Sultan was on their side.’’
8
One of the interesting aspects of this account is that it demonstrates that women have been involved in Shiite rituals from the very beginning and that their role was significant enough to be singled out for comment.

Shiite rituals continued to evolve somewhat unsystematically over the centuries in isolated communities, and under the patronage of regional Shiite notables or rulers. Then, in the sixteenth century, the Safavid dynasty estab- lished a Shiite state centered on the Iranian plateau and worked systematically to enhance their religious legitimacy by promoting explicitly Shiite rituals. This turned out to be a watershed event for Ithna’ ‘Ashari Sh’ism and the rituals associated with it. Unlike their Sunni neighbors the Ottomans, the Uzbeks, and the Mughals, the Safavids declared Ithna’ ‘Ashari Shi‘ism to be the official religion of the dynasty and set out to promote an orthodox Shiite culture, society, and political order. It was in this environment in 1501–1502
CE
that the popular religious orator Husayn Va‘iz Kashifi composed his semi- nal work,
Rawzat al-shuhada’
(The Garden of the Martyrs).
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Kashifi’s book represents a new trend in Shiite memorial literature, which involves a synthe- sis of historical accounts, elegiac poems, theological tracts, and hagiographies in a chain of short narratives that together formed a much larger narrative of Karbala. This book also articulated a complex set of canonized doctrines, which stressed the courage, piety, and sacrifice of Husayn and his followers at Karbala.

The new
Rawza
genre of pious narratives was read aloud at religious gatherings, which progressively evolved into mourning rituals called
Rawza Khani,
which roughly means, ‘‘Reading the
Rawza
’’ (that is, reading the book,
Rawzat al-shuhada’
). Today, the
Rawza Khani
is a ritual in which a sermon is given based on
Rawzat al-shuhada’
or some similar text, with a great deal of improvisation on the part of a specially trained orator.

The Passion of ‘Ashura in Shiite Islam
119

The objective of the oration is to move the audience to tears through the recitation of the tragic details of the battle of Karbala.
10
This type of mourn- ing ritual is viewed by Shiite Muslims as a means of achieving salvation by developing empathy and sympathy for the martyrs. This belief is illustrated by the often-repeated quotation, ‘‘Anyone who cries for Husayn or causes someone to cry for Husayn shall go directly to Paradise.’’
11

By the time of the Qajar Dynasty in Iran (ca. 1796–1925), the Rawza Khani had evolved into a much more elaborate ritual called
Shabih Khani
or
Ta‘ziyeh Khani.
The
ta‘ziya
(‘‘lamentation’’), an elaborate theatrical per- formance of the Karbala story based on the same narratives used in the Rawza Khani, involves a large cast of professional and amateur actors, a director, a staging area, costumes, and props. The Qajar rulers of Iran were great sponsors of these rituals, and social and religious status among the elites were based partly on their ability to sponsor such rituals on a large scale. These rituals, which were also sponsored by a variety of social groups organ- ized around guilds, neighborhoods, tribes, or ethnic groups, also reinforced a variety of social identities. The Iranian Ta‘ziyeh ritual reached its greatest level of popularity during the late Qajar period. It entered a relative decline under the Pahlavi Dynasty (1925–1979) and became much less common in the large cities of Iran during the 1930s and the 1940s. However, the Ta‘ziyeh continues to exist on a smaller scale in Iran in the traditional quarters of cities and in rural areas.
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In the past two centuries, the policies and agendas of the various regimes ruling Iran have influenced manifestations of ‘Ashura. However, these sym- bols and rituals have proven to be substantially independent of the control of the state. The state’s ability to make use of the Karbala paradigm has been a very important factor in its ability to maintain its legitimacy and at least some degree of connection or integration with the broader society. The state’s failure to adequately incorporate these symbols and rituals into its program and ideology, as was the case with the Pahlavi regime, contrib- uted in part to the state’s crisis of legitimacy. This allowed opposition groups to make very effective use of the symbols and rituals of ‘Ashura in overthrow- ing the regime. The government of the present Islamic Republic of Iran has made very effective use of these symbols and rituals to articulate the state’s ideology and policies. This has made it diffi for anyone critical of the Islamic regime to use ‘Ashura symbols and rituals to critique or oppose the state. However, this state versus opposition dynamic is only part of the modern story of ‘Ashura.

