Would You Kill the Fat Man (24 page)

6
. In “Morality, Action and Outcome” in Honderich 1985, 36.

7
. Dershowitz 2002, 141.

8
. It’s worth pointing out that at least one well-known antiutilitarian, Bernard Williams, describes this defense of absolutism as “a cop out.” See “Utilitarianism and Moral Self-indulgence” in Williams 1981, 43.

9
. This is Jeff McMahan’s position. I’m grateful to Professor McMahan for his extremely helpful comments on this chapter.

10
. Rai Gaita interview for Philosophy Bites:
www.philosophybites.com
.

11
. Dostoyevsky 1991, 245–46.

12
. In “Killing and Letting Die” in Foot,
Moral Dilemmas
, 2002, 79.

13
. This example is from James Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” 115, reprinted in Steinbock and Norcross 1994.

14
. Shelly Kagan makes a similar point in
The Additive Fallacy
(1988).

15
. In the BBC World Service documentary,
Would You Kill The Big Guy
(May 2010).

16
. Kamm 2007, 95.

17
. Although Kamm draws this clever distinction, she herself believes that in virtually all cases the intention with which an act is done is irrelevant to whether or not the action is permissible. She believes that the relevant facts have to do not with mental states but with causal relations. The key question for her is whether killing the one is a causally necessary means to saving the five.

Chapter 7: Paving the Road to Hell

1
. Cleveland 1904, 109.

2
. Papke 1999, 30.

3
. Cleveland: Proclamation 366: July 8, 1894.

4
. Anscombe 1957.

5
. Anscombe 2003, 32.

6
. From p. xlvi of report, available online at
http://archive.org/stream/reportonchicago00wriggoog#page/n6/mode/2up
.

7
. Foot,
Virtues and Vices
2002, 21. See also Bennett 1995, 210–11. Bennett imagines a bomber during a war who wants to lower morale among enemy civilians and so targets and kills some of them in a raid. However, he claims he doesn’t intend to kill them, he only intends that they should appear dead for a year or two until the war is over!

8
. Nagel 1986, 181.

9
. Nagel 1986, 182. Nagel believes that if you are “guided by evil” you will adjust your response to changed circumstances. But even if you adjust your response to changes in a trolley scenario, that doesn’t imply that you are “guided by evil” in a deeper sense. Thus, if the five were to escape, you wouldn’t want to still kill the fat man. Nonetheless, our understanding of intentionality is deepened by Nagel’s insight that we reflect on what we would do in alternative situations.

10
. Kamm 2007, 97–99.

11
. Kamm 2007, 97. Strangely, Kamm wants to draw a distinction between Extra Push and Two Loop. She thinks it’s wrong to give the trolley
an Extra Push, but it is perfectly legitimate to redirect the trolley again in Two Loop. It seems to me that they are morally on a par, and that giving the trolley an extra push or redirecting the trolley onto the second loop both make the intention to hit the one unambiguous.

Chapter 8: Morals by Numbers

1
. Mill 1980, 44.

2
. Russell 1977, 85.

3
. Brougham 1838, 287.

4
. King 1976, 2.

5
. Bentham 1970, footnote on p. 283.

6
. William Empson,
Cobbett’s Political Register
, December 12, 1818.

7
. Dinwiddy 1984, 23.

8
. Bassett and Spenser 1929, 146.

9
. Bowring,
The Works
, vol. 10, 57, 63; also see vol. 2, 493–94.

10
. Bowring,
The Works
, vol. 2, 497.

11
. Bowring,
The Works
, vol. 2, 501.

12
. Quoted by Conway 1989, 87.

13
.
The Principles of International Law: Essay 4
(A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace).

14
. Though it’s worth noting that the source for this is Mill’s
Autobiography
, which might peddle some family myths.

15
. Mill 1980, 44.

16
. Mill 1992, 37.

17
. Bentham 1830, 206.

18
. Mill, 2002, chapter II, paragraph 6.

19
. Mill 1992, 60.

20
. Mill is sometimes described as a “rule utilitarian,” though this is a contentious label for him. A rule utilitarian believes that an action is right insofar as it conforms to a rule that leads to the greatest good. Rule utilitarians believe that even if, on a particular occasion, it would be better to break the rule in order to maximize happiness or well-being, nonetheless, one should abide by the rule.

21
. Sidgwick 1962, 490.

22
. Williams 1985, 108. With this phrase Williams was drawing attention to what he called “the important colonialist connections of utilitarianism.”

23
. Sidgwick 1962, 490.

24
. Ibid., 489.

25
. See, e.g., Hare 1981. He calls his two levels of thinking the intuitive and the critical.

26
. It should be said that there are a few consequentialists—Brad Hooker is the best known—who believe that what we should do is identify the rules that maximize happiness or well-being and stick to these rules even if on certain occasions we could increase happiness or well-being by violating these rules.

27
. Both scenarios are in Smart and Williams 1973, 97–100.

28
. A phrase used by Henry Sidgwick: Sidgwick 1962, 382.

Chapter 9: Out of the Armchair

1
. Barry Smith, interview on BBC
Analysis
program, June 28, 2009.

2
. And note that David Hume’s seminal work,
A Treatise of Human Nature
, had, as its subtitle
Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Methods of Reasoning into Moral Subjects
.

3
. Joshua Knobe, interview on
Philosophy Bites
(
www.philosophybites.com
).

4
. Thomson 1986, 107 (my italics).

5
. Email correspondence with author.

6
. See Weinberg et al., 2001. This is not a result that others have managed to replicate.

7
. See Knobe and Nichols 2008, chap. 6, “Moral Responsibility and Determinism.”

8
. Hugh Mellor, quoted in “Philosophy’s Great Experiment,”
Prospect Magazine
, March 2009.

