After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (7 page)

Much like the Al-Saud and the Al-Sabah, the ruling families of the former Trucial States have also ruled unopposed since their independence. In Bahrain’s case, Isa bin Salman Al-Khalifa ruled from 1961 until his death in 1999 when he was peacefully succeeded by his eldest son, Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, who continues to rule. Succession in Qatar has, by contrast, been much more complicated, with Ahmad bin Ali Al-Thani being deposed in 1972, one year after Qatar’s independence, by his cousin Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani. Then, in 1995 Khalifa was dramatically deposed by his second wife’s eldest son, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani. Nevertheless, the overall authority of the Al-Thani dynasty has never come under serious question, with the family remaining in tight control of Qatar. In Abu Dhabi, after succeeding his unpopular older brother with some degree of British assistance in 1966,
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Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan enjoyed a long and relatively untroubled reign. His death in 2004 was closely followed by the succession of his eldest son and long-serving crown prince, Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. But following a secret family agreement reached in 1999 which saw Khalifa’s ambitious younger half-brother, Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, being appointed as deputy crown prince,
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Muhammad was then immediately upgraded to crown prince following their father’s death—despite Khalifa having two adult sons. Since then, Muhammad has risen to become one of the most powerful members of the Al-Nahyan family, controlling most key policy areas in the emirate. In neighbouring Dubai, the Al-Maktoum family had a similarly long-serving patriarch, with Rashid bin Said Al-Maktoum ruling from 1958 until his death in 1990. Survived by four sons, his eldest—Maktoum bin Rashid Al-Maktoum—duly succeeded. However, and as something of a precursor to the Al-Nahyan succession arrangements, he appointed one of his younger brothers—Muhammad
bin Rashid Al-Maktoum—as crown prince in 1995, rather than one of his own sons. Between then and 2006, when Maktoum died, Muhammad was Dubai’s de facto ruler, and thus his eventual succession in 2006 was little more than a formality.

The ruling families of the smaller former Trucial States have, like Qatar, been a little more prone to internecine disputes and ‘palace coups’. In Sharjah’s case, only a year after independence its ruler Khalid bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi was assassinated by an exiled former ruler, Saqr bin Sultan Al-Qasimi. Turning to Khalid’s most educated younger brother, the ruling family appointed Sultan bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi as ruler. In 1987 Sultan’s passed-over elder brother, Abdul-Aziz bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi, briefly seized power before Sultan was able to reassert control.
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Similarly, in Ra’s al-Khaimah the succession process has been bumpy, although the ruling Al-Qasimi family’s authority has never been directly contested. As discussed later in this book, the emirate’s long-serving ruler, Saqr bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi, had appointed his eldest son, Khalid bin Saqr Al-Qasimi, as crown prince in 1961. But in 2003 the aging Saqr had switched crown princes, choosing one of his younger sons, Saud bin Saqr Al-Qasimi.
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Although Khalid was forced into exile, his return to Ra’s al-Khaimah following Saqr’s death in 2010 prompted a brief crisis before Saud was eventually confirmed as the new ruler.

The period immediately before and after the Trucial States’ independence from Britain in 1971 deserves special attention, as it has had important ramifications for these monarchies’ subsequent state formation process. In 1968 the British government announced that within just three years it would dismantle all of its bases and treaties ‘east of Aden’, in an effort to cut imperial expenditure and focus more resources on Britain’s struggling domestic welfare system. The ruling families of the Trucial States were so alarmed by the prospect of their protector’s departure that they even offered to subsidise the deployment of British troops in the region after independence was granted.
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Britain’s solution, however, was to encourage the various rulers to form a cohesive federation that would provide their sheikhdoms with at least some degree of collective security.

