A Secret Life (24 page)
Authors: Benjamin Weiser
Tags: #History, #Europe, #Germany, #World, #True Crime, #Espionage
Kuklinski wrote that he had much to report and had taken advantage of “particularly favorable circumstances presented by late evening and night work” to photograph documents. “Leaving work at night, often with my superiors, I kept taking out more important documents and photographing them at home, without drawing my wife’s and children’s attention.”
Among the forty classified documents he had photographed since the last exchange were the minutes and decisions of meetings of the Defense Ministers and Political Advisory Committees and the Military Council of the Warsaw Pact members from 1969 to 1977. There were presentations from the recent Defense Ministers Committee meeting in Budapest on Warsaw Pact air defenses and command-and-control systems. And there was a proposal by Warsaw Pact Commander Kulikov to bring the Warsaw Pact armies exclusively under Soviet control during wartime. The proposal, which became known as the wartime statute, had deeply angered Kuklinski.
They are also irrefutable proofs of the limited sovereignty of the Warsaw Pact countries. They are proof of the indolence and of the puppet functions, contradictory to the state’s interests, and activities of the Polish People’s Republic’s authorities.It is my hope that, in case my present mission comes to an end, these matters will get through to our society. Perhaps these materials could constitute some type of bargaining factor.
On January 20, 1978, two days before the planned exchange, Marshal Kulikov made a surprise visit to the General Staff, accompanied by his chief of staff, General Anatoly Gribkov. Kulikov wanted to discuss his plan for putting Warsaw Pact armies under exclusive Soviet control in wartime. Each Warsaw Pact leader would be asked to sign the proposal, which was being drafted as a treaty. Kuklinski found Kulikov to be bombastic, swaggering, and tactless and suspected he would push the plan through with little debate.
In a letter to Kuklinski delivered in the January 22 exchange, the CIA wrote:
As you will recall, our first truly clandestine meeting took place just about five years ago in the vicinity of the Powstancow Warszawskich cemetery which honors those heroes of the Polish nation who sacrificed their lives for their beloved Poland during the Warsaw Uprising. Little could they have known or even dreamed that their struggle for the ideals for which they gave their lives would be carried on by others in subsequent generations. . . .As we begin our sixth year of cooperation for our common cause, we respectfully bow to you and salute you, wish to convey to you our deepest gratitude and admiration. Through you, Poland lives and will continue to live.
Daniel also wrote, expressing his disappointment that Kuklinski’s voyages had been ended:
Even had we not been able to meet for some reason or other, I would have been happy to know that you had the freedom to move, to explore, and to enjoy―if only for a few weeks―a respite from the burdens of your work.I have not given up hope that the decision will be reversed, and that we will again meet along the way―you, Henryk, our colleague from Warsaw, and I. Time passes, but friendship is sustained over any obstacle of time or distance. You will recall that at our last meeting, Henryk spoke of retiring. He did so this past summer (after learning that we would be unable to meet with you). He then moved to California, bought a new house, and was just about to settle down when the doctors told him he needed a rather delicate operation.I have not seen him since then, but he called me several nights ago to assure me that he is once again in good humor and approaching good health. He also assured me that―retirement or not―he is ready to come back when I call with a sign that we will once again travel to meet you.
Daniel said that he was writing before President Carter’s trip to Warsaw, adding, “We will be with him in spirit.”
At headquarters, the Soviet Division sent CIA director Turner a memo describing the significance of Kuklinski’s latest haul; it had amounted to 600 pages of classified material.
On February 3, 1978, during a strategic war game in Warsaw, General Teodor Kufel, chief of military counterintelligence, briefed the participants in the game on foreign espionage activities inside Poland. Kufel said his officers had established camouflaged surveillance posts in Warsaw, in areas where spies were believed to be operating, and on the routes diplomats used on their way to and from work. The surveillance posts had “passed the tests,” Kufel said. He also said that a “spy film” had been found and was under investigation.
In early February, Kuklinski contracted pneumonia and was sick for several weeks. Hanka, still in frail health, had decided to take a year’s leave without pay and would stay at home. Kuklinski returned to work in March. Over the next month, he obtained important Soviet documents on the outfitting of Warsaw Pact armies through the 1980s, including materials on the new T-72 battle tank. The Soviets were in the earliest stages of fielding the T-72, which had armor designed to be impervious to NATO tank rounds. The Pentagon could envisage 4,000 such tanks crossing into Europe in a war. Obtaining accurate data about the tank’s armor, the quality of its fire-control system, and the lethality of its projectiles was a priority for the Pentagon, which wanted to devise countermeasures.
Kuklinski also attended a weeklong exercise with the Soviet General Staff that included a demonstration of wartime command-and-control procedures for the Warsaw Pact. He secretly photographed documents on a new four-stage combat-readiness system designed to harmonize the transition of the Warsaw Pact militaries from peacetime to wartime under Soviet command. The documents gave a step-by-step explanation of how the Soviets and Warsaw Pact would prepare for war.
“I recommend that two documents be meticulously analyzed,” Kuklinski wrote to the CIA, citing the Soviet combat-readiness materials. He noted that film roll number seven “contains real data from the system introduced recently into the Soviet Armed Forces. It will be introduced, with some supplements, into the Warsaw Pact forces towards the end of the current year.”
He also described a question-and-answer session that had taken place in the exercise: Who will be in command of war conducted in Europe? What would be the structure and relationships in the command of operations in the European war theater? How and when will the Warsaw Pact armies become subordinate to the Soviet high command?
