Europe's Last Summer (31 page)

A Bavarian general noted in his diary that there was "unfortunately . . . peaceful news. The Kaiser absolutely wants peace. . . . He even wants to influence Austria and to stop her continuing further."

According to War Minister von Falkenhayn, the Kaiser "made confused speeches which give the clear impression that he no longer wants war and is determined to [avoid it], even if it means leaving Austria-Hungary in the lurch." But Falkenhayn reminded the Kaiser that he "no longer had control of the affair in his own hands." In other circumstances this would have seemed shockingly insubordinate. But ever since the
Daily Telegraph
affair of 1908,* the emperor's position had been precarious. In May 1914, only two months before Falkenhayn's reminder, Edward House, President Wilson's envoy, had reported from Berlin that the "military oligarchy" were supreme, were "determined on war," and were prepared to "dethrone the Kaiser the moment he showed indications of taking a course that would lead to peace." Of course Wilhelm, whose grip on reality was fragile at best, may not have been fully alive to the perils of his position. Alternatively, House may have exaggerated.

*See p. 73.

But there can be little doubt that much was going on of which the emperor was unaware. Indeed, among the things that Wilhelm did not know was that, the day before, Jagow had cabled Vienna urging—indeed, practically ordering—the Austrian government to declare war on Serbia immediately. Jagow warned that the English proposal for a conference to keep the peace could not be resisted much longer. The German foreign minister neither consulted the Kaiser before sending this warning nor informed him afterwards that it had been sent.

In Austria, too, a reluctant monarch was gotten around. Emperor Franz Joseph was hesitant about declaring war, and his ministers were obliged to obtain his assent in order to do so. Berchtold obtained that assent by reporting—falsely—that Serbian troops had opened fire on Austrian forces. Actually—and it was only one isolated incident—it was Austrian troops who fired on Serbs.

Vienna.
It was WAR. The decision had been reached the day before. Responding to the pressure from the German foreign office, Austria at long last declared war on Serbia. According to the German ambassador, it was done "chiefly to frustrate any attempt at intervention."

As with so many things, the Austrians did it awkwardly. Sending the declaration of war by an envoy under a flag of truce was not feasible because, until the declaration was received, the countries were not yet at war, so a white flag was inappropriate. Having no representative in Belgrade anymore, the Hapsburg government sent its declaration to the Serbian government by cable. There was no assurance that it would be received—or would be received by the right party. In the event, the Serbian government, once it received the curious telegram, cabled to the major European capitals to inquire whether it was a hoax. The declaration of war made reference to the alleged attack by Serbian troops on Austrian forces.

Conrad, Austria's chief of staff, had opposed issuing the declaration. He wanted to wait two weeks or so until his armies were ready to march. But, overtaken by international diplomacy, Austria-Hungary had run out of time.

That night the Austrian artillery, briefly and ineffectively, bombarded Belgrade across the narrow Danube River frontier.

Paris.
France knew nothing of the war crisis; the news of which everyone spoke was that Mme Caillaux had been acquitted!

St. Petersburg.
Russia initiated mobilization in four military districts that previously had been alerted in "preparation for war steps."

Unaware that it was his own foreign office that was undoing his efforts to restrain the Austrians, Wilhelm sent a message to the Czar. In it he reminded his cousin that "we both, you and I, have a common interest, as well as all Sovereigns" in punishing the Serbs for killing members of a ruling family. "In this, politics play no part at all." But, the Kaiser continued, "On the other hand, I fully understand how difficult it is for you and your government to face the drift of public opinion." Russian nationalism, incalculable, but a force nonetheless, was a fact of political life for Nicholas. (Whether or not Wilhelm knew it, pressure to mobilize also was being exerted by Russia's General Staff.) The Kaiser told the Czar of his "hearty and tender friendship" and assured him, "I am exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly."

This message—the first in the Willy/Nicky
correspondence that took place after Austria declared war on Serbia—crossed with one from the Czar: "Am glad you are back . . . I appeal to you to help me. An ignoble war has been declared on a weak country. . . . [S]oon I shall be overwhelmed by pressure brought upon me . . . to take extreme measures which will lead to war. To try and avoid such a calamity as a European war, I beg you in the name of our old friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going too far."

London.
Grey swung back to the view that direct negotiations between Russia and Austria afforded the best possibility of keeping the peace.

Berlin.
Bethmann turned his attention to putting Germany in a position to fight a major war.
Domestic discord was the chief obstacle, so now the government entered into talks with the
Socialist Democratic party (S.P.D.) aimed at securing agreement from working-class representatives to remain loyal in the event of war. This was a genuine concern. The Executive Committee of the S.P.D., denouncing "the frivolous provocation of the Austro-Hungarian government," had called out its supporters into the streets. Its newspaper predicted that war would bring revolution in its wake. Demonstrations in Berlin on July 28, which the police attempted to break up, brought violence to the capital itself and looked to be merely a foretaste of more disturbances to come.

However, Bethmann scored a success in negotiating an agreement with the S.RD. leadership to fall in line behind the government in this moment of national danger.

Meanwhile, the Kaiser, still unaware that his decision for peace had been sabotaged by his subordinates, confusedly wondered whether he had acted too late. He remarked that "the ball is rolling" and "can no longer be stopped."

London.
Churchill reported to King George V the various measures taken by the Admiralty to place the navy "upon a preparatory precautionary basis." After detailing many of the steps taken, he assured his monarch: "It is needless to emphasize that these measures in no way prejudice an intervention or take for granted that the peace of the great powers will not be preserved."

At midnight Churchill wrote to his wife: "My darling one and beautiful, everything tends towards catastrophe and collapse." Britain was not, he continued, "in any serious degree responsible for the wave of madness which has swept the mind of Christendom."