Various meetings and negotiations took place, but it quickly became apparent that Bahrain and Qatar were unwilling to form a state with their less developed neighbours,
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with both declaring themselves independent emirates in summer 1971. To make matters worse, Ra’s al-Khaimah was
also baulking at joining the federation, as it too held ambitions to become an independent state. Moreover, on 1 December 1971—the day before Britain’s official withdrawal—Iran had seized three contested islands belonging to Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah, thus further alarming the remaining Trucial States rulers. Nonetheless, the following day a six member federation of United Arab Emirates was inaugurated,
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and the next month Ra’s al-Khaimah reluctantly agreed to join. Given that Abu Dhabi commanded the bulk of the UAE’s oil reserves it became the federal capital and its ruler, Zayed, was installed as the UAE’s first president with Dubai’s ruler, Rashid, as vice president.
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Much like Kuwait, Bahrain began its period of independence with an attempt at building a parliament as the ruling family sought to involve the influential merchant community. A constitution was drawn up detailing a fully elected body with an all-male electorate, and the first ballots were cast in 1973. Political parties were forbidden and the unelected prime minister—Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa—was a member of the ruling family. Nonetheless some political blocs did form, and a brief period of vibrant debate ensued. But within just two years the emir moved to dissolve the parliament. Members had begun to dispute the Al-Khalifa family’s enthusiasm for an American military presence in Bahrain and were frustrated over the lack of land reform, with the Al-Khalifa continuing to own most of the island’s territory. Moreover, parliament had crossed another red line by calling for a more transparent state budget as oil revenues boomed.
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Thus, for most of the 1980s the only spaces for political discussion in Bahrain were in more traditional settings, in particular the
majalis
for Sunni citizens, and the ‘mourning houses,’ or
mataams
for Shia citizens.
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By the early 1990s, with deepening security ties between the Al-Khalifa and the US, and with rising unemployment and falling incomes, hundreds of Bahrainis petitioned the emir for a reinstatement of the 1973 parliament, but only an appointed advisory council was established. Further opposition and fresh demands in the 1990s—detailed later in this book—were similarly unsuccessful, with the emir refusing to re-open parliament.

By 2001, however, the ruling family chose to return to earlier neo-patriarchal strategies by holding a referendum on a ‘National Action Charter’ that would supposedly transform Bahrain into a constitutional monarchy. In 2002 a new constitution was duly implemented on the basis of the charter which promised the creation of a bicameral, halfelected
parliament, the abolishing of much maligned ‘security courts’, and a new requirement that half of all judges were to be elected. In 2006 ‘political societies’ were even approved,
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bringing Bahrain the closest of all Gulf monarchies to accepting political parties. However, the charter also re-designated the emir as ‘king’ with Bahrain becoming a kingdom rather than an emirate, and the king remained in control of all key appointments, including the prime minister and all of the cabinet ministers. Crucially, he also retained the power of approving or rejecting all proposed legislation.
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But interestingly, in parallel to the Khalifa bin Salman-controlled government, the king also set up a new Economic Development Board (EDB), which was gradually assigned more and more control over Bahrain’s economy. Given that the EDB is chaired by the king’s eldest son and crown prince, Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, and given that—until recently at least—Khalifa bin Salman’s ministers had to answer to the EDB,
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Bahrain provides a good example of how state formation in the Gulf monarchies has often been manipulated in order to manage ruling family divisions. Broadly speaking, the Al-Khalifa dynasty has become factionalised into conservatives led by the prime minister and a number of key members of the royal court, and reformists, led by the crown prince. The king, rather precariously, has had to sit somewhere in the middle.

