Battleship Bismarck (15 page)

This offensive reached its high point in the first quarter of 1941. Between January and March, the battleships
Scharnhorst
and
Gneisenau
, under Fleet Commander Admiral Günther Lütjens, spent eight weeks operating against British commerce in the Atlantic. The total of shipping sunk was relatively low, 122,000 gross register tons, but the mere presence of German battleships in the Atlantic had forced the British Admiralty to take inconvenient countermeasures. It had to deploy significant forces in the ocean areas menaced by the
Scharnhorst
and
Gneisenau
and in the northern passages into the Atlantic, and the whole convoy system was thrown into disarray because, now, every convoy had to be escorted by at least one battleship. The Seekriegsleitung responded with a plan to form a four battleship task force—the
Bismarck, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst
, and
Gneisenau
—and send it into the Atlantic to prey on convoys. Although the intention was to send this force out as soon as possible, it turned out that the
Tirpitz
, commissioned on 25 February, could not be operational until the late fall, and in the meantime the Seekriegsleitung would have to be content with the
Bismarck, Scharnhorst
, and
Gneisenau.
No wonder it was anxious for the powerful
Bismarck
to be operationally ready.

The expectation with which the
Bismarck
was awaited was matched by a corresponding anxiety on the British side. To the Admiralty, it was clear that, when the German commerce-raiders in the Atlantic were joined by the
Bismarck
, the situation could only get worse. Therefore, it watched the
Bismarck’s
progress towards operational readiness very closely and apprehensively. It was reported at one point that the
Bismarck
in company with light forces had passed
Skagen on a northwesterly course on 18 April 1941. That day the
Bismarck
was still training in the Gulf of Danzig.

British interest in the
Bismarck
went back further than that, however. Since the beginning of the war, Winston Churchill, first as First Lord of the Admiralty and, after May 1940, as Prime Minister, had repeatedly pointed out the danger inherent in the German fleet being reinforced by the addition of the
Bismarck
and had taken part in discussions as to how this danger could best be countered. In February 1941, the
Bismarck
still not being operational, he tried to foresee what the Seekriegsleitung would do. He reasoned that it would not make a move until the
Bismarck
and the
Tirpitz
had been completed—and up to that point, he guessed Berlin’s intentions correctly. It seemed to him that Germany could not make better use of these great ships than to keep them in the Baltic and, every now and again, start a rumor that they were about to depart for the Atlantic. This would compel Great Britain to keep a powerful force at Scapa Flow, the Home Fleet’s main base, to the detriment of other missions. It would also give Germany the advantage of being able to select her own timing for any operation; she would not have to keep her ships in constant readiness. And since the British ships would naturally have to go into the yard from time to time, it would be very difficult for the Admiralty to maintain superiority over the German commerce-raiders at all times.

Two months later, Churchill coupled a reference to the serious damage that the
Scharnhorst
and
Gneisenau
had done to British trade at the beginning of the year with the remark that the situation would shortly be made worse by the appearance of the
Bismarck.
Several times since the war began, he had pointed out the necessity of mounting air attacks to delay the construction of the
Bismarck
by at least three or four months, and said that success in such a mission would be helpful to British fleet dispositions worldwide. In August 1940, he wrote to the British Air Minister, “Even a few months’ delay in
Bismarck
will affect the whole balance of sea-power to a serious degree.”
*
And in October, he wrote to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, “The greatest prize open to Bomber Command is the disabling of
Bismarck
and
Tirpitz.
”
†

However, these hopes about the fate of the
Bismarck
were not to be fulfilled before she put to sea on her first operational cruise.

*
Winston Churchill,
The Second World War, Vol.
11. 578.

†
Churchill, p. 445.

5    Operation Orders for Exercise Rhine

The success of the
Gneisenau
and
Scharnhorst
as commerce-raiders naturally led the Seekriegsleitung to intensify its conduct of this form of warfare with heavy ships. On 2 April 1941, as the
Bismarck
approached combat-readiness, it issued an operational directive that read in part:

During the past winter the conduct of the war was fundamentally in accord with the directives of the Seekriegsleitung . . . and closed with the first extended battleship operation in the open Atlantic. Besides achieving important tactical results, this battleship operation showed what important strategic effects a similar sortie could have. They would reach beyond the immediate area of operations to other theaters of war (the Mediterranean and the South Atlantic). The goal of the war at sea command must be to maintain and increase these effects by repeating such operations as often as possible.

We must not lose sight of the fact that the decisive objective in our struggle with England is to destroy her trade. This can be most effectively accomplished in the North Atlantic, where all her supply lines come together and where, even in case of interruption in more distant seas, supplies can still get through on the direct route from North America.

Gaining command of the sea in the North Atlantic is the best solution to this problem, but this is not possible with the forces that at this moment we can commit to this purpose, and given the constraint that we must preserve our numerically inferior forces. Nevertheless, we must strive for local and temporary command of the sea in this area and gradually, methodically, and systematically extend it.

