A History of the Roman World (77 page)

13
C
LASS STRUGGLES IN GREECE
. Fustel de Coulanges (
Questions historiques
(1893), 121 ff.) advanced the view that the upper classes in the Greek states supported Rome and that Rome’s varying policies in Greece were influenced by the internal class struggles there. This idea has been widely held, though challenged by A. Passerini (
Athenaeum
, 1933, 309 ff.). It is probably true that the Romans favoured the upper classes in general, but only if and when this did not impinge upon their own interests, which they often conceived as best served by the preservation of a balance of power during the incessant internal quarrels that vexed the Greek states. The ‘Greek resistance’ to Rome was obviously determined by those who at any given time had political control in their own individual cities or leagues. J. Deiniger,
Der politische Widerstand gegen Rom in Griechenland 217–86 v. Chr.
(1971), argues that until Pydna a pro- or anti-Roman policy was decided by internal rival political leaders with little reference to the desires of the people as a whole, whose influence was brought to bear only in the final Achaean revolt (147/6) when members of the upper class supported the lower. Though this view is perhaps too simple (cf. R. M. Errington,
JRS
, 1973, 249 f.; J. Briscoe,
Cl. Rev.
, 1974, 258 ff.), the relevant ancient evidence is usefully collected. Cf. also p. 515 n. 14 below.

14
T
HE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
. See Kromayer,
Schlachtfelder
, ii, De Sanctis,
SR
, IV, i, F. W. Walbank,
Philip V
(1940). On Philip’s strategy cf. Kromayer, 3 ff., De Sanctis, 44 ff.

15
T
HE CAMPAIGNS OF 200–198
. See the three works cited in previous note, together with N. G. L. Hammond,
JRS
, 1966, 39 ff., for various views of the topography, especially of the Aoüs valley. For the campaign of 198 see also A. M. Eckstein,
Phoenix
, 1976, 119 ff., who limits Flamininus’ military and diplomatic skill and thinks that he turned south-east after Aoüs for reasons of supply not of diplomacy.

16
F
LAMININUS’ TERMS
. Cf. T. Frank,
Roman Imperialism
(1914), 161, n. 29. Since the terms were more sweeping than those offered in 200, Flamininus could hardly have made these additions on his own initiative.

17 F
LAMININUS
. Polybius was fairly critical of Flamininus, and Livy suppresses some of these criticisms. Various assessments of Flamininus’ policy and ambitions have been reached: see H. H. Scullard,
Roman Politics, 220–150
BC, edn 2, (1973), index
s.v.
Quinctius; J. P. V. D. Balsdon,
Phoenix
, 1967, 177 ff.; E. Badian,
Titus Quinctius Flamininus: Philhellenism and Realpolitik
(1970, University of Cincinnati); J. Briscoe,
Latomus
, 1972, 22 ff. and
Commentary on Livy xxxi–xxxiii
(1973), 22 ff. For his family and early career, Badian,
JRS
, 1971, 102 ff. Balsdon is more favourably disposed to Flamininus than is Badian, who thinks that on occasion he was ready to sacrifice principle and even Rome’s interests to his own personal ambitions (though he emphasizes that Flamininus should be judged by the standards of his own day). Badian’s study is an astringent corrective to attempts to ‘whitewash’ Flamininus; he would even question the extent of Flamininus’ personal culture. But however much or little Flamininus shared Greek culture, he certainly showed respect for it and this must have helped his dealings with the Greeks, even though few would now suppose that his policy was based on ‘sentimental’ philhellenism.

18
C
YNOSCEPHALAE
. De Sanctis (
SR
, IV, i, 86 n.) roughly follows W. M. Leake (
Travels in Northern Greece
, iv (1835), 457) who places the site between Sulpi and Dulvatan: Kromayer places it some six miles further west. See also Walbank,
Polybius
, ii, 576 ff. and W. K. Pritchett,
Studies in Ancient Greek Topography
, vol. ii (1969), 133 ff.

19
D
ANGER FROM THE NORTH
. This threat is minimized by Holleaux,
CAH
, viii, 177.

20
T
HE AETOLIAN CLAIMS
. When the Aetolians asked for the return of four cities which Philip was willing to concede, Flamininus contended that three of them could not be handed back according to the terms of the Romano-Aetolian treaty of 211 (see p. 499 n. 16 above) which he claimed they had abrogated by making a separate peace in 206: even if the treaty
was
still valid, he asserted that their request contradicted its terms. The issues are uncertain and Flamininus may have been guilty of sharp practice, but in any case his refusal naturally angered the Aetolians, who had played an important part in the battle of Cynoscephalae.

