From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome from 133 B.C. to A.D. 68 (13 page)

Marius owed his victories largely to his military reforms, which helped to convert a citizen-militia into a semi-professional army. True, the Roman armies of this period were very different from those of the early Republic when men were eager to hasten back to their homes and farms after each annual campaign, and probably in practice many men not enrolled in the five property classes (i.e. the
capitecensi
) had been recruited,
²⁶
but it was Marius who officially opened the army to them as a career (cf. p. 42). One farreaching effect of recruiting these landless volunteers was that they would look to their commanders to provide spoils and to help them after demobilization. As the State did not step in with any scheme of pensions, the men tended increasingly to expect their generals to provide allotments for them by securing the passing of a
lex agraria
. This spelt danger: these semiprofessionalized soldiers, bound to their commanders by ties of personal
interest, made possible the rise of a series of military dictators who in the end overthrew the Republic.

Marius also introduced far-reaching tactical changes in the army. The legions had normally fought in a formation based on three separate lines which differed in age and equipment; these were now abolished and all the infantry were armed alike. For some time the sections (maniples), into which a legion was divided, had on occasion been grouped into threes in a unit known as a cohort. Marius now made the cohort the standard tactical unit (the battalion) of the legion, which henceforth consisted of ten cohorts of 600 men, each of which was subdivided into six centuries. At the same time each legion was given a silver eagle as its standard, and the men began to develop a ‘regimental’ loyalty to their legion. The legionaries’ chief arms were the sword and a long javelin (the
pilum
). Marius, following the example set by Rutilius Rufus (
cos.
105), gave his men a thorough training in armsdrill by methods based on those of the gladiatorial schools, and provided the
pilum
with a wooden rivet to help fasten the metal head to the wooden shaft; on impact this rivet would break and thus made it impossible for the enemy to throw the
pilum
back.
²⁷
When on the move, Roman armies built a camp each night for protection and for this purpose had depended on baggage trains. Marius made the army more mobile and independent by making the men carry their own entrenching tools and other equipment: consequently they became known as Marius’ mules (
muli Mariani
). But an efficient army is lost without efficient officers. The commanding officer was normally a consul, who had under him six military tribunes
²⁸
and sixty centurions for each legion; and it was these centurions, seasoned and experienced veterans, six to each cohort, that provided firm leadership for the rank-and-file. Thus by his military reforms Marius partly gave final shape to earlier developments and partly introduced real innovations. The Roman army owed him much and became one of the finest fighting machines of antiquity.

Rome was exceedingly fortunate in that the rambling movements of the German tribes allowed Marius time to shape his army into a first-class force. In fact he had so much time that he employed his men in digging a new channel at the mouth of the Rhone to by-pass the estuary which tended to silt-up. This new waterway, the
fossa Mariana
, which ran from near modern Fos to Arles (Arelate), allowed shipping to get to the Rhone in safety, facilitated the supply-line of Marius’ army, promoted the commercial prosperity of Arelate and of S. Gaul in general, pleased the Equites, and fore-shadowed the similar use of the imperial army on public works.
²⁹
In 102, however, Marius, who had been elected to his fourth consulship in Rome with Saturninus’ help, received news that brought him post-haste back to Gaul. The barbarians were planning a converging attack on Italy: the Teutones were hoping to advance along the coast from the west, the Cimbri over the Brenner Pass from
the north, and the Tigurini over the Julian Alps from the north-east. This division may have weakened the strength of the attack, but it also forced the Romans to divide their armies. While his colleague Q. Lutatius Catulus stood guard in N. Italy, Marius at first refused battle in S. Gaul (probably near Tarascon), allowed the Teutones to march past him, and then managed to work his way round in front of them before they reached Aquae Sextiae (modern Aix). Here in a valley surrounded by hills he cut to pieces the Ambrones who arrived first, and then engaged the Teutones in a tough struggle; a detachment of 3000 Romans concealed in reserve suddenly threatened the enemy’s rear and helped to achieve a complete victory. The western invasion was smashed and Narbonese Gaul was safe. Meanwhile Catulus had foolishly advanced up the Adige to meet the Cimbri in the hilly country near Tridentum (Trento), but his army managed to extricate itself, though at the cost of abandoning Transpadane Gaul to the invaders. Nevertheless his command was prolonged for 101 when he was joined by Marius, now consul for the fifth time. Together they advanced with some 55,000 men over the Po and finally in the heat of the midsummer met the enemy at Campi Raudii near Vercellae. Here the rout of the Cimbri was no less decisive than that of the Teutones at Aquae Sextiae. The Tigurini found safety by retreating to Switzerland, hastened on their way by Sulla.
³⁰