Prime Minister Asquith wrote to his confidante, Venetia Stanley, that he had just been told that the French government was ordering heavy sales of securities on the London Exchange in order to raise cash: "It looks ominous." The English house of Rothschild, with whom the order was placed, refused to execute it. Then Asquith received a cable reporting "that Austria had ordered war!" Venetia Stanley sometimes told the Prime Minister that there were days when she would like to trade places with him; this, he suggested, probably would not be such a day.

CHAPTER 36: JULY 29

Potsdam.
Willy cabled Nicky that Russia really could stay out of the conflict. "I think a direct understanding between your government and Vienna possible and desirable" and—the Kaiser did not know that this was untrue—"my government is continuing its exertions to promote it." Wilhelm cautioned, however, that if Russia were to take military measures that threatened Austria, such measures would bring war rather than peace.

Nicky replied, indicating what puzzled him was that what he was hearing from the Kaiser was not what he was hearing from the Kaiser's ambassador. "Please clear up this difference," he wrote. Nicholas urged that the Austro-Serbian conflict be referred to The Hague* for adjudication. "I trust to your wisdom and friendship."

*His reference would have been to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, established at The Hague by the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1899).

Questions arose in the minds of Austrian generals now that it was recognized in Vienna that Russia really might intervene if Serbia were threatened with destruction. These questions were directed to German Foreign Minister Jagow. A couple of days before, he had given official assurances to the Russian government that Berlin had no objection to a Russian partial mobilization so long as it was not directed against Germany.

The Austrians now pointed out to their German colleagues that a partial Russian mobilization had been ordered that was directed against Austria. Were it to remain in effect would that not mean that when Austria sent its armies against Serbia, the Dual Monarchy would be left defenseless against a Russian attack from behind? Conrad still hoped that Germany would deter Russia, and rashly made his dispositions on the assumption that Germany would succeed in doing so.

In conversation with a Russian envoy, Jagow therefore reversed his position. In view of Russia's partial mobilization, "Germany was likewise obliged to mobilize; there was therefore nothing left to be done and the diplomatists must now leave the talking to the cannon." If this was intended to persuade the Russians to roll back their partial mobilization, it failed of its purpose.

Moltke delivered to his government a memo he had written on the current situation. He had expected, as had his military colleagues, that Austria would not commence hostilities for another couple of weeks. Like the Kaiser, he had not known that Jagow had been pressuring Vienna to act at once. Therefore Moltke had been taken by surprise by the Austrian declaration of war. In his memo, he analyzed the consequences of Austria's move. When Austria moved, it was bound to initiate a series of events that would bring Germany into a war against Russia. According to Moltke, "the civilized states of Europe will begin to tear one another to pieces." It now would take a miracle to prevent the
outbreak of a "war which will annihilate the civilization of almost the whole of Europe for decades to come."

Yet it was a price he was prepared to pay. His question to his government essentially was, did it still believe that it could localize the conflict and thus avert the dire consequences he foresaw?

The Kaiser summoned Germany's military leaders to Potsdam to discuss his conversations with Bethmann. The Kaiser said that his Chancellor, in the words of Tirpitz, who was there, "had collapsed completely" and Wilhelm had "expressed himself without reserve
regarding Bethmann's incompetence."

Bethmann, in fact, had set two chief goals for himself. One of them had been to secure acceptance of the war policy by labor and the Left—which he had done. The other was to get Britain's pledge of
neutrality—which he had not done. Keeping Britain out of the war was important to Bethmann though not at all important to Germany's military leaders.

According to Tirpitz, at the Potsdam conference, "The Kaiser informed the company that the Chancellor had proposed that, in order to keep England neutral, we should sacrifice the German fleet for an agreement with England, which he, the Kaiser, had refused."

It was decided at the conference to do nothing until Vienna responded to the Kaiser's proposal to halt in Belgrade and then stop the war. Bethmann had finally sent the proposal, while sabotaging it. He had forwarded it with instructions to his ambassador to make sure the Austrians understood that Germany did not wish to "restrain" them; he wanted to underline for Vienna that the proposal was only for propaganda purposes.

But after the Kaiser had upbraided Bethmann at Potsdam and the Chancellor had collapsed emotionally, Bethmann tried desperately to reverse himself. He threw himself into an effort to get Vienna to do precisely what he had let Vienna understand only the day before that it should not do. At 10:18 p.m. he sent an open cable to Austria-Hungary asking if his
halt-in-Belgrade message of the day before had been received. Twelve minutes later he impatiently cabled again.

By now the Chancellor was aware that, independently of one another, both Britain and Italy had proposed plans to keep the peace that were quite similar to the Kaiser's halt-in-Belgrade plan. It now looked as though, if only Bethmann and Jagow had loyally carried out Wilhelm's instructions the day before and brought Germany's full weight to bear upon its ally, the war crisis would have been resolved.

Instead, on the evening of the twenty-ninth, Bethmann, if he were to escape the Kaiser's wrath, had to hope that Austria-Hungary, too, would be willing to change course.

To his ambassador in Austria, Bethmann now cabled: "We are, of course, prepared to do our duty as allies, but must decline to let ourselves be dragged by Vienna, irresponsibly and without regard to our advice, into a world conflagration." He told his ambassador to persuade Berchtold that Austria should at least make a show: "In order to prevent general catastrophe, or at any rate put Russia in the wrong, we must urgently advise that Vienna should initiate and pursue conversations."

But at the same time Moltke was cabling Conrad to urge a full Austrian mobilization. Perhaps this showed Moltke's justified concern that Austria might mobilize against Serbia rather than Russia.