Authors: Mark Fainaru-Wada
League of Denial (58 page)
1
Paper Number 5:
Elliot J. Pellman et al., “Concussion in Professional Football, Part 5,”
Neurosurgery
, Nov. 2004.
2
A number of conclusions:
Elliot J. Pellman et al., “Concussion in Professional Football, Part 5,”
Neurosurgery
, Nov. 2004.
3
Confidential documents:
The NFL produced the documents on Oct. 28, 2004, in response to discovery requests for “all other benefit claims for TBD (total and permanent disability) in which the Plan participant has asserted that: (1) the claim is based on mental disability, and (2) the mental disability was alleged to have resulted from repetitive trauma to the head or brain from League football activities.” The NFL listed 11 such claims (besides Webster’s) and produced incomplete case histories for several. The players’ names were blacked out. It is impossible to tell from the documents the total number of players who received benefits from the NFL on the basis of claims of mental disability related to football.
4
One was Gerry Sullivan:
Sullivan’s case history shows that he was awarded benefits for both mental and orthopedic disabilities. An independent psychiatrist determined that Sullivan was totally and permanently disabled “due to cognitive impairment and behavioral disinhibition.” A neurologist brought in by the NFL disagreed. The retirement board granted benefits on the basis of the reports of the psychiatrist and an orthopedist.
5
The appellate court:
Jani v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan
, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, unpublished opinion, Dec. 13, 2006.
6
So far as to declare:
David C. Viano et al., “Concussion in Professional Football, Part 10,”
Neurosurgery
, Dec. 2005.
7
“Virtually worthless”:
“Study of Ex-NFL Players Ties Concussion to Depression Risk,”
New York Times
, May 31, 2007.
8
Numerous studies:
J. S. Delaney et al., “Concussion during the 1997 Canadian Football League Season,”
Clinical Journal of Sports Medicine
, 2000; J. S. Delaney et al., “Concussions among University Football and Soccer Players,”
Clinical Journal of Sports Medicine
, 2002.
9
At his alma mater:
Guskiewicz brought up the NFL midway through his commencement speech to emphasize the need for “perseverance, surrounding yourself with good people, and carefully making decisions.” He said: “In 2005 and 2007, I published (along with a group of 5 colleagues) two research papers that have defined my career as a neuroscientist. The findings of my research outlined in these papers appeared to be incriminating toward arguably one of the most popular and profitable industries in America—professional football, yes—the NFL. Our four-year study identified a high probability of developing later life cognitive impairment and depression once a player had sustained 3 or more concussions during their NFL career. It was the last thing the NFL wanted to hear, and the league’s own medical committee immediately began dismissing our findings and trying to hire other doctors and scientists to ‘put out the fire.’ The NFL was in damage control mode. Its committee members began pointing fingers at our research and even initiated its own study. This was ‘industry-funded research’ at its
best. Members of the league’s committee even suggested that we were out to ruin the game of football. It was a difficult time for our group, because we knew our research was solid, and we refused to be intimidated and just walk away. The irony of this is that my 3 boys were playing Pop Warner Football at the time, and if I wanted to paint this ugly picture of the game—would I really allow my own children to participate in the sport? All along, we had claimed that our goal was to identify risk factors for concussion and long-term effects to help improve the game and to help preserve the sport of football.”
10
Protector of the league:
Bob Cantu interview, 2012.
11
Conclusions of NFL Paper Number 6:
Elliot J. Pellman et al., “Concussion in Professional Football, Part 6,”
Neurosurgery
, Dec. 2004.
12
The response:
Elliot J. Pellman et al., “Concussion in Professional Football, Part 6,”
Neurosurgery
, Dec. 2004 (comments).
13
A lark:
Bill Barr interview, 2012.
14
Coauthored a chapter:
Mark R. Lovell and William Barr, “American Professional Football,”
Traumatic Brain Injury in Sports
, pp. 209–219.
15
Madison Square Garden:
Barr interview, 2012.
16
He was incredulous:
Barr interview, 2012.
17
Pellman later denied:
“Doctor Yes,”
ESPN The Magazine
, Oct. 28, 2006.
18
Barr began to contact:
Barr e-mail correspondence with Rick Naugle, Chris Randolph, and John Woodward.