‘Ashura symbols and rituals remain very important in modern Iranian society, culture, and politics. Although they have exercised an important influence upon the fortunes of the state, the state itself has usually not been the most important factor in the evolution of Karbala symbols and rituals. Rather than a ‘‘trickle down’’ effect, according to which the state’s policies determined the nature of these diverse forms of religious expression,

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the relationship between the state and the society was complex, inconsistent, and above all, a ‘‘two-way street.’’ In other words, religious symbols and rituals were produced through a complex process of interaction between the Iranian state and the Iranian society. Much of the evolution of religious expression in Iran was the product of factors that had little or nothing to do with the state. Karbala symbols and rituals have been one of the primary means of expressing social and political ideals on a broad societal level. In some cases, this took the form of direct opposition to the state. In other cases, the rituals that commemorated Karbala served as a means for maintain- ing social bonds, ideals, and identities that were independent of the agendas and policies of the state. Changing economic and demographic forces transformed preexisting and newly emerging political relationships. Other important factors included changes in ethics, aesthetics, class dynamics, social institutions, groupings, and identities. Discourses on contemporary social and political crises have also found expression in ‘Ashura symbols and rituals. Over the centuries, Shi‘ism spread from Iraq and Iran into parts of South Asia. According to popular belief in South Asia, Shiite rituals were first intro- duced at the end of the fourteenth century by the conqueror Timur Leng (Tamerlane, d. 1405
CE
), who is said to have converted to Shi‘ism prior to his invasion of the Indian Subcontinent.
13
As Juan Cole has argued, Shi‘ism spread along with the migration of Iranian elites (that is, notables, scholars, poets, artisans, and merchants) from the Iranian plateau and Iraq into South Asia. One important side effect of this infl of Iranians was the establish- ment of an elite culture that was largely derived from Persian elite culture. In some cases, this elite culture was Shiite, which led to the spread of Shi‘ism in parts of South Asia. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Shiite states were established in Southern India. For example, the Nizam Shahi dynasty (r. 1508–1553
CE
) ruled in Ahmednagar, the Qutb Shahi dynasty (r. 1512–1687
CE
) ruled in Hyderabad, and the ‘Adil Shahi dynasty ruled in the Deccan kingdom of Bijapur. These dynasties were able, in varying degrees, to encourage Shiite practices, until the Mughal Dynasty suppressed

them from the sixteenth century onward.
14

While the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries
CE
were characterized by Shiite rule in certain provinces of South Asia, one should be careful not to overstate the importance of these political trends. In many ways, the spread of Persian elite culture was a more influential factor in the spread of Shi‘ism in South Asia. This is particularly important to note for northern Indian areas like Kashmir and Awadh, where large Shiite minorities lived, mostly under Sunni rule. This elite culture survived well into the modern period and was quite influential in certain areas, where Shiite elites (including some women) promoted Shiite beliefs and ritual practices, depending on the degree of tolerance of the Sunni rulers. For example, elegies were recited both in private and in public, public processions were sometimes organized, and the Karbala Narrative was recalled in the form of sermons and domestic rituals

The Passion of ‘Ashura in Shiite Islam
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in the homes of Shiite elites. In addition, replicas of the tomb of Husayn were built for use in these various rituals and remain a central feature of South Asian Muharram rituals to this day.
15

Similar trends can be seen among the Arab Shiite communities that were located outside of Safavid control. In Iraq and Lebanon, major Shiite com- munities flourished under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, which fluctuated between tolerance and persecution. In fact, during the eighteenth century, when political decentralization, economic chaos, and Afghan invasions weakened the religious establishment in the Iranian plateau, the Shiite shrine cities of southern Iraq, in particular Najaf and Karbala, flourished relatively independently of state infl ce. The important influence of Iraqi Shiite scholarship continued into the nineteenth century as well. During the period of decline of Iran’s religious establishment, many of the greatest Shiite scholars either were from Iraq or chose to study and work there. In this environment, Shiite beliefs, practices, and rituals continued to develop and evolve, as they had in previous centuries.

While ‘Ashura rituals were more prevalent in areas where Shiites were concentrated, such as Lebanon, Iran, southern Iraq, Hyderabad, and Awadh, some Sunnis (especially those oriented more toward popular culture and Sufism) also commemorated Karbala in observances that were based on Shiite models. In some areas, such as South Asia, Sunnis have often been enthusias- tic participants in Shiite rituals. In the modern era, the rituals of Sunnis and Shiites have become more distinct from each other. However, throughout much of Islamic history the differences between Sunnis and Shiites based on ideological constructs were often less prevalent. This was particularly true of popular practices, which could often be at variance with the views of the ulama.
16

In summary, the rituals of ‘Ashura that are dominant in the world of Shiite Islam have been of three basic types. The first type of ritual is the sermon gathering, in which pious elegies are recited, usually including a combination of chants, elegies, story telling, and sermons. In these rituals, believers mourn the tragedy of ‘Ashura and learn ethical or spiritual lessons from the story. They also hope, through their mourning and commemoration, to become closer to the Imams and thereby to be drawn closer to God. The second type of ritual, which involves various forms of reenactment of the battle of Karbala, is a natural extension of the first and can include other actions, such as building or destroying various ritual objects, like a model of Husayn’s tomb. The third type of ritual involves public physical mourning rituals, which typically involve self-mortifi ation, often by slapping the chest and head or by hitting oneself with chains. In rare cases, blades are used to inflict more serious pain. Regional variations on such rituals can often be extremely diverse. The object is to infl ct pain on oneself, without causing serious injury, because it is believed that pain allows the ritual participants to empathize with the martyrs by experiencing a small fraction of the pain they