From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (28 page)

Adams and Clay's efforts to promote closer relations with hemispheric neighbors through participation in an inter-American conference in Panama became hopelessly entangled in the bitter partisan politics that afflicted their last years in office. Bolívar conceived the idea of an inter-American congress to build closer ties among the new nations to help fend off European intervention and perhaps also support his own ambitions for Hemispheric leadership. Some Latin American leaders saw inviting the United States as a means to secure the pledges of support Washington had been unwilling to give on a bilateral basis. Adams and Clay were not prepared to go this far, but they were willing to participate, Clay to further his dreams of an American System, Adams, who critics sneered had caught the "Spanish American fever" from his secretary of state, to promote U.S. commerce and demonstrate goodwill. Their missionary impulse was manifest in Clay's instructions to the delegates. They were not to proselytize actively, but they should be ready to respond to questions about the U.S. system of government and the "manifold blessings" enjoyed by the people under it.
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The Panama Congress became a political lightning rod, drawing increasingly bitter attacks from the followers of presidential aspirants former secretary of the treasury William Crawford, Vice President Calhoun, and especially Andrew Jackson. Critics ominously warned that participation would violate Washington's strictures against alliances and sell out U.S. freedom of action to a "stupendous Confederacy, in which the
United States have but a single vote." Southerners protested association with nations whose economies were competitive, expressed concern that the congress might seek to abolish slavery, and objected to association with Haitian diplomats. A Georgia senator issued dire warnings against meeting with "the emancipated slave, his hands yet reeking in the blood of his masters." The acerbic Virginia congressman John Randolph of Roanoke declaimed against a "Kentucky cuckoo's egg, laid in a Spanish-American nest." Condemning the political "bargain" that had allegedly given Adams the presidency and made Clay secretary of state, he sneered at the union of the "Puritan with the black-leg," a "coalition of Blifil and Black George" (the reference to especially unsavory characters from Henry Fielding's novel
Tom Jones
). Randolph's charges provoked a duel with Clay more comical than life-threatening, the only casualty of which was the Virginian's greatcoat.
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United States participation never materialized. A hostile Senate delayed for months voting on Adams' nominees. By the time they were finally approved, one refused to go to Panama during the "sickly season," and the other died before receiving his instructions. When the congress finally assembled in June 1826 after repeated delays, no U.S. representative was present. After a series of sessions, it adjourned with no plans to reconvene. Adams gamely persisted, appointing a new representative, but the congress never met formally again. The Senate refused even to publish the administration's instructions to its delegates, writing a fitting epitaph to a comedy of errors. For the first time but by no means the last, a major foreign policy initiative fell victim to partisan politics.
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The Panama Congress fiasco typified the travails of Adams's presidency. Perhaps the nation's most successful secretary of state, he met frustration and failure in its highest office.
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Although he brought to the White House the most limited mandate, he set ambitious goals. He and Clay achieved some important accomplishments, especially in the construction of roads and canals and the passage of a highly controversial protective tariff in 1828. In most areas, they failed. Outraged at losing an election in which they had won a plurality of the popular vote, Jackson and his supporters built a vibrant political organization and obstructed administration initiatives. Caught off guard by the opposition, Adams often seemed incapable of asserting effective leadership. Perhaps like Jefferson and also from hubris, he too overreached, refusing to bend from
principle in trade negotiations with England and badly misjudging the willingness of weak nations such as Mexico to succumb to U.S. pressure.

This said, the era of Monroe and Adams was rich in foreign policy accomplishment. Through the Transcontinental Treaty, the United States secured its southern border, gained uncontested control of the Mississippi, and established a foothold in the Pacific Northwest. The threat of European intervention diminished appreciably. Britain was still the major power in the Western Hemisphere, but the United States in a relatively short time emerged as a formidable rival, already larger than all the European states except for Russia. Still threatened by manifold dangers in 1817, the U.S. continental empire was firmly established by 1824. Well might Adams observe in his last months as secretary of state that never had there been "a period of more tranquility at home and abroad since our existence as a nation than that which prevails now."
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The election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 provoked alarm among some Americans and many Europeans, especially in the realm of foreign policy. The first westerner to capture the White House, Jackson, unlike his predecessors, had not served abroad or as secretary of state. His record as a soldier, especially in the invasion of Florida, raised legitimate concerns that he would be impulsive, even reckless, in the exercise of power.

