War of Numbers (39 page)

8.
Memorandum for the record, 31 January 1968, from S. Adams to George A. Carver, Jr. Mr. Carver later turned the memo over to the CIA Inspector General.

9.
Washington Post,
1 February 1968, p. 1.

10.
Washington Post,
4 February 1968, p. 1. Interestingly, Peter Braestrup’s
Big Story
pooh-poohs Arnet’s story, saying that “Tet was less a demonstration of Vietcong efficiency than the result of a kind of mass escapism by the Saigon regime” (vol. 1, p. 194). Generally, I agree with Braestrup’s criticisms of the press. Not this one. It was a good story, which made several fascinating observations.

11.
CIA’s Central Intelligence Bulletin, 3 February 1968.

12.
There was a vast discrepancy between the U.S. aircraft losses as reported in the situation room (a total of 1,200 destroyed or damaged), and the U.S. aircraft losses which MACV admitted publicly (58 destroyed and 239 damaged, for a total of 297). There is no question in my mind that “1200” was the approximate number I saw in the situation room, since on 26 February 1968, I mentioned this figure to the so-called DDI analyst, who duly recorded it. George Allen later told staffers of the House Select Committee on Intelligence that he had seen a message from General Westmoreland requesting 500 aircraft to “replace those lost during Tet. This suggests that the total of 1200 is in the right ballpark, since damaged aircraft doubtless outnumbered destroyed. The question arises: How come the discrepancy? I recall discussions at the time, that MACV was jiggering with definitions of what constituted “destroyed,” and what constituted “damaged.” My recollection is that for an aircraft to be publicly reported as “destroyed,” MACV required that it be virtually obliterated, and for an aircraft to be publicly reported as “damaged,” it had to have suffered severe structural damage. Aircraft which suffered only light or moderate damage went unreported, at least in public. Two problems arise. The first is that many—if not most—aircraft publicly reported as “damaged”
never flew again,
leading one to question MACV’s definition of “destruction.” The second problem is that the numbers still don’t track. (That is, even if one postulates that
all
of the 297 aircraft publicly reported as “destroyed” or “damaged” were permanently grounded, the number is still some 200 short of the 500 General Westmoreland requested as replacements.) I have since heard allegations that
MACV changed the tail numbers of aircraft to conceal the extent of the losses. I was told this involved taking a new plane and giving it a destroyed plane’s tail number. This leaves the question unanswered of how MACV explained the disappearance of the new plane’s number. I leave it to someone else to track down what really happened. Meanwhile, the “official” losses—as put forth by Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham in his testimony to the House Intelligence Committee on 3 December 1975—are still 297 aircraft.

13.
MACV Order of Battle, 31 December 1967. MACV J-2 skipped the 31 January 1968 OB because of the exigencies of Tet.

14.
My memorandum for the record, “Suggested Topics for Research,” 5 February 1968.

15.
MACV CDED Log Numbers 01–1988–68, 01–1998–68, and 01–1999–68. These documents were captured before Tet, warning the defenders of Pleiku that an attack was coming. Despite the warning, the VC got into town, and destroyed large numbers of U.S. helicopters in the process. A visitor to Pleiku shortly after the attack recalled seeing long lines of wrecked helicopters. I do not know whether MACV classified these as “destroyed” or “damaged.” Vietcong losses in personnel were very heavy at Pleiku.

16.
Based on my memorandum for the record “George Allen’s Remarks about the Communist Force Commitment,” 10 February 1968.

17.
I have been unable to locate the citation for this document. However, another document—CDEC log number 05–1131–68—mentions the presence of VC self-defense militia units in Hue.

18.
Based on my memorandum of conversation with Mr. George Carver, Jr., 11 February 1968.

19.
CIA cable, CIA Headquarters to the Saigon Station, 13 February 1968.

20.
CIA cable, Saigon Station to CIA Headquarters, 19 February 1968.

21.
CIA cable, CIA Headquarters to the Saigon Station, 19 February 1968. This answered the cable cited in Note 20.

22.
During this same trip, I went over the OB with Colonel Hawkins. Again, we had no major disagreements. I wrote up a memorandum of conversation on the following day, 28 February 1968. In it, I made this comment: “Colonel Hawkins, as usual, was candid and thoroughly aware of the OB problem. Personally, I feel he is one of the most competent officials in the U.S. intelligence apparatus. Not only does he seem extraordinarily honest, but he obviously shares my belief that intelligence and politics should not be mixed. I wish there were more like him.”

23.
Blascik’s cover sheet to his secretary read: “This memo must: 1) Be read by Sam Adams, 2) Go to Carver for approval, 3) Be finalized, 4) Go to the
director this
P.M.
, 5) Courtesy copies to Paul Wash, Dean Moor and Ron Smith. Have Fun. DWB.”

