War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942 (50 page)

On the fifth day it ended. German soldiers moved warily across to take the surrenders. Meissner recalled, ‘we moved over hundreds of dead, dying and wounded, they had no apparent organisation for dealing with the latter. Russki – Komm!’ was the first order preceding nightmarish forced marches to the rear and PoW camps.

The battle of Kiev spluttered to an end on 24 September 1941. A doctor from the 3rd Panzer Division surveying the battlefield reported:

‘A chaotic scene remained. Hundreds of lorries and troop carriers with tanks in between are strewn across the landscape. Those sitting inside were often caught by the flames as they attempted to dismount, and were burned, hanging from turrets like black mummies. Around the vehicles lay thousands of dead.’
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Sergeant Ivan Nikitch Krylov, a demoted Soviet staff captain, witnessed the final days in the pocket.

‘The Germans outnumbered us, their munitions were practically inexhaustible, their equipment without fault and their daring and courage beyond reproach. But German corpses strewed the ground side by side with our own. The battle was merciless on both sides.’
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Six Soviet armies – the Fifth, Twenty-first, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-seventh, Thirty-eighth and Fortieth – were either wholly or partially destroyed and 50 Soviet divisions were removed from the Soviet order of battle as a consequence. The German news service announced the pocket contained 665,000 Russian prisoners, 884 tanks and 3,718 guns. Soviet sources record that 44 divisions and six brigades with 12 defended localities participated during the Kiev defensive operation conducted between 7 July and 26 September. A total of 700,544 casualties are admitted, of which the greater part – 616,304 – were irrecoverable losses.
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The battle, as Krylov suggested, was not completely one-sided. Feldwebel Max Kuhnert’s unit suffered heavy casualties but, as a colleague pointed out, ‘our losses are nothing like the poor devils of the battalions’. The IInd Battalion and reconnaissance unit on his right flank was much reduced: ‘motorcycles with sidecars were standing or lying on the primitive track and there were bodies everywhere’.
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Chaplain Rudolf Gschöpf’s 45th Division had received a comparable mauling to that already received at Brest-Litovsk. Three infantry Regiments lost 86, 151 and 75 men respectively; 40 others died at the division dressing station and 40 more were scattered elsewhere. In total the division lost 40 officers and 1,200 NCOs and men. This represented half a regiment’s complement of officers and a battalion and a half of men. A service was held over the graves, freshly covered in flowers, and the military band played before the division departed the battlefield. Gschöpf commented, ‘it was the last time our music corps were able to play their instruments during this war.’
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Vehicle shortages had dictated the instruments be sent home to make space for essential stores. The war was losing its heraldry; lethality and objective usefulness were all that was left.

The German press was jubilant. The
Völkischer Beobachter
crowed: ‘An Army of One Million Wiped Out!’ and ‘End of the Kiev Catastrophe’. The
Frankfurter Zeitung
declared simply: ‘Five Soviet Armies Annihilated’.
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For over a month there had been no
Sondermeldungen
relayed to the population since the heady days of Smolensk. The third anniversary of the start of World War 2 had passed, bringing with it an inevitable questioning of what had been achieved and, more significantly: what remained to be done? Interest in the Russian War had not been attracting the previous banner headlines. Secret SS situation reports briefed to Himmler at the beginning of September stated, ‘the already overlong campaign in the east is viewed by much of the population with a certain disquiet.’
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Victory at Kiev changed all this. Attention once again focused on Russia. Popular interest surged to the previous ‘Barbarossa invasion levels. ‘Recently held convictions that static positional operations had developed and that a severe winter campaign is in the offing have slipped into the background,’ observed reports.
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A German housewife living near Nuremberg wrote:

