1415: Henry V's Year of Glory (67 page)

As shown in Appendix Four, the actual ratio of Frenchmen to Englishmen at the battle cannot have been more than two to one. Indeed, it was probably slightly less than that: the English army of between eight and nine thousand fighting men found themselves facing between twelve and fifteen thousand Frenchmen. There simply is no evidence to support a larger French army. Those who have opted to maintain the vast disparity mentioned in chronicles like the
Gesta
have done so largely because of national pride and tradition, not because of a body of supporting evidence. On the other hand, those who have sought to correct such views have themselves failed to answer a crucial question arising from their revisionism: why were the English astonished as they climbed the hill above Blangy and saw the French army? Or, to put it another way, why do so many chronicles on both sides agree that the French hugely outnumbered the English?

The most likely answer – which has not been put forward before – lies in the different make-up of the two armies and the numbers of their respective non-combatants. English companies had thirty
archers to every ten men-at-arms, and thus only ten pages: an extra 25% non-combatants. In the French army, for every thirty archers there were sixty men-at-arms, and thus sixty pages: an extra 66% non-combatants. Whereas the English had about 1,500 pages, the French had between eight and ten thousand. In addition, all the men-at-arms on both sides would have had spare horses, and the easiest and safest way to move these was to allow the pages to ride them. From a distance of three or four miles, it would have been very difficult to distinguish between the men-at-arms and the pages. So when the French looked at the English army they saw no more than eleven thousand men in total (eight to nine thousand fighting men, plus the pages and support staff). But when the English looked at the French army, they saw at least eighteen thousand mounted men – not including the four or five thousand archers and crossbowmen, and the extra infantry raised from the locality. If there were ten thousand men-at-arms, as the Burgundian chroniclers and Gilles le Bouvier suggest, then the English probably really did see an army about three times the size of their own fighting force.

From the point of view of the French, another factor has to be considered – the prejudice against low-status archers. French archers had won no major battles, and had contributed very little to French military prestige over the centuries. Crossbowmen employed in French wars were often mercenaries; and the French saw their archers as relatively insignificant. Also, crossbows were slow and weak in battle; it is unlikely that many Frenchmen knew how destructive a coordinated mass of English longbows could be – the most that any of them had faced in living memory was the thousand or so archers at St-Cloud in 1411. For the English, on the other hand, the archers were crucial. So, while eight thousand English soldiers came to terms with the prospect of fighting what appeared to be an army of 24,000 or more Frenchmen (three-to-one), the French saw that their own men-at-arms outnumbered the English men-at-arms six-to-one. The contemporary chronicler Edmond de Dyntner adopted this form of reckoning: ‘there were ten French nobles against one English,’ he stated, slightly exaggerating.
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The social prejudices of the French military elite, in addition to variations in the two kingdoms’ military traditions, meant that both sides thought the French army outnumbered the English heavily, whether three-to-one, or six-to-one.

The feeling the English had of being outnumbered three-to-one was exacerbated by the fact that they could not see the whole of the French force. They knew the size of their own army, of course, having marched in three battles and camped together for the last three weeks. But for them, the whole of the surrounding area might have been populated with French troops. The villages could not be presumed to be unoccupied; a large number of scouts had attacked French troops at villages and river crossings. The very character of the medieval landscape meant that coppices, barns and houses obscured the forces of the defending army.

On top of this, both sides would have been aware that not all the French troops had yet arrived. It seems the count of Nevers was not actually with the French army at this stage.
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It is possible that his men-at-arms had delayed at Corbie, and had been the cavalry whom the English had seen at Péronne on the 19th. Certainly his brother, the duke of Brabant, was still hurrying to the army, staying at Lens this evening, thirty miles away. The duke of Brittany was still at Amiens, although he had sent ahead his brother the count of Richemont with some of his men. The duke of Anjou’s six hundred men-at-arms also had not yet arrived, being led by the seigneur de Longny. The commander of the Parisian garrison, Tanneguy du Chastel, who was also in the battle plan, was also absent. Even the newly appointed overall commander of the French forces, the duke of Orléans, was not yet with the army. For the already-outnumbered English the prospect of becoming more heavily outnumbered on the following day can only have demoralised them further.

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Henry’s reaction to the news that a huge army lay ahead of him was to set spurs to his horse and ride ahead to join the duke of York. Having seen the French army for himself, he returned to the main battle and ‘very calmly and quite heedless of danger, he gave encouragement to his army and drew them up in battles and wings, as if they were to fight immediately’.
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The troops began to make their confessions. They knelt and prayed.

According to some reports, it was at this juncture that Sir Walter
Hungerford said to Henry that he wished they had another ten thousand of the finest archers in England. According to the
Gesta
Henry replied,

that is a foolish way to talk because, by the God in Heaven upon whose grace I have relied and in whom is my firm hope of victory, even if I could I would not have one man more than I do. For these men with me are God’s people, whom He deigns to let me have at this time. Do you not believe that the Almighty, with these his humble few, is able to overcome the opposing arrogance of the French who boast of their great number, and their own strength?
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Another source has Henry replying less lyrically to a request by Hungerford for just one thousand more archers:

Thus, foolish one, do you tempt God with evil? My hope does not wish for one man more. Victory is not seen to be given on the basis of numbers. God is all-powerful. My cause is put into His hands. Here he pressed us down with disease. Being merciful, He will not let us be killed by these enemies. Let pious prayers be offered to Him.
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Did such a conversation take place? Other chroniclers do mention it – but in very similar words. All the accounts might have been based on a story circulating in the wake of the
Gesta
. The authors were writing with the benefit of hindsight, and keen to expand on the religious virtues of the king. But even if the story is true, and verbatim, it was not wholly original. It has several precedents in biblical speeches attributed to Judas Maccabeus, the Old Testament king to whom Edward III had been compared, and with whom Henry’s father had associated himself.
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For example, in 1 Maccabees 3: 16–19, one reads:

When he reached the city of Beth-Horon, Judas went out to meet him with a few men; but when they saw the army coming against them, they said to Judas: how can we, few as we are, fight against such a mighty host as this? Besides we are weak today from fasting; but Judas said: it is easy for many to be overcome by a few; in the sight of Heaven there is no difference between deliverance by many or a few; for victory in war does not depend upon the size of the army but on the strength that comes from Heaven.