19
This was false:
“Doctor Yes,”
ESPN The Magazine
, Oct. 28, 2006.
20
Lovell denied:
Mark Lovell interview.
21
Maroon seemed taken aback:
Pellman et al., “Concussion in Professional Football, Part 6,”
Neurosurgery
, Dec. 2004 (comments).
22
A letter to his dean:
Letter from Barr to Richard I. Levin, Vice Dean for Education, Faculty and Academic Affairs, NYU School of Medicine, April 29, 2005.
23
Five papers in as many months:
“Concussion in Professional Football,” Parts 4–8, ran monthly between Oct. 2004 and Feb. 2005 in
Neurosurgery
. Committee members told the authors that the NFL project evolved into a series of 16 papers but that no specific number was originally planned.
24
Concussions were so minor:
Elliot J. Pellman et al., “Concussion in Professional Football, Part 7,”
Neurosurgery
, Jan. 2007.
25
“Concussion prone”:
Elliot J. Pellman et al., “Concussion in Professional Football, Part 12,”
Neurosurgery
, Feb. 2006.
26
For $500,000:
“NFL Helmet Manufacturer Warned on Concussion Risk,”
Frontline
, May 1, 2013. This article, written by Sabrina Shankman, was part of a reporting partnership between
Frontline
and ESPN’s
Outside the Lines
. The original article can be found at
pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sports/concussion-watch/nfl-helmet-manufacturer-warned-on-concussion-risk
; and
espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/9228260/report-warned-riddell-no-helmet-prevent-concussions-nfl-helmet-maker-marketed-one-such-anyway/
.
27
A confidential report:
Report from Chris Withnall, senior engineer, Biokinetics, prepared for Riddell Inc., Nov. 15, 2000.
28
“Full stop”:
Frontline
, May 1, 2013.
29
Riddell provided the helmets:
Mark Lovell interview, 2012.
30
Collins, who led the study:
Micky Collins et al., “Examining Concussion Rates and Return to Play in High School Football Players Wearing Newer Helmet Technology: A Three-Year Prospective Cohort Study,”
Neurosurgery
, Feb. 2006.
31
A blistering commentary:
Micky Collins et al., “Examining Concussion Rates and Return to Play in High School Football Players Wearing Newer Helmet Technology: A Three-Year Prospective Cohort Study,”
Neurosurgery
, Feb. 2006 (comments).
1
Apuzzo continued to rubber-stamp:
Cantu, the section editor, said other peer reviewers were recruited to evaluate the papers after he and Guskiewicz refused; the publication of the NFL concussion series continued until just before the MTBI committee was disbanded.
2
Agreed to publish Omalu’s paper:
Omalu e-mails.
3
Support Cantu’s theory:
Cantu interview, 2012.
4
The torturous review process:
Omalu e-mails and interview, 2012.
5
An original version:
Omalu and Hamilton e-mails.
6
The paper was published:
Bennet I. Omalu et al., “Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National Football League Player,”
Neurosurgery
, July 2005.
7
Donald Marion:
Omalu interview, 2012; Hamilton e-mails; Donald Marion interview, 2012.
8
Omalu wrote to his colleagues:
Omalu e-mail to DeKosky and Hamilton.
9
The NFL’s letter:
Ira R. Casson, Elliot J. Pellman, and David C. Viano, “Correspondence,”
Neurosurgery
, May 2006.
10
A shot of Johnnie Walker Red:
Omalu interview, 2012; Omalu,
Play Hard, Die Young: Football Dementia, Depression, and Death
.
11
He did some quick research:
Omalu interview, 2012; Omalu,
Play Hard, Die Young: Football Dementia, Depression, and Death
.
12
Omalu e-mailed:
Hamilton e-mails.
13
Hamilton wasn’t at all amused:
Hamilton interview, 2012, and e-mails.
14
The men exchanged e-mails:
Hamilton e-mails.
15
Dug further into the history:
Omalu, Hamilton, and DeKosky interviews, 2012.
16
He had discovered another case of CTE:
Omalu, Hamilton, DeKosky, and Wecht interviews; Hamilton e-mails.
17
Terry Long killed himself:
Long autopsy report.
