Berlin 1961 (87 page)

The numbers were a reflection: New York Times
, 10/16/1961, 10/17/1961, 10/18/1961; Slusser,
The Berlin Crisis of 1961
, 294.

The Palace of Congresses was unique: Washington Post
, 10/18/1961.

Time
magazine assessed:
“Communists: The Khrushchev Code,”
Time
, 10/20/1961.

Though he owed his position:
Beschloss,
The Crisis Years
, 44, 53, 461, 583; Fursenko and Naftali,
Khrushchev’s Cold War
, 202.

It seemed to party colleague Pyotr Demichev:
Taubman,
Khrushchev
, 514.

Still, Khrushchev looked leaner:
See for Khrushchev’s entire speech at the opening session of the 22nd Party Congress:
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press
, 13, no. 49 (1962);
New York Times
, 10/18/1961, 10/19/1961, 10/22/1961.

During an otherwise genial:
David Talbot,
Brothers: The Hidden History of the Kennedy Years
. New York: Free Press, 2007, 75;
New York Post
, 11/08/1961;
New York Times
, 11/05/1961.

By the time the plan:
Carl Kaysen to General Maxwell Taylor, Military Representative to the President, “Strategic Air Planning and Berlin,” September 5, 1961, Top Secret. Source: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Maxwell Taylor: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/BerlinC1.pdf; also see FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, Doc. 43, Memo from the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy, Strategic Air Planning and Berlin, Washington, September 19, 1961.

Kaysen conceded the need:
Carl Kaysen to General Maxwell Taylor, Military Representative to the President, “Strategic Air Planning and Berlin,” September 5, 1961, Top Secret, excised copy, with cover memoranda to Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Lyman Lemnizer, Released to National Security Archive, National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/BerlinC1.pdf.

In a White House that:
Fred Kaplan,
The Wizards of Armageddon
. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983, 299–300; Marcus G. Raskin,
Being and Doing
. New York: Random House, 1971, 62–63.

Kennedy didn’t have the same misgivings:
Memo from General Maxwell Taylor to General Lemnitzer, September 19, 1961, enclosing memo on “Strategic Air Planning,” Top Secret. Source: National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Maxwell Taylor, Box 34, Memorandums for the President, 1961. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/BerlinC3.pdf.

The following day’s National Security Council:
FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, Doc. 44, Memo of Conference with President Kennedy, Washington, September 20, 1961.

Power had directed the firebombing:
Kaplan,
The Wizards of Armageddon
, 246; Scott D. Sagan,
The Limits of Safety: Organization, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons
. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, 150; U.S. Air Force,
General Horace M. Wade OH
, October 10–12, 1978, 307–308, K239.0512–1105, Air Force Historical Research Center; JFKL, NSF, Memo Bundy to Kennedy, January 30, 1961, Box 313.

Martin Hillenbrand, director:
JFKL,
Martin J. Hillenbrand OH
, Interviewed by Paul P. Sweet, American Consul General, Stuttgart, August 26, 1964, 8; Martin J. Hillenbrand,
Power and Morals.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1949, 30.

Cool and rational, at age fifty-four Nitze:
See Nitze himself in the foreword to William R. Smyser,
From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany
. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999, xiv–xv; Strobe Talbott,
The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace
. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988, 37, 70, 72–73.

As Truman’s chief of policy:
Paul H. Nitze, with Ann M. Smith and Steven I. Rearden,
From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decisions—A Memoir
. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989, 91–92; Talbott,
Master of the Game
, 52, 58, 112.

Like Acheson, Nitze considered:
David Callahan,
Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War.
New York: HarperCollins, 1990, 216–218.

On August 13, Nitze:
Callahan,
Dangerous Capabilities
, 223; Nitze,
From Hiroshima to Glasnost
, 199–200.

To safeguard Berlin access:
Nitze,
From Hiroshima to Glasnost
, 202–204; FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 173, Minutes of Meeting, Berlin Build-up and Contingency Planning, Washington, October 10, 1961; Doc. 185, Enclosure, U.S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict, Washington, October 20, 1961.

The
Washington Post
reported on efforts: Washington Post
,
New York Times
,
Tagesspiegel
,
Der Kurier
, 10/29/1961;
Christian Science Monitor
, 09/05/1961;
New York Times,
09/17/1961.

Time
magazine ran: Time
, 10/20/1961.

It seemed that only Macmillan:
Macmillan,
Pointing the Way, 1959–1961
, 398–403; Nigel J. Ashton,
Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence
. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, 60–61.

With the Allies deeply at odds:
FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 184, Minutes of Meeting, Washington, October 20, 1961; also JFKL, NSF, Memo of Meeting, Washington, October 20, 1961, 10 a.m., Meetings with the President, Top Secret, drafted by Bundy.

As so often:
National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Items for Cables to Taylor; in FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 184.

A few hours after the meeting:
FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 185, Letter from President Kennedy to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe (Norstad) and Enclosure, U.S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict, Washington, October 20, 1961.

Bruce said that through Kennedy’s:
FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 183, Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, London, October 20, 1961, 4 p.m.

It was an unlikely audience:
Beschloss,
The Crisis Years
, 329; Benjamin C. Bradlee,
Conversations with Kennedy
. New York: W.W. Norton, 1975, 230.

Knowing nothing of the Bolshakov:
Wyden,
Wall
, 258.

