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I
n the summer of 1421 the emperor Zhu Di lost a stupendous gamble. In doing so, he lost control of China and, eventually, his life.

Zhu Di's dreams were so outsized that, though China in the early fifteenth century was the greatest power on earth, it still could not summon the means to realize the emperor's monumental ambitions. Having embarked on the simultaneous construction of the Forbidden City, the Ming tombs, and the Temple of Heaven, China was also building two thousand ships for Zheng He's fleets. These vast projects had denuded the land of timber. As a consequence, eunuchs were sent to pillage Vietnam. But the Vietnamese leader Le Loi fought the Chinese with great skill and courage, tying down the Chinese army at huge financial and psychological cost. China had her Vietnam six hundred years before France and America had theirs.
¹

China's debacle in Vietnam grew out of the costs of building and maintaining her treasure fleets, through which the emperor sought to bring the entire world into Confucian harmony within the Chinese tribute system. The fleets were led by eunuchs—brave sailors who were intensely loyal to the emperor, permanently insecure, and ready to sacrifice all. However, the eunuchs were also uneducated and frequently corrupt. And they were loathed by the mandarins, the educated administrative class that buttressed a Confucian system in which every citizen was assigned a clearly defined place.

Superb administrators, the mandarins recoiled from risk. They disapproved of the extravagant adventures of the treasure fleets, whose far-flung exploits had the added disadvantage of bringing them into contact with “long nosed barbarians.” In the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), mandarins were the lowest class.
²
However, in the Ming dynasty, Emperor Hong Wu, Zhu Di's father, reversed the class system to favor mandarins.

The mandarins planned Hong Wu's attack on his son Zhu Di, the Prince of Yen, whom Hong had banished to Beijing (Nanjing then being the capital of China). The eunuchs sided with Zhu Di, joining his drive south into Nanjing. After his victory in 1402, Zhu Di expressed his gratitude by appointing eunuchs to command the treasure fleets.

Henry Tsai paints a vivid portrait of Zhu Di, also known as the Yongle emperor:

Under Zhu Di, the mandarins were relegated to organizing the finances necessary to build the fleet. But for generations of mandarins who governed the Ming dynasty and compiled almost all Chinese historical sources, the voyages led by Zheng He were a deviation from the proper path. The mandarins did all they could to belittle Zheng He's achievements. As Edward L. Dreyer points out, Zheng He's biography in the
Ming-Shi-lu
was deliberately placed before a series of chapters on eunuchs “who are grouped with ‘flatterers and deceivers,' ‘treacherous ministers,' ‘roving bandits' and ‘all intrinsically evil categories of people.'”
⁴

As long as the voyages prospered, and tribute flowed back to the Middle Kingdom to finance the fleet's adventures, the simmering rivalry between mandarins and eunuchs could be contained. However, in the summer of 1421, Zhu Di's reign went horribly wrong. First, the Forbidden City, which had cost vast sums to build, was burned to ashes by a thunderbolt. Next, the emperor became impotent and was taunted by his concubines. In a final indignity, he was thrown from his horse, a present from Tamburlaine's son Shah Rokh.
⁵
It appeared that Zhu Di had lost heaven's favor.

In December 1421, at a time when Chinese farmers were reduced to eating grass, Zhu Di embarked on another extravaganza. He led an enormous army into the northern steppe to fight the Mongol armies of Aruqtai, who had refused to pay tribute.
⁶

This was too much for Xia Yuanji, the minister of finance; he refused to fund the expedition. Zhu Di had his minister arrested along with the minister of justice, who had also objected to the adventure. Fang Bin, the minister of war, committed suicide. With his finances in ruins and his cabinet in revolt, the emperor rode off to the steppe, where he was outwitted and outmaneuvered by Aruqtai. On August 12, 1424, Zhu Di died.
⁷

Zhu Gaozhi, Zhu Di's son, took over as emperor and promptly reversed his father's policies. Xia Yuanji was restored as minister of finance, and drastic fiscal measures were adopted to rein in inflation. Zhu Gaozhi's first edict on ascending the throne on September 7, 1424,
laid the treasure fleet low: he ordered all voyages of the treasure ships to be stopped. All ships moored at Taicang were ordered back to Nanjing.
⁸

The mandarins were back in control. The great Zheng He was pensioned off along with his admirals and captains. Treasure ships were left to rot at their moorings. Nanjing's dry docks were flooded and plans for additional treasure ships were burned.