The northern peril was ended. Both Marius and Catulus received triumphs, but though some senators might try to believe that their man Catulus deserved his, the People’s hero Marius clearly was the real saviour of Rome. Memories of the sack of the city by the Gauls in 390 B.C., combined with the series of recent defeats that had culminated at Arausio, had justifiably aroused Rome’s fears and now increased her gratitude towards her preserver. Many Romans may have been thinking that disciplined legions must in the end have succeeded in defeating the barbarians, despite their numbers, but that would not have been possible without outstanding leadership. Marius in his army reforms, tactics and strategy had proved himself to be a general of great ability, if not of genius. The future was soon to show whether he could rival his military achievements when he turned to the battleground of politics.

After his triumph Marius enjoyed such prestige and
auctoritas
that, had he so wished, he might have achieved a great measure of social reform, but there is little to suggest that his mind ever moved on such lines except in so far as the interests of his veterans were involved. They needed land and they should have it, but of statesmanship to match his generalship he showed not a spark. So far from taking any personal lead, he merely used Saturninus for his immediate purpose. Saturninus, glad of the chance to increase his own
popularity, sponsored measures to provide allotments in Transalpine Gaul and colonies in Sicily, Achaea, Macedonia, Cercina (an island off the coast of N. Africa), Africa (now or earlier), and perhaps in Corsica. A land commission (
decemviri agris dandis attribuendis iudicandis
), on the lines of the Gracchan commission, was set up, and it perhaps dealt with the colonies as well; one of the members was the father of Julius Caesar (he became praetor in 91). Though few of these ambitious plans were implemented, at least the settlements in Africa, which had been voted if not actually started in 103 (p. 46), were considerable. One feature of the scheme shows insight: some at any rate of the colonies were to be Latin not Roman. Since not many Romans would be willing to sacrifice their citizenship by joining them, the colonists presumably must have been drawn largely from the Latins and allies. It was only fair that their share in the joint repulse of the northern invaders should be rewarded, but unfortunately the experience of Gaius Gracchus had shown that the selfish Roman plebs was reluctant to share any of its privileges and so in fact this generous feature of the proposal alienated some of the popular support which Saturninus enjoyed in Rome.
³¹

A law had been passed a little earlier (probably December 101) to supplement the efforts of M. Antonius against the pirates in the eastern Mediterranean (p. 47). It was designed to mobilize resources for a drive against them, and closed all harbours of the empire and of allied states to their ships. Its real purpose was scarcely to create an extra-ordinary command in Asia for Marius, as has been suggested, though he was probably becoming anxious about his future; nor can it definitely be associated with Saturninus, though he might well favour a measure which would promote the interests of the Equites.
³²
The law contained a
sanctio
which bound magistrates to take an oath to observe its provisions. This was not necessarily an unusual feature, but Saturninus broke new ground when he tried to anticipate senatorial opposition to his
lex agraria
by inserting into it a
sanctio
under which all senators, on pain of exile, must swear to abide by it. This gave great offence. The urban plebs were already displeased because of his attitude to the allies, but by bringing some of Marius’ veterans into the Forum Saturninus routed his opponents in a fracas and got his measures carried. After some hesitation the senators followed the lead of Marius who took the oath, but subject to the validity of the law; Metellus Numidicus alone refused and preferred exile.
³³

At the elections for 99 Saturninus secured a third tribunate. Glaucia, though holding a praetorship, illegally stood for the consulship; his chief rival, C. Memmius (tribune in 111) was murdered or killed in a riot. This was too much for Marius, who had a strong sense of law and order and must have been increasingly uncomfortable about the wisdom of his political alliance with these demagogues and perhaps also about their ultimate political aims. When the Senate passed the
senatus consultum ultimum
and summoned him to see
to the safety of the state, he deserted his allies, who with their followers had seized the Capitol. By cutting off their water-supply he soon compelled them to surrender, and in order to save them from lynching at the hands of the mob he shut them up in the Senate House, but the crowd broke through the roof and pelted them to death with the tiles.

