1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (58 page)

But the lobbying may have been superfluous; the leadership probably needed little convincing. Already on i June, a group of senior officials, including Shertok, Cabinet Secretary Ze'ev Sharef, and Minority Affairs Minister Bechor Shitrit, had resolved that the Arabs "were not to be helped to return" and that IDF commanders "were to be issued with the appropriate orders.""" It was feared that the refugees would try to exploit the impending truce beginning i i June to infiltrate back to their homes. Front-line units were instructed to bar a refugee return. Oded Brigade HQ instructed its battalions "to take every possible measure to prevent" a return; this would "prevent tactical and political complications down the road." 16' The army, too, appears to have been thinking of both the military and political advantages of barring a return.

The Cabinet discussed the issue on 16 June. In speech after speech, with Ben-Gurion and Shertok setting the tone, the ministers spoke against refugee repatriation. "I believe ... we must prevent their return at all costs," said Ben-Gurion, adding, "I will be for them not returning also after the war." Shertok agreed: "Had anyone arisen among us and said that one day we should expel all of them-that would have been madness. But if this happened in the course of the turbulence of war, a war that the Arab people declared against us, and because of Arab flight-then that is one of those revolutionary changes after which [the clock of] history cannot be turned back.... The aggressive enemy brought this about and the blood is on his head ... and all the lands and the houses ... are spoils of war.... All this is just compensation for the [Jewish] blood spilled, for the destruction of [Jewish property]."

Preventing a return was not just a national interest; it had personal implications for some of the ministers. Agriculture Minister Cisling, from Mapam (Ahdut Ha avodah wing), said that the villagers of Qumiya, which overlooked his home in the Jezreel Valley kibbutz `Ein Harod and from which it had been harassed with fire, should also not be allowed back. 1711

No vote was taken on 16 June-though orders immediately went out to all front-line units to bar refugee infiltration "also with live fire." 171 Within weeks the consensus turned into government policy, partly in response to Bernadotte's growingly persistent appeals to allow refugee repatriation. On z8 July the Cabinet formally resolved, by nine votes to two, that "so long as the war continues there is no agreement to the return of the refugees." 172 The decision was augmented in September: "A final solution to the refugee problem [would be reached] as part of a general settlement when peace comes." 173 During the following weeks, the Cabinet repeatedly reendorsed this position. But peace never came-and the refugees never returned.

During the Second Truce the IDF not only barred refugees from crossing back into Israeli-held territory but systematically scoured the newly conquered areas for returnees, preventing resettlement in the abandoned and semiabandoned villages. A few would-be returnees were killed along the front lines; many more were rounded up and shoved back across the borders. The degree of resolution and harshness in implementation varied from area to area and unit to unit. There was a perpetual cat-and-mouse struggle between the troops and the returning and resettling refugees.

On zo July, Giv'ati's Fifty-first Battalion HQ cautioned its companies: "With the start of the [Second] Truce there is a fear of the return of the villagers to the conquered villages. Such a return could also be accompanied by the infiltration of a camouflaged enemy force." The companies were ordered to prevent infiltration to the villages of Summeil, Barqusiya, Bi'lin, Masmiya al-Saghira, al-Tina, Kheirna, Idnibba, Jilya, Qazaza, and Mughallis, all close to the front line with the Egyptians. The units were told to "destroy" any "armed force" and "to expel ... unarmed 74villagers."r The previous day, a patrol had visited Kheima, Jilya, Qazaza, Mughallis, and Idnibba to ascertain that they were empty. Near Kheima, it encountered a group of Arabs in a grove of carob trees, refugees from Masmiya and Ajjur. "They were warned ... that if anyone entered areas under our control-they would be killed. They promised to obey and were released."175 During the following days, patrols expelled refugees near Tel al-Safi, al-Tina, and Mughallis, apparently killing three of those initially detained. 176 At Tel al-Safi, the Fifty-third Battalion was left an unwelcome "dowry" by a previous unit-"fourteen Arab males, aged over sixty, four of them handicapped, and six old Arab women, all blind, and eight toddlers." The Fifty-third's intelligence officer complained and requested a vehicle to solve the "problem" (presumably by expulsion). 177 A fortnight later, Givati reported Arabs returning to several villages to harvest crops and resettle. Units torched Kheima and Mukheizin and scoured Idnibba, Mughallis, Jilya, Qazaza, and Sajd, killing a number of Arabs in firefights.178

