Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army (19 page)
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Authors: Jeremy Scahill
BOOK: Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army
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During the 1991 Gulf War, Fallujah was the site of one of the single greatest massacres attributed to “errant” bombs during a war that was painted as the dawn of the age of “smart” weaponry. Shortly after 3:00 p.m. on the afternoon of February 13, 1991, allied warplanes thundered over the city, launching missiles at the massive steel bridge crossing the Euphrates River and connecting Fallujah to the main road to Baghdad.
2
Having failed to bring the bridge down, the planes returned to Fallujah an hour later. “I saw eight planes,” recalled an eyewitness. “Six of them were circling, as if they were covering. The other two carried out the attack.”
3
British Tornado warplanes fired off several of the much-vaunted laser-guided “precision” missiles at the bridge. But at least three missed their supposed target, and one landed in a residential area some eight hundred yards from the bridge, smashing into a crowded apartment complex and slicing through a packed marketplace.
4
In the end, local hospital officials said more than 130 people were killed that day and some 80 others were wounded.
5
Many of the victims were children. An allied commander, Capt. David Henderson, said the planes’ laser system had malfunctioned. “As far as we were concerned, the bridge was a legitimate military target,” Henderson told reporters.
6
“Unfortunately, it looks as though, despite our best efforts, bombs did land in the town.” He and other officials accused the Iraqi government of publicizing the “errant” bomb as part of a propaganda war, saying, “We should also remember the atrocities committed by Iraq against Iran with chemical warfare and against [its] own countrymen, the Kurds.”
7
As rescue workers and survivors dug through the rubble of the apartment complex and neighboring shops, one Fallujan shouted at reporters, “Look what Bush did! For him Kuwait starts here.”
8
2
Having failed to bring the bridge down, the planes returned to Fallujah an hour later. “I saw eight planes,” recalled an eyewitness. “Six of them were circling, as if they were covering. The other two carried out the attack.”
3
British Tornado warplanes fired off several of the much-vaunted laser-guided “precision” missiles at the bridge. But at least three missed their supposed target, and one landed in a residential area some eight hundred yards from the bridge, smashing into a crowded apartment complex and slicing through a packed marketplace.
4
In the end, local hospital officials said more than 130 people were killed that day and some 80 others were wounded.
5
Many of the victims were children. An allied commander, Capt. David Henderson, said the planes’ laser system had malfunctioned. “As far as we were concerned, the bridge was a legitimate military target,” Henderson told reporters.
6
“Unfortunately, it looks as though, despite our best efforts, bombs did land in the town.” He and other officials accused the Iraqi government of publicizing the “errant” bomb as part of a propaganda war, saying, “We should also remember the atrocities committed by Iraq against Iran with chemical warfare and against [its] own countrymen, the Kurds.”
7
As rescue workers and survivors dug through the rubble of the apartment complex and neighboring shops, one Fallujan shouted at reporters, “Look what Bush did! For him Kuwait starts here.”
8
Whether or not it was an “errant” bomb, for the decade that followed that attack, it was remembered in Iraq as a massacre and would shape the way Fallujans later viewed the invading U.S. forces under the command of yet another President Bush.
9
Already, the overwhelmingly Sunni population of Fallujah was one of Saddam Hussein’s most loyal populations within Iraq and the home of many of his elite Revolutionary Guard soldiers.
10
“Even though Saddam Hussein regarded Fallujah as a city that had supported his regime, the Iraqi government couldn’t insulate Fallujah’s hospitals and clinics from the devastating effects of US-led economic sanctions,” recalled veteran human rights activist Kathy Kelly, founder of Voices in the Wilderness.
