Goebbels: A Biography (111 page)

115.
Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin 1932
, 259f.

116.
TB, 27 April 1932.

117.
TB, 29 April 1932.

118.
Pyta,
Hindenburg
, 691; Brüning,
Memoiren
, 575ff.

119.
TB, 7 May 1932.

120.
TB, 9 May 1932. See Reuth,
Goebbels
, 222.

121.
TB, 9 May 1932.

122.
LAB, A Rep 358-01/721, Generalstaatsanwalt, 6 June 1932 to Prussian Ministry of Justice; TB, 13 May 1932;
VZ
, 13 May 1932, “Polizei im Reichstagssaal”;
Verhandlungen Reichstag
, vol. 446, 2686ff.; Reuth,
Goebbels
, 224.

123.
TB, 13 May 1932. On Groener’s resignation, see Schulz,
Brüning
, 820f.

124.
TB, 14 May 1932.

125.
TB, 19 May 1932.

126.
TB, 25 May 1932.

127.
Pünder,
Reichskanzlei
, 126; Brüning,
Memoiren
, 593ff.;
Staatssekretär unter Ebert, Hindenburg, Hitler
, 224ff. See also Schulz,
Brüning
, 853.

128.
TB, 28 May 1932;
VZ
, 26 May 1932, “Blutige Saalschlacht im Landtag” (headline).

129.
TB, 28 May 1932.

130.
On this conversation, see Schulz,
Brüning
, 843ff;
Kabinett Brüning I und II
, no. 773, Niederschrift des Staatssekretärs Pünder über die letzte Ministerbesprechung des Reichskabinetts Brüning am 30. Mai 1932; Brüning,
Memoiren
, 597ff.; Pünder,
Politik
, 128f., Brüning’s report on the conversation immediately after the meeting with Hindenburg.

131.
On the background, see Fiederlein,
Der deutsche Osten und die Regierungen Brüning, Papen, Schleicher;
Schulz,
Brüning
, 800ff.

132.
TB, 31 May 1932.

133.
TB, 30 May 1932.

134.
TB, 31 May 1932.

135.
TB, 1 June 1932.

136.
On the von Papen government, see Hörster-Philipps,
Konservative Politik in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik;
Petzold,
Franz von Papen
.

137.
TB, 1 June 1932; on the continuation of this “dispute,” see 3 June 1932.

138.
TB, 5 June 1932.

139.
Schulz,
Brüning
, 879f.

140.
TB, 5 June 1932.

141.
TB, 7 June 1932.

142.
Der Angriff
, 6 June 1932, “Was müssen wir tun?” and 14 June 1932, “Papen, werde hart!” See also Reuth,
Goebbels
, 226.

143.
TB, 10 June 1932; on reform, see Kissenkoetter,
Straßer
, 68ff.;
VB
(Bavaria), 15 June 1931, Hitler’s instruction as well as Strasser’s (extensive) regulations for implementing it.

144.
TB, 15 June 1932.

145.
TB, 15 June 1932; Reuth,
Goebbels
, 226, on the reaction to the speech; Kissenkoetter,
Straßer
, 139f.

146.
Kissenkoetter,
Gregor Straßer
, 137ff.

147.
BAB, NS 22/2, letter from Goebbels/Dietrich to all Party offices, 4 June 1932; letter from Goebbels/Dietrich to all Gauleiters and Gau propaganda directors, 27 June 1932; further detailed instructions of 5 July 1932; BAB, NS 26/289, undated memorandum on the Reichstag election and various circulars from the Party’s Reich propaganda headquarters to the Gauleiters and Gau propaganda directors; see also Paul,
Aufstand
, 100ff.

148.
BAB, NS 26/289, circulars from the Party’s Reich propaganda headquarters to all Gau propaganda and press offices, 19 July 1932.

149.
BAB, NS 26/289, memorandum by the Reich propaganda headquarters on the Reichstag election of 1932.

150.
TB, 15 June 1932; the scenario described in the Kaiserhof version is much more detailed than in the original TB version. See also Reuth,
Goebbels
, 226f. Decree of the Reich President against Political Unrest of 14 June 1932,
RGBl
. 1932 I, 297; Goebbels learned about it on 16 June; TB, 17 June 1932.

151.
TB, 28 June 1932.

152.
TB, 9 July 1932.

153.
TB, 10 July 1932; Heiber (ed.),
Goebbels Reden
, no. 4;
VB
(Bavaria), “200,000 im Berliner Lustgarten.”

154.
TB, 11–16 July 1932.

155.
VB
(Bavaria), 13 July 1932, “Des Führers Freiheitsflug über Deutschland beginnt” (headline); see also 17/18–31 July 1932: continued reporting on the flight.