Perhaps the most extensive rear-area Second Truce "cleansing" operation was carried out by Givati in the sand dunes around Yibna-Arab SukreirNabi Rubin, just north of the Egyptian lines. The operation was named mivtza nikayon (Operation Cleaning); armed units were to be destroyed and unarmed civilians expelled.179 The operation was mounted on z8 August. Shacks and huts were torched, ten Arabs were killed, three were injured, and three were captured (many others probably fled as the IDF approached). Twenty cows, camels, and mules were also killed. The refugees were from Zarnuqa, Yibna, and Qubeiba and were trying to harvest their fields. "The hunger rampant among the refugees forces them to endanger themselves [and] penetrate our area," stated the IDF report.180

Similar operations took place in other areas immediately behind the front lines. On 8 August, for example, a Golani Brigade company scoured the area of Umm al-Zinat in the Hills of Menashe, southeast of Haifa, "to seek out and destroy the enemy." The company encountered a band of fleeing Arabs and fired at them, killing one. Another group of Arabs was discovered in a nearby wadi. One man was interrogated and shot (the report does not say why). At Umm al-Daraj, the unit encountered another group, which included women. They said they were Druze, "[so] we did nothing to them." "s' Some miles to the east, another Golani unit ambushed a group of Arabs trying to enter the abandoned village of Hittin "to gather their belongings." The unit chased them off, killing some men and pack animals. "I In the northern Negev enclave, cut off from the core of the Jewish state by the Egyptian expeditionary force, the Yiftah Brigade regularly scoured villages and bedouin encampments. On 22 September the troops entered the abandoned villages of Muharraqa and Kaufakha, detained four men, and blew up houses. A number of "elderly residents" were allowed to stay. 183

The IDF units patrolling the newly conquered areas regularly drove off or skirmished with armed harvesters. The encounters in early August between one Golani patrol and harvesters in the Lower Galilee were typical. Near the abandoned village of al-Mujeidil the unit saw "groups of Arab women working fields. I [squad leader Shalom Lipman] ordered the machine gun to fire three bursts over their heads, to drive them off. They fled in the direction of the olive grove." But after the patrol left, the Arabs returned. The patrol came back and encountered "a group ofArab men and women.... I opened fire at them and as a result one Arab man died and one Arab man and one woman were injured. In the two incidents, I expended 3i bullets." The following day, 6 August, the patrol returned and witnessed two funeral processions; one of those injured the previous day presumably had died. A day or so later, the patrol again returned to the site and saw a large group of women harvesting. "When we approached them to drive them off, an Arab male [was found] hiding near them, [and] he was executed by us. The women were warned not to return to this area of Mujeidil." The company commander appended his comment to the squad's report: "I gave firm orders to stymie every attempt to return to the area of the village of Mujeidil and to act with determination."184 At about the same time, Giv ati's Fifty-second Battalion reported sending a patrol to the fields of Sawafir, Jaladiya, and Beit Affa, where "a large number of Arabs were seen reaping.... Most ... were women and old men." The patrol killed eight Arabs and detained three. 185

Alongside the roundups and expulsions and the prevention of harvesting, the Yishuv, starting in spring 1948, took a series of measures that helped assure the nonreturn of the refugees. Some of the procedures stemmed from immediate military necessity; others from economic requirements. But, taken together, all obviated any possibility of a return.

Probably the most important measure was the near-systematic destruction of villages after conquest and depopulation. While two villages, Arab Suqreir and Qisariya, had been demolished by Haganah troops in January and February 1948, the start of a policy of demolition can be pinpointed to the first half of April, when Haganah units involved in Operation Nahshon and in the battle around Mishmar Ha`emek were ordered to level the villages after conquest. "We intend to destroy the villages when we leave them," a Golani unit fighting around Mishmar Ha`emek informed Carmeli and Golani HQs on 9 April.111 That day, the Palmah's First Battalion demolished the village Ghubaiya al-Fauga.'87 The next day Haganah troops occupied and New up thirty houses in al-Kafrin and additional houses in Abu Zurciq and Abu Shusha.188 The last houses in Abu Zureiq, a large village northwest of Mishmar Ha`emek, were destroyed on 14 April. 181

A similar pattern prevailed in Operation Nahshon, when the Haganah tried to secure the road to Jerusalem. While the original operational order, from 4 April,190 did not call for the destruction of the villages, follow-up orders almost invariably included instructions to demolish houses. On bo-u April the Palmate captured and destroyed the village of Qaluniya, west of Jerusalem."' "When I left," recorded an American journalist, "sappers were blowing up the houses. One after another, the solid stone buildings, some built in elaborate city style, exploded and crashed." 92 The Harel Brigade blew up the village of Saris on 16 April.193 That day, Nahshon Corps HQ ordered the troops "to take and destroy" Beit Suriq,'94 Sajd,'95 and Beit Jiz, and part of Qubab.196 The reasoning behind the demolitions was simple: the Haganah lacked troops to garrison every empty village and feared that, should they be left intact, they would be reoccupied by Arab irregulars, who would again cut off the road to Jerusalem, or be used as bases by the Arab armies when they invaded.