Then suddenly, unexpectedly, on May 29, 1425, Zhu Gaozhi died. He was succeeded by his son Zhu Zhanji, Zhu Di's grandson.

Zhu Zhanji seemed destined to be one of China's greatest emperors. Far more cautious than Zhu Di, he was nonetheless extremely clever. He quickly realized that China's abdication as Queen of the Seas would have disastrous consequences—not least that the barbarians would cease paying tribute. What's more, the dream of a world united in Confucian harmony would be dashed and the colossal expenditure that had enabled China to acquire allies and settlements throughout the world would be wasted.

Zhu Zhanji also realized that the eunuchs disfavored by his father had their virtues. He set up a palace school to instruct them
⁹
and appointed eunuchs to important military commands. He reversed his father's plan to move the capital south to Nanjing, restoring it to Beijing, once again facing the Mongols. Yet he also believed in the Confucian virtues espoused by the mandarins and cultivated their friendship over bottles of wine. In many ways Zhu Zhanji combined the best of his father, including his concern for farmers, with that of his grandfather, whose boldness he emulated in approaching the barbarians.

The new reign would be known as Xuan De, “propagating virtue.” For Zheng He and the eunuchs, it marked a return to center stage. Soon another great sailing expedition would be launched, to bear the word to the barbarians to instruct them into deference and submission.

I
n 1430 the young emperor empowered Admirals Zheng He and Wang Jinghong to act on his behalf, issuing them a specially minted brass medallion, in a mix of zhuanshu
¹
and kaishu
²
scripts, inscribed
AUTHORISED AND AWARDED BY XUAN DE OF THE GREAT MING
.

The emperor appointed Zheng He as his ambassador. Here is the edict from the
Xuanzong Shi-lu,
dated June 29, 1430: “Everything was prosperous and renewed but the Foreign countries, distantly located beyond the sea, still had not heard and did not know. For this reason Grand Directors Zheng He, Wang Jinghong and others were specially sent, bearing the word, to go and instruct them into deference and submission.”
³

This voyage to “instruct” the foreigners was the zenith of Admiral Zheng He's great career. Before departing, he had two inscriptions carved in stone to document his achievements. The first inscription, dated March 14, 1431, was placed near the temple of the sea goddess at Taicang, downriver from Nanjing near the estuary of the Yangtze.

The other inscribed stone was placed farther down the Chinese coast at the mouth of the Min River in Fujian. It is dated the second winter month of the sixth year of Xuan De, which makes it between December 5, 1431, and January 7, 1432. It is called the Chang Le epigraphy.

Liu Gang, who owns a Chinese map of the world from 1418, a critical document that we will revisit later, has translated the Chang Le epigraphy as it would have been understood in the early Ming dynasty. His translation differs in some key respects from the modern translation produced above.

The full import of the distinctions become apparent once we understand what the terms “western region of the Imperial Ming” and “northward extension from the Imperial Ming” meant at the time the stones were carved. “The term ‘western region' originated during the Han dynasty and at that time referred to the region between Zhong
Ling (now in the northern Xian Jiang autonomous region) and Dun Huang (at the edge of the Takla Makan Desert),” Liu Gang explains.

The phrase “the north of the northward extension from the Imperial Ming” is even more pregnant with meaning. As Liu Gang has explained, in Zheng He's era the Chinese had no concept of the North Pole as the highest point of the earthly sphere. Accordingly, when they traveled north from China to the North American continent, traversing the North Pole (great circle route), they believed the journey was always northward. The modern geographic understanding is that the great circle route from China to North America runs north to the North Pole, then south to North America. This concept was unknown to the Chinese.

