Crossfire: The Plot That Killed Kennedy (30 page)

In February, Soviet deputy prime minister Andrei Gromyko arrived in
Cuba to arrange large-scale economic and military assistance to Castro.

And on April 17, 1961, less than three months after Kennedy became
president, Castro's fears were realized. A force of anti-Castro Cubans
landed at the Bay of Pigs.

The plans to destroy Castro and regain control of Cuba began while
Eisenhower was in office, more than a year before Kennedy became
president.

By early 1960, the thousands of Cuban refugees in the United States had
begun forming small groups dedicated to regaining their homeland, each
claiming to be the one true voice of the exiles. To bring order to this
situation, the CIA in May 1960 assisted in the creation of a Cuban
coalition that came to be known as the Cuban Revolutionary Council
(CRC). Early on this task was handled by CIA officer E. Howard Huntlater to be involved in the Watergate affair and to be accused of being in
Dallas the day Kennedy was killed.

As the election year of 1960 moved on, so did the CIA's plans for an
"upheaval" in Cuba. Once in the hands of CIA staffers and adventurous
case officers, the plan seemed to take on a life of its own.

Secrecy was the prime concern of everyone involved. Even CIA director
Allen Dulles did not know many details of the plan. He had simply turned
the whole project over to a deputy director, Richard M. Bissell, Jr. Bissell,
in turn, handed the project to the former CIA station chief in Caracas, who
recruited various CIA personnel, such as Hunt, Tracy Barnes, and David
Atlee Phillips.

Many of the CIA officers involved in the Bay of Pigs had participated in
the 1954 overthrow of the popularly elected government of Jacobo Arbenz
in Guatemala, and their intent was to stage a similar low-key coup in
Cuba.

Unknown to these CIA officers who began to create a Cuban-refugee
fighting force, Bissell was working on a concurrent project the assassination of Fidel Castro.

Bissell's idea began to work its way through the CIA bureaucracy with
unintended humorous results. Plans were conceived to poison Castro's
cigar, to slip him a depilatory so his famous beard would fall out or
administer an LSD-type chemical so that the Cuban leader would halluci nate. These schemes took on a more sinister aspect, however, with the
suggestion that American gangsters be hired to do the job.

President Dwight Eisenhower knew none of this. All he knew was that
on March 17, 1960, at the urging of a top-secret committee for covert
operations-known as the 5412 Committee because it was authorized by
National Security Council Directive 5412/2-he had authorized a CIA plan
entitled "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime." This
plan offered a four-point program-1) the creation of a Cuban government
in exile, 2) a "powerful" propaganda offensive, 3) the creation of a
"covert intelligence and action organization" inside Cuba, and 4) "a
paramilitary force outside of Cuba for future guerrilla action."

The fourth point, the "paramilitary force," was to evolve into Brigade
2506, a Cuban-exile expeditionary force supported by air and sea power as
well as U.S. military units.

One man who did understand what all this might mean was Eisenhower's vice president, White House action officer, and the head of the 5412
Committee-Richard M. Nixon. Nixon had several reasons for supporting
action against Castro. A year earlier, the anticommunist Nixon had met
with Castro and concluded: "Castro is either incredibly naive about Communism or is under Communist discipline." And as one of the congressmen who passed the legislation creating the CIA, Nixon undoubtedly
wanted to support the men who through the years had passed along
information politically helpful to him. Then, too, the November election
was approaching and Nixon was eager to have the Republican administration get the credit for ending Castro's reign.

Whatever the reason, Nixon kept exhorting his executive assistant for
national-security affairs, General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., to press the CIA
officers for action.

Meanwhile, Hunt and an associate, Bernard L. Barker (who later participated in the Watergate break-in under Hunt's guidance), were wheeling
and dealing in the Miami Cuban exile community, sometimes carrying as
much as $1 15,000 in a briefcase to secure agents. Training camps were
located, arms secured, and Cubans recruited. The plan was advancing into
broader and grander stages and still the lower-level operators were in
charge.

On July 23, 1960, presidential candidate John F. Kennedy was first
briefed by Dulles about the Cuban operation. Since at that time only
guerrilla infiltration and air drops were contemplated, Kennedy did not
learn of the full invasion plan until after his election.

In an ironical twist, some of Senator Kennedy's speechwriters encouraged him to speak out against Castro and urge U.S. support for Cuban
exiles. Nixon was furious, believing that Kennedy had been told about the
invasion and was compromising security by using this knowledge as a
political weapon against him. Nixon, who encouraged the invasion, was forced to attack Kennedy's proposal as "wrong and irresponsible because
it would violate our treaty commitments" to protect the covert operation.

Shortly after the election, Dulles-along with Bissell-again briefed
Kennedy on the Cuban plan. This briefing, too, was long on vague
generalities and short on details.

It was not until near the end of 1960 that anyone outside of the CIA
officers in charge were told that the plan had been expanded to include an
invasion with air support. Even military brass, who were being asked for
material assistance, were sworn to secrecy. Most of those ranking military
officers brought into the plan thought the whole thing sounded "impractical."

The invasion was indeed impractical, for: one, it was predicated on a
massive revolt against Castro by the Cuban people, a concept loudly
advanced by the CIA analysts but doubted by most others involved, and
two, it was apparent that to succeed, the invasion had to have the support
of U.S. naval and air power, a contingency both Eisenhower and Kennedy
had opposed.

By mid-March, 1961-with the invasion only a month away-Kennedy
was having second thoughts. The Trinidad Plan, an invasion proposal
hastily put together by the Pentagon, was rejected by the new president as
"too spectacular," with its amphibious assault, air strikes, and landing of
a provisional government.