21
P
EACE
. Polybius, xviii, 33–9; 44 ff.; Livy, xxxiii, 11–13; Plutarch,
Flam.
, 9. See especially De Sanctis,
SR
, IV, i, 90 ff. Livy, (xxxiii, 30, 6) adds that Philip’s armaments were limited and that he was not to engage in foreign wars without Rome’s consent. This is probably an annalistic invention to try to justify Rome’s interference later: see E. Taübler,
Imperium Romanum
, i (1913), 230.

1
G
REEK CITIES IN ASIA MINOR
. On the Greek cities of Asia Minor and on Rome’s treatment of them see D. Magie,
Roman Rule in Asia Minor
(1950), especially ch. iv and the Notes in vol. ii where many matters are discussed in detail relevant to the present and following chapters. See also E. Badian, ‘Rome, and Antiochus: a study in Cold War’ (
Cl. Phil.
, 1959, 81 ff. =
Studies in Greek and Roman History
(1964), 112 ff.). The annalistic tradition (Livy, xxxii, 8; 27) that Attalus appealed to Rome against Antiochus’ invasion in 198 has been rejected by Holleaux (
Klio
, 1908, 273 ff.), but is defended by Bickermann (
Hermes
, 1932, 47) and Badian (
Cl. Phil.
, 1959, 82 f.).

2
R
OME AND THE AUTONOMY OF GREEK CITIES
. When the Romans based their policy of intervention in Greece upon a proclamation of ‘freedom’ for the Greek cities, they were using a word with a long and somewhat ambiguous history. Freedom or autonomy had been a catchword of the kings who succeeded Alexander the Great. Although in theory it meant complete sovereignty (and in practice it sometimes did, as at Rhodes), it often in fact involved only a privileged status granted to cities by kings rather than
real independence. Theoretically it involved the continuance of the city’s constitution, the absence of a garrison and immunity from regular taxation, but in practice it generally fell short of such concessions (cf. e.g. ‘those of the autonomous cities which formerly paid tribute to Antiochus,’ Polybius, xxi, 46). It was this royal conception of freedom in the main that Rome adopted
vis-à-vis
the cities of the Hellenistic world (cf. A. H. M. Jones,
Anatolian Studies presented to W. H. Buckler
, 103 ff.).
    That intervention on the principle of autonomy was justified was not denied by e.g. Philip of Macedon. At a meeting of the Achaean League (200–199) he counterattacked Roman charges not by refusing to admit the validity of such intervention in principle, but by asserting that the Romans had no right to act upon such a principle in view of their treatment of the Italian Confederacy, especially of Rhegium, Tarentum and Capua. To this charge the Roman envoy put up a spirited reply (see Livy, xxxi, 29–31).
    Rome’s claim to extend this principle to the Greek cities of Asia Minor (cf. p. 260) was complicated by the fact that so many of these cities had at one time or another been subjected to foreign conquerors (e.g. Persia) and had temporarily been robbed of their freedom; in particular the political relationship of these autonomous cities to the kings of Syria has formed the subject of much discussion. Their status of freedom has sometimes been interpreted as a grant dependent upon the unilateral act of the monarch, and hence revocable and to be renewed at each accession: it was based on the conqueror’s right to dispose of ‘territory won by the spear’ (cf. E. Bickermann,
Institutions des Séleucides
, 106 f., 133 f.;
Hermes
, lxvii, 50 ff.; M. Rostovtzeff,
Soc. and Econ. Hist. of Hellenistic World
, e.g. 153, 525–30, 1343 n. 15, 1347 n. 25). The view of E. Bickermann (
Rev. ét. gr.
, 1934, 346) that Alexander as conqueror of Asia arbitrarily gave autonomy to the Greek cities of Asia Minor has been refuted by W. W. Tarn (
Alexander the Great
, vol. ii (1948), 199 ff.), who shows that Alexander treated them as free allies and restored their original freedom which
de iure
they had never lost (these cities were not parties to the Peace of Antalcidas); he merely removed the obstacle of Persian rule and thus allowed the exercise of free rights which were still there. Those who accept this view will be less ready to follow Bickermann in his belief that Antiochus III laid claim to the possession of the Greek cities by right of conquest since they had formed part of the empire of Lysimachus. Rather, their independence which had been recognized by Alexander was confirmed by Antiochus I when he declared all Greek cities ‘free, autonomous and ungarrisoned’. This was the policy of Alexander’s successors, pursued in however an opportunist spirit, until it was abandoned by Antiochus III when he started on a career of active aggression (cf. D. Magie,
The Greek Political Experience
, 174 ff.,
Roman Rule in Asia Minor
, 825 ff.). But theory and practice often varied, and although ‘there certainly was a difference between genuine freedom (independence) and bogus freedom (under royal protection), it depended on the
de facto
situation, and I question whether the kings ever gave it precise legal formulation – it was to their interest to maintain the ambiguity of the term
ἐλευθεϱία
’ (A. H. M. Jones,
The Greek City
, 315 n. 8).
    E. Badian (
Foreign Clientelae
, 69 ff.) has argued that ‘freedom for the Greeks’ is not a new idea in Roman diplomacy, but a development of her earlier methods (e.g. towards the Illyrian coast), and he shows how the idea developed between 200 and 196 (in 200 Philip was to stop attacking the Greeks, in 198 to withdraw from Greece, then in 196 came the full declaration). But see A. H. McDonald
JRS
, 1959, 149.

