Battleship Bismarck (16 page)

Group North recommended that, weather permitting, the force should straightway enter the Atlantic through the narrow Iceland-Faeroes passage, keeping far away from the coast of Iceland. Should that not be possible, it should wait in the Norwegian Sea for more favorable weather and make use of the opportunity to fuel from the tanker
Weissenburg
, which would be in the area.

Group West allowed the Fleet Commander a free hand in carrying out the mission in the area of operations, but stipulated that, although the
Prinz Eugen
was to spend most of her time operating in tactical combination with the
Bismarck
, she would be subject to being sent on special missions at the direction of Group West or at the discretion of the Fleet Commander. It stated that if the breakout into the Atlantic should be detected, the mission would remain the same, being shortened or broken off, as necessary. Group West emphasized that the important thing was to preserve the combat-readiness of the ships; combat with enemy forces of equal strength should therefore be avoided. Contact with a single battleship covering a convoy was permissible only if it could be done without fully engaging her and if it gave the cruiser a chance to engage successfully the remaining escort or the convoy. If combat was unavoidable, it was to be conducted as forcefully as possible.

Two points in the above directives require comment. One point is that the Seekriegsleitung’s admonition that our forces strive “gradually, methodically, and systematically” to establish command of the sea in the North Atlantic, even “local and temporary” command, was, in view of our limited surface strength, unrealistic. Apparently, it was born of a certain euphoria in Berlin.

The other point is that the brevity with which the directives treated the matter of a sortie being undetected might give the reader the impression that this aspect of an operation, though desirable, was almost incidental. Such was far from the truth, but the few lines devoted to it sufficed because it was axiomatic with German naval officers at that time that if they could get out into the Atlantic without being detected the chances of their operations being successful were enormously improved. Indeed, concealment was their highest priority, at least until the first attack had been made on a convoy. For our side, the weaker side, surprise was half, if not more, of the battle. And it must be said that surprise in later phases of an operation was equally important. Once the position of a German commerce-raider had been disclosed by a contact with the enemy, the raider might just as well make for remote areas of the high seas, from which it could later emerge with renewed surprise. An undetected sortie was the first link in this hoped-for chain of surprise, and was recognized as a prerequisite to the success of our surface ships in the Atlantic.

On the other hand, and this also should be noted, the Seekriegsleitung did not go so far as to make concealment a sine qua non of a sortie. If it had done this, every time a force was detected its commander would have had to immediately break off or at least delay his operation. And this in turn would have meant aborting any serious threat to Great Britain from the very form of warfare upon which the Seekriegsleitung had just decided. There was no getting away from the fact that Germany had to live with the risk of her intentions being prematurely disclosed because Great Britain was strategically situated on the routes to the Atlantic. It was left to the force commanders to decide whether to proceed immediately or to turn back and try again later.

On the morning of 25 April the
Bismarck
received orders to depart Gotenhafen in company with the
Prinz Eugen
on the evening of the twenty-eighth. The 6th Destroyer Flotilla was to escort the task force. This order had hardly arrived on board when we were informed that our departure on Exercise Rhine would be postponed by from
seven to twelve days because, as the
Prinz Eugen
was making her way to Kiel, a mine exploded near her and did her considerable damage.

Lütjens spent 26 April in Berlin, conferring with Raeder on Exercise Rhine. The mishap on the
Prinz Eugen
gave the two admirals an opportunity to go over once more the composition of our surface task forces in the Atlantic. Lütjens declared that if there was to be no change in the plan to send the
Bismarck
and
Prinz Eugen
out as a pair, either it should be done as soon as the latter was repaired, or they should wait for the next new moon after the one just waning. But there were also valid reasons for awaiting the availability of the
Scharnhorst
, which was still in the midst of an engine overhaul, if not for the
Tirpitz
, which was nearing completion, as well. The appearance of all four would make the operation much more effective than it would be with a “teaspoon” deployment now. Lastly, if one of our new and powerful battleships were to appear now as a commerce-raider, the enemy would have time to take countermeasures that would reduce the prospect for success when joint operations became possible. Nevertheless, it was deemed wiser to resume the Battle of the Atlantic as soon as possible: in plain language, the
Bismarck
and
Prinz Eugen
should not await reinforcement, they should go into action right away.

And with this return to the original operation order, Lütjens came to agree fully and completely with the basic thinking of Raeder. In Raeder’s opinion, any interruption in the battle against Great Britain’s Atlantic commerce could only strengthen the enemy. Furthermore, in the northern latitudes the passing season was bringing ever shorter nights and every delay increased the difficulty of reaching the Atlantic under cover of darkness. But, he told Lütjens: “Deliberate, careful operations are indicated. It would be a mistake to risk a heavy engagement for limited and perhaps uncertain results. Our objective with the
Bismarck
and, later, the
Tirpitz
must be continuous, sustained operations.”