Kennedy wanted something quiet, something that would not reveal the
involvement of the United States.

A week before the invasion, Kennedy left no doubt as to his position on
using U.S. military forces to help the Cuban exiles. The New York Times
carried a two-column headline reading: PRESIDENT BARS USING U.S. FORCE
TO OUST CASTRO. The Cuban exiles were aghast, but their CIA officers
quietly assured them that no one would stand by and watch them die.
Miscommunication was rampant up and down the chain of command.

On Saturday, April 15, 1961, less than three months after Kennedy took
office, a force of six B-26 bombers left a secret airfield in Nicaragua for
Cuba. It was to have been sixteen, but Kennedy ordered a reduction to
"minimum" scale.

This weekend air strike was a partial success. Castro's tiny air force was
caught on the ground. Only three T-33 jets-considered good only as
trainers-along with two B-26 bombers and a few decrepit British Sea
Furies escaped the bombing raid. But it was enough.

On Monday, April 17, the Cuban Brigade landed at Bahia de Cochinos,
or Bay of Pigs (named after the wild boars that inhabited this desolate area
of Cuba). Ironically, Castro knew the area intimately since it was his
favorite hunting spot. It was a good location for a landing, with only two
main road arteries leading past swamps and dense undergrowth. But this
same attribute also made it a formidable trap should Castro's forces arrive
too soon.

A second air strike had been planned and, by most accounts, would have completed the destruction of Castro's air force. However, the CIA
planners had failed to reckon with John F. Kennedy. Kennedy hesitated,
growing more and more concerned that the entire world was realizing that
the United States was supporting this invasion of another country.

United Nations ambassador Adlai Stevenson, who had been lied to by
the CIA, was facing intense pressure after telling the General Assembly
that the United States had nothing to do with the invasion.

Although the Cuban Brigade already was running into trouble on the
beaches-one of their ships, the Houston, was set afire by Castro's planes
-Secretary of State Dean Rusk was more concerned that the "international noise level" had risen to an intolerable degree. Rusk argued that no
further air strikes be attempted until it could be made to look like the
planes came from captured Cuban airfields. Kennedy concurred and ordered a halt to any air strikes. Castro's surviving planes were able to
disrupt the landing, allowing his troops to bottle up the beaches. The Bay
of Pigs had become a death trap for the Cuban Brigade.

Kennedy authorized U.S. Navy ships sitting offshore to help evacuate
the Brigade, but the Cuban commanders didn't want evacuation. They
wanted the ammunition, naval support, and the "umbrella" of air cover
that had been promised to them. It never came. As the remnants of the
Brigade called for help from the beaches, U.S. military men could only
stand silent by their weapons and watch as the gallant Cuban Brigade was
torn to bits.

As news of the debacle spread, everybody concerned was furious.

Kennedy believed he had been led down a primrose path by optimistic
CIA officials. He felt betrayed. The CIA planners felt betrayed in that the
actual invasion had been scaled down on Kennedy's orders. The military
felt betrayed because they had not been allowed to help in the planning of
the invasion. And the Cuban exiles felt betrayed most of all because they
had been led to believe they had the full support of the U.S. government.

In Guatemala City, staging area for the Brigade, the CIA officers were
devastated. Many were getting drunk. CIA station chief Robert Davis
described them this way: "If someone had gotten close to Kennedy, he'd
have killed him. Oh, they hated him!"

Of the 1,600 men of the Cuban Brigade, 114 were killed, 1,189 were
captured by Castro's forces, and 150 either never landed or made their way
back to safety. (The captured Brigade was finally freed on December 23,
1962, after the United States agreed to exchange them for $53 million
worth of food and drugs.)

Infuriated by this disastrous defeat, Kennedy nevertheless took the
burden of blame. He told reporters: "There's an old saying that victory has
a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan. What mattered was only one
fact: I am the responsible officer of government."

No one-especially in the CIA, the military, organized crime, or in the
Cuban exile community-was to forget this acceptance of responsibility.

Following a shake-up in U.S. intelligence over the Bay of Pigs disaster,
Attorney General Robert Kennedy took responsibility for overseeing Cuban affairs.

Soon another war-this one much more secret-was being waged against
Castro under the code name "JM/WAVE." JM/WAVE operated on the
campus of the University of Miami under the cover of an electronics firm
called Zenith Technological Services. By mid-1962, this operation involved nearly six hundred CIA case officers, as many as three thousand
contract agents, and numerous fronts such as boat shops, detective and
travel agencies, and gun stores. With nearly a quarter million Cuban
refugees living in the United States, it was easy to find those with a
burning passion to liberate their island and return home.

The JM/WAVE operation seemed inconsistent from the start. President
Kennedy stated "all actions should be kept at a low key," while his
brother, Robert told CIA officials "no time, money, effort-or manpowershould be spared."

The near nightly raids on Cuba-landing saboteurs, dropping propaganda leaflets, and occasional military-style raids-actually achieved very
little except confirmation of Castro's accusations that the United States
was guilty of aggression.

Today, several of the military and intelligence officials who were dealing with President Kennedy during this period say they believed that the
assassination of Castro was to be a part of this "Cuban crusade." However there is no documentation of this and, in fact, the only documentation
available shows quite the opposite.

Early in 1962, Robert Kennedy was trying to prosecute a top Mafia boss
named Sam Giancana, when he found the CIA interceding on Giancana's
behalf. Pursuing the matter, Kennedy was finally told about the earlier deals
between the CIA and Mafia to kill Castro. According to CIA attorney
Lawrence Houston, the Attorney General ordered a halt to dealings with the
Mafia. The younger Kennedy later told aides, "I stopped it . . . I found
out that some people were going to try an attempt on Castro's life and I
turned it off."