The Senate possibly declared that Saturninus’ legislation, or at any rate the measures carried in 100, was invalid, since it had been carried by force (
per vim
). Marius’ lack of political principle was exposed. No longer feared by the Senate or respected by the People, he was in a weak position; after a vain protest against a measure to recall Metellus from exile, in 98 he went off to Asia and obscurity.
³⁴
This conduct at least showed his loyalty to the constitution: unusually close ties had bound him to his army, and the support of the People had secured him six consulships. These, however, he had held primarily because of the military needs of the day and he had not attempted to use them as stepping stones to a personal predominance. The use of his soldiers in the Forum in 100 was a disquieting precedent, but Marius’ own lack of political ability or ambition, combined with his innate sense of law and order, limited the possible development of the evil. Danger to the State would arise only when military need elevated men of greater political insight who were prepared to use the army for their own personal advancement. In the meantime the authority of the nobility had prevailed over the turbulent demagogues and over the
novus homo
who became an army commander.

The end of the second century had witnessed stirring events both at home and abroad. By contrast the first few years of the next century were relatively peaceful in both spheres, though in fact they were to prove merely an uneasy lull before even greater storms. Pacification abroad was symbolized in a series of triumphs by victorious generals: the joint triumph of Marius and Catulus over the Teutones and Cimbri was followed by those of M. Antonius over the pirates (100), T. Didius over the Scordisci, and Dolabella over the Lusitanians (98), while Manius Aquilius celebrated an
ovatio
for his reduction of the Sicilian slave-war. While these public spectacles assured the people of Rome that the frontiers of the empire were safe, the domestic scene was also enlivened by a number of political trials, in which several men alleged to have been sympathizers of Saturninus were condemned.
²
Both Senate and Equites were breathing more freely and in their common desire to avoid such upheavals as had disfigured the year 100 they achieved a state of co-existence, if not of harmonious co-operation. The Senate in particular failed to express by more generous action any relief it may have felt at having rounded a dangerous corner. Rather, it attempted to strengthen its position: the consuls of 98 carried a
lex Caecilia-Didia
, which (
a
) by forbidding ‘tacking’ various measures together in omnibus-bills guarded the Senate against possible coalitions, e.g. between Equites and People, and (
b
) by enacting that a regular interval must elapse between the promulgation of a measure and its voting in the Assembly, guarded the Senate against suprise attacks.

Of far greater moment, however, was the Senate’s criminally short-sighted attitude to the Italian allies, many of whom had come to Rome during the
recent upheavals. By a
lex Licinia-Mucia
the consuls of 95 set up a
quaestio
on aliens who were claiming to be citizens.
^2a
This action, though quite legal, was incredibly foolish, but before its full consequences were felt the mutual toleration between Senate and Equites received a rude shock. An equestrian jury condemned on a charge of extortion P. Rutilius Rufus (
cos.
105) who had served in Asia as a legate of Mucius Scaevola: so far from being guilty of oppression, he had helped to draft an exemplary edict for the administration of the province and had protected the provincials from the exactions of the equestrian tax-gathers.
³
The Equites now had their revenge: despite the dignity of his defence, Rufus was condemned and retired to live in exile at Smyrna among the very provincials that he was alleged to have oppressed. Though he was a
novus homo
(and therefore an easier target than Scaevola), the Senate must have felt this affront to their Order very bitterly, while the political bias of the ‘Gracchan’ juries was patent.