Act boldly against convoys—keep heavy British escorts tied down but don’t get into action unless it serves the primary mission and can be done without excessive risk—if battle becomes unavoidable, conduct it with full force—operate deliberately and carefully—such were the conflicting demands laid upon the Fleet Commander. How often was Lütjens going to have the heavy responsibility of deciding when to forgo an irretrievable tactical opportunity and when to take it. His mission was far from simple.

After his meeting with Raeder, Lütjens stopped briefly in the office of the future Rear Admiral (Engineer) Hans Voss, who was then assigned to the Oberkommando der Marine. “Voss,” he said, “I’d like to make my farewells; I’ll never come back.” When Voss looked at him questioningly, he added, “Given the superiority of the British, survival is improbable.”

*
The
Bismarck
and the
Prinz Eugen

†
The
Scharnhorst
was undergoing a lengthy overhaul of her engines.

*
“Weisung für weitere Unternehmungen von Überwasserstreitkräften.” Skl. 1 Op 410/41 Gkdos Chefsache, 2. IV. 1941. For the full text,
see
Appendix A.

†
An intermediate rank between admiral and fleet admiral for which there is no American or English equivalent.

‡
“Operationsbefehl des Flottenchefs für die Atlantikoperation mit ‘Bismarck’ und ‘Prinz Eugen’ (Deckbezeichnung ‘Rheinübung’),” Flottenkommando B. Nr. Gkdos 100/41 Al Chefsache o 22. IV. 1941, Annex I: “Allgemeiner Befehl für die Atlantikunternehmung,” is reproduced in Appendix B.

6    Another Postponement and Last Liberty

“Anxiety to get into our first battle,” wrote a twenty-four-year-old petty officer, “reached fever pitch, and tension was kept high by numerous rumors that we were about to go into action.”

By the end of April the
Bismarck
was provisioned for three months at sea. This meant that, among other things, she had embarked enough pork and beef to feed a city of 250,000 inhabitants for one day. On the twenty-eighth, Lindemann reported to the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, Naval Group North, Naval Group West, and the Fleet Commander that his ship was fully operational in terms of men and material. In the War Diary, he noted: “The crew, from whom it is impossible to keep our approaching departure secret—war correspondents, prize crews, and B-Dienst
*
teams come aboard daily—still does not know that our departure has been postponed. Everyone is working on the final preparations with enthusiastic energy. I fear a considerable setback in morale if the delay is long.” Then again:

The first stage of the ship’s life since her commissioning on 24 August 1940 has come to a successful conclusion. Our goal has been attained in eight months, only 14 days more than the original schedule (Easter) allowed, and that was only because we had to wait in Hamburg for six weeks because the Kiel Canal was blocked and ice was creating a problem.

The crew can be proud of this feat. It was achieved because the desire to come to grips with the enemy as soon as possible was so strong that I had no hesitance in making extraordinary demands on the crew over long periods of time, and because the ship and her systems suffered no major malfunction or damage, despite heavy demands and very little time in port. The level of training is equivalent to that attained by big combatants preparing for the annual battle practice inspection in a good peacetime year. Even though my crew, with few exceptions, has had no combat experience, I have the comforting feeling that, with this ship, I will be able to accomplish any mission assigned to me. This feeling is strengthened by the fact that, in combination with the level of training achieved, we have—for the first time in years—a ship whose fighting qualities are at least a match for any enemy.

The delay in our departure, whose approximate date obviously could not be kept from the crew, is a bitter disappointment to everyone concerned.

I will use the waiting time the same way as before, to acquire a still higher degree of training, but I will allow the crew more rest, and give more time to divisional exercises and the external conditioning of the ship, activities that have understandably had to be severely restricted in recent weeks.

The following days were devoted to continuing battle drills, maintenance, and division drills. Statz had his hands full; he inspected the shafts for the engine battle circuits, lubricated the bevel wheel connections, and saw for the first time the little white box with the red letters “Procedure V”
*
in the pumping room for setting off the scuttling charges if that became necessary. The idea that it would ever have to be used was as remote as the stars. “Soon we were so keyed up,” the then twenty-four-year-old petty officer wrote later, “that we burned to see our first action. The numerous rumors and watchwords of an imminent operation heightened this tension from day to day.”

It was announced that the fleet staff would embark in the
Bismarck
on 12 May and conduct a practical test of its collaboration with the ship’s command in a clear-for-action drill at sea the following day. The staff numbered approximately sixty-five men. It consisted of the Fleet Commander, Admiral Günther Lütjens, his chief of staff, Kapitän zur See Harald Netzbandt, with whom he had been close friends for years, three other senior officers, the fleet engineer, the fleet surgeon, the officer in charge of the B-Dienst, and a few junior officers, plus petty officers and men.

Kapitän zur See Harald Netzbandt, Admiral Lütjens’s chief of staff. (Photograph courtesy of Hans H. Hildebrand.)