To the Ming Chinese, “in the north of the northward extension from the Imperial Ming” means a place beyond the North Pole. This understanding is reflected in the 1418 world map, which shows a passage through the polar ice across the North Pole leading to America. (According to the Dutch meteorological office, there were three exceptionally warm winters in the 1420s, which could have melted the Arctic sea ice.)
⁸

Thus, if we take the two steles at their word, it appears that Zheng He's fleets had already reached three thousand countries as well as the North Pole and North America beyond the Pole.

The emperor's order to Zheng He to instruct distant lands beyond the seas to follow the way of heaven now seems awesome. Zheng He is
being ordered to return to all three thousand countries he had visited in his life at sea. The task would require a huge number of ships—several great fleets readied for voyages across the world. This explains the lengthy delay between the imperial edict and the fleets' actual departure from Chinese waters some two years later.

Each month, a wealth of evidence comes to our website from sources in about 120 different countries. Taken together, the evidence, which includes the wrecks of Chinese junks in distant waters, has convinced me that my original estimate of the size of Zheng He's fleet—some one hundred ships—was far too low.

Over the past three years, two researchers, Professor Xi Longfei and Dr. Sally Church, have found references in the
Ming Shi-lu
to the number of junks built in the years 1403 to 1419. The figures are subject to interpretation, particularly with regard to the number that can be assigned specifically to Zheng He's fleets. But it seems the low estimate of the size of Zheng He's fleets is as follows: 249 ships completed in 1407 “in preparation for sending embassies to the Western Oceans”; plus five oceangoing ships built in 1404, which the
Ming Shi-lu
explicitly states were ordered because envoys would soon be sent abroad; plus 48 “Treasure ships” built in 1408 and another 41 built in 1419. That makes a total of 343 ships constructed for Zheng He's voyages.
⁹

A middle estimate would include “converted” ships, the purpose of which is unspecified in the
Ming Shi-lu
. Of these, there were 188 in 1403; 80 in early November 1405; 13 in late November 1407; 33 in 1408; and 61 in 1413. Adding these converted ships to the 343 ships described above would give Zheng He a total of 718 ships.

The high estimate includes 1,180
haizhou,
ordered in 1405, whose purpose is unspecified, and two orders of
haifeng chuan
(ocean wind ships)—61 in 1412 and the same number again in 1413. All together, that would mean a fleet of 2,020 ships out of a total construction program of 2,726. Even at this high estimate, Zheng He's fleet would still have been smaller than Kublai Khan's, though of better quality.

Based on Camões's account of the Chinese fleet that reached Calicut eighty years before Vasco da Gama, my guess is that Zheng He had at his disposal more than 1,000 ships. “More than eight hundred sail of large
and small ships came to India from the ports of Malacca and China and the Lequeos (Ryuku) Islands with people of many nations and all laden with merchandise of great value which they brought for sale…they were so numerous that they filled the country and settled as dwellers in all of the towns of the sea coast.”
¹⁰

The emperor's massive ship-building program was accompanied by major improvements in the junks' construction. Professor Pan Biao of the College of Wood Science and Technology of Nanjing Forestry University has carried out groundbreaking work into the types of timber found in the Nanjing shipyards where the treasure ships were built. About 80 percent of the material was pine, 11 percent hardwoods other than teak, and 5.5 percent teak.

The pine—soft, humidity-and decay-resistant, and long used for building both houses and ships—was largely from south China. Teak, which is hard, heavy, and resistant to insect attack, is ideal for main frames. However, it was foreign to China and a new material for Chinese shipbuilders.