During the first battleship operation in the Atlantic the enemy was able always to deploy one battleship against our two on both of the main supply lines. However, it became clear that providing this defense of his convoys brought him to the limit of the possibilities open to him, and the only way he can significantly strengthen his escort forces is by weakening positions important to him (Mediterranean, home waters) or by reducing convoy traffic.

As soon as the two battleships of the
Bismarck
class are ready for deployment, we will be able to seek engagement with the forces escorting enemy convoys and, when they have been eliminated, destroy the convoy itself. As of now, we cannot follow that course, but it will soon be possible, as an intermediate step, for us to use the battleship
Bismarck
to distract the hostile escorting forces, in order to enable the other units engaged to operate against the convoy itself. In the beginning, we will have the advantage of surprise because some of the ships involved
*
will be making their first appearance and, based on his experience in the previous battleship operations, the enemy will assume that
one
battleship will be enough to defend a convoy.

At the earliest possible date, which it is hoped will be during the new-moon period of April, the
Bismarck
and the
Prinz Eugen
, led by the Fleet Commander, are to be deployed as commerce-raiders in the Atlantic.
†
At a time that will depend on the completion of the repairs she is currently undergoing,
Gneisenau
will also be sent into the Atlantic.

The lessons learned in the last battleship operation indicate that the
Gneisenau
should join up with the
Bismarck
group, but a diversionary sweep by the
Gneisenau
in the area between Cape Verde and the Azores may be planned before that happens.

The heavy cruiser
Prinz Eugen
is to spend most of her time operating tactically with the
Bismarck
or with the
Bismarck
and
Gneisenau.

In contrast to previous directives to the
Gneisenau-Scharnhorst
task force, it is the mission of this task force to also attack escorted convoys. However, the objective of the battleship
Bismarck
should not be to defeat in an all-out engagement enemies of equal strength, but to tie them down in a delaying action, while preserving her own combat capability as much as possible, so as to allow the other ships to get at the merchant vessels in the convoy. The primary mission of this operation also is the destruction of the enemy’s merchant shipping; enemy warships will be engaged only when that objective makes it necessary and it can be done without excessive risk.

The operational area will be defined as the entire North Atlantic
north of the equator, with the exception of the territorial waters (three-nautical-mile limit) of neutral states.

The Group Commands have operational control in their zones. The Fleet Commander has control at sea.
*

The Group Commands mentioned in the above directive were Naval Group Command North in Wilhelmshaven and Naval Group Command West in Paris. Both commands, each of which was then headed by a Generaladmiral,
†
were responsible for the conduct of operations in their geographically defined areas of authority. They were immediately subordinate to the Seekriegsleitung in Berlin, and the senior officers afloat were subordinate to them. This form of organization was adopted for several reasons: a headquarters ashore would have the best intelligence available; it would have much better communications than the senior officer afloat; and its communications systems was less vulnerable. The Fleet Commander has control over all tactical matters and, obviously, in action.

The directive had no sooner reached the Fleet Commander, Admiral Lütjens, than it was out of date. On 6 April, the
Gneisenau
, then undergoing repairs in Brest, was hit by a British aerial torpedo and a few days later by four bombs. She would not be available for a long time. The task force was now reduced to the
Bismarck and
the
Prinz Eugen.
Nevertheless, Lütjens proceeded to issue orders for the overall operation, and Group North and Group West did the same for their respective areas of authority. Group North was responsible until the task force entered the Atlantic, at which point Group West took over.

In his order of 22 April, Lütjens gave the forthcoming operation the code name Rheinübung (Exercise Rhine),
‡
and set forth his strategy: taking every precaution not to be detected, the task force was to steam through the Great Belt, the North Sea, and the Denmark Strait to the North Atlantic, where it would attack convoys on the Halifax-England route. Subsequent missions would depend on what the situation was, but munitions and stores would be replenished at a port in western France.

Under Lütjens’s command were to be the
Bismarck
and
Prinz Eugen
; the U-boats operating along the north-south Atlantic routes; after the end of May, the four U-boats on the Halifax-England convoy route; the scouts
Gonzenheim
and
Kota Penang
; two fleet supply ships; and five tankers. For protection,
Sperrbrecher 13
and
Sperrbrecher 31
would precede the force on its way from Arkona to the Great Belt, and the 5th Minesweeping Flotilla would escort it through the Skagerrak minefield. Thereafter, it would have a destroyer escort consisting of the
Z-23, Z-24, Hans Lody
, and
Friedrich Eckoldt.
Independently operating forces such as reconnaissance planes and fighters were to provide cover as prescribed by Group North and Group West.

Group North timed the task force’s passage through the Great Belt so that it would transit the channel in the outer Kristiansand-South minefield around 2030 on the third day of the operation and enter Korsfjord (now Krossfjord), near Bergen, the following morning. After spending that day in the fjord, which would allow the
Prinz Eugen
and the destroyers to refuel from a tanker, at nightfall the formation would depart through the northern exit of Hjeltefjord and steam at high speed for a point thirty nautical miles west of Sognefjord. Thereafter, it would continue at its own discretion.