Although having shared a similar imperial history to Bahrain, Qatar’s post-independence state formation process has been quite different and much more autocratic, mostly due to its smaller population and—as discussed in the following chapter—the ruling family’s greater ability to distribute wealth and resources. A ‘Basic Law of Qatar’ had already been drafted in 1970, a year before Britain’s departure, and this went on to become a provisional constitution in 1972. Although designed to be as flexible as possible, so as to reflect the transitional nature of the Qatari state,
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it nonetheless provided the basis for setting up an appointed Council of Ministers and a twenty-member Advisory Council or
Majlis Al-Shura
. Although the latter was also appointed, some concessions were made to electoral politics, with Qatar being divided into ten tribal districts, the leaders of which could each nominate four members, two of whom would then be selected by the emir.
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In 1975 the Advisory Council was expanded to thirty-five members, but it remained under the full control of the Al-Thani family, with the emir able to re-appoint its members indefinitely and to block or ratify all proposed legislation.
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Much like the Kuwaiti constitution and the second Bahraini constitution, Qatar’s provisional constitution also sought to combine patriarchal authority with legal-rational authority by slipping in a clause aimed at establishing the permanency of the ruling family. This required all Qatari citizens to ‘…pledge their loyalty and absolute obedience to the Ruler in the fear of God’. Moreover, in another attempt to strengthen the dynasty and prevent unwanted succession disputes the constitution described the need for consensus between ruling family members, although without outlining procedures or specifics.
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Upon his succession in 1995, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani made a number of promises to reform Qatar’s political institutions and several decrees were duly signed. Three years later the first elections were held for Qatar’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry; and in 1999 the first elections were held for Qatar’s twenty-nine member Municipal Council, with over 22,000 men and women voting. In 2007 a second round of elections were held, with about 50 per cent of the electorate voting.
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Much like the Saudi elections though, these were only for an institution with very limited powers, and no influence on Qatar’s central government. In 2003 a referendum had already taken place on the subject of a new, permanent constitution to replace the original 1972 provisional constitution. Significantly the new constitution—approved by 97 per cent of Qataris—committed the state to becoming ‘democratic’ and called for a new, elected Advisory Council as opposed to the original appointed body. The council was to be expanded to forty-five members, thirty of whom would be elected; it would sit for four year terms and its recommendations would still require the emir’s approval.
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Elections were promised for 2005 but never materialised, as was also the case in 2010. The council thus continues to be fully appointed and is increasingly criticised for its ineffective role and limited scope. Indeed, it only meets for eight months a year, and only sits for two hours a week.
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Nevertheless in late 2011 another announcement was made that the promised reforms would still take place, with elections due to be held in 2013 for thirty of the forty-five positions.
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The UAE’s state formation has been more complicated, not least due to the existence of a federal government that came into being following independence in 1971, and the continuing existence of various emirate-level governments answering to their respective ruling families. Originally envisaged as a loose confederation, with only limited powers being
transferred to federal ministries, a provisional constitution was signed by the six founding rulers in late 1971, and then by the ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah in early 1972. Given that Abu Dhabi, as discussed, was in control of most of the UAE’s oil reserves and had become the UAE’s capital, most of the new ministries were located there. But neither defence nor oil policies were transferred to the federal government, as it was felt that too rapid centralisation of such key matters would harm the status and prestige of the poorer emirates’ governments, thus risking friction and instability. Indeed, when Abu Dhabi attempted to unify the different emirate-level armed forces in the late 1970s both Dubai and Ra’s al-Khaimah threatened their withdrawal from the union, prompting a constitutional crisis. Only in 1996 was the constitution made permanent with a unified UAE Armed Forces being established under Abu Dhabi’s umbrella. By this stage Dubai and most of the other emirates were pressing ahead with costly infrastructure projects in efforts to build up more diverse economic bases, and preferred to transfer as many costly services as possible to Abu Dhabi and the federal government.
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Overseeing the federal government since 1971 has been the Supreme Council of Rulers, which is made up of the seven hereditary rulers of each emirate and, on occasion, their respective crown princes. While the constitution allows for an SCR presidential election to take place every five years,
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in practice the rulership of Abu Dhabi remains synonymous with the presidency of the UAE, not least because of Abu Dhabi’s single-handed financing of most federal development projects. The SCR also reflects Dubai’s elevated status in the UAE by awarding only the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai veto power in its meetings—as per an article of the constitution,
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—and by always appointing the ruler of Dubai as the UAE’s vice president. In support of the SCR, or more specifically the president, there exists a presidential office and a presidential court with its own staff. However, given the ruler of Abu Dhabi’s similar emirate-level institutions it is unclear if the two function independently.