Other speeches are to be found in the various chronicles for the evening – but these too are of uncertain veracity, and written with the benefit of hindsight. Henry supposedly made a speech in which he declared that he would rather die than be taken by the enemy. He might have done, he might not. Similarly, some French chronicles state that Henry sent heralds to the French asking that the battle be put off until the following day. As not all the French had arrived, such a plan suited them well.
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If Henry did seek a short truce, he did not trust the answer. He kept his troops drawn up in battle formation until sunset, and for much of that time he made them kneel and pray.
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Only when it was clear that there would be no pitched battle did he tell them to take shelter for the night in the houses, gardens and orchards of Maisoncelle.

It was then that it began to rain.

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The night of 24–25 October 1415 cannot have been easy for anyone anywhere near Agincourt, whether they were French or English. For the Englishmen camped in the tents in the orchards and gardens of Maisoncelle, and for their lords and masters in the houses and barns, there was the sheer nervous anticipation of the following day. Few could have slept well. Some were still suffering from dysentery.
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As they lay or sat there, listening to the pounding of the rain – if they were not actually feeling it soak through their clothes – most would have believed that on the following day they would die. Men who survived the battle but who were captured and could not afford to pay a ransom would be killed, normally with a knife through the windpipe or an axe blow through the skull. It was being said that the French were casting lots for which English lords they were going to take prisoner, such was their confidence. The rain was the least of their worries. Their lack of food, their tiredness and fear – tomorrow everything would be over, the whole hellish episode.

For the Frenchmen things cannot have been much easier. The rain was a bother. They had to go into the villages and take what straw and hay they could find to try to soak up the mud where they were
camping. Many men had been billeted in villages until now, and so lacked any tents or other shelter, and so grew depressed as they sat waiting in the heavy rain. They were also tired, having tracked the English army for two weeks, and having had several hard days’ riding in order to cut off the English advance. They too were hungry and miserable. They had been forced to live off the land, and had had to requisition or steal food from their own people. Groups of them had regularly confronted the English and been wounded. Large portions of their army were absent. The duke of Orléans seems to have caught up with the rest of the army during the night, or first thing in the morning, so presumably he was riding through the dire weather.
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But that meant their overall commander was tired and unfamiliar with the territory as well as the troops. And where were the other ducal companies? Where was the duke of Brittany? Where were the duke of Anjou’s men? Where was the duke of Brabant? Where was the duke of Lorraine? Where were John the Fearless and his son, the count of Charolais?

Henry was lodged in a small house in Maisoncelle. His night was no doubt spent in prayer – in part at least. Everything he had worked for was to be put to the test on the morrow. Every decision he had made was likewise to be tested. But most of all, his faith was on trial. If God was not on his side after all, then tomorrow he would be a prisoner of the king of France, and in his absence his enjoyment of the throne of England would depend entirely on the loyalty of his brothers. How loyal would they be, after he had forsaken the advice of his brother and heir, Thomas, in undertaking this march across France? The very reason he was here in France was to prove his right to the throne of England by demonstrating it was God’s will that he should be king of France. If he lost this battle and many hundreds of men, he stood to lose not just his claim on the French throne but the security of his English title too. He had staked everything on victory. It was all or nothing.

In this light one has to give Henry credit for holding his nerve and providing such controlled leadership, especially in the wake of his own ill health. Few other men could have done it, in such appalling circumstances. But he did not let up for a moment. In line with his strict discipline on the march, he ordered that the whole camp was to remain silent throughout the night. Men-at-arms making a noise
were to have their horses and armour confiscated. Archers and servants who were not silent were to have an ear cut off. This rule of silence served two purposes: it encouraged prayerfulness, and it permitted careful attention to the sounds of the night. Had the English been making a clamour, and with the rain falling so heavily, it would have been very easy for a French sortie to make a sudden night attack and cause confusion and panic throughout the English army. The two camps were no more than 1,200 yards apart; one source says their front lines were as close as 250 paces.
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Because of the danger, Henry also ordered his men to build bonfires by which to keep watch through the night.

The moon was now in its last quarter. With the rain clouds above, there was virtually no moonlight. Nevertheless it appears that the count of Richemont advanced to the English lines with two thousand men, and came close enough to be noticed and attacked by archers before he withdrew.
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Henry also sent out men to reconnoitre the land. Despite the darkness and the rain, it was worth getting to know as much as possible about the site of the forthcoming battle.

Friday 25th: the Feast of
St Crispin and St Crispinian

It is unlikely that Henry slept. At the best of times he needed very little rest. In the hours before dawn he probably stayed in his house in Maisoncelle, discussing the battle ahead with members of his council, hearing reports of the attack of the count of Richemont, and waiting for the return of the scouts he had sent to spy out the land during the night.