1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (61 page)

On the other hand, the West Bank and East Jerusalem had not been earmarked by the United Nations for the Jewish state; the bulk of the Negev had been. Taking the Negev would enjoy at least a measure of international legitimacy. The northern Negev settlements had to be relieved. And, last, the large-potentially the strongest-Arab army a mere 18 miles from Tel Aviv, was a standing mortal threat. If the war ended with the Egyptians still at Isdud, who knew what might happen ten or twenty years hence? This was the situation the status quo and the Bernadotte plan threatened to perpetuate.

The IDF believed that it had sufficient power to launch a major offensive on only one front. Its effort in July to launch simultaneous offensives had resulted in failure against the Egyptians and the Syrians and only partial success against the Jordanians. The IDF still lacked sufficient heavy weaponry. The General Staff plumped for the southern option. In early September it issued preliminary operational orders for a major assault against the Egyptians, mivtza esser (Operation Ten)-from the ten plagues meted out to Egypt by the Almighty in Moses' day-to be mounted later that month.240 The planned operation was later renamed mivtza yoav, Operation Yoav.

But matters were delayed by the Bernadotte assassination-and by political indecision at the top. The Cabinet would have to resolve where and when to strike. The decision in effect was taken, in two stages, at the Cabinet meetings of 26 September and 6 October.

The precipitant to the first debate was an attack by Palestinian irregulars on 24 September on Position 219 near the ruins of ancient Modi'in, the birthplace of the Maccabees, in which twenty-three Israeli soldiers were killed, and Arab Legion harassment of Jewish convoys near Latrun and along the Burma Road.241 Position 219 was immediately retaken, but Ben-Gurion hoped to use the events as a fulcrum for a large-scale IDF assault against the Arab Legion at Latrun and points east, to firmly secure the length of the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road. He understood that this could provoke Arab attacks along the whole West Bank front or even an Egyptian attack in the south, renewing the war. But he was not averse to this: "If as a result war will break out throughout the country ... I see this as positive for a number of reasons." He explained that the IDF could then conquer the remainder of the Galilee, break through the Egyptian line between Majdal and Beit Jibrin, and link up with the Negev settlements enclave.

As to the center of the country, it is not completely clear whether Ben-Gurion wanted the IDF to conquer the whole of the West Bank or only a large part of it, with or without East Jerusalem. In the course of the 26 September meeting, he said different things. But the thrust of his thinking was probably embodied in the following passage: "We have [that is, there are] two sorts of goyim [non-Jews], Arabs and Christians. I don't know who are better. If I had to choose, I would choose the Christian world. But I have no choice. The Land of Israel is in this part of the world, surrounded by Arabs. And we will have to, to the extent it is up to us, to find a way to [coexist with] the Arabs-[find] a way to an agreement, to a compromise.... We are now full of bitterness toward the Arab world, but they are here and will remain here. And we must look to the future." Ben-Gurion seemed to be saying that the IDF should conquer the western edges of the West Bank, thus widening the Jewish-held Coastal Plain, and expand the Israeli-held Jezreel Valley southward, perhaps as far as Nablus, but leave in Arab hands the hilly spine from Nablus through Ramallah to East Jerusalem. He preferred that the Arabs retain East Jerusalem and Israel West Jerusalem rather than that all the city become a Christian-ruled international zone.

But the majority of the Cabinet opposed an offensive in the West Bank. Justice Minister Pinhas Rosenblueth (Rosen) reacted by saying: "I heard Ben-Gurion's words with dread, but also amazement." Renewing the war would result in the bombing "of our airfields, the bombing of Tel Aviv." He quoted Ben-Gurion as saying, only a few days before, that Bernadotte's assassination prevented an Israeli renewal of hostilities. Health Minister Haim Moshe Shapira argued that one could also lose in war. "We tried to conquer Latrun six times, and who knows what will happen on the seventh try." And renewing the war would hurt Israel's international position. Transport Min ister David Remez said, "Both to murder Bernadotte and to defy UN decisions-that is a bit much." Minority Affairs and Police Minister Bechor Shitrit feared that the Americans would cut off economic aid. Religious Affairs Minister Yehuda Leib Fishman (Maimon) said that the Old City was a matter "for the Messiah. We will not conquer it." But he supported the campaign to secure the road to Jerusalem. The two Mapam ministers were divided-Bentov (Hashomer Hatza'ir) seemed to oppose any Israeli military initiative and sought to leave the way open for a deal with King 'Abdullah while Cisling (Ahdut Ha'avodah) supported both an attack on Latrun and "securing the Negev."

Ben-Gurion was adamant. He said, "Were it possible to achieve the minimum through an agreement with the Arabs-I would do it, because I am full of fear and dread of the militarization of the youth in our state. I already see it in the souls of the children, and I did not dream of such a people and I don't want it." He pressed his proposal to attack Latrun; the attack on Position 219 could not be left unanswered.

