35 Miles from Shore (33 page)

Those familiar with public hearings will readily admit that new information is seldom uncovered. The hearings usually occur months after an accident, and the majority of the individuals testifying have already given statements to investigators. The proceedings are designed more for the benefit of the public rather than as an investigative tool. But as Balsey was being questioned by Marty Spieser, one very important piece of information came to light that somehow
had been overlooked. It happened toward the beginning of the afternoon session. Balsey had just walked the spectators through the entire flight up to the point where he was about to describe the ditching when the following exchange took place:

Q. When you went to emergency power, would you describe what emergency systems were available to you, especially in the area of communications between the cabin and yourself in the cockpit?

A. I don't quite follow your question here at this time, Mr. Spieser.

Q. When you went to emergency power, was the public address system available to you to communicate to the cabin?

A. The public address system from the cockpit to the cabin was inoperative on this flight.

Q. I beg your pardon?

A. The public address system from the cockpit to the cabin was inoperative on the flight.

Q. When did it become inoperative?

A. It was inoperative when I checked it at JFK.

The comment stunned the investigators, who had no prior knowledge of the inoperative PA system. There had been numerous reports from passengers who claimed that there had been no warning prior to impact, but the investigators assumed that the crew had simply neglected to make an announcement. The disclosure of the inoperative PA made headlines the next day, though none of the papers mentioned the fact that the PA was not a required item according to the minimum equipment list (MEL), or that Balsey had tried to signal the crew by flicking the seatbelt sign off and on three times.

During a break in his testimony, Balsey was mobbed by reporters. When one reporter stepped in front of him and shoved a microphone in his face, Balsey swiped the microphone away. “If you guys start pushing me where I can't breathe, I'll make room. I don't want anyone within three feet of me!” Balsey looked around at the startled
faces. They were mostly reporters for the local papers. When they didn't back off fast enough, Balsey raised his voice. “Do you guys understand English?” Balsey had a few more choice words with the group before forcing his way out of the room.

Over the course of the next few days, each of the remaining crewmembers was put on the witness stand. Hours of testimony were taken. The hearings were extended an extra two days to accommodate all twenty-two witnesses. The drama of the ditching and rescue was played out for the spectators through the testimony of the crewmembers, passengers, and rescuers. Press coverage of the hearings, however, was limited to the equivalent of sound bites, with reporters latching on to only one or two points from a select few witnesses. With Balsey, it was the inoperative PA. With Hugh, it was the lack of emergency training on the DC-9. When Harry was asked if he had received training for the flight, he answered that he had not. He added that he had requested additional training and had been told that he would be trained on the flight. The next day the headlines read: “Lack of Training Cited in Ditching.” Ed Veronelli was particularly upset with that misrepresentation. Ed had gone out of his way to give Harry twenty-five hours of observer time before assigning him the trip. He tried to clarify that fact when he testified on Friday, but by the time he took the stand most of the reporters had already left.
*

Also testifying on Friday was B. H. Thompson, a Douglas Aircraft engineer. He was brought in specifically to address the problem of the spinning fuel totalizer. After several hours of esoteric testimony related to the operation of the fuel quantity indicating system on the DC-9, Thompson speculated that the problem with the totalizer was
most likely the result of water droplets on the fuel probes or a fault in the wiring. He testified that the sloshing of fuel inside the tanks was an unlikely cause for the spinning, though he admitted that Douglas Aircraft had never actually flight tested a DC-9 with fuel as low as that on ALM 980.

The last person to testify on Friday was Steedman Hinckley. It was late in the day, and except for the Safety Board and a few ONA employees, the room was mostly empty. Most of the spectators had left during the testimony of B. H. Thompson, the Douglas Aircraft engineer. Not even the most dedicated reporter was able to sit through his lengthy explanation of the fuel measuring system on the DC-9.

For Steedman, the accident had been a major setback. The negative publicity had weakened an already shaky financial picture. Declining revenues had forced him to sell off his interests in both the river boats and the cruise ships. His hotel venture was also threatened. Adding to his troubles was the knowledge that his decision to delay the installation of the extra fuel tank had played a role in the accident, albeit indirectly.

As he took his seat and faced the sparse crowd, Steedman appeared relaxed and at ease, as if he were getting ready to conduct one of his weekly safety briefings. The first hour or so Steedman answered questions related to the steps involved in getting the route approved by the CAB and FAA. The reporters who had left early hadn't missed much. It wasn't until Dick Baker took the microphone that things got interesting. Dick, reading directly from the lease agreement Steedman had signed with ALM, asked Steedman why the extra fuel tank had not been installed as agreed upon in the lease agreement. Up until this point, Steedman wasn't even sure if he would be questioned about the missing tank. ONA had given investigators everything they had requested, but the attorneys had advised
against saying anything about the fuel tank unless specifically asked. Steedman gave a concerned look to Bob Wagenfeld, ONA's corporate attorney, who happened to be sitting at the examiners' table. When Wagenfeld indicated no objections, Steedman took a deep breath then proceeded to explain in detail why the tank had not been installed. He recounted the phone conversations he had had with Octavio Irausquin concerning the delays with Douglas Aircraft. He told the investigators that it had been his idea to delay the tank installation because of better-than-expected load factors. It was the type of damning information that could have only added to ONA's troubles. But with no reporters present, the story of the missing fuel tank went unreported. ONA dodged a bullet, thanks primarily to the long-winded testimony of one engineer.

With the questions concerning the extra fuel tank behind him, Steedman relaxed once again. Despite the obvious pressure he had been under the past several months, he hadn't lost his sense of humor. When he was asked if he was aware of any problems on the New York–St. Maarten flights prior to May 2, Steedman responded by saying that “Running an airline is a problem any way you look at it.”

