Destroy Carthage (12 page)

Hannibal landed in western Sicily in 410. Accompanied by
a modest advance force, mainly of Libyans, he put a stop to
Selinuntine aggression but was unable to attack Selinus itself
until his full army of nearly 50,000 troops had gathered. The
delay in fielding his Spaniards and Africans - a year had passed
before all were assembled - demonstrated a major problem of
reliance on mercenaries. Selinus was now besieged with grim
efficiency.

Raising wooden assault towers and wielding battering-rams
equipped with metal heads, Hannibal's troops breached the
walls and poured into the city, robbing, raping and slaying
indiscriminately. If this were a tragic concomitant of em­ploying 'barbaric' troops (the Greeks attributed the worst to
the Iberians), their commander showed no remorse. Begged
to ransom the citizens who had escaped death, Hannibal re­torted that those who could not defend their freedom must
try their hands at slavery. As for the temples, shamelessly
looted, the fall of the city was evidence, claimed the general,
that these had been deserted by the gods.

Joined by hordes of Sicels eager to witness Greek discom­fiture, the victorious army next marched to avenge the humili­ation of Himera. A small force of Syracusans had reinforced
the city, but the magnitude of the assault was overwhelming.
About half the population contrived to escape by sea; of the
rest, the women and children were seized as prizes by the
foreign troops. About 3,000 male prisoners were led to the
spot where Hamilcar had met his death and butchered, on
Hannibal's orders, as a sacrifice to his dead relative.

Having perpetrated this odious deed and razed Himera, the
Punic general abstemiously refrained from the further con­quests his success might have warranted, returning promptly
to Carthage and loud applause. Laboriously recruited, his host
dispersed in quick time. When circumstances soon demanded
a new campaign, recruiting officers had to set out for foreign
parts once again.

Within a short time of its sack, Selinus had been occupied
by a Syracusan leader named Hermocrates as a base for raids
on Phoenician land. Amid mounting tension, both Carthage
and Syracuse sought Sicilian and Italian allies, and appealed to
Greece. Athens backed Carthage; Sparta, Syracuse. But the
great states of Hellas were too fiercely engaged in their own
fight to send material help west. Hannibal was commissioned
to lead a second expedition, this time with the overthrow of
Syracuse as its aim.

Disembarking in southwest Sicily, the Punic army secured
the region of Selinus then marched east toward Syracuse. The
first place of size on the route was Acragas, a prosperous trad­ing city celebrated for its public buildings, the richness of its
arts, its general opulence. Shutting their gates on the advanc­ing host, the Acragantines declined either to join Hannibal
or pledge their neutrality. Independence was a local trait. A
natural stronghold perched upon rocky slopes, Acragas in­spired its residents with confidence.

The investment of the city is interesting for a number of
phenomena featuring persistently in the wars:

Pestilence.
A danger commonly associated with the con­ditions of ancient and medieval field camps, epidemic was
perhaps the most crucial of Carthage's enemies in Sicily. Diodorus described the symptoms as dysentry, delirium, swelling
of the throat and body pustules - conceivably typhoid. Though
not as disastrous at Acragas as elsewhere, the disease killed
Hannibal early in the siege leaving his lieutenant, Himilco, in
command.

Corruption.
While chronic inter-state and internecine
rivalries among the Siceliots advises caution in accepting
charges of treason and bribery too readily, the frequency with
which they are imputed against politicians and generals
suggests the adept use of Carthaginian wealth in subverting
the opposing cause.

In a bid by Syracuse to relieve Acragas, a powerful force
from the eastern city defeated a Carthaginian contingent a
short distance from the beleaguered walls. For a moment, the
town garrison had a chance to sally effectively against a shaken
enemy. The failure of the Acragantine captains to do so raised
accusations of bribery against them, and four were stoned to
death by impassioned compatriots.

Religious attitudes.
Hannibal's claim at Selinus that his
victory indicated the abandonment of the city by its gods
was unexceptional logic in antiquity, certainly among ancient
generals. Divine commitment to martial causes was vital to
participants, who watched for signs of holy displeasure with
fearful eyes. At Acragas, a cemetery outside the city was used
to provide material for the siege until one of the tombs was
struck by lightning. Immediately, Himilco stopped the desecra­tion and offered a sacrifice to the gods.

When disease among the troops intensified, it was actually
deemed provident to build a temple in Carthage to honour
Demeter and Persephone, Greek deities much favoured in Sicily
and thought likely to have had a hand in the pestilence.

