Authors: Patrick K. O'Donnell
The training program turned many Ph.D.s into bar fighters. But Fairbairn remained realistic on the bounds of his training, noting, “
In a sense, this is for fools, because you should never be without a pistol or a knife. However in case you are caught unarmed, foolishly or otherwise, the tactics shown here will increase your chances of coming out alive.”
Tofte trained women as well, teaching them to use an umbrella as a weapon “
every bit as dangerous as a bayonet.” However, Tofte longed to take a more active part in the war, and recognizing the value of his skills, the Army eventually sent him to Cairo with a mission to destroy the Italian oil industry in Albania. As soon as he arrived, that mission was canceled, but Tofte would soon tackle an equally formidable challenge with the assistance of the MU. Taylor, Tofte, Smith, and Hayden initially went about their own missions but would come back together as a team and thrust themselves into the heart of combat and Allied operations as they moved into continental Europe.
S
INCE
J
ANUARY
1943,
when Churchill and Roosevelt met at the Casablanca Conference to plot their war strategy, the two Allied leaders had faced mounting pressure from the Soviet Union to open a western front. Roosevelt and Churchill disagreed on the best approach. The Americans preferred to use their existing forces in North Africa to invade Europe. Churchill, with an eye on postwar Europe and keeping the Soviet Union in check, favored launching an invasion of southwest Europe through Greece and the Balkans and persuading neutral Turkey and its large army to align with the Allies. But the Turks refused to budge and maintained neutrality. Despite Churchill's protestations regarding Greece and the Balkans, the Allies decided to first attack Sicily in July 1943 and then advance up the spine of Italy as they prepared for the Normandy landings and the invasion of France. Throughout the remainder
of the war Churchill remained obsessed with the Mediterranean. With limited men and shipping to spare, Eisenhower and Roosevelt agreed to only a small increase in guerrilla activity in the area. British General Henry Maitland “Jumbo” Wilson proposed occupying some of the Greek islands by “
means of a piratical war,” using small bands of commandos and other specially trained troops to raid German and Italian garrisons. One of the first such raids was on the Greek island of Kos. Swept up in these island buccaneering efforts was the OSS, which provided intelligence services independent of the British and took part in special ops and intelligence operations.
In the summer of 1943, the Allies went to great lengths to inflate the size and strength of their forces in the eastern Aegean. Through deception operations they attempted to convince the Germans that they planned to land in Greece. One elaborate disinformation operation, code-named “Mincemeat,” involved a dead body from a London morgue dressed in a high-ranking officer's uniform and handcuffed to a suitcase full of “top secret” plans for a fake invasion of Greece and Sardinia. They cast the body into the sea so it would wash up on an Axis shore. The Germans fell for the canard and bought the fake invasion plans. Double agents working for the Allies fed troves of disinformation to the Germans. The deception plan had a measure of success, and the Axis shifted reinforcements to Greece, Sardinia, and Corsica instead of Sicily, where the Allies eventually landed on July 9.
G
RAND STRATEGY ASIDE
,
Taylor's first priority involved setting up MU's base camp to train operatives and house vessels. He handled everything from obtaining vessels and office supplies to developing the training curriculum. To his dismay, Taylor discovered that OSS headquarters had already selected a site in Ras el Kenayis, Egypt, which was located on the Mediterranean coast about 140 miles from Alexandria. He found the location undesirable because it
lacked “
protection from the elements, and the outlying reefs made it a nightmare to navigate in and out of the base camp.” Taylor spent the next several weeks traveling throughout the Middle East trying to find a suitable spot for the base camp, but his efforts to set up operations were in vain. He identified a potential site in Palestine and yet another in Mersa Matruh, Egypt, a city ten miles west of the Ras el Kenayis. However, Colonel Guenther did not approve either location, and the Maritime Unit ultimately abandoned plans for a training facility in Egypt. Lieutenant Taylor's lowly rank undoubtedly played a role in his inability to win the approvals he needed from colonels and majors. He also faced extreme challenges in building consensus and recognition of the Maritime Unit from the other branches within the OSS, which were reluctant to recognize the nascent unit that had recently broken away from the Special Operations Branch. For months, Taylor and the small team of extraordinary men focused on the mission and, as a result of their sheer determination, overcame the barriers of rank and branch.