During the following weeks, Haganah/IDF units as a matter of routine destroyed-when they had sufficient explosives or caterpillars-captured villages, partially or wholly. Without doubt, an element of vengefulness and punishment underlay the destruction-to pay back villages for specific acts of aggression or "the Arabs" for the war they had unleashed upon the Yishuv. There were also economic considerations: the Jewish settlement institutions had always needed and wanted more land, for existing and projected settlements; destroying villages meant the nonreturn of the original inhabitants, which, in turn, meant that more land would become available for Jewish use. Above and beyond this there were general and specific military considerations, And from summer 1948, immediate and long-term political calculations came to the fore: the villages had to be destroyed to prevent a return in order to obviate the rise of a fifth column, to keep down Arab numbers, and to maintain Arab-free areas the Jewish state untended to coopt.

During June and July awareness of the destruction and dissent from it, on ideological grounds, surfaced in the Cabinet, largely from Mapam ministers, who in principle favored-or at least said they favored-the return of the refugees after the war. As Cisling put it in the Cabinet on 16 June, "it was one thing" to destroy villages in battle; it was quite another to destroy a site "a month later, in cold blood, out of political calculation.... This course will not reduce the number of Arabs who will return to the Land of Israel. It will [only] increase the number of [our] enemies." 197

But a more powerful, and ultimately effective, source of opposition arose inside the Yishuv that summer: the Finance Ministry. Seen from an economic perspective, and against the backdrop of the massive Jewish immigration that began to flood the country, the destruction of rural and urban housing made no sense in terms of the new state's problems. The abandoned houses were needed for the new immigrants (olim). At the least, urged Yitzhak Gvirtz, director of the Arab (or Absentee) Property Department, the houses should be stripped of reusable assets such as doors, window frames, and tiles before being demolished. 198

The problem was greater than window frames, however. The houses themselves needed to be preserved or at least those deemed habitable by olim. By autumn the country faced an acute, growing housing shortage. As Reuven Gordon, an inspector of abandoned property responsible for Isdud, complained in December: "A week ago [soldiers] ... began to destroy buildings.... Of course, if the army has an order, they carry it out, but I ask, can't they find [another] solution ... as these villages near Rehovot can be used to house new immigrants." 199 A few weeks earlier, Finance Minister Eli`ezer Kaplan told his fellow ministers: "Every possibility of accommodating [immigrants] must be exploited and a general order must be issued to the army not to destroy houses without a reason."200 By early winter, Kaplan had his wish, and the army generally refrained from destroying villages and urban housing. But by then the country's rural and urban landscapes had been radically transformed.

More than the house demolitions ushered in this transformation. Also at work were the takeover and allocation of the abandoned agricultural lands, the establishment of new Jewish settlements in the countryside, and the settlement of olim in the largely abandoned Arab urban neighborhoods.

In spring 1948 Jewish settlements began to reap abandoned Arab fields around the country while preventing Arab farmers from harvesting their crops. This was a mirror image of Arab efforts to harass Jewish harvesters, but the Arabs were less efficient. The reaping was "crucial to the war effort," said Gvirtz.201 It undermined the economy, self-confidence, and staying power of the rural Arabs, and it bolstered the Yishuv's war economy. The harvesting, carried out by Jewish settlements, was largely organized by Jewish regional authorities, and it gave rise to acquisitive urges. During May the line between asking for one-time permission to harvest abandoned fields and requesting permanent possession was imperceptibly crossed. By July, settlements were formally writing to the newly formed Agriculture Ministry for permanent leaseholds. As Kibbutz Neve-Yam, asking for the lands of neighboring Sarafand, south of Haifa, put it: the Arab exodus "opened up the possibility of a radical solution which once and for all could give us sufficient land for the development of [our] settlement."202 Weitz, certain that the refugees would not be returning, jotted down in his diary that "a complete agrarian revolution" was under way.203