‘Another public announcement was issued today saying the Russians appear to be breaking up around Kiev and 50 divisions have been destroyed. Father said that would be an even greater blow because of the amount of material taken there as well. The Russians with their great masses are impervious to human losses, but they will not be so quick to replace all the equipment.’
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German infantry with Army Group South were less sanguine. It was they who had to mop up the mortally wounded Soviet armies, easily written off by the press, as if surrounding them was all that was required. Finishing off the Kiev pocket had been a hazardous enterprise. Thirty-five German divisions, including six Panzer and four motorised, had been required to execute this Cannae. They represented about one-third of the strength of the original ‘Barbarossa’ invasion force – a massive effort. Soldiers felt and recognised the immense strain. An Obergefreiter with the 98th Infantry Division wrote, ‘we have had 75% losses in our company’. He anticipated the arrival of replacements in a few days. ‘But I believe if they do arrive sooner, as is invariably the case, we will already have been relieved and moved on before they even get here.’ Replacements never seemed to arrive.
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Another Unteroffizier, with the 79th Infantry Division, wrote he ‘had got through the pocket fighting east of Kiev well enough’. He hoped ‘that after this battle they would be taken out of the line, but, even though we have shrunk to a tiny band, sadly, it was out of the question’. They were already marching toward Kharkov. ‘I have strong reservations,’ he confessed, ‘whether we will see an end to the war in Russia this year.’ The outlook appeared pessimistic. ‘Russia’s military might is certainly broken, but the land is too big, and the Russians are not thinking of surrender.’
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His view was echoed by that of a Gefreiter with the 72nd Infantry Division, who declared in a letter that ‘the campaign against Russia began today, three months ago’. He had then surmised ‘the Bolsheviks would be ripe for surrender within at least eight to ten weeks’. German soldiers, he reflected, were more used to a Blitzkrieg – a tempo campaign. Progress had been as rapid as in France when considered in manpower and material terms. ‘Only this morning,’ he wrote, ‘we heard by chance that near Kiev for example, 600 guns were destroyed and 150,000 men taken prisoner… What about those for numbers!… Russia is almost inexhaustible!’ But there was, he pointed out, a fundamental difference between the French and Russian campaigns. In the west:

‘After the penetration of their defensive lines and encirclement, their armies saw further resistance as senseless genocide. They surrendered to save their people. It’s another case here. We’re not fighting against the Russian people but against the Bolshevik world menace, which has enslaved them.’

In short, ‘there would be no armistice forthcoming from the Russians’.
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Generalfeldmarschall von Bock became impatient to begin the promised thrust against Moscow as soon as the encirclement at Kiev had been achieved. The move south had been a distraction from his main effort. He had been miserly with resources, husbanding the main forces within Army Group Centre for as long as possible, reluctant to assist Guderian in the tactical possibilities he opened up as operations progressed. As these forces moved further south he became correspondingly geographically removed from what he clearly considered to be the overdue main effort: an assault on Moscow prior to winter. Throughout the Kiev encirclement battles his diary reflected his frustration and concern. On 20 September, the day after the formation of the pocket, he wrote:

‘The build-up in my front lines can’t be concealed from the enemy in the long run. I must reach a decision: should I wait for the bulk of the promised forces or should I not? In spite of the difficulty of the attack, I am leaning toward “risking something” and attacking as soon as the most necessary units are in place.’

On 24 September he observed, ‘it is clear that the Russians are withdrawing forces from in front of my front to prop up their threatened northern and southern wings. It is time!’
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As ever, the soldiers in the field were blissfully ignorant of this intent. Panzerjäger Ernst Victor Meyer was enjoying the same sunny day to the east of the Kiev pocket. Writing to friends back home, he admitted his virtual ignorance of the true situation.

‘As always we know practically nothing about objectives and intentions. So for now, we are totally unaware what should become of us. Another “Kessel” pocket [
Kiev
] has been “finished off” and for the moment our task completed. Now where are we off to?’
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Theo Scharf, moving through cornfields with the 97th Infantry Division toward Kharkov, recalled, ‘the yellow ripe cornfields could now be picked out of their own tall, stalky forests.’
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It was autumn.

