From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (27 page)

Monroe's statement raised as many questions as it answered. It left unclear whether the non-colonization principle applied with equal weight to all of North and South America and what—if anything—the United States might do to defend the independence of Latin America. The Greek issue was settled when Congress subsequently tabled a resolution calling for recognition, but Monroe's statement did not close the door entirely to U.S. involvement in Europe. It did not even represent a definitive exposition of U.S. policy. The administration, Adams included, was prepared to consider an Anglo-American alliance should the threat of European intervention materialize.
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The immediate response gave little indication that Monroe's pronunciations would assume the status of holy writ. Americans lustily cheered and then largely forgot the ringing reaffirmation of America's independence from Europe. European reaction ranged from outright hostility to incredulity at the pretentiousness of such strong words from such a weak nation. That high priest of the old order, Austria's Prince Metternich, privately denounced the statement as a "new act of revolt" and warned that it would "set altar against altar" and give "new strength to the apostles of sedition and reanimate the courage of every conspirator."
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When Canning realized that he had been outmaneuvered, he released a statement given him by the French government making clear that Britain had been responsible for deterring European intervention. Many Latin Americans
had minimized the threat of European intervention from the outset. Those who took it seriously perceived that Britain, not the United States, had headed it off. Latin American leaders were eager to ascertain whether Monroe's apparent offer of support had substance, but they also feared a North American threat to their independence. The practical effects of the "doctrine" were also limited. Indeed, for many years, the United States stood by while Britain violated—and enforced—its key provisions

The Monroe "doctrine" was by no means a hollow statement. It neatly encapsulated and gave public expression to goals Monroe and Adams had pursued aggressively since 1817. That it was issued at all reflected America's ambitions in the Pacific Northwest and its renewed concerns for its security. That it was done separately from Britain reflected the nation's keen interest in acquiring Texas and Cuba and its commercial aspirations in Latin America. It expressed the spirit of the age and provided a ringing, if still premature, statement of U.S. preeminence in the hemisphere. It publicly reaffirmed the continental vision Adams had already privately shared with the British and Russians: "Keep what is yours but leave the rest of the continent to us."

Monroe, Adams, and Clay continued to pursue this vision, pushing relentlessly against foreign positions in the Northwest and Southwest. Adams's vigorous protests against the ukase and Monroe's message were heard in St. Petersburg. This time listening to his foreign policy advisers rather than the Russian-American Company, the tsar made major concessions in treaties of 1824 and 1825, dividing Russian and United States "possessions" at 54° 40', opening the ports and coasts of the Russian Pacific to U.S. ships, and leaving the unsettled stretches of the Pacific Northwest open to American traders as long as they did not sell firearms and whiskey to the indigenous peoples.
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Chosen president by the House of Representatives after a hotly disputed 1824 election, Adams immediately ratcheted up the pressure on Britain. He sent the veteran diplomat Gallatin to London with instructions to extend the boundary along the 49th parallel to the Pacific. Still determined to protect British interests in the Oregon country, Canning insisted on the Columbia River as a boundary. When it was evident that neither nation would back down, they agreed in 1827 to leave the territory open indefinitely to the citizens of each. Adams found it expedient to delay rather than risk conflict at a time when the U.S. position was still weak.

