From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (121 page)

The United States also narrowly averted—at least temporarily—a major crisis in the already shaky alliance. In early 1967, economically beleaguered Britain announced plans to reduce its overseas forces by one-third and threatened to remove its troops from Europe unless West Germany
assumed the cost of supporting them. West Germany, in turn, threatened to curtail purchases of U.S. and British military equipment. After extended negotiations, Bonn consented to buy on a smaller scale. The United States and Britain agreed to "redeploy" troops from Germany to their home territories, keeping them under NATO command and ready to send back when needed. But Britain proceeded with cutbacks in July, and West Germany reduced its forces to 400,000 instead of building them up to 508,000 as originally planned.
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The Western alliance was substantially weakened by France's defection and surging economic pressures.

The price of hegemony was starkly manifest in Asia and the Pacific. Detente and the Vietnam War sometimes disturbed America's Asian allies, but they also provided leverage to extort concessions from Washington. The mere hint of a change in U.S. China policy, along with Beijing's 1964 diplomatic successes and especially its nuclear test, deeply alarmed Taiwan's leaders. The United States quickly rebuffed Chiang Kai-shek's offers to take out China's nuclear program and launch a military offensive in southern China—the "Gimo and Madame eat-sleep-love-dream 'counterattack,' " the U.S. ambassador mused.
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The administration also rejected his proposal for a regional military alliance and politely declined his offer of combat units for Vietnam. On the other hand, to palliate Chiang, the United States sent up-to-date military hardware, including fighter planes. The Nationalist leader skillfully exploited LBJ's absorption with Vietnam. Nationalist troops took part in CIA covert operations there. U.S. forces used Taiwan bases as staging areas for operations in Vietnam, and Taiwan earned huge profits from civilian contracts. The Vietnam War thus tightened U.S.-Taiwan ties.
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The war produced major strains in America's relations with its major East Asian ally, Japan. Japanese continued to press for the reversion of Okinawa. Minimizing the threat in Vietnam, they generally opposed the war and especially feared they might be sucked into it. U.S. officials were reluctant to give up the "Keystone of the Pacific," especially with war raging in Southeast Asia. Americans resented that Japan took advantage of the U.S. defense "umbrella" while contributing only minimally to its own security. As Japan's economy grew by leaps and bounds and the balance of trade shifted heavily in its favor, Americans pushed for greater access to its markets.
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LBJ's desperation for help in Vietnam forced repeated concessions to Japan. The son of a sake brewer and protégé of postwar leader Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato was a masterful politician and diplomat who adeptly maneuvered amidst a bewildering array of external and internal pressures. The two nations reached vague agreement on the reversion of Okinawa "within a few years," with the United States to retain basing rights.
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Japan opened the door slightly to U.S. imports. Sato provided token support in Vietnam, mainly medical supplies and ships flying the U.S. flag for coastal transport in South Vietnam. Japan furnished bases for U.S. air operations. In the meantime, as one Japanese journalist observed, Japan, "like a magician, satisfied both its conscience and its purse."
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Sato tolerated popular protests against the war. Vietnam helped Japan surpass the United States as the major economic power in the region. Japanese sold the U.S. armed forces an estimated $1 billion per year in everything from beer to body bags. Southeast Asia nations used vast U.S. expenditures to purchase Japanese consumer goods. Japan indeed may have been the only winner of the war in Vietnam.
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Other Pacific allies contributed troops for the war, but most drove a very hard bargain. Some shared with the United States concern about Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia. Some depended on U.S. security guarantees. Most seized the chance to extort concessions in return for modest numbers of troops. Only Australia provided sizeable forces at its own expense. New Zealand neatly balanced its concern not to offend the United States or inflame domestic critics of the war by sending a small artillery battery. South Korea provided about fifty thousand combat forces, but secured handsome subsidies, substantial additional military aid, and expanded security commitments. The Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos extracted maximum gain from a minimal investment. In addition to a small engineering unit, he offered to mobilize ten battalions of troops at U.S. expense, then kept them at home for his own self-protection. Recognizing that he had been had, LBJ warned an aide: "If you ever bring that man near me again, I'll have your head."
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Even more than in Asia, in the ever volatile Middle East, the Johnson administration was subject to manipulation by a close friend with a powerful constituency in the United States and an ambitious foreign policy agenda. Following JFK's lead, Johnson took steps to further what was now called the special relationship. Like many Americans, he had long admired Israel's plucky defense of its territory. As a senator, he had faithfully supported the new nation. He appreciated the importance of the Jewish vote to the Democratic Party and the clout of the Israel lobby. His close friends among American Jews included several of his White House advisers. Indeed, his aide Harry McPherson once speculated that "some place in Lyndon Johnson's blood" there were a "great many Jewish corpuscles."
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As president, Johnson expanded the flow of weapons to Israel. He recognized the importance of Arab oil, of course, and he was increasingly angered by the opposition of Jewish intellectuals to the war in Vietnam. Like Kennedy, he worried about Israel's nuclear ambitions, and he refused repeated requests for F-4 fighter-bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. He preferred that arms be provided through third parties like West Germany than directly from the United States. But he was usually there for Israel, whether it be A-4 Skyhawk fighters, the first commitment of combat aircraft for Israel, M-48 tanks, or M-113 armored personnel carriers. Such weapons were deemed essential to counter Soviet shipments to Arabs and to placate Israel when the United States supplied moderate Arab states such as Jordan. United States officials also indulged in the wishful thinking that satisfying Israel's demands on conventional arms would sway it from seeking nuclear weapons. The administration tried to hinge military assistance on the right to inspect Israel's nuclear facilities, but the Israeli tail often wagged the superpower dog, and Tel Aviv stubbornly and successfully resisted U.S. conditions.
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The 1967 Middle East crisis, a classic example of the way escalation begets war, originated from the rekindling of the ever explosive Arab-Israeli dispute. Certain that Israel would soon acquire nuclear weapons, the radical Arabs stepped up their pressure. In February 1966, a Baathist regime seized power in Syria and, with Soviet backing, set out to "out-Nasir Nasir."
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Syria's move spurred the Egyptian leader back into action lest he lose his position among the more militant Arabs. Nasser promptly demanded removal of a UN peacekeeping force stationed in the Sinai as a buffer between Egypt and Israel. Surprised when the UN complied, he massed troops along the Israeli border and threatened to close the Gulf of Sidra, Israel's lifeline to the outside world. In the meantime, the newly formed Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) mounted deadly terrorist attacks against Israel from bases in the West Bank and the Golan Heights. Encircled and increasingly embattled, unsure of outside support, nervous Israelis feared for the existence of their state.