11
“We visited hospital wards before the invasion in Fallujah that were like ‘death rows’ for infants because of shortages caused by the sanctions.” Kelly has been to Iraq scores of times since first traveling there during the 1991 Gulf War. In a visit to Fallujah before the 2003 invasion, she said she and some British activists went to the city in an effort to acknowledge U.S./U.K. culpability in the marketplace bombing of 1991 and to interview survivors. Kelly got separated from the group and recalled, “One man began to shout at me, in English: ‘You Americans, you Europeans, you come to my home and I’ll show you water you wouldn’t give your animals to drink. And this is all that we have. Now, you want to kill our children again. You cannot kill my son. My son, he was killed in the first Bush war.’” After shouting at her, Kelly recalled, the man calmed down and offered her tea at his home. To her, that was evidence that “even in Fallujah, there might have been a chance to build fair and friendly relations, in spite of the suffering inflicted on ordinary Iraqis. But those chances were increasingly squandered by maintenance of economic sanctions and eventual bombing of the no-fly zones.” When U.S. Forces rolled into Iraq in April 2003, it didn’t take long for them to pour gasoline on the already volatile anti-American rage born in Fallujah at least twelve years earlier.
9
Already, the overwhelmingly Sunni population of Fallujah was one of Saddam Hussein’s most loyal populations within Iraq and the home of many of his elite Revolutionary Guard soldiers.
10
“Even though Saddam Hussein regarded Fallujah as a city that had supported his regime, the Iraqi government couldn’t insulate Fallujah’s hospitals and clinics from the devastating effects of US-led economic sanctions,” recalled veteran human rights activist Kathy Kelly, founder of Voices in the Wilderness.
11
“We visited hospital wards before the invasion in Fallujah that were like ‘death rows’ for infants because of shortages caused by the sanctions.” Kelly has been to Iraq scores of times since first traveling there during the 1991 Gulf War. In a visit to Fallujah before the 2003 invasion, she said she and some British activists went to the city in an effort to acknowledge U.S./U.K. culpability in the marketplace bombing of 1991 and to interview survivors. Kelly got separated from the group and recalled, “One man began to shout at me, in English: ‘You Americans, you Europeans, you come to my home and I’ll show you water you wouldn’t give your animals to drink. And this is all that we have. Now, you want to kill our children again. You cannot kill my son. My son, he was killed in the first Bush war.’” After shouting at her, Kelly recalled, the man calmed down and offered her tea at his home. To her, that was evidence that “even in Fallujah, there might have been a chance to build fair and friendly relations, in spite of the suffering inflicted on ordinary Iraqis. But those chances were increasingly squandered by maintenance of economic sanctions and eventual bombing of the no-fly zones.” When U.S. Forces rolled into Iraq in April 2003, it didn’t take long for them to pour gasoline on the already volatile anti-American rage born in Fallujah at least twelve years earlier.
U.S. Special Forces took Fallujah in April, early on in the invasion, but soon left the city.
12
Local Iraqis said they agreed to surrender the conservative Sunni city without a fight on the condition that U.S. troops would not occupy it for more than two days.
13
As in many Iraqi communities, the people of Fallujah began to organize themselves and to take stock of the consequences of the earth-moving developments in their country. They even assembled a new city council.
14
As the occupation spread and various U.S. commanders fanned out to different regions in Iraq, the Eighty-second Airborne Division ultimately moved into Fallujah.
15
Like their countrymen elsewhere, the people of Fallujah did not immediately resist the occupying forces. Instead they watched and waited. It didn’t take long for resentment to build, as the Americans would speed up and down the streets in their Humvees; checkpoints humiliated local people and invaded their privacy, and some complained the soldiers were staring at local women inappropriately.
16
There were also allegations that soldiers were urinating on the streets.
17
A clear consensus was building in Fallujah that the Americans should at least withdraw to the city limits.
18
It took only days before the situation in the city took a decisive and bloody turn for the worse. Hundreds of troops from the Eighty-second quickly spread out across Fallujah, and on Friday, April 25, a few days before the birthday of Saddam Hussein, they occupied Al Qaed (The Leader’s) School on Hay Nazzal Street, converting the two-story compound into an occupation headquarters in Fallujah.
19
12
Local Iraqis said they agreed to surrender the conservative Sunni city without a fight on the condition that U.S. troops would not occupy it for more than two days.
