All In (41 page)

Petraeus again assured the president that he would faithfully support and execute his decision, but he noted that he would have to say, if asked at his confirmation hearing in two days, that the timeline was more aggressive than he had recommended. The president understood the obligation of military witnesses at congressional hearings to provide their personal views on issues when asked. Nonetheless, it was a tense moment. Finally, the president made his decision: 10,000 forces would leave Afghanistan by the end of the year, and the remaining 23,000 surge troops would be out by the end of summer 2012.

When Petraeus left the White House, he reportedly felt he had been heard. His recommendation had not been adopted, but he believed in and supported the process, and he recognized that only the president could truly weigh all the factors—many of which went beyond the military's purview. He'd acknowledged as much at the first meeting. He accepted the president's decision—and was ready to execute. He wanted to get in touch with his headquarters in Afghanistan to reassure them that all was well; he knew many would feel disappointed. It was time, as he liked to say, “to look forward and take the rearview mirrors off the bus.” He wrote a statement and asked Lieutenant General James Bucknall, his deputy at ISAF headquarters, to read it at the morning's stand-up. He added one important instruction: Do not forward it to anyone via e-mail. The president had not yet made his public announcement, but Petraeus wanted his team to be prepared to deal with, if not shape, the troops' and coalition members' reaction. His statement read:

 

Today, I participated in the final session with President Obama on deliberations over the drawdown of the US surge forces (i.e. the final 33k). President Obama will announce his decision on Wednesday evening, US time. I provided the President various options and assessments of risk to the military campaign plan for each option, and we had excellent discussions during the course of three meetings; indeed, he gave a very full hearing to all participants and I had ample opportunity to describe our campaign plan and the way ahead. US Forces will, needless to say, execute the president's decision; that is, of course, our constitutional duty and we embrace it. The mission will not change; it will remain hard, but doable. We will not lose focus on the initiation of the execution of the drawdown; in fact, we will redouble our efforts to help our Afghan partners develop the capabilities to secure and govern themselves, thereby ensuring that this country does not once again become a sanctuary for Al Qaeda and its affiliates. We will likely have to work harder in some cases, as we begin to reduce forces over the course of this year and continue in 2012; that is understandable but doable. Consequently, I will expect more, not less, of each of you. So will General Allen. And we will, of course, continue to take the fight to the enemy, along with our Afghan partners, with our Afghan counterparts increasingly in the lead. We will continue to help our civilian counterparts, international and Afghan, build on the gains ANSF and ISAF forces have achieved as they seek to help establish local governance, stimulate economic development, support provision of basic services, promote establishment of the rule of law, pursue reintegration, and so on. I will work with the staff when I return late this week to tweak our campaign plan to reflect the adjusted force levels and timelines, to ensure that we continue to drive the campaign forward, and to build on the achievements of ANSF and ISAF forces in the past year, in particular, as well as to set General Allen up for success. I look forward to getting back to Kabul and the mission of the largest coalition in history! Best from Washington—COMISAF.

“BIDEN WINS, PETRAEUS LOSES”
was the headline the following morning as news of the president's decision began to leak. “That's not the issue,” Petraeus told one of his confidants. “This is not about one person's rep; it's about achieving our national objectives.” Obama saw Afghanistan as a “war of necessity” but was reducing forces more rapidly than advised. To explain the president's position, the White House held a background briefing for reporters that afternoon, several hours before the president's nationally televised address. Officials described what the president would announce: 10,000 troops would leave Afghanistan by the end of the year, and all 33,000 surge troops would be out by the end of the summer of 2012—in fifteen months, faster than Petraeus had recommended. He and Obama were only three months apart—but those three months would have left those troops in country through the end of the 2012 fighting season, which Petraeus considered critical in consolidating the gains he had achieved over the previous year.

A reporter asked the White House spokesperson point-blank whether Petraeus had endorsed Obama's plan. The fuzzy answer he got back bespoke the extreme sensitivity of the issue. “In terms of General Petraeus, I think that, consistent with our approach to this, General Petraeus presented the president with a range of options for pursuing this drawdown,” one official said. “There were certainly options that went beyond what the president settled on in terms of the length of time that it would take to recover the surge and the pace that troops would come out—so there were options that would have kept troops in Afghanistan longer at a higher number. That said, the president's decision was fully within the range of options that were presented to him and has the full support of his national security team.”

The
New York Times
soon quoted two administration officials as saying that Petraeus had not endorsed Obama's decision, while Gates and Clinton reluctantly had. Keane denounced the decision and told Petraeus in an e-mail that it “appears to undermine the entire COIN campaign at a time when we finally have gained momentum. My god, Dave, they just pushed your recommendations aside and changed the war fundamentally. What a mess.” Petraeus did not respond.

President Obama addressed the nation at 8:00
P.M.
from the White House. Petraeus watched it with his wife, Holly, from their home at Fort Myer. Obama called the decision he had announced at West Point in December 2009 to order 30,000 additional American troops into Afghanistan one of the most difficult decisions he had made as president. But the objectives were clear: Refocus on al-Qaeda and reverse the Taliban's momentum and build an Afghan military capable of defending the country. A drawdown of those forces would begin in July.