The United States also tried to roll back Mexico's boundaries in the Southwest. Clay had bitterly attacked Monroe and Adams for abandoning Texas in 1819. As Adams's secretary of state, he lamented that the Texas border "approached our great western Mart [New Orleans], nearer than could be wished."
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With the president's blessings, he pushed the newly independent and still fragile government of Mexico to part with territory into which large numbers of U.S. citizens were already flocking. He authorized his minister to Mexico, South Carolinian Joel Poinsett, to negotiate a boundary at the Brazos River or even the Rio Grande, arguing, with transparently self-serving logic, that the detachment of Texas would leave the capital, Mexico City, closer to the nation's center, making it easier to administer. Not surprisingly, Mexico rejected Poinsett's overtures and Clay's logic. An outspoken champion of U.S.-style republicanism, the ebullient diplomat (better known for giving his name to a brightly colored Christmas flower native to Central America) was instructed by Clay to represent to Mexicans the "very great advantages" of the (North) American system. Poinsett took his instructions much too seriously, openly expressing his disdain for Mexican institutions and aligning himself with the political opposition. The triumph of the group he backed changed nothing. The new government resisted the meddlesome minister's offers of $1 million for the Rio Grande boundary and in 1829 requested his recall. As with Britain in the Northwest, Adams and Clay refused to press the matter, certain that in time Texas would fall into U.S. hands.
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Implicit in the Monroe Doctrine was a commitment to the extension of the ideology and institutions of the United States, a key issue throughout much of the mid-1820s. The Greek and Latin American revolutions made it a practical and tangible matter. The marquis de Lafayette had dedicated his life to liberal causes. His triumphal pilgrimage across the United States in 1825 evoked an orgy of speeches and celebrations, reminding Americans of the glories of their revolution and stimulating sympathy for the cause of liberty elsewhere. The fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1826, also brought forth talk of a rededication to freedom. The remarkable, coincidental deaths of Thomas
Jefferson and John Adams on that very day seemed to President John Quincy Adams a "visible and palpable" sign of "Divine favor," a reminder of America's special role in the world.
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Much of the initiative for the extension of American ideals came from individuals, and the impetus was mainly religious. Inspired by the American Revolution and by a revival that swept the nation in the 1820s (the Second Great Awakening), troubled by the rampant materialism that accompanied frenzied economic growth, a small group of New England missionaries set out to evangelize the world. Originating primarily in the seaport communities and often backed by leading merchants, they saw religion, patriotism, and commerce working hand in hand. They were committed to the view of Congregationalist minister Samuel Hopkins that the spread of Christianity would bring about "the most happy state of public society that can be enjoyed on earth."
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In the beginning, American evangelicals worked with the British. The first missionary traveled to India in 1812. In the 1820s, they struck out on their own. They did not seek or expect government support. Certain that the millennium was at hand—the estimated date was 1866—they brought to their work a special urgency and believed the task could be done in a generation. A mission went to Latin America in 1823 to survey the prospects of liberating that continent from Catholicism and monarchy. "If one part of this new national family should fall back under a monarchical system, the event must threaten, if not bring down evils, on the part remaining."
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Two African American Baptist ministers were among the first Americans to go to Africa. The major thrust was the Middle East. An intrepid group of missionaries left for Jerusalem in 1819 to liberate the birthplace of Christianity from "nominal" Christians, "Islamic fanaticism," and "Catholic superstition." Plunged into the deadly maelstrom of Middle Eastern religion and politics, the mission moved on to Beirut and barely survived. But it established the foundation for a worldwide movement that would play an important role in U.S. foreign relations before the end of the century.
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The concept of mission assumed a major place in the foreign policy of Adams and Clay. The zealous, romantic Kentuckian had always
championed the cause of freedom, often to the discomfiture of Monroe and Adams. As secretary of state, Adams had rebuffed Clay's proposals to support the Greek and Latin American revolutions—the United States should be the "well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all . . . , the champion and vindicator only of her own," he proclaimed in an oft-quoted July 4, 1821, oration responding to Clay.
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But as president he moved in that direction. Shortly after Lafayette's visit, he dispatched a secret agent to offer U.S. sympathy to the Greeks and assess their ability to "sustain an independent Government." Whether Adams saw this as preliminary to recognition is unclear. It became irrelevant. The agent died en route. In April 1826, the Greeks suffered a crushing defeat, seemingly answering the question he was sent to ask. Adams nonetheless expressed sympathy for them in subsequent speeches. He hailed the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey in 1828 as offering them renewed hope.
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Closer to home, Adams and Clay sought to encourage republicanism in Latin America. For years, Clay had ardently championed Latin American independence. As secretary of state, he aspired to commit hemispheric nations to a loose association based on U.S. political and commercial principles. Although skeptical, Adams too came to envision the United States providing leadership to the hemisphere in those "very fundamental maxims which we from our cradle at first proclaimed and partially succeeded to introduce into the code of national law." The two men feared that the Latin American republics might fall back under European sway or as independent nations compete with each other and the United States in ways that threatened U.S. interests. The best solution seemed to be to reshape them according to North American republican principles and institutions.
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There is a fine line between encouraging change in countries and interfering in their internal affairs, and Adams, Clay, and their diplomats often crossed it. Raguet publicly expressed contempt for Brazil's monarchy and the corruption and immorality that, he claimed, inevitably accompanied it. Poinsett used the Freemasons' organization to foment opposition to the government of Mexico. The U.S. chargé actively intruded in a debate among Chileans over the principles of government.
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During the
revolutions against Spain, North Americans hailed Simón Bolívar as the George Washington of Latin America. But his advocacy of a presidency for life for Bolivia and Colombia aroused suspicions of British influence and fears of a turn toward monarchy. Clay privately enjoined the Liberator to choose the "true glory of our immortal Washington, to the ignoble fame of the destroyers of liberty." The U.S. chargé in Peru denounced Bolívar as a usurper and "madman" and backed his opponents. Minister to Colombia William Henry Harrison openly consorted with Bolívar's enemies and was asked to leave. An admirer of the United States, the Liberator observed that this rich and powerful northern neighbor "seemed destined by Providence to plague America with torments in the name of freedom."
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Adams and Clay never permitted the cause of freedom to interfere with more important interests. They were willing to recognize the Brazilian monarchy as long as Brazil's ports were open to U.S. trade. When the threat of European intervention caused Latin American leaders to ask how the United States might respond, they got only vague responses. Monroe's statement had not conveyed "any pledge or obligation the performance of which foreign nations have a right to demand," Clay asserted. The United States flatly rejected proposals by Colombia and Brazil for alliances. When wars or rumors of war among the Latin nations themselves threatened Hemispheric stability, Clay and Adams stuck to a policy of "strict and impartial neutrality."
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With Haiti and Cuba, race, commerce, and expediency dictated support for the status quo. Clay was inclined to recognize Haiti, but southerners like Calhoun fretted about "social relations" with a black diplomat and the participation of his children "in the society of our daughters and sons." Adams opposed recognition as long as the black republic granted exclusive trade privileges to France and showed "little respect" for "races other than African."
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The United States preferred the certainties of continued Spanish control of Cuba to the risks of independence. Its rule threatened throughout the 1820s by rebellion from within and a possible British takeover or Mexican or Colombian invasion from without, Spain maintained at best a precarious hold on its island colony. United States
officials, on the other hand, saw Cuba as a natural appendage of their country, certain, as Adams put it, that, like an "apple severed by the tempest from its native tree," Cuba, once separated from Spain, could "gravitate only towards the North American union." For the moment, they were content with the status quo. A premature move to acquire Cuba might provoke British intervention. The "moral condition, and discordant character" of Cuba's predominantly black population raised the specter of the "most shocking excess" of the Haitian revolution. Clay and Adams thus rebuffed schemes proposed by Cuban planters for U.S. annexation and rejected British proposals for a multilateral pledge of self-denial. They warned off Mexico and Colombia, proclaiming that if Cuba was to become a dependency of any nation "it is impossible not to allow that the law of its position proclaims that it should be attached to the United States." They did nothing to encourage Cuban independence, preferring the status quo as long as the island was open to U.S. trade.
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