Chapter 10: It Just
Feels
Wrong

1
. Some utilitarians are of the view that we should give little or no weight to our intuitions. But the majority of moral philosophers place great weight on them. In an article entitled “The Wisdom of Repugnance” the former chairman of the President’s Council on Bioethics, Leon Kass, says he is “repelled” by the prospect of cloning humans. He claims that “we intuit and feel, immediately and without argument, the violation of things that we rightfully hold dear.”

2
. Kamm 2007, 137.

3
. Although a couple of studies cast doubt on the idea of philosopher as “expert.” See, for example, Cushman et al. 2012.

4
. Email to author.

5
. Unger 1996, chapter 4.

6
. Liao et al. 2011, 661–71. In an email, Jeff McMahan told me that he got similar results when testing his students for ordering effects.

Chapter 11: Dudley’s Choice and the Moral Instinct

1
. “Usually,” because there are moral relativists who deny that morality is universal.

2
. In such a phrase the convention is that opinion (terrifying) comes before dimension (large), which comes before color (black). But “the large, terrifying, black trolley” might strike people as acceptable too.

3
. Mikhail 2011, 101. There had already been some classic works on the development of morality in children: see, for example, Piaget 1977.

4
. Hauser 2006, 34. Hauser was later disgraced, after reports surfaced of research malpractice: but there has been no suggestion that there was anything untoward about the published results in this field of study.

5
. For these and other manipulations of the trolley examples, see Mikhail 2011, 106–9.

6
. Powers 1987, 23.

7
. Simpson 1994, 61.

8
. Ibid., 62.

9
. Ibid., 69.

10
. Hanson 2000, 272.

11
. See Simpson 1988

12
. Royal Courts of Justice, September 22, 2000, Case No. B1/2000/2969.

13
. Hauser 2006, 126.

14
. I’ve put quotation marks around words like “autonomy” and “agent” because philosophers disagree about whether machines could ever really be autonomous or ever really be moral agents.

Chapter 12: The Irrational Animal

1
. The experiment, devised shortly after the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, was designed to test how badly people
would behave if under instruction from authority figures. Subjects were told that people on the other side of the wall were to learn words. The subjects were ordered to administer electric shocks to the learners if these learners made mistakes in questions about the words. In fact, the learners were actors. The subjects could hear (fake) screams and the learners banging on the wall in (apparent) desperation.

2
. Princeton Theological Seminary is an educational establishment that stresses the virtue of charity and that itself possesses staggering wealth. As of 2011, it had an endowment per student of nearly $1.7 million.

3
. Darley and Batson1973, 100–108.

4
. Danziger et al. 2011.

5
.
Philosophy Bites
interview, “Experiments in Ethics”:
www.philosophybites.com
.

6
. And choosing the nonutilitarian option—death of the five—was also linked to emotional arousal. See Navarrete et al. 2012.

7
. See Valdesolo et al. 2006.

8
. Uhlmann et al. 2009.

9
. In Thomson 1990, 292, she writes that it would “be permissible to kill one chicken to save five chickens.” McMahan 2002, chapter 3, also examines whether deontological constraints apply to animals.

10
. Hume 1975, 415.

11
. Haidt 2001.

12
. Some philosophers don’t accept Haidt’s analysis of such cases. If people run out of reasons for why they believe incest is wrong, that doesn’t imply that they are “dumbfounded.” “Incest is wrong” may simply be a foundational principle—a principle that is self-evident, that is, requires no further justification.

13
. See Wheatley and Haidt 2005.

Chapter 13: Wrestling with Neurons

1
. Damasio has an excellent account of the Phineas Gage story. The historical facts about Gage have been disputed: some say that his behavior changed significantly only later in his life.

2
. Interview for the BBC
Analysis
program, broadcast June 28, 2009.

3
. Interview with J. Greene for the BBC World Service series
Would you Kill the Big Guy?

4
. Suter 2011, 454–58.

5
. Interview with J. Greene for the BBC World Service series
Would you Kill the Big Guy?

6
. Figures from the New America Foundation.

7
. Singer 2009, 59.

8
. See, for example, Small and Loewenstein 2003.

9
. See
chapter 8
.

10
. There are several studies in this area. See, for example, Shepher 1971.

11
. A key debate is whether it is useful to draw a distinction between actions that are responsive to reasons and those that are not. For example, an addict is not responsive to rational considerations—so addicts, in one version of compatibilism, do not have free will. But if a person responds to rational reasons, he or she, on this account, acts freely. Thus, if I adore brussels sprouts, I might choose them if they’re available on the restaurant menu. But were I to read in a medical journal that brussels sprouts are carcinogenic, then I would avoid them. That shows that my decision to eat or not eat brussels sprouts is “reasons-responsive” and, therefore—according to this version of compatibilism—free.

12
. He gives this explanation, for example, in the BBC World Service Series
The Mysteries of the Brain
.

13
. Kahneman’s
Thinking, Fast and Slow
(2012).

14
. This point is well made in a
Philosophy Bites
interview with Neil Levy, at
www.philosophybites.com
.

15
. Singer 2005.

16
. See Amit 2012.

17
. Suter and Hertwig 2011.

18
. E.g., Koenigs et al. 2007.

19
. It may not be that they have stronger utilitarian tendencies, but rather weaker deontological ones. Thus, Joshua Greene believes that psychopaths are not best described as more utilitarian: rather, they simply have reduced emotional responses to causing harm. “What they really are is un-deontological” (email to author). Nonetheless, the upshot is that utilitarian considerations are the ones that do the work in reaching contentious judgments—such as that the right thing to do is push the fat man.

20
. See Lucas and Sheeran 2006.

21
. Though, as described in
chapter 12
, some psychologists have done their best to replicate real life with 3-D experiments.