156.
Lerg,
Rundfunkpolitik in der Weimarer Republik
, 448. Text republished in Heiber (ed.),
Goebbels Reden
, no. 5.

157.
TB, 19 July 1932; text in Heiber (ed.),
Goebbels Reden
, no. 5.

158.
TB, 22 (quotation) and 24 June 1932; see also 10 June 1932.

159.
Decree of the Reich President concerning the Re-establishment of Public Security and Order in the Territory of the State of Prussia of 20 July 1932,
RGBl
. 1932 I, 377;
Akten der Reichskanzlei, Das Kabinett von Papen (1932)
, Karl-Heinz Minuth (ed.), nos. 57 and 59, Ministerbesprechungen vom 11. Juli und 12. Juli 1932, 16:30 Uhr.

160.
Schirmann,
Altonaer Blutsonntag 17. Juli 1932
.

161.
Schulz,
Brüning
, 920ff.

162.
TB, 20 July 1932 concerning the events of the previous day and on 20 July itself.

163.
TB, 21–23 July 1932.

164.
TB, 21–29 July 1932.

165.
Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin 1933
, 262ff.

166.
TB, 1 August 1932.

1.
TB, 3 August 1932; Reuth,
Goebbels
, 230.

2.
TB, 7 August 1932.

3.
TB, 9 August 1932.

4.
On Meissner’s report, see note 9.

5.
TB, 12 August 1932.

6.
TB, 11 August 1932: “S.A. concentrated around Berlin. Makes the honorable gentlemen very nervous. That’s the point.”

7.
TB, 12 August 1932. The
VB
(R) of 12 August denied the rumors: “Judenschwindel über eine Berliner S.A.-‘Aktion’ ” (headline). See also Reuth,
Goebbels
, 332.

8.
TB, 14 August 1932; Pyta,
Hindenburg
, 718f.; Pünder,
Politik
, 141.

9.
TB, 14 August 1932;
Kabinett von Papen
, p. 399, no. 101, Note by state secretary Meissner about a conversation between the Reich president and Adolf Hitler on 13 August 1932, at 16:15; see also Reuth,
Goebbels
, 232f.

10.
What was being referred to was above all the communiqué’s formulation that Hitler had demanded “the power of the state to its fullest extent,” which Hitler had not in fact done.
Kabinett von Papen
, doc. 101n5. No. 102, Adolf Hitler an den Reichswehrminister, Staatssekretär Meissner und Staatssekretär Planck, 13 August 1932 (The Nazi leadership’s account of the events).

11.
VB
(R), 17 August 1932.

12.
TB, 14 August 1932: “Kerrl is given the task of negotiating with the Center Party. That’s now the biggest threat we can make.” Morsey,
Der Untergang des politischen Katholizismus
, 59f.

13.
TB, 15–22 August 1932.

14.
Reich Presidential Decree Against Political Terror; Decree of the Reich Government Concerning the Creation of Special Courts; Reich Presidential Decree Concerning the Securing of Domestic Peace; all of 9 August 1932,
RGBl
. 1932 I, 403ff. On their passage, see
Kabinett von Papen
, no. 98, Ministerbesprechung vom 9. August 1932.

15.
On the wave of violence at the beginning of the month, see Longerich,
Geschichte der SA
, 156f.; see details in the daily reports of the
VZ
from 2 August 1932.

16.
RSA
, vol. 5, doc. 174, Hitler telegram to the five condemned SA men published in
Der Angriff
of 23 August 1932 and elsewhere.

17.
TB, 26 August 1932.

18.
TB, 26 August 1932. While the coalition with the Center Party was seriously considered as a second best solution, Goebbels, in revising the text for the Kaiserhof version, was to portray this solution as merely a feigned option (and thereby to emphasize that in this instance Strasser, who was no longer referred to by name, was advocating a maverick policy): “We set up contacts with the Center Party, if only as a means of putting pressure on the other side. It’s naturally not really an option. A certain section of the Party strongly supports the Center Party solution. The Führer is in favor of continuing with the old line. I fully support him in this.” On the meeting between Brüning and Strasser, see Brüning,
Memoiren
, 623; Morsey,
Untergang
, 61.

19.
TB, 27 and 28 August 1932.

20.
TB, 29 August 1932.

21.
TB, 30 August 1932. Thus, according to this, the meeting between Brüning and Hitler took place on 2 August. Brüning confirmed in his memoirs that during this conversation he had offered to mediate between the NSDAP and the Center Party’s
central committee (p. 623f.). Schulz,
Brüning
, 968; Morsey gives 28 August as the date of the conversation.
Untergang
, 61.

