A Benjamin Franklin Reader (6 page)

A year after he had run away to Philadelphia, Franklin traveled to London, where he worked for 18 months in two of the city’s best print shops. Among the books he helped to publish was an edition of William Wollaston’s
The Religion of Nature Delineated,
an Enlightenment tract which argued that religious truths were to be gleaned through the study of science and nature rather than through divine revelation. With the intellectual spunk that comes from being youthful and untutored, Franklin decided that Wollaston was right in general but wrong in parts, and he set out his own thinking in a piece in which he mixed theological premises with logical syllogisms to get himself quite tangled up. He inscribed it to his erstwhile friend James Ralph, who had absconded on some debts he owed him. The result was, as Franklin later conceded, so shallow and unconvincing as to be embarrassing. He printed a hundred copies, called it an “erratum,” and burned as many as he could retrieve.

In his defense, philosophers greater and more mature than Franklin have, over the centuries, gotten lost when trying to sort out the question of free will and reconcile it with that of an all-knowing God. The primary value of his “Dissertation” lies in what it reveals about Franklin’s willingness to abandon Puritan theology.

L
ONDON
, 1725

A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, &c. To Mr. J. R.

Sir,

I have here, according to your request, given you my
present
thoughts of the
general state of things
in the universe. Such as they are, you have them, and are welcome to them; and if they yield you any pleasure or satisfaction, I shall think my trouble sufficiently compensated. I know my scheme will be liable to many objections from a less discerning reader than your self; but it is not designed for those who can’t understand it. I need not give you any caution to distinguish the hypothetical parts of the argument from the conclusive: you will easily perceive what I design for demonstration, and what for probability only. The whole I leave entirely to you, and shall value my self more or less on this account, in proportion to your esteem and approbation.

Sect. I. Of liberty and necessity.

I.
There is said to be a
first mover,
who is called
god,
maker of the universe.

II.
He is said to be all-wise, all-good, all powerful.

These two propositions being allowed and asserted by people of almost every sect and opinion; I have here supposed them granted, and laid them down as the foundation of my argument; what follows then, being a chain of consequences truly drawn from them, will stand or fall as they are true or false.

III.
If he is all-good, whatsoever he doth must be good.

IV.
If he is all-wise, whatsoever he doth must be wise.
The truth of these propositions, with relation to the two first, I think may be justly called evident; since, either that infinite goodness will act what is ill, or infinite wisdom what is not wise, is too glaring a contradiction not to be perceived by any man of common sense, and denied as soon as understood.

V.
If he is all-powerful, there can be nothing either existing or acting in the universe
against
or
without
his consent; and what he consents to must be good, because he is good; therefore
evil
doth not exist.

Unde malum?
Has been long a question, and many of the learned have perplexed themselves and readers to little purpose in answer to it. That there are both things and actions to which we give the name of
evil,
is not here denied, as
pain, sickness, want, theft, murder,
&c. But that these and the like are not in reality
evils, ills,
or
defects
in the order of the universe, is demonstrated in the next section, as well as by this and the following proposition. Indeed, to suppose any thing to exist or be done,
contrary
to the will of the almighty, is to suppose him not almighty; or that something (the cause of
evil
) is more mighty than the almighty; an inconsistence that I think no one will defend: and to deny any thing or action, which he consents to the existence of, to be good, is entirely to destroy his two attributes of
wisdom
and
goodness.

There is nothing done in the universe,
say the philosophers,
but what God either does, or
permits
to be done.
This, as he is almighty, is certainly true: but what need of this distinction between
doing
and
permitting?
Why, first they take it for granted that many things in the universe exist in such a manner as is not for the best, and that many actions are done which ought not to be done, or would be better undone; these things or actions they cannot ascribe to God as his, because they have already attributed to him infinite wisdom and goodness; here then is the use of the word
permit;
he
permits
them to be done,
say they.
But we will reason thus: if God permits an action to be done, it is because he wants either
power
or
inclination
to hinder it; in saying he wants
power,
we deny him to be
almighty;
and if we say he wants
inclination
or
will,
it must be, either because he is not good, or the action is not
evil,
(for all evil is contrary to the essence of
infinite goodness
). The former is inconsistent with his before-given attribute of goodness, therefore the latter must be true.

It will be said, perhaps, that God
permits evil actions to be done, for wise ends and purposes.
But this objection destroys itself; for whatever an infinitely good God hath wise ends in suffering to
be,
must be good, is thereby made good, and cannot be otherwise.

VI.
If a creature is made by god, it must depend upon god, and receive all its power from him; with which power the creature can do nothing contrary to the will of god, because God is almighty; what is not contrary to his will, must be agreeable to it; what is agreeable to it, must be good, because he is good; therefore a creature can do nothing but what is good.

This proposition is much to the same purpose with the former, but more particular; and its conclusion is as just and evident. Though a creature may do many actions which by his fellow creatures will be named
evil,
and which will naturally and necessarily cause or bring upon the doer, certain
pains
(which will likewise be called
punishments;
) yet this proposition proves, that he cannot act what will be in itself really ill, or displeasing to god. And that the painful consequences of his evil actions
(so called)
are not, as indeed they ought not to be,
punishments
or unhappinesses, will be shown hereafter.

Nevertheless, the late learned author of
the religion of nature,
(which I send you herewith) has given us a rule or scheme, whereby to discover which of our actions ought to be esteemed and denominated
good,
and which
evil:
it is in short this, every action which is done according to
truth,
is good; and every action contrary to truth, is evil: to act according to truth is to use and esteem every thing as what it is, &c. Thus if
a
steals a horse from
b,
and rides away upon him, he uses him not as what he is in truth, viz. The property of another, but as his own, which is contrary to truth, and therefore
evil.
But, as this gentleman himself says, (sect. I. Prop. Vi.) In order to judge rightly what any thing is, it must be considered, not only what it is in one respect, but also what it may be in any other respect; and the whole description of the thing ought to be taken in: so in this case it ought to be considered, that
a
is naturally a
covetous
being, feeling an uneasiness in the want of B’s horse, which produces an inclination for stealing him, stronger than his fear of punishment for so doing. This is
truth
likewise, and
a
acts according to it when he steals the horse. Besides, if it is proved to be a
truth,
that
a
has not power over his own actions, it will be indisputable that he acts according to truth, and impossible he should do otherwise.

I would not be understood by this to encourage or defend theft; ’tis only for the sake of the argument, and will certainly have no
ill effect.
The order and course of things will not be affected by reasoning of this kind; and ’tis as just and necessary, and as much according to truth, for
b
to dislike and punish the theft of his horse, as it is for
a
to steal him.

VII.
If the creature is thus limited in his actions, being able to do only such things as God would have him to do, and not being able to refuse doing what God would have done; then he can have no such thing as liberty, free-will or power to do or refrain an action.

By
liberty
is sometimes understood the absence of opposition; and in this sense, indeed, all our actions may be said to be the effects of our liberty: but it is a liberty of the same nature with the fall of a heavy body to the ground; it has liberty to fall, that is, it meets with nothing to hinder its fall, but at the same time it is necessitated to fall, and has no power or liberty to remain suspended.

But let us take the argument in another view, and suppose ourselves to be, in the common sense of the word,
free agents.
As man is a part of this great machine, the universe, his regular acting is requisite to the regular moving of the whole. Among the many things which lie before him to be done, he may, as he is at liberty and his choice influenced by nothing, (for so it must be, or he is not at liberty) choose any one, and refuse the rest. Now there is every moment something
best
to be done, which is alone then
good,
and with respect to which, every thing else is at that time
evil.
In order to know which is best to be done, and which not, it is requisite that we should have at one view all the intricate consequences of every action with respect to the general order and scheme of the universe, both present and future; but they are innumerable and incomprehensible by any thing but omniscience. As we cannot know these, we have but as one chance to ten thousand, to hit on the right action; we should then be perpetually blundering about in the dark, and putting the scheme in disorder; for every wrong action of a part, is a defect or blemish in the order of the whole. Is it not necessary then, that our actions should be overruled and governed by an all-wise providence? How exact and regular is every thing in the
natural
world! How wisely in every part contrived! We cannot here find the least defect! Those who have studied the mere animal and vegetable creation, demonstrate that nothing can be more harmonious and beautiful! All the heavenly bodies, the stars and planets, are regulated with the utmost wisdom! And can we suppose less care to be taken in the order of the
moral
than in the
natural
system? It is as if an ingenious artificer, having framed a curious machine or clock, and put its many intricate wheels and powers in such a dependence on one another, that the whole might move in the most exact order and regularity, had nevertheless placed in it several other wheels endowed with an independent
self-motion,
but ignorant of the general interest of the clock; and these would every now and then be moving wrong, disordering the true movement, and making continual work for the mender; which might better be prevented, by depriving them of that power of self-motion, and placing them in a dependence on the regular part of the clock.

VIII.
If there is no such thing as free-will in creatures, there can be neither merit nor demerit in creatures.

IX.
And therefore every creature must be equally esteemed by the creator.
These propositions appear to be the necessary consequences of the former. And certainly no reason can be given, why the creator should prefer in his esteem one part of his works to another, if with equal wisdom and goodness he designed and created them all, since all ill or defect, as contrary to his nature, is excluded by his power. We will sum up the argument thus, when the creator first designed the universe, either it was his will and intention that all things should exist and be in the manner they are at this time; or it was his will they should
be
otherwise i.e. In a different manner: to say it was his will things should be otherwise than they are, is to say somewhat hath contradicted his will, and broken his measures, which is impossible because inconsistent with his power; therefore we must allow that all things exist now in a manner agreeable to his will, and in consequence of that are all equally good, and therefore equally esteemed by him.