13
As in many Iraqi communities, the people of Fallujah began to organize themselves and to take stock of the consequences of the earth-moving developments in their country. They even assembled a new city council.
14
As the occupation spread and various U.S. commanders fanned out to different regions in Iraq, the Eighty-second Airborne Division ultimately moved into Fallujah.
15
Like their countrymen elsewhere, the people of Fallujah did not immediately resist the occupying forces. Instead they watched and waited. It didn’t take long for resentment to build, as the Americans would speed up and down the streets in their Humvees; checkpoints humiliated local people and invaded their privacy, and some complained the soldiers were staring at local women inappropriately.
16
There were also allegations that soldiers were urinating on the streets.
17
A clear consensus was building in Fallujah that the Americans should at least withdraw to the city limits.
18
It took only days before the situation in the city took a decisive and bloody turn for the worse. Hundreds of troops from the Eighty-second quickly spread out across Fallujah, and on Friday, April 25, a few days before the birthday of Saddam Hussein, they occupied Al Qaed (The Leader’s) School on Hay Nazzal Street, converting the two-story compound into an occupation headquarters in Fallujah.
19
The takeover of the school, attended by both primary and high school students, immediately sparked anger in the city for a number of reasons. Among them, parents and teachers were trying to return their children to some semblance of normalcy, and school was viewed as central to that. But also, rumors were rampant that the U.S. soldiers were using their night vision goggles to peer through windows at Iraqi women from the roof of the school and that troops were gawking at women without head coverings in the privacy of their own backyards.
20
Local Iraqi leaders met with U.S. soldiers throughout the weekend, urging them to leave the school. The weekend passed, and on Monday, April 28, Saddam Hussein’s 66th birthday, some 150 soldiers continued to occupy the school.
21
20
Local Iraqi leaders met with U.S. soldiers throughout the weekend, urging them to leave the school. The weekend passed, and on Monday, April 28, Saddam Hussein’s 66th birthday, some 150 soldiers continued to occupy the school.
21
That night, with tensions rising in the city over the presence of the troops, a local imam preached against the U.S. occupation from the pulpit in his mosque during evening prayers and decried the continued occupation of the school.
22
In the face of the heavy U.S. presence in their city, local clerics had been reminding people of the adage “Better to be strong than weak.”
23
After the prayers ended, people began to assemble in what would become the first organized demonstration against the United States since troops moved into Fallujah.
24
A week earlier, U.S. forces had killed ten demonstrators in the northern city of Mosul, but that did not deter the people of Fallujah. At around 6:30 the evening of April 28, people began to gather outside the former Baath Party headquarters, which had also been commandeered by U.S. forces and converted into a command post. Next door was the U.S.-backed mayor’s office, where the local U.S. commander was holding a meeting.
25
The crowd chanted slogans like “God is great! Muhammad is his prophet!” as well as “No to Saddam! No to the U.S.!”
26
Military officials claim that some in the crowd were firing weapons in the air, a common practice at Iraqi demonstrations. Local residents say that is untrue, and many Iraqi witnesses contend that no weapons were fired.
27
The U.S. commander in Fallujah, Lt. Col. Eric Nantz, said his forces warned the protesters to disperse, announcing, he claims, in Arabic through a loudspeaker that the demonstration “could be considered a hostile act and would be engaged with deadly force.”
28
The crowd moved from the mayor’s office and made its way through the streets of Fallujah gathering momentum and size. By the time it reached the school, there were hundreds of people. In the crowd, someone held a large picture of Saddam, which residents say was the clearest symbol of opposition to the occupying forces.
29
“There is no God but Allah, and America is the enemy of Allah,” demonstrators chanted on Hay Nazzal Street, as Americans looked down from sniper positions on the roof of the school. “We don’t want Saddam and we don’t want Bush,” said Mohamed Abdallah, a retired accountant. “The Americans have done their job and they must go.”
30
22
In the face of the heavy U.S. presence in their city, local clerics had been reminding people of the adage “Better to be strong than weak.”