After his failure to establish the MU training base, Taylor thrust himself into an area he knew wellâthe sea. To conduct maritime covert operations and missions in the Aegean, Taylor urged Commander Woolley to send him high-speed PT boats. He cabled headquarters that “
it was absolutely urgent that a fast surface craft approximately 85-ft. in length, with speed in excess of 15 knots, be assigned to his area in the Middle East.” Taylor pestered anyone who would listen, but the acute shortage of Allied surface craft in the Aegean forced the OSS to resort to extreme alternatives.
The first craft Taylor managed to employ looked more like a pirate ship than a covert craft for inserting agents. Known as the
Samothrace,
the 90-foot, 150-ton high-masted luxury yacht was most definitely not the fast boat Taylor had requested. The flashy craft stuck out like a sore thumb among the other boats in the Aegean. The ostentatious schooner was owned by cotton tycoon George McFadden. Fittingly code-named “
Daffy,” McFadden was an old Princeton classmate of one of the archaeologists at the Greek Desk.
Tired of waiting for vessels from Washington, the OSS leased the schooner from McFadden, who continued to entertain guests on the yachtâeven while it was on convert missions! One OSS staffer acidly wrote, “Daffy intolerable. . . . Tell him we are at war. He hasn't heard.”
But using a luxury yacht for covert operations wasn't just foolhardy; the cost was exorbitant. Because the
Samothrace
was deployed in a war zone, the insurance premium topped a whopping $1,500 per month, more than $20,000 in today's dollars. The OSS had to invest even more money before Taylor could undertake the missionâthe boat required a total engine overhaul that “
was completed two days later after many exasperating delays.”
It's likely Hayden also piloted the
Samothrace.
While waiting for his mission orders, the movie star once “
borrowed a Jeep from the motor pool and cruised alone down to Alexandria, where I promoted a fast cruising sloop from the Royal Egyptian Yacht Club and had myself some sailing.”
T
HE
OSS'
S OTHER OPTION
for sea-going transportation seemed better-suited to covert missions. They began utilizing Greek boats known as caïques, small, wooden-hulled vessels that weighed ten to forty tons. The boats had auxiliary sails, but most were powered by gasoline engines. Two to six men crewed the small boats. Generally the captain was the boat owner, and most of the crew members knew each other or were from the same island. “
Some of these men showed great loyalty and daring in their operations under OSS; others (occasionally the same ones) were masters of smuggling, thievery, and goldbricking,” noted one OSS operative. Money motivated the men, as did patriotism fueled by the German occupation of their country.
Taylor's first battle was to wrestle control of the caïques from the Secret Intelligence branch, which had previously taken responsibility for inserting its agents into occupied areas within the
Aegean. The thirty-four-year-old Hollywood dentist used his well-tuned social skills to convince SI and Guenther to place the caïque service under control of the Maritime Unit. To pry the control of the boats out of SI hands, Taylor used the argument that “
they were wasting good intelligence men on maritime matters” better left to the MU.
Ultimately the Maritime Unit's caïque fleet would swell to thirty-six boats, although not all of them operated at the same time. A maintenance nightmare, the boats cost OSS headquarters $3,000 per week to maintain, operate, and compensate their Greek crews. However, these native craft were very valuable and effective because they easily blended in, helping to avoid detection by German patrols.
After assembling the MU's ragtag fleet, Taylor, working with Hayden, Tofte, and other OSS officers, began planning for future missions to set up a supply line to bring food, medicine, and weapons to Yugoslav partisans fighting against the Germans. Despising desk work, Taylor, a man of action, immediately started inspecting the existing fleet of caïques and, acting in his customary hands-on style, prepared his first operation.
*
I interviewed Lloyd Smith in 2002, and we immediately connected because we were both college wrestlers. On a snow-filled January day, Smith fondly pulled out Hayden's .357 Magnum, which he had won in a poker game.
PIRATE YACHTS AND SPIES OF THE CLOTH
T
HE WIND AND SPRAY OF THE WESTERN
Mediterranean pelted Jack Taylor as he piloted the 150-ton
Samothrace
across the turbulent blue-green water. Controlled by the Axis, the Aegean Sea was swarming with roving patrols of enemy ships and planes, which provided a formidable challenge to the MU's first mission. A master sailor, Taylor felt at home at the helm of the 90-foot sloop. Years of experience on solo cruises across the Pacific, yacht races in the Caribbean, and a narrow escape from being buried alive in a gold mine in the Yukon had given Jack Taylor skills and mental toughness few men possessed.