What astonished Professor Pan Biao was the volume of hardwood and teak that was imported. “Before Zheng He, hardwood had never left its countries of origin in a single step,” he said. “But during Zheng He's voyages, and in the one or two hundred years following his voyages, hardwood was not only massively used in shipbuilding but was also brought into Southeast Asia and transplanted there for the first time.” Professor Pan Biao argues that Zheng He's voyages contributed greatly to large-scale international trade in hardwood and to the remarkable progress in Southeast Asia's shipbuilding industry.
¹¹

In each of the years 1406, 1408, 1418, and 1432, fleets of a hundred or more Chinese vessels spent lengthy periods refitting in the ports of East Java. The Chinese who settled in Java played a major part in the development of Javanese shipbuilding. Professor Anthony Reid suggests that the flowering of Javanese shipbuilding in the fifteenth century was due to “creative melding of Chinese and Javanese marine technology in the wake of Zheng He's expeditions.”
¹²

The new building program in China, aided by better timber and the huge refitting endeavor in Java, would gradually have improved the
quality of Zheng He's fleets. We know from detailed research initiated by Kenzo Hayashida that Kublai Khan's fleets, wrecked in Tokushima Bay in Japan in 1281, were doomed as much by the poor quality of their construction as by the fury of the
kamikaze
winds.

With their superior wood and construction, Zheng He's ships would be capable of crossing the stormiest oceans. However, the scale of these vast fleets would have created enormous command and control problems, as I can attest from personal experience.

In late 1968, before taking command of HMS
Rorqual,
I was appointed operations officer to the staff of Admiral Griffin, who then commanded the Royal Navy's Far East Fleet. My duties were the day-to-day operation of the fleet—an aircraft carrier, fuel tanker, supply ships, destroyers, frigates, and submarines.
¹³
I quickly learned just how difficult it is to control a fleet of twenty ships, not least in the sudden squalls of the South China Sea, which can reduce visibility to a few yards. Changes in visibility constitute a threat, which requires that the fleet be continuously repositioned.

This experience was repeated when I was in command of HMS
Rorqual.
By tradition, the first Royal Navy vessel on the scene of a sunken submarine takes charge of the recovery operation, irrespective of the seniority of her captain. When HMS
Onslaught
was simulating a sunken submarine on the seabed, the
Rorqual
was the first ship there.
¹⁴
So, for a brief period, I exercised operational control of the British Far East Fleet, a task that led me to greatly appreciate the value of wireless and satellite communications.

Zheng He's admirals had no such technology. Instead, they would have relied on bells, gongs, drums, carrier pigeons, and fireworks to coordinate their movements. Consequently, they would have been unable effectively to control more than perhaps twenty junks of various types and capabilities, such as treasure ships supplied by water carriers and grain ships protected by fighting ships. For a short period, in calm seas with unchanging good visibility, they might have been able to control as many as fifty ships. But these conditions do not last long at sea. As the weather changes, so does the threat. Capital ships, such as Zheng He's treasure ships, are protected more closely inshore than in
the open ocean. Likewise, the threat of pirates requires a different disposition than that required for landing troops on an exposed beach.

With approximately one thousand ships under his overall command, Zheng He probably would have appointed at least twenty, and quite possibly fifty, rear admirals. On his final voyage, I believe there were four full admirals (Zheng He, Wang Jinghong, Hong Bao, and Zhou Man), eight vice admirals (Wang Heng, Hou Xian, Li Xing, Wu Zhong, Yang Zhen, Zhang Da, Zhu Liang, Zhu Zhen), and another twelve rear admirals
¹⁵
in command of a total of twenty-four fleets, which is the minimum number of fleets I would expect given the number of ships.

In my opinion, the case for broad-based leadership of the fleets is reflected in the Taicang stele, which uses the first-person plural to describe the command of men and ships. (“Each time we have commanded several tens of thousands of government soldiers and more than a hundred oceangoing vessels.”) The implication is that Zheng He is acting in concert with his team of admirals.

The scope of the shipbuilding program—more than 2,700 ships—undermines the notion that Zheng He commanded just one fleet of a hundred oceangoing vessels. However, a single fleet of a thousand junks would have been impossible to control. Chinese records listing dates for outbound and returning voyages make it clear that different fleets departed and returned under different commanders often years apart.