Closing the Ring (39 page)

3. Stalin, who had nodded agreement at my description of the U-boat warfare, said that his difference with you was not about the difficulties of the operation, but as to whether we were bound to do it. You had implied that if we sailed any one of these convoys, it would be as a gift. Stalin did not feel this was a true description of the position. On his understanding of it, we were under an obligation to seek to deliver these goods. When he had sent his reply to you however you had been very much offended and would not accept his reply. I replied that we had never suggested that to send these convoys was an act of favour or charity. You had at all times been determined to make every effort to deliver these goods to our Ally, but for the reasons I had explained you could not pledge yourself to a series of operations which you might not be able to carry out. Stalin himself surely must have confidence in the good faith of his Ally, and therefore it was not surprising that you should have been hurt by the message. The Marshal said that this had not been intended.

4. After some further discussion, Stalin said that he could not agree to increase the number of men. There were already many of our sailors in North Russian ports with nothing to do, and then they got into trouble with Russian sailors. The Russians might undertake such convoys themselves. I replied that this was not possible. He said that if only our people in North Russia had treated his people as equals, none of these difficulties would have arisen, and that if our people would treat his people as equals, we could have as much personnel as we liked. After some further argument, it was decided that Molotov and I would meet tomorrow, when I would give him a list of our requirements and we would see whether we could reach agreement.

*  *  * *  *

Thus it was arranged that the convoys should be resumed. The first started in November, and a second followed it in
December. Between them they comprised seventy-two ships. All arrived safely, and at the same time return convoys of empty ships were successfully brought out.

The December outward-bound convoy was to bring about a gratifying naval engagement. The disablement of the
Tirpitz
had left the
Scharnhorst
the only heavy enemy ship in Northern Norway. She sallied forth from Alten Fiord with five destroyers on the evening of Christmas Day 1943, to attack the convoy about fifty miles south of Bear Island. The reinforced convoy escort comprised fourteen destroyers, with a covering force of three cruisers. The Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Fraser, lay to the southwestward in his flagship, the
Duke of York
, with the cruiser
Jamaica
and four destroyers.

Twice the
Scharnhorst
tried to strike at the convoy. Each time she was intercepted and engaged by the escort cruisers and destroyers, and after indecisive fighting, in which both the
Scharnhorst
and the British cruiser
Norfolk
were hit, the Germans broke off the action and withdrew to the southward, shadowed and reported by our cruisers. The German destroyers were never seen and took no part. Meanwhile, the Commander-in-Chief was approaching at his utmost speed through heavy seas. At 4.17
P.M.
, when the last of the Arctic twilight had long since gone, the
Duke of York
detected the enemy by radar at about twenty-three miles. The
Scharnhorst
remained unaware of her approaching doom, until, at 4.50
P.M.
, the
Duke of York
opened fire at twelve thousand yards with the aid of star-shell. At the same time Admiral Fraser sent his four destroyers in to attack when opportunity offered. One of these, the
Stord
, was manned by the Royal Norwegian Navy. The
Scharnhorst
was surprised, and turned away to the eastward. In a running fight she suffered several hits, but was able with her superior speed gradually to draw ahead. However, by 6.20
P.M.
it became apparent that her speed was beginning to fall and our destroyers were able to close in on either flank. At about 7
P.M.
they all pressed home their attacks. Four torpedoes struck. Only one destroyer was hit.

The
Scharnhorst
turned to drive off the destroyers, and thus
the
Duke of York
was able to close rapidly to about ten thousand yards and reopen fire with crushing effect. In half an hour the unequal battle between a battleship and a wounded battle-cruiser was over, and the
Duke of York
left the cruisers and destroyers to complete the task. The
Scharnhorst
soon sank, and of her company of 1970 officers and men, including Rear-Admiral Bey, we could only save thirty-six men.

Although the fate of the crippled
Tirpitz
was delayed for nearly a year, the sinking of the
Scharnhorst
not only removed the worst menace to our Arctic convoys, but gave new freedom to our Home Fleet. We no longer had to be prepared at our average moment against German heavy ships breaking out into the Atlantic at their selected moment. This was an important relief.

*  *  * *  *

When in April 1944 there were signs that the
Tirpitz
had been repaired sufficiently to move for refit to a Baltic port, aircraft from the carriers
Victorious
and
Furious
attacked her with heavy bombs, and she was once more immobilised. The Royal Air Force now took up the attack from a base in North Russia. They succeeded in causing further damage, which led to the
Tirpitz
being removed to Tromsö Fiord, which was two hundred miles nearer to Britain and within the extreme range of our home-based heavy bombers. The Germans had now abandoned hope of getting the ship home for repair and had written her off as a seagoing fighting unit. On November 12 twenty-nine specially fitted Lancasters of the Royal Air Force, including those of 617 Squadron, famous for the Moehne Dam exploit, struck the decisive blow, with bombs of twelve thousand pounds weight. They had to fly over two thousand miles from their bases in Scotland, but the weather was clear and three bombs hit their target. The
Tirpitz
capsized at her moorings, more than half of her crew of 1900 men being killed, at the cost of one bomber, whose crew survived.

All British heavy ships were now free to move to the Far East.

¹
See map, “Operations in Russia, July-December 1941.”

16
Foreign Secretaries’ Conference in Moscow

Back to the Quebec Conference___Need of a Meeting of the Three Heads of Governments___My Correspondence with Stalin___A Preliminary Conference of Foreign Ministers___My Note for Mr. Eden at This Conference, October
11___
The Meeting in Moscow, October
19___
The Soviet Proposals___My Private Note to Mr. Eden, October
20___
Stalin Concentrates on the Cross-Channel Invasion___The Question of Turkey, Finland, and Sweden Being Pressed to Join Us___Eisenhower and Alexander Report Gravely About Italy___Further Discussions at the Kremlin___A Friendly Atmosphere___Mr. Eden’s Account___A Russian Share in the Italian Fleet___My Telegrams of October
29___
My Proposed Triple Declaration on German War Criminals Accepted___The Important Achievements of the Conference.

