In addition to these “professionals,” there were many seedier elements that got in on the action, charging less money than their corporate colleagues and acting with even greater recklessness, among them former South African apartheid forces, some from the notorious Koevoet, who apparently entered Iraq in contravention of South Africa’s antimercenary laws. By November 2003, the United States was explicitly telling companies wishing to do business in Iraq to bring their own armed security forces into the country.
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When Bremer left Iraq in June 2004, there were more than twenty thousand private soldiers inside the country’s borders and Iraq had become known as a “Wild West” with no sheriff. Those mercenaries officially hired by the occupation would be contracted for more than $2 billion of security work by the end of the “Bremer year” and would account for upwards of 30 percent of the Iraq “reconstruction” budget. That, of course, does not take into account the private entities that widely hired mercenaries in Iraq. According to
The Economist
magazine, the Iraq occupation shot British military companies’ revenues up from $320 million before the war to more than $1.6 billion by early 2004, “making security by far Britain’s most lucrative postwar export to Iraq.”
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One source cited by the magazine estimated that there were more ex-Special Air Service soldiers working as mercenaries in Iraq than on active duty there. Within a year, the British firm Erinys had built up a fourteen-thousand-man private army in Iraq,
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staffed by locals—among them, members of Ahmad Chalabi’s “Free Iraq” forces—and commanded by expatriates from the company, some of whom were South African mercenaries. “[T]he massive demand for protection, and the fear of almost daily killing of foreign workers, has overstretched market supply, spawning an upsurge in cowboy contractors and drawing on a pool of international guns for hire that, according to reputable firms, are as much a liability to themselves and Iraqis as to their clients,” reported
The Times
of London.
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What these forces did in Iraq, how many people they killed, how many of them died or were wounded, all remain unanswerable questions because no one was overseeing their activities in the country. As of this writing, not a single U.S. military contractor has been prosecuted for crimes committed in Iraq. Still, stories trickled out of Iraq, sometimes through the bravado of the contractors themselves. One such case involved a Blackwater contractor bragging about his use of “non-standard” ammunition to kill an Iraqi.
In mid-September 2003, a month after Blackwater won the Bremer contract, a four-man Blackwater security team was heading north from Baghdad on a dirt road in an SUV when they say they were ambushed by gunmen in a small village. That morning, one of the Blackwater contractors, Ben Thomas, had loaded his M4 machine gun with powerful experimental ammunition that had not been approved for use by U.S. forces. They were armor-piercing, limited-penetration rounds known as APLPs.
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The product of a San Antonio company called RBCD, they are created using what is called a “blended metal” process. According to
The Army Times,
the bullets “will bore through steel and other hard targets but will not pass through a human torso, an eight-inch-thick block of artist’s clay or even several layers of dry-wall. Instead of passing through a body, it shatters, creating ‘untreatable wounds.’”
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The distributor of these experimental rounds is an Arkansas company called Le Mas, which admits that it gave Thomas some of the bullets after he contacted the company. During the short gun battle that day, Thomas says he fired one of the APLP rounds at an Iraqi attacker, hitting him in the buttocks. The bullet, he said, killed the man almost instantly. “It entered his butt and completely destroyed everything in the lower left section of his stomach . . . everything was torn apart,” Thomas told
The Army Times
. “The way I explain what happened to people who weren’t there is . . . this stuff was like hitting somebody with a miniature explosive round. . . . Nobody believed that this guy died from a butt shot.”
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Thomas, an ex-Navy SEAL, said he has shot people with various kinds of ammunition and that there is “absolutely no comparison, whatever, none,” between the damage the APLP bullet did to his Iraqi victim that day and what would be expected from standard ammo. When Thomas returned to base after the shooting, he says his fellow mercenaries “were fighting over” the bullets. “At the end of the day, each of us took five rounds. That’s all we had left.”
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These bullets have been a source of some controversy in Congress, and the manufacturer has lobbyists trying to get them approved for use by U.S. forces, calling it “an issue of national security.”
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In fact, Thomas says he was threatened with a court-martial for using unapproved ammunition after he was mistakenly understood by a Pentagon official to be an active-duty soldier.
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It was the first recorded kill using the bullets, which had been tested for several years at the
Armed Forces Journal
annual “Shoot-out at Blackwater” at the company compound in Moyock.
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After Thomas allegedly killed the Iraqi using the APLP round, he sounded like a paid spokesman on a commercial for the bullets. “I’m taking Le Mas ammo with me when I return to Iraq, and I’ve already promised lots of this ammo to my buddies who were there that day and to their friends,” Thomas told an interviewer during a leave from Iraq. “This is purely for putting into bad guys. For general inventory, absolutely not. For special operations, I wouldn’t carry anything else.”
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The
Armed Forces Journal
excitedly chronicled Thomas’s experience with the rounds, calling them “reason enough for Pentagon officials to insist that Special Operations Command immediately begin realistic testing of the blended-metal ammunition.”
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Thomas later posted on his MySpace Web page a link to a news article about his use of the armor-piercing bullets in Iraq with a note that said:
OSAMA BIN LADEN IS MY BITCH
And here is why [story link]
Fucker wants me dead now.
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As mercenaries roamed the country freely, there was no official explanation given to Iraqis as to who these heavily armed, often nonuniformed forces were. It would be a year before Bremer would officially get around to issuing an order that defined their status—as immune from prosecution. Iraqis killed or wounded by these mercenaries had no recourse for justice. Many Iraqis—and some journalists—erroneously believed that the mercenaries were CIA or Israeli Mossad agents, an impression that enraged citizens who encountered them. The mercenaries’ conduct and reputation also angered actual U.S. intelligence officers who felt the mercenaries could jeopardize their own security in the country.