23
After the prayers ended, people began to assemble in what would become the first organized demonstration against the United States since troops moved into Fallujah.
24
A week earlier, U.S. forces had killed ten demonstrators in the northern city of Mosul, but that did not deter the people of Fallujah. At around 6:30 the evening of April 28, people began to gather outside the former Baath Party headquarters, which had also been commandeered by U.S. forces and converted into a command post. Next door was the U.S.-backed mayor’s office, where the local U.S. commander was holding a meeting.
25
The crowd chanted slogans like “God is great! Muhammad is his prophet!” as well as “No to Saddam! No to the U.S.!”
26
Military officials claim that some in the crowd were firing weapons in the air, a common practice at Iraqi demonstrations. Local residents say that is untrue, and many Iraqi witnesses contend that no weapons were fired.
27
The U.S. commander in Fallujah, Lt. Col. Eric Nantz, said his forces warned the protesters to disperse, announcing, he claims, in Arabic through a loudspeaker that the demonstration “could be considered a hostile act and would be engaged with deadly force.”
28
The crowd moved from the mayor’s office and made its way through the streets of Fallujah gathering momentum and size. By the time it reached the school, there were hundreds of people. In the crowd, someone held a large picture of Saddam, which residents say was the clearest symbol of opposition to the occupying forces.
29
“There is no God but Allah, and America is the enemy of Allah,” demonstrators chanted on Hay Nazzal Street, as Americans looked down from sniper positions on the roof of the school. “We don’t want Saddam and we don’t want Bush,” said Mohamed Abdallah, a retired accountant. “The Americans have done their job and they must go.”
30
What happened that night is a matter of great dispute between the U.S. occupation forces and local Fallujans. According to scores of Iraqis interviewed by major media outlets at the time, no Iraqis fired on the school or at U.S. forces. Some locals describe random shots fired into the air, while others deny that any Iraqis in the crowd fired guns; and Iraqi witnesses categorically deny that shots were fired at U.S. forces. Every Iraqi witness and demonstrator subsequently interviewed by Human Rights Watch said no one in the demonstration had arms. Several said there was shooting in other Fallujah neighborhoods, but not near the school. Nantz claimed that as the demonstration went on, the crowd was “hostile, throwing rocks, and occasionally firing a number of weapons into the air.”
31
A U.S. soldier, Nantz said, was hit by a rock. Then, he says, the school came under attack from gunmen within the crowd. Iraqis there that night say that is not true. U.S. commanders say their troops threw smoke grenades and were then given orders to respond with fire.
32
Within moments, bullets were raining into the crowd. The Americans say they wore night-vision goggles and fired only at muzzle flashes.
33
Iraqis say the shooting was unprovoked and uncontrolled. “We were shouting, ‘There’s no god but Allah,’” recalled Fallujah resident Ahmed Karim, who was shot in the thigh. “We arrived at the school building and were hoping to talk to the soldiers when they began shooting at us randomly. I think they knew we were unarmed but wanted a show of force to stop us from demonstrating.”
34
31
A U.S. soldier, Nantz said, was hit by a rock. Then, he says, the school came under attack from gunmen within the crowd. Iraqis there that night say that is not true. U.S. commanders say their troops threw smoke grenades and were then given orders to respond with fire.
32
Within moments, bullets were raining into the crowd. The Americans say they wore night-vision goggles and fired only at muzzle flashes.
33
Iraqis say the shooting was unprovoked and uncontrolled. “We were shouting, ‘There’s no god but Allah,’” recalled Fallujah resident Ahmed Karim, who was shot in the thigh. “We arrived at the school building and were hoping to talk to the soldiers when they began shooting at us randomly. I think they knew we were unarmed but wanted a show of force to stop us from demonstrating.”
34
“We had one picture of Saddam, only one,” said nineteen-year-old Hassan. “We were not armed and nothing was thrown. There had been some shooting in the air in the vicinity, but that was a long way off. I don’t know why the Americans started shooting. When they began to fire, we just ran.”
