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In September of 2000, bin Laden was reportedly so unhappy with the terrorist cell's lack of success that he wanted to replace Al-Khamri and
Thawar. Al-Nashiri, in response, ordered them to execute an attack on the next U.S. warship to enter the port of Aden—that would be
Cole
—and left Yemen to try to talk bin Laden out of making any changes.
⁹

By the time
Cole
arrived on October 12, the terrorist attack boat sported a fresh coat of white paint, with red and black speckled carpet laid in the interior that gave it a clean look. Over months of careful and methodical work, Al-Nashiri had precisely placed blocks of explosives into the hull. As each was placed inside, fiberglass sheets and coats of sealant held it securely in place. The explosives used were blocks of C-4 and Semtex, containing cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine, or RDX, interleaved with blocks of TNT, or trinitrotoluene. TNT is not readily moldable, and as the explosives were built into the boat and slowly filled, it was probably used to line those areas where there were minimal curves and bends along the hull. Batteries built into the boat as part of the bomb provided the charge for the electric blasting caps the attackers used, apparently at least two for each block of RDX-based explosive. It can never be known with certainty how much was used, but the terrorists apparently believed there was enough to sink a ship at the refueling pier.

The suicide bombers themselves—Al-Khamri and Al-Thawar—initiated the detonation, exactly according to the plan. Allah was surely going to bless them when they triggered the switch that morning, which explained why they were smiling and waving at the infidels they thought they were dispatching to hell. No one knows whether the trigger was built into the console or activated by a foot switch, but it did not matter. The ignition circuit closed and their destiny was sealed. A surge of current from the battery raced along the lines to the electric blasting caps. The caps' bridge wires heated white hot and burst into searing flame, igniting the RDX-based explosive that initiated the explosive conversion of the TNT surrounding it as numerous strands of detonation cord extended the blast. In about one ten-thousandth of a second, the chemical chain reaction was initiated and the massive shock wave, travelling at over 25,000 feet per second, began to do its work.

Ultimately, prisoner interrogations and other evidence showed that bin Laden had not only ordered the attack, but also paid for it himself.
None of this, none of this at all, was known. Not to me as commanding officer, nor to Admiral Moore as Commander, Fifth Fleet, nor to anyone in Washington when
Cole
pulled up to the refueling pier on October 12.

The admiral did not know that the Central Intelligence Agency had absolutely no assets in Aden to monitor and assess the terrorist threat there. In reality, without relying on local Yemeni authorities to provide NCIS with information, the United States was essentially blind in its ability to accurately evaluate threats in the port. As the FBI investigator Ali Soufan put it much later in his book,
Cole
was “a sitting duck.”
¹⁰
The blind leading the blind had led directly to the tragedy that disabled my ship.

In closing out his review of the actions of the leadership on
Cole
, Admiral Moore took a broader view of the events of October 12, 2000, and put them in context. He felt the combination of actions by USS
Cole
, fleet logistic and contingency requirements, the declining number of replenishment ships, intelligence assessments, Task Force oversight, U.S. policy and relations with the government of Yemen, Navy and Joint Force Protection Measures, and the training cycle prior to deployment had all contributed to putting USS
Cole
and its crew in a situation where a successful attack could be ruthlessly carried out by a well-trained and determined adversary.
¹¹

Admiral Moore concurred with each of the recommendations set forth in the investigative report. Just as damage control is integrated into every facet of a sailor's training, he said, force protection must now assume that same priority. But regardless of what measures were taken to improve force protection measures throughout the Navy, he observed, a ship and its crew must not bear the onus of finding out what the threat was in a theater of operations. That burden should be borne by the upper echelons of the chain of command, which should assume greater responsibility for the coordination and integration of intelligence reports to support commanding officers in making force protection decisions. He also called for closer coordination and a broader intergovernmental effort to provide ships with relevant information about ports. Admiral Moore said he and his staff did not believe an attack in Yemen was any more likely than it would be anywhere
else in the region. “The simple fact is that terrorists operate out of most Middle East countries,” he wrote.

The United States had been drawn into an undeclared war with al Qaeda, Admiral Moore observed. The attack on USS
Cole
was not a purely criminal deed; it was an asymmetric act of war. While our nation had dedicated billions of dollars towards developing a sophisticated intelligence network and a modern military that could detect, deter, and defend against conventional threats, these resources, tactics, and strategy must now be focused on the global terrorist threat. Clearly, there was insufficient emphasis on waterborne security by the Navy. Unlike land facilities where layered defenses were possible, no such protection existed for ships. His conclusion set the stage for the revolution in the Navy's approach to force protection that the attack on USS
Cole
made inevitable.

Immediately following Admiral Moore's endorsement on November 30, 2000, the entire command investigation package was forwarded to Admiral Robert J. Natter, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, in Norfolk, and Admiral Natter's legal team, headed by Captain Larry McCullough, JAGC, USN, started an independent internal review process.

The document was classified Secret, with the special caveat NOFORN attached, meaning not for release to foreign nationals because the information contained in it was so sensitive that it could not be shared with any of our allies. When it arrived at Atlantic Fleet headquarters on December 6, Admiral Natter was adamant that only a limited number of personnel could have access to it.

But the media were continuously pressing the Navy for updates on the status of the investigation. Once the crew returned home on November 3, the drumbeat picked up considerably. Given the public attention being devoted to the investigation, the hunt was on to find a scapegoat, someone who must have been responsible for ordering
Cole
into the port of Aden and leaving the ship open to attack. It was only a matter of time until someone in the Navy leaked the investigation still in progress. On December 9, the
Washington Post
published a front-page article citing the failure of
Cole
to fully execute its classified force protection plan. The article
also noted that while some of the crew had assumed the attacking boat was a garbage scow, they were unaware of any attempt to challenge it.