Conscious of the personal risk that he was taking, a leader at long last came forward, bold enough to follow in the footsteps of Gaius Gracchus and to tackle the twin problems of the law-courts and the Italians. Ironically enough he was the son of Drusus who had opposed C. Gracchus. Elected tribune for 91, the younger M. Livius Drusus was not prepared to stand by and let the State drift into disaster. Aristocratic, wealthy and somewhat severe in manner, he sponsored a more generous senatorial policy and gradually worked towards his ultimate aim of gaining franchise for the Italian allies. In the Senate he had many friends who included the Princeps Senatus, Scaurus, and the great orator Crassus, but he needed wider support and so he turned to the People. He carried a bill to provide allotments, and served on the decemviral commission which it established, as well as being one of the five members of another such commission set up by a law of his tribunician colleague Saufeius. He also made arrangements for the distribution of cheap corn and sponsored a colonial bill, perhaps to implement the scheme started by his father (p. 31). After having gained, as he hoped, popular support he then turned to the thorny question of the law-courts. He probably proposed (the evidence is contradictory) that they should be shared between the two Orders, i.e. ‘mixed’ juries of senators and Equites should be established, and that all members should be subject to a law against judicial corruption, based on an adaptation of Gracchus’ legislation (p. 30). Or he may have proposed to add 300 Equites to the Senate which would then provide the
iudices
.
⁴

Relations between the two Orders, however, were too strained to permit of compromise: Drusus found that he had pleased neither, but had fallen between two stools. Some public disturbances ensued, in one of which
Drusus’ brother-in-law Caepio, with whom he had quarrelled, was in danger of being hurled from the Tarpeian Rock. In the Senate the opposition to Drusus was led by one of the consuls, L. Marcius Philippus, whose following gradually increased despite the help that Drusus received from the oratory of Crassus. The scales began to tilt against him when it became known that he was contemplating a bill to give Roman franchise to the Italians, many of whom came to Rome to support him. He was known to have entertained the Marsic leader, Q. Poppaedius Silo, in his home, and men who feared that the Italians were now so restless that they might turn to force in order to secure their demands, began to doubt his loyalty. The fact that he warned Philippus of a plot to murder him showed that such doubts were unfounded, but it also revealed his knowledge of the allies’ plans.
⁵
His position was thus quickly undermined: he lost the support of the Senate, of the Equites, of the People who continued selfishly to refuse to contemplate extending their privileges to the Italians, and lastly even of some of the Italians themselves who feared that their land might be threatened under his agrarian and colonial schemes. Philippus then persuaded the Senate to declare all Drusus’ legislation invalid, because it infringed the
lex Caecilia-Didia
, probably on the technical ground that some of the measures (e.g. the agrarian and colonial plans) had been ‘tacked’ together. Disappointed, disillusioned and deserted on all sides, Drusus had to admit himself beaten, since he was not prepared to lead the Italians against Rome as some of his political enemies may have feared. Soon afterwards he was murdered by an unknown assassin. Nor were his friends left in peace: early in the year 90 a tribune, Q. Varius Hybrida, disregarded the veto of his colleagues and carried a law that established a court with equestrian jurors to try anyone suspected of collusion with the allies. Those who fell victims to this enquiry included many famous men (though in the next year Varius was hoisted on his own petard and condemned under his own law).
⁶
Thus Drusus’ attempt at reform had failed. He may not have shown great wisdom in his methods, which combined with his proud manner may have aroused fears that he was seeking too much personal power, but at least his aims were the aims of a statesmen, and his death was the signal for war.

Fearing widespread discontent in Italy, the Senate had already sent Roman agents to various districts to watch developments. At Asculum in Picenum the people, thinking that their plans were revealed, turned on a visiting Roman praetor who had behaved rashly: they promptly killed him and all other Romans in the city. A deputation of allies went to Rome to protest at Rome’s past treatment of them, but the Senate refused to listen unless they made restitution for the massacre at Asculum. Feelings ran too high for
compromise. The highlanders of Picenum and Samnium were determined to fight for their independence, and both sides spent the winter of 91/90 preparing for war.

The ensuing struggle is sometimes called the Social War (the war of the
socii
), but the title is misleading because it obscures a fact of the highest importance: the Latin allies did not join in, but every one, with the single exception of Venusia, remained loyal to Rome.
⁷
If therefore the more privileged Latin allies abstained, what drove the rest of the Italici to such extreme measures?
⁸
They had many grievances as has been seen, but why did they so eagerly want Roman citizenship? If they got it, few of them would have been able to go all the way to Rome to vote, and fewer still could ever have hoped to win their way into the exclusive circle of Roman nobles and magistrates. At first in the days of the Gracchi they apparently wanted the protection that citizenship would give them against oppression and exploitation by Roman magistrates and they might even have been satisfied if granted the
ius provocationis
(cf. p. 27). But as time went on and their hopes were continually shattered they became more sensitive to their social and political inequality. Rome could never have won her present position without their help: why should they not be treated as Romans? Thus Roman disregard of their legitimate complaints (about the effect of Roman agrarian laws and other matters) hurt their spirits even more than their material interests: frustrated and cheated of proper recognition, their patience suddenly snapped. Denied equality, they would fight for independence. The violence of the war that ensued testifies to the depth of the feeling involved.