While frantically seeking to calm tensions on both sides, the United States appears to have given Israel the freedom to respond as it saw fit. United States officials recognized the perils of a Middle Eastern war, especially the possibility of a superpower confrontation at a time when they were bogged down in Vietnam. Even more, they feared further Soviet penetration of a vital region and a successful Arab war of liberation. Many openly sympathized with Israel. Choosing an analogy calculated to catch the president's ear, adviser John Roche referred to the "Israelis as Texas, and Nasser as Santa Ana."
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The administration proposed an international naval force—the so-called Red Sea Regatta—to break Nasser's blockade but gained little support from Congress or key allies. The president at first tried to discourage Israel from firing the first shot, admonishing repeatedly—and suggestively—that "Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone." But he also promised to use force to open the straits and in time conveyed signals through crony Abe Fortas and others that seemed to give Israel a green light to launch a preemptive strike. In any event, threatened on two sides and from within, and certain that the best defense was a good offense, Israel would probably have started the war anyway. Sensing that the best way to maximize its security was to strike first, Israel on June 5, 1967, launched a short and entirely one-sided conflict with enormous implications for the future of the Middle East.
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Israel's daring move paid huge military dividends. Striking without warning, U.S.-supplied Skyhawk jets bearing the Star of David insignia knocked out Egyptian and Jordanian air forces on the ground, destroying three hundred Egyptian planes in less than an hour and a half. Control of the air ensured smashing battlefield success. Using U.S.-provided tanks, Israel promptly seized Gaza, the Sinai, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. The United States, privately pleased with the embarrassment suffered by
Nasser and the USSR, firmly backed Israel. Mainly concerned with possible Soviet intervention, Washington sought to reassure Moscow that the United States had not been complicit in Israel's surprise attack. The Johnson administration also promoted a cease-fire in place, an arrangement that favored Israel.
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Israel's unprovoked and brutal attack on a U.S. Navy ship close to the Egyptian coast on the fourth day of the war made clear its willingness to defy its patron. The USS
Liberty
incident is still shrouded in mystery and has given rise to numerous conspiracy theories. It remains unclear exactly what the "ugliest, strangest looking ship in the U.S. Navy," as Adm. Thomas Moorer called it, was doing, why it was attacked, and who ordered the attack.
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The slow-moving, unarmed, and unguarded electronic surveillance vessel was apparently not where it was supposed to be because of a communications foul-up. The Israelis may have tried to destroy it to prevent it from intercepting radio traffic reporting the massacre of Egyptian troops in the Sinai.
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They may have been trying to hide from the prying ears of U.S. electronic espionage their preparations for attacking the Golan Heights.
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On the afternoon of June 8, Israeli aircraft and then gunboats struck the
Liberty
with rockets, napalm, and torpedoes, killing 34 sailors, wounding 171. At first believing that Egypt or the Soviet Union was responsible, the United States dispatched aircraft from a nearby carrier. In the meantime, learning that Israel had attacked the ship and fearing escalation of the war, it recalled the planes. Israel naturally fell back on mistaken identity, a claim only the most gullible could believe. "Inconceivable," staunch friend of Israel Clark Clifford snorted. "Incomprehensible," Rusk concurred.
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Israel apologized and paid an indemnity. United States officials accepted the apology without much further questioning.