3
N
EGOTIATIONS
, 194–193. See De Sanctis,
SR
, IV, i, 130. A diplomatic manoeuvre by Rome: see Holleaux,
CAH
, viii, 200. Spheres of influence: T. Frank,
Roman Imperialism
(1914), 171.

4 S
CIPIO AFRICANUS AND HANNIBAL
. The story, given by Livy (xxxv, 14, 5) on the authority of a later Roman annalist, that Scipio was a member of the embassy and met Hannibal at Ephesus, must be dismissed. Scipio was, however, on a mission sent to Carthage in 193 and also travelled in the eastern Mediterranean (he made dedications at Delos and Delphi: Scullard,
Scipio Africanus
(1970), 285 f.), so it is just possible he might have met Hannibal, though not at Ephesus.

5
H
ANNIBAL’S PLANS
. On these and his relations with Antiochus see Kromayer,
Schlachtfelder
, ii, 127, whose views are supported by E. Meyer (
Kl. Schr.
, i, 260 ff.;
Meister d. Politik
, 160 ff.) against the criticism of Lehmann (
Delbrück-Festschrift
, 69 ff.). De Sanctis
(SR
, IV, i, 143 f., 155) rejects Kromayer’s belief that Hannibal intended to carry the war into Italy. Groag (
Hannibal als Politiker
, 132 ff.) attempts to defend Hannibal’s war plan against Kromayer’s criticism, but his attempt is not convincing, especially in its assumption of the weakness of the Italian confederacy.

6
N
ABIS AND PHILOPOEMEN
. It is not certain that the conduct of Nabis was so black and of Achaea so white as our pro-Achaean sources paint it: cf. De Sanctis
SR
, IV, i, 133, 231. In any case the Romans wished to stop the fighting before it spread. On Philopoemen see R. M. Errington,
Philopoemen
(1969).

7
A
NTIOCHUS’ AIMS
. See De Sanctis,
SR
, IV, i, 141 ff.

8
T
HERMOPYLAE
. On the topography see Kromayer,
Schlachtfelder
, ii, 134 ff. and
Atlas
, cols 42, 43; G. B. Grundy,
The Great Persian War
(1901), 257 ff.; W. K. Pritchett,
Studies in Ancient Greek Topography
(1965), i, 71 ff. Traces of the wall survive.

9
L
UCIUS SCIPIO
. On the political intrigues behind these appointments Livy (xxxvii, 1–2) and Cicero (
Phil.
, xi, 7;
Pro Mur.
, 14) give slightly differing accounts. Cf. Scullard,
Roman Politics, 220–150
BC, edn 2, (1973), 284 f. L. Scipio’s abilities are not generally rated very highly, but see J. P. V. D. Balsdon,
Historia
, 1972, 224 ff., for a more favourable assessment.

10
T
HE ROMAN INVASION OF ASIA
. In spite of the Polybian tradition to the contrary (Polybius, xxi, 15), Antiochus’ decision not to contest the crossing seems to have been wise. Cf. Kromayer,
Schlachtfelder
, ii, 161 ff. The Scipios sent a letter to Prusias, stating Roman policy to kings: Polybius, xxi, 11.

11
M
AGNESIA
. On the battle see Kromayer,
Schlachtfelder
, ii, 163 ff. and
Atlas
, cols 43–6. The criticism of Delbrück (
Geschichte der Kriegskunst
, i, edn 3, 426 ff.) is far from convincing.