“Tonight I can tell you that we are fulfilling that commitment,” Obama said. “Thanks to our extraordinary men and women in uniform, our civilian personnel and our many coalition partners, we are meeting our goals.” The president did not credit Petraeus by name for assuming command and overseeing the effort to gain momentum on the battlefield. Obama continued:

 

As a result, starting next month, we will be able to remove 10,000 of our troops from Afghanistan by the end of this year, and we will bring home a total of 33,000 troops by next summer, fully recovering the surge I announced at West Point. After this initial reduction, our troops will continue coming home at a steady pace as Afghan security forces move into the lead. Our mission will change from combat to support. By 2014, this process of transition will be complete, and the Afghan people will be responsible for their own security. . . . Of course, huge challenges remain. This is the beginning but not the end of our effort to wind down this war. We'll have to do the hard work of keeping the gains that we've made, while we draw down our forces and transition responsibility for security to the Afghan government. . . . We do know that peace cannot come to a land that has known so much war without a political settlement. So as we strengthen the Afghan government and security forces, America will join initiatives that reconcile the Afghan people, including the Taliban. Our position on these talks is clear: They must be led by the Afghan government; and those who want to be a part of a peaceful Afghanistan must break from al-Qaeda, abandon violence and abide by the Afghan constitution. But, in part because of our military effort, we have reason to believe that progress can be made. . . . We've ended our combat mission in Iraq, with 100,000 American troops already out of that country. And even as there will be dark days ahead in Afghanistan, the light of a secure peace can be seen in the distance. These long wars will come to a responsible end.

Conservative writer Max Boot, whom Petraeus respected, was outraged by the speech. He told Petraeus that if he wanted to quit and run for president, he would work on his campaign. Petraeus told him that his position would undoubtedly be known during tomorrow's confirmation hearing but that quitting was not the answer. He certainly didn't intend to run for president, either. As a student and practitioner of civil-military relations, Petraeus had thought at length about the subject of resignation in protest, turning it over in his mind many times. He was well steeped in the theory and practice and pitfalls of civil-military relations. Military decision making and the use of force as they related to civil-military relations had been foundations of his doctoral research.

Petraeus strongly believed that “military leaders should provide advice that is
informed
by important nonmilitary and military factors beyond their strict purview, but is
driven
by the situation on the ground and military considerations.” In other words, a military leader's advice was premised first and foremost on his or her areas of expertise—military affairs, not political ones. Petraeus fully subscribed to the oath of office, including obeying “the orders of the President of the United States and the officers appointed over me.” Obama's decision to draw down forces faster than he had recommended did not, in his mind, begin to approach the threshold for such an extraordinary action as resignation. He thought it would have been a selfish, grandstanding move with huge political ramifications. He had had ample opportunity to provide input and give his best advice, and now it was time to salute and carry on.

Some politicians thought otherwise.

Senator Joseph Lieberman issued an immediate statement saying that Obama's speedier drawdown would “put at risk the substantial gains we have made in Afghanistan.”

Soon after, Gates's press secretary sent Petraeus's team a statement from Gates supporting the president. “Over the past 18 months our troops have made tremendous progress degrading the capability of the Taliban while enhancing the Afghan security forces,” Gates said. “It is critical that we continue to aggressively prosecute that strategy. I support the President's decision because it provides our commanders with enough resources, time and, perhaps most importantly, flexibility to bring the surge to a successful conclusion.”

A short while later, Petraeus's executive officer sent him the prepared statement that Joint Chiefs chairman Mullen would use to open a hearing in the House Armed Services Committee on Thursday morning:

 

Let me start by saying that I support the President's decisions, as do Generals Mattis and Petraeus. We were given voice in this process. We offered our views—freely and without hesitation—and they were heard. As has been the case throughout the development and execution of the Afghanistan strategy, the Commander-in-Chief presided over an inclusive and comprehensive discussion about what to do next. I am grateful for that.

AT UNION STATION
over drinks and dinner that evening, Senator Graham took a cell phone call from his colleague and fellow Afghan war booster Senator McCain. The two strongly disagreed with Obama's decision. “This is now his policy; he needs to own it,” Graham told McCain. “He did not take the advice of his military advisers, and it has put the mission in jeopardy. This assumes too much risk. His decision was political, and we need to pin it on him.” Graham was livid. “You know, as a ranking GOP member, I have supported the war and the president's position, but he is about to lose that support and the rest of those in the party who have backed this war,” he said as he closed his cell phone.

Petraeus was determined to avoid getting sucked into the politics of either side. He knew some senators would question the drawdown decision during his confirmation hearing the following day. He needed to keep the troops in Afghanistan focused, to give them energy and reassurance that the president's decision did not call for such doomsday political rankling. Initially, he intended for his deputy commander to read the statement he had provided at the stand-up in Kabul on Thursday morning, the morning after the president's announcement. But Petraeus quickly decided that wasn't enough; the best point of influence as the battlefield commander was for him to be with the troops, to the extent that he could from D.C. He had his communications team arrange for him to deliver a revised statement personally via a secure video teleconference from his Fort Myer home that evening at 11:00
P.M.

Whatever he may have felt about the decision that day, there was no trace of disappointment on his face or in his message, a modified version of what he'd sent his deputy earlier:

 

As was noted earlier, President Obama announced this evening in Washington his decision on the drawdown of the US surge forces. As he explained, the drawdown will entail a reduction of 10K US forces by the end of this year and the remaining 23K by the end of next summer. This culminated a decision-making process that was rapid and thorough, in which three meetings were held in the past week alone, during which I was provided ample opportunity to contribute and in which I offered forthright, professional military advice that included options for implementing the policy, assessments of risk for each option, and recommendations. As President Obama noted, this decision will fulfill the drawdown commitment he made in his speech at West Point on 1 December 2009. And, as he observed, it is a decision made possible in large part by the hard-fought progress made over the past 18–24 months by ISAF and ANSF troops. Needless to say, with the decision being announced, all of us will support the decision and strive to execute it effectively. That is our responsibility as military leaders. As we contemplate the way ahead, we should recall that during the course of the drawdown of the 33K US troopers over the next 15 months, ANSF numbers will increase likely by some 70K, if we count, in addition to the additional ANA and ANP to be fielded, the additional APPF, ALP, and specialty forces, such as the Khost Protection Force and various NDS Counter-Terrorist Pursuit Team elements.