Less than twenty-four hours later, Israeli forces attacked the Golan Heights and drove within forty miles of Damascus. They aimed, apparently, not only to strengthen their strategic position but also to eliminate the hostile Syrian government. The attack threatened the superpower confrontation U.S. officials most feared. Humiliated by the total defeat of two of its leading clients and ridiculed by the Chinese, Moscow promptly broke relations with Israel. Premier Alexei Kosygin warned LBJ in the first
use of their hotline that unless Israel was stopped the USSR might take action "which may bring us into a clash, which will lead to catastrophe." During a tense top-level meeting marked by hushed voices, LBJ ordered the Sixth Fleet from Crete to the eastern Mediterranean close to Syria. Tired of coddling Israel and angered by the
Liberty
attack, U.S. officials also insisted that it accept a cease-fire without delay.
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The tough action—and Israel's achievement of its goals—produced results. The Soviet Union backed off, Israel backed down on June 11, and the crisis eased.

Israel's smashing victory had enormous consequences. In just 132 hours, it seized forty-two thousand square miles of territory, tripling the size of the country. Intoxicated with success, Israelis called it the Six-Day War, an unmistakable reference to the creation story in Genesis. Indeed, the war restored the dimensions of biblical Israel and soon led to occupation and settlement of the captured lands. For the Arabs, the war became known as the Disaster, a humiliation that made them even less inclined toward peace with Israel. Nasser's pan-Arab dreams were crushed. Arab nationalism would never recover from the debacle. Some Arab intellectuals turned to modernization and democracy; many others, to a revival of traditional Islam.
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Although U.S. officials were pleased with Israel's success, the war caused major problems for them. The Israeli lobby now pressed for the full-fledged alliance that would further compromise America's position in a vital region. The Johnson administration feared that Israel's success would fuel its ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons and hang on to the conquered territories, moves that would further destabilize the Middle East. A humiliated USSR set out to rebuild its clients' shattered arsenals and recoup its influence. A Baathist coup by Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 1968 raised the possibility of a new Soviet client in an oil-rich state. Armed with Soviet weapons, Palestinian radicals mounted deadly attacks on Israeli positions in the West Bank and Israel itself.
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