Destroy Carthage (14 page)

Timoleon died in 337. For twenty years and more there was
relative peace in Sicily. Distantly, Alexander blazed east toward
the Indus; in the west, an inferior but ambitious captain strove
for power at Syracuse. Agathocles, appearing first as a soldier
pledged to democracy, took the classic path via popular revol­ution to dictatorship. Soon, emulating Dionysius, the new
tyrant led his forces west.

But Agathocles lacked support beyond Syracuse. Provoked
by his blatant aggression in 311, a Carthaginian expedition
was quickly joined in Sicily by a swarm of native and Siceliot
allies, routing the tyrant's army on the river Himeras. The
Punic commander, Hamilcar, son of Gisco, was a popular am­bassador. One by one, the Greek cities of the island took his
side against Agathocles.

At this point, rather than await the onslaught of Hamilcar
and most of Sicily, the tyrant conceived an astounding stroke:
a counter-invasion of Africa to divert the Carthaginian army
before it could overwhelm Syracuse. It meant weakening his
forces in the city, but Carthage and her Tunisian provinces
were weaker in garrisons. Coastal attack was outside their
experience. That the beleaguered Agathocles should venture
so far seemed to Carthage unthinkable. He lacked even a strong
fleet.

Indeed, when he actually landed it was widely believed that
the entire Carthaginian expedition must have perished in some
appalling catastrophe.

Agathocles, having packed all the troops he could spare in a
few dozen vessels, and dodged the Punic navy, reached Africa
at Cap Bon. Here, compounding the audacity, he promptly
burnt his ships. Probably, he had too few men to leave a guard
on them. At all events, his army was left no alternative, what­ever its fears, but to advance with him. The going was en­couraging.

'Barns were crammed with everything conducive to good
living,' wrote Diodorus. 'Sheep and cattle grazed the plains,
and there were pastures full of horses.'

Horses were important, for Agathocles had brought none
with him. Now, with cavalry to support his hoplites, he set
about the countryside around Carthage. If Carthaginian un-
preparedness was his chief fortune, he lacked neither boldness
nor energy. In the time before his enterprise at last collapsed,
Agathocles enlisted several native tribes to his banner, captured
by Greek account 200 'cities' (mostly villages, in fact, though
he took Hadrumetum, Thapsus and Utica) and fought a
number of successful engagements.

Carthage, with most of her troops away in Sicily, was left
with untrained warriors. Apart from her early confusion, a
crisis of military leadership helped the invader. The two gen­erals designated to repulse Agathocles, Hanno and Bomilcar,
were bitter enemies, or they might have scored an early
victory. As it was, the first battle was handed somewhat tamely
to the presumptuous Greek. Unable to agree on tactics, Hanno
led the right wing of the Carthaginian force in a fierce attack;
Bomilcar held back, anxious to preserve his troops.

The resulting death of Hanno and strategic withdrawal of
Bomilcar left the latter with supreme command at Carthage and an ambition more pressing than the destruction of Agath-
ocles. Projecting crisis on crisis, Bomilcar staged an armed
coup. Diodorus recalled the scene:

Having reviewed the soldiers in the New City
(the sub­urbs ?),
a short distance from Old Carthage, Bomilcar dismissed
the majority, keeping back those in the plot . . . then he
proclaimed himself the government. His men were deployed
through the streets in five units, killing and suppressing re­sistance. In the confusion, the Carthaginians first assumed
the city had been betrayed
(to the invaders)
but, perceiving
the truth, the young men banded together against Bomil­car . . . Many Carthaginians occupied the tall buildings
which surrounded the main square, showering missiles on
the rebels below. At last, with many losses, the rebels
formed close ranks and forced their way under fire through
the narrow streets back to the New City, where they took
position on a hill. But Carthage was now in arms against
them . . .

Thus the coup failed. With the rebels pinned down, the
citizens offered them amnesty 'in view of the external dangers
to the city.' But Bomilcar himself was put to death. The re­sponse of the people to a grave and dangerous situation,
fraught with complexity, was notably resolute. Time would
show that it was not an untypical reaction.

Agathocles, having failed to capitalize the episode, main­tained his campaign until his troops grew weary and mutinous,
when he fled Africa for the unbreached bulwarks of Syracuse.
It is doubtful if Carthage, with sea command and her massive
walls, had been directly imperilled by the Greek assault.
Nevertheless, her economic losses had been considerable.
Characteristically, she chose peace to the expense of pursuing
the destruction of Syracuse.

One Greek antagonist of stature remained in Punic history.
Pyrrus, king of Epirus in northern Greece, was a relative by
marriage of Alexander, and a warrior of scarcely lower repute,

Hannibal Barca later rated them together among the world's
greatest generals. The monarch's intention, to succeed in the
west as Alexander had succeeded in the east, was not im­plausible. He possessed, at the outset, an army of 25,000, and
expected to swell it with Italiots and Siceliots.