The highlanders of the glens and hills of central Italy formed the heart of the uprising, and comprised two groups, the Marsic in the North (the whole war is sometimes named the Marsic War) and the Samnite in the South. Eight warriors, who are depicted on a coin taking an oath, probably represent the Marsi, Picentines, Paeligni, Marrucini, Vestini, Frentani, Samnites and Hirpini. They obtained no support at first in Etruria or Umbria; Latium and northern Campania remained loyal to Rome; Calabria was not affected, nor Bruttium at first; but they soon won help in southern Campania, Lucania and Apulia. Their first need was a headquarters and military organization. For the former they chose a good centre at Corfinium, which lies in a plain girdled by magnificent mountains in the territory of the Paeligni. But they at once showed that they were not mere rebels banded together to destroy Rome; rather, they sought to found an independent nation. Corfinium was proudly renamed Italia and the organization of the new confederacy may have outrun the needs of a purely military machine. Officers (two consuls and twelve praetors) and a Senate were established, but unfortunately the details are obscure: some suppose that the constitution was modelled on that of Rome, others that the council was a federal body of allied delegates, and
others again that the organization was a binary league based on the two main cantonal groups of Marsi and Samnites.
⁹
Soon no less than 100,000 men were ready for battle: Poppaedius Silo commanded the Marsic group, Papius Mutilus the Samnite, each commander having six divisional officers under him. To pay the troops special issues of coins were minted, which both helped to unify the cause and advertise its ideals: on them we see groups of warriors taking oaths of loyalty, Italia personified, the Italian bull goring the Roman wolf, and the names of the commanders in Latin or Oscan. The men themselves were sturdy fighters and many of them had served alongside Roman armies in the past. Rome now found that her selfish policy had unleashed a veritable whirlwind of potential destruction.

In the hour of their self-imposed danger the Romans did not lose courage. If they could weather the first onslaught, they might hope to survive, since they mustered some 150,000 men and through their control of the sea they might get further help from the provinces or client kings. The fighting flared up in two main theatres of war, each of which was entrusted to one of the consuls of 90 B.C., supported by more experienced men serving as
legati
. In the North P. Rutilius Lupus had Marius and Cn. Pompeius Strabo (the father of Pompey) on his staff; L. Iulius Caesar in the South had Sulla and T. Didius. In the North the Italians hoped to extend the revolt outwards from Picenum and at the same time to thrust westwards from Corfinium along the Via Valeria, which led across the peninsula to Rome itself, sweeping past the loyal colonies at Alba Fucens and Carseoli.
¹¹
To meet these threats Strabo, who had large estates in Picenum, was sent there against Asculum, and after some misadventures he was able to start to besiege the city. In their attempts to rescue Alba, the Romans were less successful. Rutilius was defeated and killed in the Tolenus valley, and Caepio was destroyed by Poppaedius Silo; Marius, however, who had managed to retrieve the positions after these defeats, was now left in sole command and defeated the Marsi and Marrucini, though the fate of Alba remains uncertain. Meantime in the South the Italians gained successes in three areas: (
a
) they turned against Aesernia, a key fortress which covered their communications between the northern and southern areas; after twice defeating the consul Caesar, they forced Aesernia to surrender after a grim siege; (
b
) Papius Mutilus with the Samnites burst into southern Campania and won over many towns until he was defeated at Acerrae by Caesar; and (
c
) other Italian commanders led successful raids into Apulia and Lucania. Despite these losses, however, the Romans managed to survive the first year of the revolt and wisely made political concessions (see below) to prevent it spreading farther, for instance to Etruria which was becoming restless.