Objective Moscow

Führer Directive Number 35 was issued on 6 September as Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 battled southward to begin the closure of the Kiev pocket. Code-named ‘Taifun’ (Typhoon), the operation aimed at the defeat and annihilation of the Russian forces blocking the road to Moscow ‘in the limited time which remains available before the onset of the winter weather’. Following the encirclement and destruction of the Red Army facing Army Group Centre, Generalfeldmarschall von Bock would ‘begin the advance on Moscow with [his] right flank on the Oka [river] and [his] left on the upper Volga’.

Army Group Centre was to become the
Schwerpunkt
(main point of effort) in this last push before the end of the year. Von Bock issued his attack order on 26 September,
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even as the final blows were being administered to the disintegrating Kiev pocket. In order to provide Army Group Centre with the appropriate force and penetrative power commensurate with its
Schwerpunkt
role to achieve the objective, Army Groups North and South were directed to transfer important forces to von Bock’s control. Hoepner’s Panzergruppe 4 was to be detached from Army Group North and Panzergruppe 2, fighting around Kiev, from Army Group South. Von Bock would have three Panzergruppen under command: these two and Hoth’s Panzergruppe 3, at that moment supporting von Leeb’s assault on Leningrad. Three marching infantry armies – the Ninth, Fourth and Second – would follow behind the Panzer forces.

The attack plan aimed at a double armoured encirclement which would close their pincers east of Vyazma, bringing the Panzer spearheads to within 160km of Moscow astride the main road leading from the west. Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 (now renamed Second Panzer Army) was tasked to attempt an envelopment southeast of Bryansk, by advancing north-east from its present position at Kiev to effect a junction with the Second Infantry Army moving due east. Staff preparation now focused on the requirement to amass the necessary force and matériel.

The war in the east was approaching a climax. On the German side Army Group Centre had nearly two million (1,929,000) soldiers at its disposal, facing one and a quarter million Russian defenders. Over one-third of the forces on both sides formed the logistic and rear area security ‘tail’ supporting the operational ‘teeth’ forward. In reality some 1,200,000 German ‘fighters’ were to engage 800,000 Russian, a ratio of broadly eight German to every five Russian soldiers.
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This was not sufficient for the conventional military wisdom of a ratio of three to one, to ensure a realistic chance of success for attack against defence. Overall figures are less important, however, than tactical and operational excellence, which is required to create the necessary force ratios that ensure success at a given time and place at the front. Surprise is one factor ensuring this, but it becomes subject to an effectiveness ‘fade’ once the operation is underway.

Such a point had arguably been reached in the eastern campaign. The Red Army was configured in a quasi-offensive stance at the outset of ‘Barbarossa’ and was ‘checkmated’ in the wrong place when the German attack began. Massive defeats and encirclements at Minsk and Smolensk bore testimony to the benefits of the surprise achieved. With Leningrad besieged and the armies at Kiev annihilated by a further unexpected move, only one clear German objective remained. This was Moscow. The only remaining conundrum was ‘when?’

Surprise is a two-edged weapon and applies to both sides. Captured Soviet West Front documents give an insight into the tactical and technical surprises inflicted by the German onslaught during the initial invasion phase. ‘Use of infantry forces strongly supported by heavy-calibre infantry guns and anti-tank weapons, with motorcycle troops and the application of deeply echeloned Panzer attacks, in close co-operation with the Luftwaffe’, according to the documents, had considerable impact, ‘thereby deceiving the intent of eventual encirclement, and with good fire control on the move.’ A lesson of the previous short campaigns, which was missed due to the rapidity of the Polish and Balkan operations, but partly reflected in the greater German casualties suffered during the latter part of the French campaign, was that, with experience, Blitzkrieg could be blunted. Shortfalls discerned and commented upon by the German General Staff,
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following the six-week French campaign, were not identified by the enemy until it was too late.