The scheme, as Plutarch told it, was to conquer Italy, pro­ceed to seize Sicily -'then who would not go on to Africa
and Carthage?'

But Pyrrus was born too late for such an enterprise. By now,
Etruscan power had been superseded by that of the Romans,
a force already of huge confidence, its dominions spreading far
to the Italian south. Pyrrus won battles against them (280 and
279), but so rugged were the Romans, so costly the victories,
that he abandoned the struggle and, in 278, sailed to Sicily.

He found the island once more infested with petty Siceliot
despots; yearning for a second Timoleon. Hailed as a saviour
by the Greeks, he carried all before him until Carthage dug
her toes in at Lilybaeum. Built since the fall of Motya, the
stronghold incorporated everything the Carthaginians knew
about defensive works. Here, after a triumphant passage
through the island, Pyrrus ran headlong into unyielding walls;
here, prestige dented, he languished until the Siceliots grew
tired of his demands for men, money and sacrifice. When the
saviour resorted to extortion, they began to drift to the
Carthage camp.

In 276, a chastened Pyrrus withdrew his force from Sicily.
As a farewell gesture, the Punic fleet fell in with his transports
and scattered them. So vanished the vision of Greek empire
in the west.

By
the 3rd century
b.c.,
Carthage was accepted by ancient
authors as a member of the exclusive club they distinguished as
civilized: a mainly Hellenic body in a world of 'barbarians.' Too
opulent for some tastes, too exotic for others, the white city on
the shore of the dark continent possessed the ultimate sesame
in her constitution. Contemporary thought was much con­cerned with systems of government. Whatever her rivals held
against Carthage, there was wide agreement that her system
was excellent.

Eratosthenes had no doubt that it entitled her people to Greek
esteem. Aristotle quoted a general opinion that 'in many re­spects it is superior to all others'- a judgement with which, on
the whole, he was in accord. 'A State is well-ordered when the
commons are steadily loyal to the constitution, when no civil
conflict worth mentioning has occurred, and when no one has
succeeded in forming a tyranny.' Less pleasing to the philos­opher was the importance in Carthaginian government of great
wealth.

Details are scanty, but Greek observers defined the constitu­tion of Carthage as a mixture of three elements familiar in
their own regimes: the aristocratic, represented in what can be
termed the senate, or deliberative body; the democratic, re­presented in popular assemblies; and, at least during much of
the city's development, some form of monarchical element.

Aristotle, writing in the 4th century, spoke of kings at
Carthage. Hamilcar who died at Himera, Hanno the colonizer
and explorer, and Himilco. Son of Gisco, among others, were
described in Greek accounts by the word
basileus,
or king. But
they were not monarchs in a full sense. Indeed, they were
compared expressly with the kings of Sparta, survivors of an
older age whose powers had withered. As at Sparta, Carthagin­ian kings acted as generals in many wars. Unlike their Spartan
counterparts, they were elected.

When historians turned to 3rd century Carthage, the term
'king' disappeared and heads of state were referred to as
magistrates or sufets (a Roman corruption of the Hebrew
shophet =
judge). Elected annually, at least two in number,
the Carthaginian sufets presided over the senate and controlled
the civil administration as well as functioning in a judicial
role.

According to Aristotle, officers of state were unpaid at
Carthage. Men of wealth, they seem hardly to have grown
poor in service. The lucrative opportunities open to the govern­ing class, leading at length to its decadence, were reflected in
the scandals denounced by Hannibal Barca. But, until grossly
abused, the system flourished.

Affluent families, filling the 300-strong senate, exercised
control over all public affairs, legislating, deciding on peace
and war, providing an inner council which guided the sufets.
The senate also nominated a panel of inquiry
-
the so-called
court of a hundred judges - to which state officials, particularly
generals, were accountable. An important check on the power
of the military, this court was said by Justinus to have orig­inated in the $th century due to fear of the Magonid com­manders.

When the power of the house of Mago endangered public
freedom, a court of a hundred judges was formed among
the senators. Generals returning from war were obliged to
account to the court for their actions so that, being kept in
awe of the state's authority, they might bear themselves in
military command with due regard to the laws of Carthage.
The device was effective. Though command of hired armies
without deep loyalty to Carthage offered obvious temptation
to generals with political ambition, only one, Bomilcar, is
known to have used troops in an attempted coup. In fact,
despite the harsh treatment of unsuccessful commanders -
some were exiled or even executed - Carthaginian generals
showed notable devotion to the state, often through service
of many years.

Senators held office for life, seemingly co-opting new mem­bers when places fell vacant. The consistency of the body and
its performance was accordant with a self-renewing system
capable of reconciling internal discord; a close-knit establish­ment bound by class interests and social codes. Livy indicated
that political affairs at Carthage were debated at society meet­ings and banquets before formal resolution in the senate.