24.
CIA cable, CIA Headquarters to the Saigon Station, 26 March 1968.

25.
Joint memorandum (CIA and DIA) “The Attrition of Vietnamese Communist Forces 1966–1969,” 30 March 1968.

26.
Based on notes I took while talking to Mr. Andrews, 1 April 1968.

27.
Based on notes I took at the conference, 10 April 1968.

28.
The final conference report went to the director in a memorandum entitled “Results of Community Negotiations on Enemy Strengths in South Vietnam,” under serial number SC 09739/68, from Paul V. Walsh, 2 May 1968.

29.
My memorandum to the CIA Inspector General, “Complaints About Research on the Vietcong,” 27 May 1968.

30.
My memorandum for the record “Comments on the Current Draft of the Introductory Note and Text of National Intelligence Estimate 14.3–67,” 9 November 1967, p. 8.

31.
Based on notes I took during my conversation with Mr. Stewart, 28 May 1968.

32.
Based on notes I took during my conversation with Mr. Stewart, 5 June 1968. Mr. Douglas Andrews was also present. I relayed the conversation to the so-called DDI analyst, who duly noted it down. The analyst’s account agrees with mine.

33.
The ex-chief of the Saigon Station, Gordon Jorgensen (see
Chapter 3
) also took part in these discussions. He was slightly bemused, but otherwise his same old self—direct, and Cagney-like in his manner of expression.

34.
A VC document putting the number of victims at 3,000 was translated under CDEC log number 06–2049–68.

35.
Quoted from Dr. Stephen Hosmer’s
Viet Cong Repression and Its Implications for the Future
(Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books, 1970) p. 49. He got the account from the
New York Times
edition of 1 May 1968. An earlier account of the massacre appeared in the
Times
of 28 March 1968. See Dr. Hosmer’s book, p. 45–51. I later talked to a CIA case officer, who was present when the first bodies were unearthed. He said that it was the most horrible sight he had ever encountered.

36.
Based on notes of my conversation with Messrs. Breckenridge and Gier, 1 August 1968.

37.
Based on notes of my conversation with Mr. Stewart, 22 August 1968.

38.
Headquarters notice NH 20–363 of 13 September 1968.

39.
Based on notes of my conversation with Mr. Ueberhorst, 17 September 1968.

40.
Based on my memorandum of conversation with Colonel Lawrence K. White, 20 September 1968. I took especially careful notes on this occasion, so that much of what Colonel White said is verbatim.

41.
My memorandum to Colonel Lawrence K. White “Accuracy of a Draft Memorandum of Conversation,” 23 September 1968.

42.
Based on notes of my conversation with Colonel White, 23 September 1968.

43.
Based partially on memory, but also on notes I made after my conversation with Mr. Helms, 8 November 1968. I took no notes on the incident concerning Earl McGowan, but I remember it distinctly.

44.
Thomas Powers was kind enough to give me a copy of the chronology he compiled in preparation for writing his book.

45.
Based on notes of my conversation with Messrs. Proctor and Smith, 19 November 1968. George Carver was also present.

46.
My letters to Taylor and Rostow, 18 November 1968, sent with a cover letter, to Helms.

47.
Memorandum from Admiral Rufus Taylor, deputy director CIA, to S. Adams, 20 November 1968.

48.
My memorandum “Intelligence Failures in Vietnam: Suggestions for Reform,” 24 January 1969.

49.
Memorandum from Admiral Rufus Taylor, deputy director CIA, to S. Adams, 31 January 1969. It was among the last official documents the admiral ever produced. He retired from the government that afternoon.

50.
Washington Post,
6 April 1969, the Outlook Section, p. B1 and B4. The interview originally appeared in
L’Europeo,
a magazine published in Milan, Italy, by the Rizzoli Corporation. Ms. Fallacci, whose reporting I greatly admire, described Giap as chubby, about five feet tall, “slightly bloated,” and with “an infantile little round nose. But his eyes are among the most intelligent I’ve ever seen, and also the most crafty, the most cruel.” In one of the more significant passages of the interview, Giap bragged about the Vietnamese beating the Mongols in
A.D.
1200. Although 800 years old, it’s an event that all Vietnamese apparently savor.

A NOTE ON THE AUTHOR

Sam Adams was a graduate of Harvard College (1955) and spent ten years (1963–1973) as an analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency. After leaving the CIA he wrote, raised beef cattle in Virginia, testified before Congress, and helped to produce a CBS television documentary about American intelligence failures in Vietnam. He was completing an account of his time with the CIA when he died suddenly of a heart attack in 1988. He is survived by his wife Anne and two sons, Clayton and Abraham.