But the Cabinet voted seven to five against.242 The ministers seem to have been motivated by the Bernadotte assassination and its repercussions on Israel's international standing; by fears that an attack in the West Bank would frustrate a deal with 'Abdullah; and by the possibility that the defeat of the Legion might suck in the British (via their mutual defense pact with Jordan) and/or result in the incorporation of hundreds of thousands of additional Arabs, resident in the West Bank, by Israel.

Ben-Gurion was subsequently to call the Cabinet's decision a bechiya ledorot (a cause for lamentation for generations), since he feared that it had put paid to any thought of acquiring Judea and Samaria, along with the Old City of Jerusalem, for Israel, perhaps forever.

Having nixed the "Jordanian option," the Cabinet in effect ushered in the offensive against the Egyptians. On 6 October it debated and decided on an offensive in the south-to be triggered by an Egyptian provocation. The aim was to link up with the settlements enclave and break the back of the Egyptian army. But Ben-Gurion still hoped that the renewed hostilities would result in Israeli conquest of the West Bank.

Ben-Gurion told the ministers that the IDF believed that it could "destroy the whole Egyptian force in seven days" (he was being wildly optimistic) and that the army could then take over the Bethlehem-Hebron area "unopposed." Indeed, such a victory would mean that the whole of the south, "from Jerusalem to Aqaba," would be in Israeli hands. There would then be no need to conquer Latrun; a road could be built, south of the current corridor, to Jerusalem that would run outside the range of Jordanian artillery. Ben-Gurion (incorrectly) predicted that the other Arab armies, with the Iraqis in the lead, would intervene in the Israeli-Egyptian hostilities.

If the Arabs in the West Bank joined in, Ben-Gurion said, "the intention" was to send several brigades down the Jordan Valley to cut off and envelop the Iraqi force in Samaria (and perhaps the Legion in Judea, as well). But if the other Arab armies did nothing, Israel would leave the West Bank alone.

Ben-Gurion was not overly worried about the international reactions to an offensive in the south: "[Impending are] elections in America. This was not a decisive factor, but it is an important factor ... and it would be a crime and idiocy to miss this [opportunity].... [Pro-Israeli] cables [even] arrive from goyim [standing for election to Congress].... They send greetings and want a reply and to use it in their electoral district. Therefore at this time the Americans won't rush to condemn us."243

What helped Ben-Gurion and the other ministers make up their minds was the arrival, earlier that day, of information from Washington and Paris that President Truman had instructed Marshall to cease pushing the Bernadotte plan-which Israel feared would be adopted by the United Nations-and to renew American support for the 29 November 1947 partition borderswhich meant that the bulk of the Negev would remain Israeli .244

Bentov countered, "Our final objective, after all, is to make peace with the Arab world." The question was whether the contemplated offensive would bring this objective any closer. But most of the ministers backed Ben-Gurion. The Cabinet voted for the offensive,245 with Shertok, away in Paris, joining the "ayes."246 The ministers were not informed, by Shertok or Ben-Gurion, of the previous weeks' Egyptian peace feelers.

Following the meeting, the IDF General Staff refined the plan. Like BenGurion, several generals felt that renewed hostilities in the south would enable the IDF to advance also in the center of the country, to take Beit Jala and Bethlehem, and possibly parts of the northern West Bank.247

THE SOUTH

The Egyptians had no interest in renewing the war. By mid-October their high command was under no illusions. It was keenly aware of its army's weakness and vulnerability and of Israel's growing strength. The expeditionary force was overstretched-strung out along three axes, between El Arish and Isdud along the coast, with its back to the sea; between Auja, Beersheba, and Bethlehem to the east; and between Majdal and Beit Jibrinand short of manpower, weaponry, and ammunition. The high command knew that the other Arab armies would offer them no help. Months before, the Egyptians had abandoned any idea of further advance; they hoped merely to emerge with their gains intact. Their army was on the outskirts of Jerusalem and twenty miles from Tel Aviv and, entrenched along the Majdal-Beit Jibrin road, separating the Negev from the Jewish state. They had not destroyed the Jewish state or defeated the IDF. But they had "saved" a substantial part of Palestine for the Arabs.

From the Israeli perspective, things looked very different, indeed, grim. True, they had stopped the Egyptian advance. But the bulk of the territory allocated by the United Nations for Jewish statehood-the Negev and its northern approaches-was either in Egyptian hands or cut off, and the expeditionary force threatened the long-term security of the state's core. If the front lines of 14 October were to turn into permanent borders, Israel would be truncated and extremely vulnerable. Moreover, the no-peace, no-war sit cation was untenable. As David Ben-Gurion put it to his ministers on z6 September, "A protracted truce will break us."n The Egyptian expeditionary force had to be destroyed or, at the least, driven from Palestine. The IDF brass, keenly aware of Egypt's political isolation and military vulnerability, was chafing at the bit.2