The powers of the popular assembly are uncertain. Probably,
it ratified the election of sufets, provided a third opinion when
senate and sufets (or kings) disagreed, and was lobbied to
bolster support for risky ventures. While conditional on pro­perty ownership, membership of the popular assembly re­presented modest wealth against the riches of the senate.
Opposition between the groups was recurrent, but not critical
so long as most citizens prospered.

Aristotle noted that the oligarchy at Carthage allowed the
masses a liberal share of profits. Among a people more attached
to commerce than politics - moreover, spared the social up­heavals of war service - there was much to be said for the
status quo. In contrast to the Siceliots, the Carthaginians seem
never to have supported an aspiring dictator in any numbers.
It was to take a rare combination of economic distress and

corruption to alter things.

* * *

Not the least part of Carthaginian solidarity was the city's
spiritual character. Religious intensity, linked with a disposi­tion to honour one god above others, made for unity. In the
early period, the supreme male deity Baal Hammon, sometimes
wrongly called Moloch (a sacrificed offering, not a god), held
sway with formidable compulsion. Then came something of a
revolution. From the 5th century, a virgin goddess, Tanit, became the
centre of popular worship. Softer and more approachable than
the awesome Baal, her appeal blossomed beside the orchards
and fields of the newly acquired African territories. Though
commonly associated with the Phoenician goddess Asherat
(Astarte), Tanit may have owed her name, as well as some­thing of her nature, to the Libyans.

There were other cults. Above a flock of minor deities
(ialonim
and
baalim)
stood the Tyrian Melkart, identified by the
Greeks with Hercules; Eshmoun, identified with Aesculapius
the healer; and a sea-god associated with Poseidon, or Neptune.
Also connected with seafaring was Patechus, or Pygmaeus, a
grotesque monster like the Egyptian Ptah, whose image was
placed on the prows of ships to frighten enemies.

Despite vocational priests and priestesses, and probably
priestly schools, the supervision of religious matters in Carth­age was entrusted to a council of ten senators. The merchant
families of the governing class were too practical, it seems,
to allow the growth of a despotic priesthood.

The outside praise bestowed on the constitution of Carthage
did not extend to her religious observances, which the Greeks
and Romans condemned for embracing human sacrifice.
Though largely replaced by animal sacrifice in the later cen­turies, there is no doubt that the practice occurred on a large
scale later at Carthage than in Greece or Roman Italy.
Diodorus described the sacrifice of 500 children from leading
families at the end of the 4th century.

That such holocausts actually took place was put beyond
doubt by the modern discovery in the Sanctuary of Tanit of
thousands of urns containing the charred bones of children.
Tophets with similar urns witnessed sacrifices at Hadrumetum,
Motya, Sulcis, and other Phoenician foundations. Centuries
after the Canaanites had felt obliged to offer 'first-fruits' to
their gods, their descendants could still believe that the suc­cess of Agathocles in Africa was divine punishment for their
avoidance of sacrifice. At the same time, it should be said that Greek and Roman
denunciations, inspired as much by political hostility as moral
fervour, strike a note of hypocrisy. The Greeks left more
children to perish of exposure and starvation than the Carthag­inians burnt, while the Roman taste for slaughter, eventually
indulged for sheer pleasure, scarcely needs comment.

Nevertheless, the topic raises a distinction in racial psyche.

The only mortals the Carthaginians accorded divine status
were those, such as Dido, who destroyed themselves. Not sur­prisingly, a people who considered mystic suicide the most
deserving of all acts was prepared on occasion to sacrifice them­selves, or their own, for the national good. Their moral code is
a lost book. Yet, while love and compassion are universal, these
seem not to have received the higher endorsement of religion at
Carthage.

The concept of an ethically demanding divinity never il­luminated worship there. The sins of which the Carthaginians
accused themselves were ritual, not moral ones; the response
expiatory rather than renunciatory. Thus, the gods remained,
on the whole, an oppressive force.

Remarkably, considering the martyrological element in the
society, its people appear to have attached little importance
to the notion of an afterlife. Existence was earthbound; self-
sacrifice consoled wholly by devotion to the state itself.

To the east, the establishment of the great dynasties which
emerged when Alexander died - the Antigonids, Seleucids and
Ptolemies - , brought a period of stability in which Carthagin­ian commerce spread quickly to the Aegean and Nile ports.
Imposing Phoenician money and measures on his empire, the
first Macedonian king of Egypt, Ptolemy-son-of-Lagos, provided
a strong inducement to Punic trade.

Hitherto, Carthaginian coinage, minted specifically to pay
mercenaries, had conformed to Greek standards. Now, switch­ing to the Phoenician standard, Carthage adopted money for
general use, availing herself of the experience and good offices
of Egyptian financiers, the most expert in the ancient world.
Increasingly, Punic merchantmen plied the eastern Mediter­ranean.

Carthaginians were everywhere. Inscriptions record their
presence at Athens and Delos. They did business at Thebes.
They carved their names in the sepulchre of sacred bulls at
Memphis. As the foremost brokers and carriers of the day,
they served clients as diverse as their commodities.