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His endorsement was also not without criticism of my performance, nevertheless. “I am not completely satisfied with the Commanding Officer's performance,” he wrote, adding that he was “troubled” that I had not pressed harder before we entered port in Aden for information about where the ship would be moored, whether we would be authorized to deploy small boats, and so on. But in addressing several key measures that we had not implemented, his endorsement specifically refuted the opinion that their omission had created a seam in the defensive posture of the ship that allowed the terrorist boat to approach.
¹⁷
Admiral Natter viewed the seventeen men and women of
Cole
who gave their lives in defense of their country as casualties in a continuing conflict between the forces of a free nation committed to protecting the liberty and lives of its people and ruthless bands of highly organized terrorists, bent on destruction and death.
¹⁸

His endorsement, the second, was forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Clark, who on January 9, 2001, completed his endorsement, the third. Admiral Clark concurred with the Atlantic Fleet commander's recommendation to take no punitive action against the commanding officer or any of the crew for the tragedy. “I concluded, along with the previous endorsers, that the tools and information at the
Commanding Officer's disposal on 12 October 2000, coupled with the lack of any indication of hostile intent before the attack, severely disadvantaged the Commanding Officer and crew of
COLE
in trying to prevent this tragedy. Likewise, I concur that the investigation clearly demonstrates that
COLE
was a well-trained, well-led, and highly capable ship.”
¹⁹

In his comments, Admiral Clark maintained that, based on the threat warnings, NCIS Threat Assessment, and other information and intelligence, the ship was focused almost exclusively on a shore-based threat. There was an absence of any specific indication of a waterborne threat. Moreover, an intelligence assessment contended that the known terrorist groups in Yemen had limited operational capability. Given this paucity of specific indications, the Chief of Naval Operations felt that the security measures employed by
Cole
were not unreasonable.
²⁰

The admiral also agreed with the assessment by both Naval Forces Central Command and Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, that implementation of all THREATCON Bravo force protection measures would not have thwarted or stopped the attack. Specifically, Admiral Clark stated, “I find nothing in the warnings that would have induced a commanding officer to deploy boats and establish a security perimeter around the ship, the only measure that, in my judgment, would have protected the ship from a suicide attacker. I conclude that THREATCON BRAVO measures were inadequate for the 12 October scenario.”
²¹

During the course of his review, Admiral Clark also determined that none of the previous ships entering Aden had requested additional security or intelligence information about the port and all had adjusted their force protection posture based on the conditions in the harbor when they pulled in to refuel. Yet while the inadequacy of THREATCON Bravo measures was central to his determination that disciplinary action was not warranted, like Admiral Natter, Admiral Clark was troubled by one shortfall in my performance as commanding officer—my failure to press the chain of command harder before pulling into port in Aden for answers to my questions about the mooring arrangements and other conditions we would find there. That, he said, had contributed to inadequate formulation of the force protection plan.
²²

In the end, the command investigation, limited to examining the actions taken by the ship's commanding officer and crew, did not address the conduct of others higher up in the chain of command for their degree of accountability and responsibility for what happened. Admiral Clark indicated that he would address this issue separately.

More broadly, Admiral Clark's endorsement addressed the issue of the Navy's force protection program. The measures then in force were written to be applicable in all situations, but gave insufficient guidance to commanding officers, for example, as regarding the requirement to keep unauthorized craft away from a ship. Without benefit of picket boats specifically trained in what to look for, or trained linguists to be able to interface with the local police and populace, what commanding officers should do was not clear. Admiral Clark was particularly concerned that the scope of the measures for each threat condition must also be reassessed to determine their adequacy in addressing waterborne and other threats.

Additionally, he concurred with Admiral Moore's recommendation that ships should be provided with more assistance in formulating force protection plans for particular ports. Ships should not be required to draw information and intelligence from the “system”; higher headquarters should ensure that information is provided to ships as they develop their plans. While the nature of naval operations might preclude a briefing as soon as a ship reported for duty in a particular theater of operations, some information had to be provided before they entered that area of operations.

The Chief of Naval Operations deemed the performance of
Cole
's crew in damage control effective. The CNO remarked on the investigation's findings of brilliant and determined leadership and demonstrated that when significant damage occurred to the ship, the
Cole
's crew immediately and aggressively fought for their ship and the lives of their shipmates, relying on their countless hours of training.

The crew's heroic actions, both individually and as a team, saved the lives of many shipmates and ultimately saved the ship. His pride in the actions of the individual sailors was apparent with his comment, “This tragedy demonstrated the courageous character and resourcefulness of our service members, many of whom risked their lives to save their shipmates and
their ship. Their heroic lifesaving and damage control efforts upheld the highest Navy traditions.”
²³

As he put it in a press conference when the command investigation report was released a few days later, “The investigation clearly shows the commanding officer of the
Cole
did not have the specific intelligence, the focused training, the appropriate equipment and on-scene security support to effectively prevent or deter such a determined, such a preplanned, assault on his ship. So in short, the system—and that's all of us—did not equip this skipper for success, and if you look at my statement, you will see those kinds of words. If you look at my endorsement and my assessment of the . . . and conclusions about the investigation, we did not support him in this kind of an environment, the kind he encountered, when they pulled into Aden on October the 12th.”
²⁴