By Saturday, July 11, the last day of testimony, interest in the hearings had waned. Attendance by spectators had dropped off considerably. The only earth-shattering news to come out of the hearings thus far happened early on Wednesday morning when San Juan was rattled by an earthquake. Many of the hearing participants were forced to vacate their hotel rooms, fearful that the hotel might collapse. Robert Seijkens, the St. Maarten tower controller, jumped from his second floor balcony during the worst of the tremors. Those who witnessed the leap jokingly commented that he had jumped in an attempt to do himself in, so he wouldn't have to testify. He was in San Juan by subpoena.

By Sunday, the hearings hadn't garnered a single column of news coverage. The big story on Sunday was the crowning of the new Miss Universe, Marisol Malaret Contreras, a twenty-year-old secretary from Puerto Rico.

For Balsey, the close of the public hearings was the final chapter on the accident. There was nothing more that he could do or say. When ALPA approached him about his automatic appeal to his dismissal, he waived his right for a separate hearing and agreed to have his case heard along with that of Harry Evans. Balsey didn't even attend the hearing in which his dismissal was upheld. He put the accident behind him and moved on with his life. It would be more than thirty years before he would once again agree to talk about that fateful day.

The final NTSB report on the accident was issued March 31, 1971. The probable cause of the accident was stated as follows:
¹

The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was fuel exhaustion which resulted from continued, unsuccessful attempts to land at St. Maarten until insufficient fuel remained to reach an alternate airport. A contributing factor was the reduced visibility in the approach zone because of rain showers, a condition not reported to the flight.
*

The Board also finds that the probability of survival would have been increased substantially in this accident if there had been better crew coordination prior to and during the ditching.

The final report also included a number of recommendations, some of which have been adopted and some which have not. The first recommendation was to have the words “warn passengers” inserted as one of the last items on the emergency landing or ditching checklist. This recommendation was adopted, and today all emergency landing checklists have similar wording for the crew to warn the passengers prior to any emergency landing. The second recommendation was to require that no passenger flight be dispatched without a working PA system from both the cockpit and the cabin. The FAA and the airlines argued that this requirement was unnecessary due to alternate means of communicating with the passengers, including the use of megaphones and bells as signals. As a result, as long as other means of communicating are established, a flight can legally depart without an operative PA from the cockpit.

The Safety Board also recommended that steps be taken to eliminate fabric-to-metal-type seatbelts. This recommendation was adopted. There were two recommendations for improving the access and usability of life vests and life rafts. While there has been much improvement involving life rafts, especially in the area of combination escape/slide rafts, little has been done to improve life vest usability. The life vests in use today are, for the most part, identical to those found in 1970. Lastly, the Board recommended that a VHF communications link between San Juan ARTCC and Juliana Tower be installed to improve voice communications between the two. This was accomplished soon after the report.

The following paragraph was also included in the report:

There is no doubt that the ditching was accomplished under extremely adverse conditions. The captain demonstrated exceptional airmanship in the control of the aircraft, and the first officer and navigator greatly minimized the loss of life while awaiting rescue in the water. The effectiveness of three cabin attendants was reduced because of their lack of knowledge of what was happening, and the short preparation time available to them.

For the passengers and for family members of those lost, the accident would take its toll for years to come. A number of passengers and family members filed lawsuits. Every lawsuit was eventually settled out of court. The amount of the settlements depended on a number of factors, including the extent of the passenger's injuries; whether the suit involved the loss of life; and the aggressiveness of the respective lawyer. The average settlement was approximately $20,000 after lawyer's fees. The lowest settlement I found was to George and Martha Kellner, the married couple who had negotiated with ALM to have it pay for a stay in San Juan, Puerto Rico. They were originally offered just $3,000 each, which they rejected. The next offer was for $12,500 each. Their lawyer suggested that they accept the offer, stating that the insurance company had been keeping tabs on them since the accident. The insurance company knew about their trip to San Juan. It also knew that the couple's baby had been born without complications and that both had been on several airline flights since the accident.
²
The couple subsequently agreed to the $25,000 settlement.

The highest settlement I was able to uncover was to Loretta Gremelsbacker, who had lost her husband and also suffered a broken back. She agreed to a settlement of $1,250,000.
³

Some passengers agreed to settlements that they would later regret. Walter Hodge and Jeannie Larmony are two examples. Both were unable to return to work as a result of the injuries they sustained in the accident. The money they received fell far short of compensating them for their loss of income. The same could be said for family members who had lost loved ones in the accident. The daughter of Jacques and Sylvia Urighere, who were both lost in the accident, settled for $50,000. The emotional stress to her and her family over the loss of her parents would linger for many years.
⁴

Not all passengers pursued lawsuits against the airlines. Israel and Toby Kruger did not sue. Toby Kruger had worked as a legal secretary and didn't want to have to relive the accident in depositions and court appearances. They did, however, collect an insurance check for $135,000 for their lost jewelry.

Emerson Ussery wasn't looking for a large settlement, but he did have legal claims for a lawsuit. Besides his emotional pain and suffering, he also had physical injuries. He suffered a back injury that kept him in a full-body brace for three months. He couldn't claim loss of earnings, though, because he continued to work even with the brace on. His lawyer filed suit within three weeks of the accident, asking for $150,000. The suit was eventually handed over to a New York law firm that took the case on a 35% contingency fee. Emerson flew to New York to give a deposition. While he was there, his lawyer brought back a settlement offer of $10,000. Emerson scratched his head. “You guys are willing to settle for that?” he asked incredulously. He couldn't believe that they would settle for something that would net them a measly $3,500.