Jackson introduced important institutional changes. His cabinet met sparingly and rarely discussed foreign policy. He went through four secretaries of state in eight years, much of the time assuming for himself the primary role in policymaking. He instituted the first major reform of the State Department, creating eight bureaus and elevating the chief clerk to a status roughly equivalent to a modern undersecretary. He expanded the consular service and sought to reform it by paying salaries, thus reducing the likelihood of corruption, only to have a penurious Congress reject his proposal and try to reduce U.S. representation abroad. With much fanfare, he institutionalized the principle of rotation in office—a spoils system, critics called it. He used the diplomatic service for political ends. Ministers William Cabell Rives, Louis McLane, Martin Van Buren, and James Buchanan distinguished themselves in European capitals, but they were among the major exceptions to a generally weak group of diplomatic appointments. The eccentric John Randolph—sent to St. Peters-burg
to get him out of Washington—left after twenty-nine days, finding the Russian weather unbearably cold even in August. Jackson crony and world-class scoundrel Anthony Butler was the worst of a sorry lot of appointments to Latin America.
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In keeping with the democratic spirit of the day, Jackson altered the dress of the diplomatic corps. His Democratic Party followers accused Monroe and Adams of trying to "ape the splendors . . . of the monarchical governments"; Jackson himself thought the fancy diplomatic uniform "extremely ostentatious" and too expensive. He introduced an outfit more in keeping with "pure republican principles," a plain black coat with gold stars on the collar and a three-cornered hat.
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Jackson's changes were more of style and method than substance. Cadaverous in appearance with strikingly gray hair that stood on end, chronically ill, still bearing the scars from numerous military campaigns and carrying in his body two bullets from duels, the rough-hewn but surprisingly sophisticated hero of New Orleans embodied the spirit of the new republic. His rhetoric harked back to the republican virtues of a simpler time, but he was both the product and an ardent promoter of an emerging capitalist society. Domestic struggles such as the nullification controversy and the bank war occupied center stage during Jackson's presidency. There were no major foreign policy crises. At the same time, Jackson saw foreign policy as essential to domestic well-being and gave it high priority. He was less concerned with promoting republicanism abroad than with commanding respect for the United States. He readily embraced the global destiny of a rising nation. More than his predecessors, he sought to project U.S. power into distant areas. He energetically pursued the major goals set by Monroe, Adams, and the despised Clay: to expand and protect the commerce upon which America's prosperity depended; to eliminate or at least roll back alien settlements that threatened its security or blocked its expansion.
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Jackson's methods represented a combination of frontier bluster and frontier practicality. In his first inaugural, he vowed to "ask nothing but what is right, permit nothing that is wrong." He did not live up to this high standard, but he did establish a style distinctly his own. Like Monroe and Adams, he had been profoundly influenced by the menacing and
sometimes humiliating experiences of the republic's infancy. He was extremely sensitive to insults to the national honor and threats to national security. He claimed to stand on principle. He insisted that other nations be made to "sorely feel" the consequences of their actions; he was quick to threaten or use force if he thought his nation wronged. In actual negotiations, however, he was conciliatory and flexible. If, on occasion, he raised relatively minor issues to the level of crises, he also solved by compromise problems that had frustrated Adams, a man renowned for diplomatic skill. His gracious manner and folksy charm won over foreigners who expected to find him offensive.
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Like Monroe and Adams before him, Jackson gave high priority to expanding U.S. trade. A product of the southwestern frontier, he recognized the essentiality of markets for American exports. Despite the efforts of his predecessors, commerce had stagnated in the 1820s, and surpluses of cotton, tobacco, grain, and fish threatened the continued expansion of agriculture, commerce, and manufacturing. He thus moved vigorously to resolve unsettled claims disputes, break down old trade barriers, and open new markets.
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Jackson perceived that securing payments of outstanding claims would bind grateful merchants to him, stimulate the economy, and facilitate new trade agreements. Through patient negotiation and the timely deployment of naval power, he extracted $2 million from the Kingdom of Naples. The threat of a trade war helped secure $650,000 from Denmark. Settlement of the long-standing French claims dispute represented a major success of his first administration and reveals much about his methods of operation. He attached great importance to the negotiations, believing that other nations would view failure as a sign of weakness. Informed by minister Rives that France would not pay unless "made to believe that their interests . . . require it," Jackson took a firm position. But after months of laborious negotiations, when the fragile new government of Louis Philippe offered to settle for $5 million, he readily assented, conceding that, although less than U.S. demands, the sum was fair. The United States promised to pay 1,500,000 francs to satisfy French claims from the American Revolution.
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Jackson almost undid his success by pressing too hard for payment. Without bothering to determine when the first installment was due or notify the French government, he ordered a draft on the French treasury. It was returned unpaid, and the Chamber of Deputies subsequently rejected appropriations for the settlement. At this point, an angry Jackson impulsively threatened to seize French property. "I know them French," he reportedly exclaimed. "They won't pay unless they are made to."
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The Chamber appropriated the funds but refused to pay until Jackson apologized. The dispute quickly escalated. The French recalled their minister from Washington, asked Rives to leave Paris, and sent naval forces to the West Indies. Jackson drafted a bellicose message and ordered the navy to prepare for war. A totally unnecessary conflict over a relatively trivial sum was averted when a suddenly conciliatory Jackson in his December 1835 message to Congress refused to apologize but insisted he meant no offense. Paris viewed the apology that was not an apology as sufficient and paid the claims.
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Jackson also broke the long-standing and often bitter deadlock over access to the British West Indies. The departure of Adams and the death of Canning in 1827 greatly facilitated settlement of an apparently intractable issue. More interested in markets than shipping, Jackson's southern and western constituents exploited Adams's blunders in the 1828 campaign. To prove his mettle as a diplomat, Jackson sought to succeed where his predecessor had failed. British planters and industrialists had long pressed the government to resolve the issue. At least for the moment, instability on the Continent made good relations with the United States especially important.
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The two nations thus inched toward resolving an issue that had vexed relations since the American Revolution. Persuaded that Adams's rigidity had frustrated earlier negotiations, Jackson abandoned his predecessor's insistence that Britain give up imperial preference. He continued to talk tough, at one point threatening to cut off trade with "Canady." But when advised by McLane in 1830 that the issue might be settled more easily by action than negotiation, he removed the retaliatory measures prohibiting entry into U.S. ports of ships from the British West Indies. London responded by opening the West Indies to direct trade. An issue that had grown in symbolic importance while declining in practical significance
was at last settled, removing a major impediment to amicable relations. Britons especially had feared accession of the allegedly Anglophobic Jackson, executioner of Arbuthnot and Armbrister. His demeanor in these negotiations won him an esteem in London given none of his predecessors and evoked a determination, in the words of King William IV, to "keep well with the United States."
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Jackson also energetically pursued new trade agreements. James Buchanan's dismal later performance as president has obscured his considerable skill as minister to Russia. He endured the St. Petersburg weather and the constant surveillance placed on foreigners. He ingratiated himself at court through his storytelling and dancing, even his flattery of the tsar. He negotiated a treaty providing for reciprocity in direct trade and access to the Black Sea.
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