The fall of Acragas, finally abandoned by its citizens in
December 406, brought a more tangible aspect of Greek cre­ativity to Carthage. Before the vast amount of booty was
shared within Himilco's army, the most valuable works, of art
were set aside for Africa, to be greatly admired by the Carthag­inians. The new year promised even better prizes. To the east
of Acragas lay Gela, poorly fortified, then Himilco's real ob­jective, Syracuse.

The
fall of Acragas, producing furore at Syracuse, tossed power
to a remarkable demagogue named Dionysius. He had begun
his career as a clerk in a public office; he was to rule Syracuse
for thirty-eight years, becoming not only the most powerful of
Siceliots but a force in Greek Italy, indeed throughout the
Greek world.

A former adherent of Hermocrates, Dionysius had distin­guished himself in subordinate rank during the attempt to save
Acragas, a campaign which brought recrimination on the
Syracusan generals and enabled him to make his move. It was
a classic bid for tyrannical authority, based on popular
anxieties, exploitation of class resentment and the ruthless
sacrifice of colleagues.

Simultaneously boasting humble roots and seeking rich sup­port, Dionysius assured his election to the board of generals by
fervent speeches against the discredited commanders. Then,
encouraging fear of Carthaginian invasion, he accused his fel­lows on the new board of negligence, calling for an overall
commander. Invested with supreme powers as a crisis measure,
Dionysius never looked back.

At first, his position was precarious. Himilco had advanced
on Gela at the end of the winter; only prompt reinforcement
could save the town. Dionysius marched with a hastily as­sembled army of some 30,000 troops, including Italiots (Italian
Greeks) and non-Syracusan Siceliots, accompanied along the
coast by a protective fleet.

Ambitiously, he planned to attack Himilco's position west
of Gela in a multiple operation, part amphibious, part by
land. The synchronization of assaults proved too difficult for
unsophisticated units which, approaching the foe in succession,
were defeated in detail. Dionysius, in Gela when he learned
that his tactics had misfired, withdrew toward Syracuse amid
a stream of Gelan refugees.

Only the loyalty of his professional guards now spared him
the fate that had served the generals after Acragas. Aristocratic
units of his cavalry, reaching Syracuse before him, took con­trol and denounced his dictatorship. But they underestimated
his determination. Fighting his way into the city, Dionysius
overpowered the dissidents. By conceding terms favourable to
Carthage, he obtained Himilco's recognition of his govern­ment.

The Carthaginian returned to Africa in triumph. Apart from
the original dominion in western Sicily, Carthage had gained
Segesta, Selinus, Acragas, Gela, the remains of Himera and
other places, as dependencies, securing the separation from
Syracuse of every other state on the island. Never had her
Sicilian empire been greater, her treasury richer in booty.
Never had a western power imposed itself with such authority
on Greek affairs.

But the price was not negligible. For a long time the virus
from Acragas, carried back on the troopships, plagued Carthage
with wholesale death. For Dionysius, her grim preoccupation
meant a perfect chance to renege on the peace terms. Building
a massive stronghold to house his hired guards at Syracuse,
he was soon oppressing his Siceliot neighbours, subjugating
their cities and territories.

Beset by epidemic, the mercantile families which governed
Carthage faltered at spending wealth and effort to protect the
non-aligned Greeks. Procrastination proved more costly. In­exorably, Dionysius consolidated his eastern power, filling
cities with his hirelings, importing Italian troops, forcibly shift­ing populations he did not trust. In Syracuse, a puppet govern­ment gave formal approval to the tyrant's schemes. By 402, he was preparing openly for major war. The
bastions of Syracuse were strengthened, its navy enlarged by
200 ships. Craftsmen were imported to make armour and
weapons. Four years later, his plans complete, Dionysius pro­claimed Carthage the enemy of all Greeks and called for the
liberation of Punic Sicily. It was a popular message. Deluded
by the prospect of Dionysian 'freedom,' the Siceliots hailed
the end of dependence on Carthage.

At the head of the largest army remembered in Sicily,
Dionysius marched straight across the island to Motya. Every­where in his path, Greek populations, recalling Hannibal's
atrocities, turned on the Carthaginians in their midst, slaughter­ing, torturing. At Motya, an alarmed garrison destroyed its
causeway, resolved on desperate resistance. Months would pass
before Carthage, now recruiting, could bring relief.

Dionysius, versed in Punic siege techniques, did not intend
to wait. Building a mole to replace the demolished causeway,
the tyrant hoisted missile troops on wooden towers to drive
the defenders from their parapets while his miners and bat­terers worked below. Diodorus described the furious street-
fighting which ensued within the breached citadel as the
Phoenicians, 'their hope of living abandoned,' sold their lives
expensively. The community was massacred.