18
Long was like Webster:
Long biography from ProFootball
Reference.com
; Bailes interview, 2012; “Long, Terrence L,”
TribLive
, obituaries; and “Long Carries His Weight with Steelers,”
Pittsburgh Press
, Aug. 6, 1985.
19
Tested positive for steroids:
“Long’s Road Back,”
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
, Dec. 4, 1991.
20
Dramatic downward spiral:
Omalu,
Play Hard, Die Young: Football Dementia, Depression, and Death;
“Final Days Were Troubled for Former Steeler,”
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
, June 10, 2005.
21
“Ground Zero”:
“Heads Up,”
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
, Sept. 7, 2000. Upon launching the UPMC concussion program, Micky Collins told Chuck Finder: “What we really want to do is make Pittsburgh ground zero.”
22
The autopsy:
Dr. Abdulrezak Shakir interview, 2012; Long autopsy; Omalu interview, 2012.
23
Omalu repeated the process:
Bennet I. Omalu et al., “Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National Football League Player: Part II,”
Neurosurgery
, Nov. 2006.
24
Omalu sent the slides to Hamilton:
Omalu and Hamilton interviews, 2012; Hamilton e-mails.
25
He went straight to the media:
“Wecht: Long Died from Brain Injury; Had Head Trauma from NFL Days,”
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
, Sept. 14, 2005.
26
The NFL responded swiftly:
“Surgeon Disputes Findings; Disagrees with Wecht That Football Killed Long,”
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
, Sept. 15, 2005.
27
Wecht called Omalu at home:
Omalu and Wecht interviews, 2012.
28
A 1987 letter written by Maroon:
“Cause of Death Sparks Debate,”
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
, Sept. 16, 2005.
29
Even more confusing:
“Suicide Ruling in Long’s Death Hasn’t Ended Controversy,”
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
, Jan. 26, 2006.
30
Finishing touches:
Hamilton e-mails.
31
Omalu, Hamilton, and DeKosky wrote:
Bennet I. Omalu et al., “Correspondence,”
Neurosurgery
, May 2006.
32
Published the Long study six months later:
Bennet I. Omalu et al.,
“Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National Football League Player: Part II,”
Neurosurgery
, Nov. 2006.
33
The phone rang at Omalu’s desk:
Omalu and Bailes interviews, 2012; Omalu,
Play Hard, Die Young: Football Dementia, Depression, and Death
, 2008.
34
Bailes told Omalu:
Bailes and Omalu interviews, 2012.
35
One of Cantu’s former patients:
Chris Nowinski and Omalu interviews, 2012; Omalu,
Play Hard, Die Young: Football Dementia, Depression, and Death
.
36
A new breed of Dissenter:
Nowinski biography from Nowinski interview, 2012; Christopher Nowinski,
Head Games: Football’s Concussion Crisis
.
37
Killer Kowalski’s Pro Wrestling School:
www.
killerkowalskis.com
.
38
“A dynamic individual”:
Cantu interview, 2012.
39
Nowinski was checking
SI.com
:
Nowinski interview, 2012.
40
Andre Waters:
Biography from
ProFootballReference.com
; “Pro Football’s Necessary Headaches to NFL Players,”
Philadelphia Inquirer
, Oct. 30, 1994.
41
Nowinski played a hunch:
Nowinski interview, 2012.
42
While trying to get his book published:
Nowinski and Alan Schwarz interviews, 2012.
43
Primarily a baseball writer:
Schwarz interview, 2012; Alan Schwarz,
The Numbers Game: Baseball’s Lifelong Fascination with Statistics
, 2005.
44
The story on the Waters results:
This account of the background on how the Andre Waters story developed is drawn from 2012 interviews with Schwarz, Nowinski, and Omalu.
45
Waters had brain damage:
“Expert Ties Ex-Players’ Brain Damage to Football,”
New York Times
, Jan. 18, 2007.
46
When Bailes contacted Omalu:
Bailes and Omalu interviews, 2012.
47
Omalu and Maroon had struck a truce:
Omalu and Maroon interviews, 2012; Hamilton e-mails.
48
Gathered in Hamilton’s office:
This account of the meeting is drawn from 2012 interviews with Omalu, Bailes, Hamilton, DeKosky, and Maroon.