In 89 both consuls, Strabo and L. Porcius Cato, went to the northern front, while Sulla took command of the forces in Campania; Marius was curiously neglected. When Cato was defeated and killed near the Fucine Lake, Strabo was left in command of operations in the northern theatre, where he pressed on with the siege of Asculum. In a decisive engagement he defeated an Italian army of 60,000 men, who were hastening to its relief and no doubt hoped ultimately to break through to Umbria and Etruria. After this success he forced Asculum to surrender before the end of the year,
¹²
and the revolt in the North began to peter out: Poppaedius Silo fled to Samnium, and Italia, the confederate capital, was abandoned. Meantime in the South Sulla had moved over to the offensive: he defeated a Samnite army which was trying to relieve Pompeii, recovered some of the Campanian cities, advanced into the hills of southern Samnium where he took Aeclanum and Compsa, forced Papius to seek cover in Aesernia, and finally captured Bovianum Vetus, the Italian headquarters. With good hopes might Sulla then return to Rome to stand for the consulship of 88. Italian resistance was now concentrated among the Samnites, Rome’s old enemies, with new headquarters at Aesernia, where Silo bravely tried to build up fresh forces. He even succeeded in recapturing Bovianum, and in desperation appealed for help to Mithridates, king of Pontus, but he was soon defeated (88), while other centres of resistance in Apulia and the South were crushed: a few, as Aesernia and Nola, held out a little longer, but the war was essentially over.

The war would not have ended so quickly in the field, if Rome had not given ground on the political front and conceded the issue on which the Italians were fighting: Roman citizenship. During 90 the consul Caesar carried a
lex Iulia
which granted Roman citizenship to Latin and Italian communities, possibly only to those that had not yet revolted, but more probably also to any who laid down their arms; it further allowed generals to grant citizenship to individuals for service in battle.
¹³
All communities that accepted this offer would then become self-governing
municipia
instead of independent sovereign states, and probably some general law was passed later (the
lex Calpurnia
?) which arranged details of the municipal re-organization.
¹⁴
This wise measure would clearly confirm the support of the loyal and check the spread of the revolt. Early in 89 two tribunes carried a
lex Plautia-Papiria
, a supplementary measure under which, according to the older interpretation, individual members of allied states could obtain Roman citizenship by appearing within two months before the praetor peregrinus in Rome, that is individuals whose states had not accepted the offer under the
lex Iulia
and presumably any individuals whose states were still at war. This should be rejected: the
lex Plautia-Papiria
did not introduce a new principle of dealing with individuals as opposed to communities, but was designed partly to make good some detailed omission in the
lex Iulia
.
¹⁵
Another supplementary
measure, the
lex Pompeia
carried by Strabo in 89, dealt with Cisalpine Gaul and granted Latin status to the Transpadanes.
¹⁶
Thus full Roman citizenship was potentially extended to all peoples south of the river Po. Those rebels who did not accept the offer in 90 or 89 became
dediticii
when they did finally submit, and were probably enfranchised during the struggle between Cinna and Octavius in 87.
¹⁷
But although Rome’s conduct may seem generous, even if dictated by expediency, the newly enfranchised citizens still had a grievance: they were not at first distributed fairly throughout the thirty-five tribes with the result that their voting power was restricted in relation to that of the older citizens.
¹⁸

The war was over, but at a terrible cost in human lives and suffering; its economic repercussions were serious
¹⁹
and the importance of the army cast its shadow over civil life. Nevertheless the political unification of Italy was an immense step forward: Romans and Italians could now grow into a nation, and men learn to reconcile their local loyalties with a wider national citizenship. A man could now remain a loyal son of the town in which he was born and lived and yet enjoy the benefits of membership of a large sovereign state. Without destroying the extraordinarily varied individual pattern of life in the different parts of Italy, Rome now made it possible for all to belong to a single society, membership of which was guaranteed by the
civitas Romana
. Within a few years all the city-states and tribal areas were organized as
municipia
with
quattuorviri
as magistrates: semi-Celtic settlements in the north, old and proud Etruscan cities, Umbrian tribesmen, Samnite highlanders, Oscan dalesman, the old cities of Latium, the Greek cities of the South, and the wilder Bruttian tribesmen, all now found in Rome their
communis patria
. As Cicero said (
de legibus
, 2. 2. 5): ‘omnibus municipalibus duas esse censeo patrias, unam naturae, alteram civitatis’.