In response to the bad press, the head of the Navy's public affairs office, Rear Admiral Stephen Pietropaoli, warned against a “rush to judgment” against the crew or me, stressing that the inquiry was continuing. The damage, however, was done.
¹²
I took the leak as a violation of the trust I had assumed existed between the Navy's leadership and me.

The morning the article came out, I debated for a couple of hours before deciding to telephone a Naval Academy classmate of mine, Commander Frank Thorp, the public affairs officer of Admiral Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations. I felt betrayed and set up, and said precisely that. “Frank, the only way the
Post
could know about the status of what security measures I did or did not complete could be if someone familiar with the investigation purposely leaked it to the press,” I told him.

Frank was an exceptional officer. Calm and focused, he had been working the halls of the Pentagon for years. As the public affairs officer for the CNO, he was a candidate for eventual promotion as the Navy's Chief of Information. “Kirk,” he said, “you know as well as I do that these kinds of leaks happen. I don't know who did it but there is nothing we can do about it now.”

“Well, Frank, let me put it to you this way,” I told him. “That investigation is classified Secret–NOFORN. If the Navy is casually leaking classified information to the press in an effort to create the appearance that I'm going to take the fall for this, they better stand by. I have been completely loyal to the Navy to date and have yet to say anything to the press while the investigation is ongoing. You know as well as I do that the Navy's instruction for handling classified information calls for a signature by anyone that checks out or handles classified information at the Secret level or above. That means the Navy knows who has had access to the investigation and that means we have a limited group of people that could leak it to the press.”

Frank tried to calm me down. “Kirk, come on now. You know that this stuff happens. You saw it all the time when you were working for SECNAV (Secretary of the Navy). There's nothing we can do about it.”

I was stunned. If the Navy was going to try this case in the court of public opinion through leaks to the press blaming me, it would look self-serving and vindictive. Unwilling to let this slide, I continued, “I'll tell you what, why don't you let the CNO know that I am going to go to the press and let them know that since the Navy can't seem to control access to classified information, perhaps that same lackadaisical approach compromised the intelligence I had available to me and now seventeen sailors are dead as a result of the Navy's approach to safeguarding this type of material. That investigation is classified Secret and I will not tolerate any more leaks or I will call into question the ability of the Navy to protect its ships and sailors. Is that what you want?”

For a number of seconds, Frank was silent, thinking about what to say next. Finally, he took a deep breath and pleaded with me, “Kirk, please don't go to the press. Let me see what I can do, but don't do this. I'll take care of it, I promise.”

Frank and I were still good friends and had worked together on a number of projects over our time together at the Pentagon and with that, I too took a deep breath and in a very measured tone replied, “OK, you've got it. I won't go to the press, but these leaks have got to stop or I have no choice. I am not going to tolerate this investigation being tried in the press when the Navy expects me to keep my mouth shut. That investigation is classified Secret–NOFORN and it better be handled that way from this point on.”

Almost immediately, the leaks seemed to diminish considerably. Whether our conversation made the least bit of difference didn't matter; the media would have to wait until the investigation was done before drawing any more conclusions. Adding to the pressure of the investigation was a larger national issue; the country had become consumed with the outcome of the presidential election. Butterfly ballots and hanging chads became the talk of the day, and a suicide bombing in Yemen lost the interest of the press and public.

On January 4, 2001, Admiral Natter forwarded his second endorsement of the command investigation to the Chief of Naval Operations. He viewed it as his responsibility to “. . . assess whether Commanding Officer,
USS
COLE
(DDG 67) or any of his officers or crew should be held accountable for actions taken in regard to the terrorist attack of 12 October 2000.”
¹³
And his view was clear and unambiguous. “After careful consideration of the matter of personal accountability, I am firmly convinced, and conclude, that the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Command Duty Officer, Force Protection Officer, and other officers and crew of
COLE
, were not derelict in the execution of duty. Further, they did not act in violation of any regulation, order or custom of the Navy. Accordingly, no disciplinary or other adverse administrative personnel action is warranted.”
¹⁴

From the beginning of his endorsement, Admiral Natter concisely addressed the issue of the decision not to put a boat in the water on fifteen-minute standby for picket duty. He pointed out that the presence of a patrolling boat would not have caused the crew to suspect the approaching boat was anything other than the third garbage barge. Even if
Cole
were operating under the more robust THREATCON Charlie procedures and patrolling around the ship, he noted, the rules of engagement
Cole
was operating under did not allow for any meaningful engagement since the boat did not give any indication of hostile intent or commit a hostile act against the ship until it detonated. By his assessment, there would have been no justification in U.S. or international law for USS
Cole
to use force, deadly or non-lethal, against a vessel or individuals in a vessel making an apparently benign approach.
¹⁵

The endorsement then addressed the issues of crew knowledge and the planning process for the refueling in Aden. In both cases, Admiral Natter found more than ample evidence through the actions of the crew that they had been briefed on the heightened level of awareness required in a port operating under THREATCON Bravo, and he rejected the investigation report's assertion that they had not been. The crew had shown this to be the case by controlling access to the ship by unknown personnel from one of the garbage boats, and in the way the husbanding agent had not been left alone but escorted around the ship.

Regarding the actual execution of the force protection plan for Aden, Admiral Natter took specific issue with the investigating officer's opinions: