A Higher Form of Killing (45 page)

The exculpation that actions, however inhumane, can be justified on the grounds of shortening conflicts or saving one’s own side’s lives (always perceived as more valuable than those of the enemy) is older than a century but the nature of the new weapons introduced in 1915 gave it a considerable added potency requiring the strongest moral conscience to resist. Albert Einstein was pessimistic, later commenting, “It has become appallingly obvious that our technology has exceeded our humanity.” We can only hope that he was wrong.

*
A fuller discussion of the evidence that the diary was doctored and of the nature of the doctoring is included in the appendix “The
Lusitania
Controversies.”

**
Even though the United States had never declared war on Turkey, a proposal favored at one stage by some delegates was a U.S. mandate over Armenia.

***
Under the “Nacht und Nebel” directive—issued by Hitler in December 1941 and deriving its name from a spell in Wagner’s
Rheingold
—anti-Nazi activists and resistance fighters were to vanish without a trace. At the Nuremberg war crimes trials, disappearances under the “Nacht und Nebel” program were classed as war crimes.

****
The incendiaries used in these attacks were similar to the Elektron firebomb developed by German scientists at the end of the First World War.

APPENDIX

The
Lusitania
Controversies

In April 1918, a New York judge, Julius Mayer, heard claims for negligence against Cunard by survivors or relations of the
Lusitania
’s American victims. During preliminary discussions between lawyers the plaintiffs agreed to drop allegations that the ship had been armed and carrying clandestine ammunition and Canadian troops, all of which, if proven, would have considerably aided their case. Judge Mayer said simply, “That story is forever disposed of.”

Statements were taken from, or evidence given by, many people, including Captain Turner. Several passengers confirmed portholes had remained open despite Captain Turner’s instructions to close them. Much further evidence was given on the cargo. An expert from Remington stated that neither fire nor impact could have caused the rifle cartridges aboard to explode. A representative from Bethlehem Steel confirmed the shrapnel cases were unfilled and that the separate consignment of fuses did not contain any explosives. On torpedoes, witnesses said there had been from one to three, with most suggesting two. Wesley Frost, the U.S. consul in Queenstown whose report to the State Department had unambiguously stated that the
Lusitania
was sunk by one torpedo and had collected numerous statements from American survivors on which he based his view, was not called to give evidence. Nor did the State Department volunteer to make available the passengers’ statements.

Judge Mayer’s opinion, handed down on August 23, 1918, absolved Cunard and Captain Turner from blame: “The cause of the sinking of the
Lusitania
was the illegal act of the Imperial German Government, acting through its instrument, the submarine commander, and violating a cherished and humane rule observed, until this war, by even the bitterest antagonists.” Mayer also ruled that no materials had been carried that “could be exploded by setting them on fire in mass or in bulk nor by subjecting them to impact.” He agreed with Lord Mersey’s erroneous conclusion that there were two torpedoes, declaring “the weight of the testimony (too voluminous to analyse) is in favour of the two torpedo contention” and that “as there were no explosives on board it is difficult to account for the second explosion except on the theory that it was caused by a second torpedo.”

On Captain Turner’s conduct Mayer concluded, “The fundamental principle in navigating a merchantman whether in times of peace or of war is that the commanding officer must be left free to exercise his judgement. Safe navigation denies the proposition that the judgement and sound discretion of the captain of a vessel must be confined in a mental straitjacket.”

Despite Judge Mayer’s conclusions that some issues were “forever disposed of,” this did not prove to be the case. Controversies about the
Lusitania
have continued to this day, only partially resolved by dives on the wreck, in particular that by Bob Ballard and his Woods Hole team, backed by
National Geographic
, in 1993 using remotely controlled submersibles with modern video and lighting equipment.

Some writers have quoted Churchill’s comments of February 1915 to Walter Runciman, president of the Board of Trade, that “it is most important to attract neutral shipping to our shores in the hope especially of embroiling the USA with Germany.” They link these words with the limited efforts made to warn or protect the
Lusitania
to suggest that Churchill deliberately conspired to expose the
Lusitania
to bring the United States into the war. The kaiser on some occasions subscribed to this theory. Nearly a year after the sinking, he told U.S. ambassador Gerard that “England was really responsible as the English had made the
Lusitania
go slowly in English waters so that the Germans could torpedo it and so bring on trouble.”

However, there is no evidence of any such conspiracy. The general consensus at the time in the British government was that it was better to maintain the United States as a friendly supplier of munitions, rather than have it enter the war and wish to have a large say in dictating the peace. Rather than conspiring, the Admiralty appears to have been complacent, almost to the point of negligence, in disregarding information that the
Lusitania
was a German target (including the New York newspaper warning) and trusting in the
Lusitania
’s speed to get her through without taking any protective measures. Such complacency is partially explained by Churchill and Fisher being distracted by the foundering Dardanelles/Gallipoli campaign over which they were at loggerheads.

There is, however, clear evidence that after the sinking the British government, concerned not to forfeit any part of the propaganda advantage, conspired first to place the blame on Captain Turner for putting his ship at risk, and then to explain away the widely reported second explosion by attributing it to a second torpedo when they knew definitely from the message intercepted by Room 40 that there had only been one. The U.S. administration, unsurprisingly at the time of the Mayer hearing when the United States was in the war, took no action to disturb this conclusion despite the considerable information it had to the contrary.

When he realized the damage world outrage was causing to his and Germany’s reputation, the kaiser said that he would not have authorized the sinking with the resultant deaths of so many women and children had he known in advance. At the same time the German authorities continued illogically to justify the sinking on the grounds of
Lusitania
’s alleged armament and carriage of Canadian troops and of munitions. They did not recognize the inconsistency that if Schwieger had not known which ship he was attacking he could hardly have known her armament, cargo, or passenger list, thereby invalidating any justification based on them. The reality is that the
Lusitania
was an acknowledged target for the German U-boat service. Her name appears the most frequently in the merchant shipping targets identified in the German telegrams decoded by Room 40. U-boat commander Bernhard Wegener did not doubt that she was an authorized target when he lay in wait for her in the
U-27
in Liverpool Bay in March 1915. He recorded his actions carefully in his war diary stating he was following guidance from “Half-Flotilla Commander Hermann Bauer.” He signed off his war diary for each day of the cruise. It was circulated as normal and he was not rebuked or told he was wrong to target the
Lusitania
.

The
U-20
’s
war diary for the voyage on which the
Lusitania
was sunk was doctored between 1915 and 1918. At the end of a mission U-boat commanders brought their war diaries on shore, handwritten in pencil. They were subsequently and invariably typed up, usually on a purpose-designed form using both sides of the paper. Sometimes a form was not used, although both sides of the paper were still covered. Also invariably U-boat commanders signed off each day’s report. When copies were made the same format was followed and the position of the captain’s signature on the original was faithfully recorded. The only surviving copy of the
U-20
’s war diary is preserved in the German military archive at Freiburg and does not follow the normal format, being neither on a printed form nor double sided. Some of it is in a discursive style entirely uncharacteristic of the war diaries for Schwieger’s other voyages. Highly significantly, Schwieger’s signature is recorded for every day of the cruise with one notable exception—May 7, the day he sank the
Lusitania
. The copy shows many signs of cutting, pasting, and rebinding. Entries are typed more closely together and ignore usual practices on the lining up of paragraphs.

Much of the
U-20
war diary’s content is dubious, including, for example, Schwieger’s reasoning about whether to continue to Liverpool or whether to remain in the southern Irish Sea. In particular several elements of the unsigned entry for the day of the sinking are inaccurate, inconsistent, or clearly later additions. According to Schwieger’s war diary, when the
U-20
first sighted the target she was dead ahead (“
recht voraus
”), yet he also recorded that her four funnels were immediately visible, which would have been hard—indeed impossible—to distinguish if the ship were indeed approaching head-on from the horizon. The war diary incorrectly states that the
Lusitania
made the final fatal turn that brought her into range of the
U-20
toward Queenstown. In fact she turned away from the port.

The diary states Schwieger only identified the
Lusitania
by the name in gold letters on her bow as she sank. Impartial testimony states that the ship’s name had been carefully painted over in black. A competent well-briefed U-boat commander like Schwieger, assisted by an experienced merchant mariner such as Pilot Lanz who, according to Schwieger, knew “all English ships by their build” would have known immediately which ship he was attacking. Only five British liners had four funnels and the activities of each were well known to the German authorities. Only the
Lusitania
could possibly have been inbound at the time.

Schwieger’s diary reflects in detail on the sinking. He asks what was the nature of the second explosion—“boiler or coal or powder?” He states that “the ship stops immediately.” She did not. She was still moving when she sank eighteen minutes later. He also incorrectly states the bridge was torn asunder. Neither the reliable witness, Quartermaster Hugh Johnston, who was at the wheel, nor Captain Turner mentioned any damage to the bridge.

Schwieger’s personal comments, such as “it would have been impossible for me to fire a second torpedo into this crushing crowd of humanity trying to save their lives,” are out of character and out of place. Personal remarks of any kind are rare in war diaries. So too are discursive observations such as “it is surprising that just today there is so much traffic here although yesterday two big steamers have been sunk south of the St. George’s Channel. Also that the
Lusitania
was not sent through the north channel remains a mystery.” Such disingenuous remarks smack of additions made later to display German conscience and suggest British incompetence. The additions and changes were most likely made in 1918 when a worried kaiser inquired about the possibility of war crimes charges. By then Schwieger was dead and could not have signed off a revised entry for May 7, 1915.

A key German justification for the sinking was that the
Lusitania
was armed. There is no evidence in surviving records that guns were ever mounted. The only preparations made for the possible use of the
Lusitania
as an auxiliary cruiser (which never materialized) were the emplacement in the deck of four six-inch gun rings in 1913, visible in some photographs of the ship. However, no one saw guns mounted on them or elsewhere in the ship despite many careful inspections, including by U.S. customs staff before departure. After the sinking U.S. consul Wesley Frost specifically asked all American survivors whether they had seen guns. None had. Those questioned included Michael Byrne, who wrote to the U.S. administration stating he had made a thorough search and found nothing. Equally, the movie film of the ship leaving New York for the last time showed nothing. Some writers have suggested that guns were stored secretly to be mounted if the need arose. If so, they were not reported by officials, passengers, or crew. More important, they would have taken at least twenty minutes to retrieve and mount at sea in an emergency. By then either any raider would have disappeared or the
Lusitania
would have been sunk. Conclusively, Bob Ballard and his team found no guns when they dived on the wreck.