R
ETROSPECT
is now necessary to bring the course of diplomatic events into accord with the narrative. Ever since the Quebec Conference we had been making suggestions to Stalin for a triple meeting of the heads of Governments. Already at Quebec I had received the following reply from him:

Premier Stalin to Prime Minister (Quebec)

10 Aug. 43

I have just returned from the front, and already had time to become familiar with the message of the British Government dated August 7.

I agree that a meeting of the heads of three Governments is absolutely desirable. Such a meeting must be realised at the first
opportunity, having arranged with the President the place and the time of this meeting.

At the same time I ought to say that in the existing situation on the Soviet-German Front, I, to my regret, have no opportunity to absent myself and to leave the front even for one week. Although recently we have had several successes on the front, an extreme strain on the strength and exceptional watchfulness are required in regard to the new possible actions of the enemy from the Soviet troops and from the Soviet Command just now. In connection with this I have to visit the troops on that or other parts of our front more often than usual. In the circumstances at the present time I am not able to visit Scapa Flow or any other distant point for a meeting with you and the President.

Nevertheless, in order not to postpone an examination of the questions which interest our countries, it would be expedient to organise a meeting of the responsible representatives of our states, and we might come to an understanding in the nearest future concerning the place and date of such a meeting.

Moreover, it is necessary beforehand to agree on the scope of the questions to be discussed and the drafts of the proposals which have to be accepted. The meeting will hardly give any tangible result without that.

2. Taking this opportunity, I congratulate the British Government and the Anglo-American troops on the occasion of their most successful operations in Sicily, which have already caused the downfall of Mussolini and the break-up of his gang.

  This was the first favourable mention from the Russian side of a meeting between the three Allies at any level. In passing this message to Mr. Eden for transmission to Moscow, I said, “I was very glad to hear again from Bruin in the first person. Please forward him my reply, which is in the sense you desire.”

After a discussion with President Roosevelt, we framed a joint message to Stalin.

Prime Minister and President Roosevelt (Quebec) to Premier Stalin

19 Aug. 43

We have both arrived here with our Staffs, and will probably remain in conference for about ten days. We fully understand
strong reasons which lead you to remain on battle-fronts, where your presence has been so fruitful of victory. Nevertheless, we wish to emphasise once more importance of a meeting between all three of us. We do not feel that either Archangel or Astrakhan is suitable, but we are prepared ourselves, accompanied by suitable officers, to proceed to Fairbanks [in Alaska] in order to survey whole scene in common with you. The present seems to be a unique opportunity for making a rendezvous, and also a crucial point in the war. We earnestly hope that you will give this matter once more your consideration. The Prime Minister will remain on this side of Atlantic for as long as may be necessary.

2. Should it prove impossible to arrange the much-needed meeting of three heads of Governments we agree with you that a meeting on the Foreign Office level should take place in the near future. This meeting would be exploratory in character, as of course final decisions must be reserved to our respective Governments.

  Stalin replied:

25 Aug. 43

I have received your joint message of August 19.

I entirely share your opinion and that of Mr. Roosevelt about the importance of a meeting between the three of us. In this connection I beg you most earnestly to understand my position at this moment, when our armies are carrying on the struggle against the main forces of Hitler with the utmost strain, and when Hitler not only does not withdraw a single division from our front, but, on the contrary, has already succeeded in transporting, and continues to transport, fresh divisions to the Soviet-German Front. At such a moment, in the opinion of all my colleagues, I cannot, without detriment to our military operations, leave the front for so distant a point as Fairbanks, although if the situation on our front were different Fairbanks undoubtedly would be very convenient as a place for our meeting, as I said before.

As regards a meeting of representatives of our States, and in particular of representatives in charge of foreign affairs, I share your opinion about the expediency of such a meeting in the near future. This meeting however ought not to have a purely exploratory character, but a practicable and preparatory character, in order that after that meeting has taken place our Governments are
able to take definite decisions, on urgent questions. Therefore I consider it indispensable to revert to my proposal that it is necessary in advance to define the scope of the questions for discussion by the representatives of the three Powers, and to draft the proposals which ought to be discussed by them and presented to our Governments for final decision.

Prime Minister to Premier Stalin

5 Sept. 43

The Conference of Foreign Ministers. I was glad to get your message of August 25, in which you agree to an early meeting of Soviet, United States, and British representatives in charge of foreign affairs. If Monsieur Molotov comes, we will send Mr Eden.

2. The Conference even thus constituted could not of course supersede the authority of all Governments concerned. We are most anxious to know what your wishes are about the future, and will tell you our views so far as they are formed. After that the Governments will have to decide, and I hope that we may be able to meet personally somewhere. I would, if necessary, go to Moscow.

3. The political representatives might require to be assisted by military advisers. I would provide a general officer, Sir Hastings Ismay, who is my personal representative on the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and conducts the Secretariat of the Ministry of Defence. He could supply the arguments and facts and figures on the military questions involved. I believe the United States would send an officer similarly qualified. This, I think, would be sufficient at this stage for the meeting of Foreign Ministers.

4. If however you wish to go in technical detail into the question of why we have not yet invaded France across the Channel, and why we cannot do it sooner or in greater strength than is now proposed, I should welcome a separate technical mission of your generals and admirals coming to London or Washington, or both, when the fullest possible exposition of our thought, resources, and intentions could be laid before them and thrashed out. Indeed, I should be very glad that you should have this explanation, to which you have every right.