As the chief of naval operations was preparing to deliver his endorsement to the secretary of the Navy, the Department of Defense released the USS
Cole
Commission Report prepared by General Crouch and Admiral Gehman. It went beyond the focus of the command investigation, to find ways to improve the U.S. policies and practices for deterring, disrupting, and mitigating terrorist attacks on U.S. forces in transit. The recommendations in their report were to create a form of operational risk management applied at both the national and operational levels to balance the benefits against the risks of overseas operations. Ultimately, the report focused on five functional areas—organization, anti-terrorism/force protection, intelligence, logistics, and training.
²⁵

As has been true in the aftermath of other tragedies of this nature, the report called for greater unity of effort among the offices and agencies in the Department of Defense to provide resources, policy, oversight, and direction and gain the initiative over a very adaptive, persistent, patient, and tenacious new kind of terrorist. This unity must also extend across other U.S. government agencies, the Defense Department report said, including developing security capabilities of host nations to help protect U.S. forces.
²⁶
Force protection considerations were broken down into national level policy and procedural and resource improvements to better support anti-terrorism and force protection for units in transit.

The recommendations called for a number of initiatives and changes, including designating a unit's Force Protection Officer as a full-time billet [the command investigation report had also recommended this]; augmenting individual units during transits through high-threat areas; fully funding service anti-terrorism and force protection programs to support threat and physical vulnerability assessments; assessing and funding anti-terrorism and force protection physical security requirements during the budget cycle; initiating a major unified effort to identify near-term anti-terrorism and force protection equipment and technology requirements, field existing solutions, and develop new technologies to address shortfalls; and giving geographic combatant commanders sole responsibility for assigning threat levels for a country in its area of responsibility.
²⁷

In the realm of intelligence, the report was blunt in its assessment that intelligence priorities and resources were only making progress at the margins in the shift from a Cold War mentality to the new and emerging threat of terrorism. Once again, it called for reprioritization of resources for collection and analysis, including from human and electronic sources, of intelligence against terrorists. Intelligence production should be refocused and tailored to keep watch over transiting units to mitigate the terrorist threat, it said, and it also endorsed an increase in counterintelligence resources dedicated to combating terrorism and development of clearer counterintelligence standards.
²⁸

As far as logistics were concerned, the report concluded that the number of refueling oilers operated by the Navy was sufficient to meet the requirements of national security. Although no resource requirements were identified in this area, the report did urge the secretary of defense to ensure that enhanced force protection needs were addressed in the logistics planning and contract award process. It also called for the Defense Logistics Agency to incorporate anti-terrorism and force protection concerns into the entire fabric of logistics support.
²⁹

In addressing the last area, training, the report called on the U.S. military to create an integrated system of training so that units had a level of anti-terrorism and force protection proficiency on par with their other primary mission areas, including primary combat skills, such as anti-air
and anti-submarine warfare tactics. It was incumbent on the Department of Defense to develop and resource credible standards of deterrence against terrorism: tactics, techniques and procedures, and packages of defensive equipment.
³⁰

With the release of the USS
Cole
Commission Report to the public, the secretary of defense had a number of specific recommendations for review and action. The command investigation report remained as a piece of unfinished business. With the endorsement of the chief of naval operations now complete, the investigation and all three endorsements were delivered to Richard Danzig, the secretary of the Navy. A brilliant lawyer and strategic thinker, Secretary Danzig meticulously embraced his role. Since I had briefly worked for him prior to taking command of
Cole
, he knew me, but I also knew that his views regarding the investigation, endorsements, and my accountability would not by swayed in the slightest when he rendered judgment on the investigation and accountability for the attack.

Unfortunately, politics was beginning to cast a shadow on the question of accountability.

Both the command investigation report and the USS
Cole
Commission Report were scheduled for simultaneous release on January 10, 2001. The Clinton administration wanted to finish both investigations before it left office. On one hand, the President understood the need for a thorough and complete investigation into the attack and its causes. On the other hand, there was immense political pressure not to leave an incident as controversial and public as the attack on
Cole
as an outstanding piece of unfinished business for fear that the Bush administration would use it politically against them. So the Clinton administration was pressing the Department of Defense to find a single individual or organization that could be pointed to as responsible for allowing the tragedy to occur. While the temptation to blame the commanding officer looked like the quickest and easiest way to close out the investigation, the senior political and military leadership of the Department of the Navy strongly resisted it, for the reasons given in the endorsements that had been made.

Secretary Danzig and Admiral Clark stood firm; no one individual would be singled out to take the fall for the attack. They understood the larger and more strategic nature of the conflict with terrorism that had been brought to the fore by this event and blame was not an option. Frustrated with this intransigence, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen ordered the release of the investigations decoupled. Only the USS
Cole
Commission Report would be released on January 10, 2001. The command investigation could wait and perhaps the Navy's leadership could find it in themselves to come up with the “correct answer” to a perceived thorny political problem. The Navy leadership's unwillingness to single out fault for the attack resulted in the sliding of the release date until late Friday afternoon, January 19, 2001, the day before the inauguration of President George W. Bush.

It was ugly, hardball Washington, D.C., politics. If the Navy was going to be stubborn and affix blame to the entire chain of command instead of one individual, then the service would be made to pay a price. The perception that the Navy was trying to sweep the entire incident under the rug was sure to go over badly with the American public and, more importantly, Congress.