“We have responded immediately”:
Address by Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, before the Business Council at the Homestead, Hot Springs, Virginia, October 21, 1961: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/BerlinC6.pdf; “Gilpatric Warns U.S. Can Destroy Atom Aggressor,”
New York Times
, 10/22/1961; “Our Real Strength,”
Time
, 10/27/1961.

Khrushchev would later recall that Konev:
Nikita S. Khrushchev,
Khrushchev Remembers
, 459.

18.
SHOWDOWN AT CHECKPOINT CHARLIE

“I do not believe”:
FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 181, Letter from the President’s Special Representative in Berlin (Clay) to President Kennedy, Berlin, October 18, 1961.

“In the nature of things”:
FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 193, Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin, Washington, October 26, 1961, 8:11 p.m.; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2661.

E. Allan Lightner Jr.:
Slusser,
The Berlin Crisis of 1961
, 377–378; Smith,
The Defense of Berlin
, 319–320.

Lightner knew there was a slim chance:
Bruce W. Menning, “The Berlin Crisis of 1961 from the Perspective of the Soviet General Staff,” in William W. Epley, ed.,
International Cold War Military Records and History
. Proceedings of the International Conference on Cold War Military Records and History held in Washington, D.C., March 21–26, 1994, 10–13; Smyser,
Kennedy and the Berlin Wall
, 135; Gerhard Wettig,
Chruschtschows Berlin-Krise 1958 bis 1963: Drohpolitik und Mauerbau
. Munich and Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 192.

Ulbricht had apparently approved:
Cate,
The Ides of August
, 476; Slusser,
The Berlin Crisis of 1961
, 353–358.

Encouraged by Clay:
FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 189, Telegram from the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State, Berlin, October 24, 1961, 1 p.m., drafted by Lightner.

Clay disagreed:
FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 181, Letter from the President’s Special Representative in Berlin (Clay) to President Kennedy, Berlin, October 18, 1961; Smith,
Lucius D. Clay
, 642–643; 651–654; JFKL,
Lucius D. Clay OH
, July 1, 1964.

Unlike Clay, Lightner:
Cate,
The Ides of August
, 476; Smith,
The Defense of Berlin
, 319; Raymond L. Garthoff,
Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan
. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1994; Smith,
Lucius D. Clay
, 659; HSTL,
E. Allan Lightner OH
, October 26, 1973.

Lightner told friends:
Interview with Vern Pike, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2008; Gelb,
The Berlin Wall
, 250–253; HSTL,
E. Allan Lightner OH
, October 26, 1973.

As that night’s script:
FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 186, Telegram from the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State, Berlin, October 23, 1961, 2 p.m.; Cate,
The Ides of August
, 476–480.

“Look,” Lightner said to the policeman:
Cate,
The Ides of August
, 477.

About then, four American tanks:
“U.S. Protests to Soviet,”
New York Times
, 10/24/1961.

By the time Lightner’s VW: The Atlantic Times
, October 2005: William R. Smyser, “Tanks at Checkpoint Charlie. In October 1961, the World Faced a War”: http://www.atlantic-times.com/archive_detail.php?recordID=319; Cate,
The Ides of August
, 479–480, 484.

Once East German radio:
Cate,
The Ides of August
, 479–480; Howard Trivers,
Three Crises in American Foreign Affairs and a Continuing Revolution
, 41–44.

Back in Washington, Kennedy:
Ashton,
Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War
, 62; Reeves,
Kennedy: Profile of Power
, 249; Norman Gelb,
The Berlin Wall: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and a Showdown in the Heart of Europe.
New York: Dorset Press, 1986, 253; Smyser,
Kennedy and the Berlin Wall
, 137.

National Security Advisor Bundy had warned:
Ann Tusa,
The Last Division: A History of Berlin, 1945–1989
. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1997, 330; JFKL, NSF, Memo from Bundy to the President, August 28, 1961, Box 86, Berlin; Wyden,
Wall
, 264.

Though in his letter Clay:
FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 181, Letter from the President’s Special Representative in Berlin (Clay) to President Kennedy, Berlin, October 18, 1961; also in JFKL, NSF, Germany, Berlin, General Clay, Top Secret.

What followed was the general’s resignation:
Smith,
Lucius D. Clay
, 662–663.

At a time when Kennedy badly wanted:
Frédéric Bozo,
Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance
. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, 70, 71; Ashton,
Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War
, 62.

De Gaulle had disapproved:
Charles de Gaulle,
Lettres, notes et carnets (1961–1963)
. Paris: Plon, 1986, 155–158; William R. Smyser, “Zwischen Erleichterung und Konfrontation. Die Reaktionen der USA und der UdSSR auf den Mauerbau,” in Hans-Hermann Hertle, Konrad Hugo Jarausch, and Christoph Klessmann, eds.,
Mauerbau und Mauerfall: Ursachen—Verlauf—Auswirkungen
. Berlin: Christoph Links, 2002, 147–158 (151).

As harsh as it was, de Gaulle’s letter:
JFKL, POF, De Gaulle–Kennedy Letter Exchange, Box 116A.

Despite two months of U.S. diplomatic:
FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Doc. 176, Telegram 1025 from the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany, Washington, October 13, 1961; a similar letter was sent to de Gaulle: Telegram 2136 to Paris, October 13, 1961, in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-1361.