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As 2003 neared its end, much of Iraq lay in ruins, while the oft-promised “reconstruction” projects, ostensibly to be funded by Iraqi oil revenue, were overwhelmingly nonexistent or flat-out failing. For mercenary companies, though, business was booming. In early 2004, the situation in Iraq would begin to descend even further into chaos, bringing more business for private military companies.
In February 2004, Bremer’s office engaged in an incredible act of either vast miscalculation or wanton (and deadly) disregard for reality. According to a report at the time in the
Washington Post
, “U.S. officials courting companies to take part in the rebuilding insist that security is not an issue for contractors and said accounts have been overblown. ‘Western contractors are not targets,’ Tom Foley, the CPA’s director of private-sector development, told hundreds of would-be investors at a Commerce Department conference in Washington on Feb. 11. He said the media have exaggerated the issue.”
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On the contrary, Foley asserted, “The risks are akin to sky diving or riding a motorcycle, which are, to many, very acceptable risks.”
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By mid-March 2004, mercenary firms were basking in what had become a tremendous “sellers’ market” in Iraq. “What it cost to hire qualified security personnel in June (2003) is a fraction of what it costs today,” said Mike Battles, founder of the U.S. firm Custer Battles,
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which was contracted to guard the Baghdad airport.
On March 18, word hit the streets that the United States was putting up a contract worth $100 million to hire private security to guard the four-square-mile Green Zone and its three thousand residents.
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“The current and projected threat and recent history of attacks directed against coalition forces, and thinly stretched military force, requires a commercial security force that is dedicated to provide Force Protection security,” read the solicitation.
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As Blackwater’s Bremer detail succeeded in keeping its high-value “noun” alive, the company’s management seized opportunity in the chaos of Iraq. They opened several new offices, in Baghdad, Amman, and Kuwait City, as well as headquarters in the epicenter of the U.S. intelligence community in McLean, Virginia, that would house the company’s new Government Relations division. Plans were under way to expand Blackwater’s lucrative business in the war zone in a profit drive that would end with four American contractors dead in Fallujah, Iraq in flames, and Blackwater’s future looking very bright.
CHAPTER SIX
SCOTTY GOES TO WAR
BY EARLY
2004, Blackwater was firmly entrenched in Iraq, while Erik Prince, Gary Jackson, and other Blackwater executives were aggressively exploring new markets and contracts for their thriving business. Its men were guarding the head of the U.S. occupation and several regional CPA offices around Iraq, giving Blackwater a pole position for prime contracts, and its forces were the envy of the burgeoning private security business in Iraq. This was made possible by the ever-worsening security situation in the country. In January 2004, the
Financial Times
reported, “Contractors say there have been more than 500 attacks on civilian and military convoys in the last two months alone.” That month, Blackwater executive Patrick Toohey “advised” businesses looking to operate in Iraq, “You should be adding a further 25 percent for security.”
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Some began comparing the mercenary market in Iraq to the Alaskan Gold Rush and the O.K. Corral. As
The Times
of London put it, “In Iraq, the postwar business boom is not oil. It is security.”
2
Almost overnight, a once-despised industry was emerging from the shadows and thriving, and Blackwater was at the head of the pack. Eager to expand its business and profits, the company quickly put the word out that it was looking for highly qualified ex-Special Forces guys to deploy in Iraq. The company offered wages to “qualified” candidates that dwarfed basic military pay—and almost any other job’s salary. A contractor with Blackwater could make $600 to $800 a day, in some cases even more. Plus, the short-term contracts the company offered—two months—meant that a small fortune could be made quickly in a defined number of days. In many cases, contractors could extend for more terms if they wished. There were also major tax breaks offered to would-be mercenaries.
The privatization of the occupation also offered a chance for many combat enthusiasts, retired from the service and stuck in the ennui of everyday existence, to return to their glory days on the battlefield under the banner of the international fight against terrorism. “It’s what you do,” said former Navy SEAL Steve Nash. “Say you spend twenty years doing things like riding high-speed boats and jumping out of airplanes. Now, all of sudden, you’re selling insurance. It’s tough.”
3
Dan Boelens, a fifty-five-year-old police officer from Michigan and self-described weapons expert, went to Iraq with Blackwater because it was “the last chance in my life to do something exciting,” saying, “I like the stress and adrenaline push it gives me.”
4
“When a guy can make more money in one month than he can make all year in the military or in a civilian job, it’s hard to turn it down,” said ex-SEAL Dale McClellan, one of the original founders of Blackwater USA. “Most of us have been getting shot at most of our lives anyway.” Their skills—urban warfare, sniping, close-quarter combat—McClellan said, are “all worthless in the civilian world.” Plus, there’s an added bonus McClellan calls the “cool-guy factor.” “Let’s face it,” he said. “Chicks dig it.”
5
“You’re not trained for a lot of other things,” said Curtis Williams, another ex-SEAL. “That adrenaline rush is addicting. It’s something that never goes away.”
6
Many Special Forces soldiers who served in the “peacetime” of the 1990s also felt robbed of the overt combat of different eras and viewed the war on terror as their chance at glory. “We are trained to serve our country in an elite fashion,” said Williams. “We want to go back and kill the bad guy. It’s who we are.”
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A Blackwater contractor who served in Afghanistan admitted that money is a major factor. “But that’s not all of it,” he said. “After 9/11, I wanted some payback.”
8
Among those lured to Iraq by Blackwater’s offer was a thirty-eight-year-old former Navy SEAL named Scott Helvenston.
9