35
A fifteen-year-old boy, Ahmed al-Essawi, who was shot in both the arm and leg said, “All of us were trying to run away. They shot at us directly. The soldiers were very scared. There were no warning shots, and I heard no announcements on the loudspeakers.”
36
35
A fifteen-year-old boy, Ahmed al-Essawi, who was shot in both the arm and leg said, “All of us were trying to run away. They shot at us directly. The soldiers were very scared. There were no warning shots, and I heard no announcements on the loudspeakers.”
36
Within moments, the demonstration on Hay Nazzal Street turned into a bloodbath. Many people described a horrifying scene of wounded people—among them children—lying in the streets and U.S. forces firing on people attempting to rescue them.
37
“They suddenly started shooting at us,” remembered Falah Nawwar Dhahir, whose brother was killed that day. “There was continuous shooting until people fled. They shot at people when they came out to get the wounded. Then there was individual shooting, like from snipers.”
38
Mu’taz Fahd al-Dulaimi saw his cousin Samir Ali al-Dulaimi shot by U.S. forces: “There were four [U.S. soldiers] on the roof—I saw them with my own eyes. There was a heavy machine gun. It was full automatic shooting for ten minutes. Some of the people fell to the ground. When they stood up, they shot again.” Ambulance drivers also report being told to “Go away!” by U.S. forces.
39
37
“They suddenly started shooting at us,” remembered Falah Nawwar Dhahir, whose brother was killed that day. “There was continuous shooting until people fled. They shot at people when they came out to get the wounded. Then there was individual shooting, like from snipers.”
38
Mu’taz Fahd al-Dulaimi saw his cousin Samir Ali al-Dulaimi shot by U.S. forces: “There were four [U.S. soldiers] on the roof—I saw them with my own eyes. There was a heavy machine gun. It was full automatic shooting for ten minutes. Some of the people fell to the ground. When they stood up, they shot again.” Ambulance drivers also report being told to “Go away!” by U.S. forces.
39
“We were sitting in our house. When the shooting started, my husband tried to close the door to keep the children in, and he was shot,” said thirty-seven-year-old Edtesam Shamsudeim, who lives near the school and was herself shot in the leg.
40
More than seventy-five people were injured that night, and at least thirteen were killed. Among the dead were six children.
41
“The engagement was sharp and precise,” said Nantz. Soldiers, he said, “returned fire with those firing at them, and if others were wounded, that is regrettable.”
42
Almost immediately, the U.S. version of the events came under serious scrutiny when journalists toured the area. In a dispatch from Fallujah, correspondent Phil Reeves of
The Independent
of London, wrote:
40
More than seventy-five people were injured that night, and at least thirteen were killed. Among the dead were six children.
41
“The engagement was sharp and precise,” said Nantz. Soldiers, he said, “returned fire with those firing at them, and if others were wounded, that is regrettable.”
42
Almost immediately, the U.S. version of the events came under serious scrutiny when journalists toured the area. In a dispatch from Fallujah, correspondent Phil Reeves of
The Independent
of London, wrote:
[T]here are no bullet holes visible at the front of the school building or tell-tale marks of a firefight. The place is unmarked. By contrast, the houses opposite . . . are punctured with machine-gun fire, which tore away lumps of concrete the size of a hand and punched holes as deep as the length of a ballpoint pen. Asked to explain the absence of bullet holes, Lt-Col Nantz said that the Iraqi fire had gone over the soldiers’ heads. We were taken to see two bullet holes in an upper window and some marks on a wall, but they were on another side of the school building.There are other troubling questions. Lt-Col Nantz said that the troops had been fired on from a house across the road. Several light machine guns were produced, which the Americans said were found at the scene. If true, this was an Iraqi suicide mission—anyone attacking the post from a fixed position within 40 yards would have had no chance of survival.The American claim that there were 25 guns in the crowd would also indicate that the demonstrators had had a death wish or were stupid. Iraqis have learnt in the past few weeks that if they fail to stop their cars quickly enough at an American-manned checkpoint, they may well be shot.
43
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