Kuklinski listed the officers who attended the exercise. “The strictest rigors of secrecy were imposed,” he added. For him, he said, the recent period had been marked by moments of tension and anxiety, even bouts of depression. He realized that these were “inseparable elements in activity of this kind,” he wrote, and would try to cope.
He also responded to several earlier questions from the CIA. One asked for up-to-date information about Soviet troops in Poland. Kuklinski said that except for some basic information about locations and status, the Polish military had no information on their combat readiness, personnel, and equipment changes. “The Soviets do not comply with agreements on the status of Soviet troops in Poland,” he wrote. “They inform no one of strength and equipment of their units in Poland.”
The country’s economic crisis was growing more severe. “Only a small elite in power knows the true situation,” he wrote, adding that the government’s strategy had been to implement price increases selectively and quietly, so as not to stir disorder among the people. Kuklinski said there was widespread apathy in the General Staff about Poland’s political and economic problems. But with everything else going on, Kuklinski was enjoying his new home. The fact that his precarious relationship with the CIA made him feel sometimes as if he were “standing on ice,” he wrote, “does not bother me too much. I enjoy its every warm corner.”
Writing separately to Daniel, Kuklinski said that although he had not written to him as often as he had hoped to, “believe me that in my thoughts, I did address to you much more. You are a frequent guest in my home, and I talk with you openly about my ups and downs.”
Of the news that Henry had retired, Kuklinski wrote, “As you know, he was the first American whose outstretched hand I was able to shake heartily.”
So, at first Henry, and later you, Daniel, are basically the only representatives of your great nation of freedom with whom I have a right to believe that I do have a personal and sentimental contact. Your carefully considered remarks and advice are an inspiration for me, and assist me in my difficult road of life. . . .Before I retire, western countries are closed to me. I hope that I retire in the 1980s and will sail alone on the yacht to the United States. I think that our friendship will last till that time, and that we shall then be giving each other more time and attention....Yours,P.V.
On Sunday, April 16, 1978, Kuklinski turned over his letters and nineteen rolls of film in a car pass, and he received, among other things, an updated exfiltration plan. Over the next two months, he continued to receive visits from Colonel Putek, the overly inquisitive counterintelligence officer. On April 3, Kuklinski’s “Name Day,” a holiday celebrated like a birthday in Poland, Putek had arrived with a bouquet of flowers, embraced Kuklinski, and lavished him with praise. Kuklinski was baffled by Putek’s flagrant attempts at ingratiation, but he did not want to seem unpleasant and played along. Twice he recommended Putek for cash bonus awards. Putek thanked him profusely.
One day in May, Kuklinski discovered that he could not account for a roll of film the CIA had given him. At first, he thought he had mislaid it, but he searched his closets, drawers, and other hiding places without success. He could also not remember whether he had used it yet for photographing documents. He recalled General Kufel’s comment about the discovery of a lost “spy film.”
He grew more worried. General Siwicki had assigned him to write a speech to be delivered in Sofia, Bulgaria, for a combined meeting of the chiefs of the General Staffs. The session was to focus on weapons development from 1981 to 1985 as well as Marshal Kulikov’s proposal to place the Warsaw Pact armies under Soviet control in wartime. But Siwicki ordered Kuklinski to avoid including any hard data on Poland’s armed forces in the speech. Siwicki said Moscow had complained that information from recent meetings was being leaked to the West. He implied that the Romanians were to blame, but Kuklinski wondered whether the leaks could be traced to him.
In June, Daniel prepared a new letter for Kuklinski, acknowledging that the course Kuklinski set out to take in 1972 had now become more lonely and difficult, as they could no longer see each other.
Robert Kennedy, younger brother of President John Kennedy, was assassinated 10 years ago this week. Just before that, he wrote that “Every generation has its central concern, whether to end war, erase racial injustice, or improve the condition of the working-man.” Today’s young people appear to have chosen for their concern the dignity of the individual human being. They demand a government that speaks directly and honestly to its citizens. We can win their commitment only by demonstrating that these goals are possible through personal effort.I know very well that you are not alone in your “central concern” in the course you have chosen. Others like you in Poland, in the other nations of Eastern Europe, and in the Soviet Union, have the same concern. They, too, accept the dangers, control their outward manner, and know inwardly that they are fulfilling a responsibility that Robert Kennedy and his brother felt so deeply. The difference is that they, like you, must act alone. Your personal effort is not publicly known, shared, or praised by broad masses of society. It is known, in fact, by only a very few persons in my government. Yet, the results of your efforts have had, and continue to have, a deep impact on our capability to understand and counter the objectives and tactics of the Soviet Union. . . .You wistfully mention a lone cruise across the Atlantic to the United States. I wish nothing else for myself, and all those of us associated with you, than exactly this. We would welcome you with wide-open arms and a brotherly embrace. Our friendship will last not only until those days, but far beyond them. I do not have to assure you of that.
On June 18, in advance of the next exchange, Kuklinski drafted two letters to the CIA. “I await tonight’s exchange with impatience,” he wrote in one. He described Putek’s visits and Siwicki’s comment about leaks to the West. The implication that the Romanians were to blame did not exclude him “from the circle of suspects,” he said. He asked for “an analysis of my situation, honest clarifications, and eventual instructions.” He described General Kufel’s briefing on surveillance traps in Warsaw and the discovery of the so-called spy film. “Initially, I did not attach much weight to it because I was convinced that this matter does not concern me,” he wrote. But then he had discovered his own lost roll of film. “The fact is, one . . . film got lost somewhere, and I have not found it.”
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