22.
TB, 31 August 1932. See also 30 August 1932: “Göring’s going to be president of the Reichstag. That too!”

23.
TB, 1 and 2 September 1932.

24.
TB, 8 and 9 September. On the negotiations between the NSDAP and the Center Party, see Morsey,
Untergang
, 61ff.; on the subsequent “covering up of their tracks” by the Center, see 65ff.; on the plan to get rid of Hindenburg, see Pyta,
Hindenburg
, 736.

25.
TB, 1–4 September 1932; see also 9 September 1932.

26.
TB, 2 and 3 September 1932.

27.
TB, 9 and 11 September 1932. In the published version of the diary (Kaiserhof) Goebbels omitted the demand for Hindenburg’s resignation and maintained that Hitler had gone into the meeting convinced that it would not be possible to “bring [the Center] around” (10 September).

28.
Brüning,
Memoiren
, 625f. According to Brüning he told the Center Party’s Reichstag group that he would resign from the Party if any of its members entered negotiations with the NSDAP to bring “a charge” against Hindenburg for a breach of the Constitution.

29.
Pyta,
Hindenburg
, 737. The law that was originally envisaged as implementing Article 51 in the end, under the changed circumstances of December 1932, was given the status of a law altering the Constitution.
RGBl
. 1932 I, 547.

30.
TB, 13 August 1932; on the session, see Reuth,
Goebbels
, 235f.; Verhandlungen Reichstag, 6. Wahlperiode, 13ff. In view of the NSDAP/KPD majority in the Reichstag the Center Party’s parliamentary group considered it foolish to continue sticking to this position. Morsey,
Die Protokolle der Reichstagsfraktion der deuschen Zentrumspartei
, no. 711, Vorstand, 2 September 1932. Bericht des Abg. Perlitius.

31.
Schulz,
Brüning
, 973 and 993f.

32.
TB, 14 September 1932.

33.
Reuth,
Goebbels
, 236; Paul,
Aufstand
, 104ff.; BAB, NS 26/263, Streng vertrauliche Informationen der RPL, 20, 25, and 27 October 1932.

34.
Der Angriff
, 24 and 25 September 1932; TB, 22, 24, 27, and 30 September 1932.

35.
Paul,
Aufstand
, 249f.

36.
TB, 8 September 1932.

37.
TB, 7 October 1932;
VB
(R), 27 October 1932, “Neuordnung der Reichspropagandaleitung”; BAB, NS 22/1 Anordnung no. 11, signed by Strasser and Goebbels, 4 October 1932; Paul,
Aufstand
, 74.

38.
TB, 4 November 1932. On the BVG strike, see Winkler,
Der Weg in die Katastrophe
, 765ff.; on Goebbels’s role, see Reuth,
Goebbels
, 238f.

39.
TB, 5 November 1932.

40.
Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin
, 1933, 264f.

41.
TB, 7 November 1932; on the breaking off of the strike, see 8 November 1932; Winkler,
Der Weg
, 771.

42.
The first entry on the strike is in TB, 3 November 1932; see in contrast the Kaiserhof version, 2–5 November 1932.

43.
TB, 19 November 1932.

44.
Kabinett von Papen
, no. 222, Note by Meissner concerning the Reich president’s meeting with Hitler, 19 November 1932; Pyta,
Hindenburg
, 753ff.; on the conversations between Hindenburg and Hitler in November, see Meissner,
Staatssekretär
, 247ff.

45.
TB, 22 November 1933; on this second meeting, Pyta,
Hindenburg
, 756f.,
Kabinett von Papen
, no. 224, Aufz. Meissner, 21 November 1932.

46.
TB, 21 November 1932.

47.
TB, 22 November 1932.

48.
TB, 21 November 1932.

49.
TB, 22 November 1932. There followed an exchange of letters between Hitler and the president’s office which did not, however, alter the positions. TB, 23 and 24 November 1932;
Kabinett von Papen
, no. 225, Meissner to Hitler, 22 November 1932; no. 226, Hitler’s reply, 23 November 1932.

50.
TB, 1 December 1932. In the Kaiserhof book Goebbels expanded his description of this scenario in which Strasser had been “pessimistic” to a degree that they “would not have thought possible” (1 December 1932). In the published version he does not mention the fact that Strasser had given way in the end.

51.
TB, 1 December 1932. In this entry Ott is wrongly referred to as Otte.

52.
TB, 2 December 1932. In the Kaiserhof version Goebbels added to the word “toleration” the half sentence “but there can no longer be any question of that.” In fact, at the beginning of December 1932 this was a feasible option from the point of view of the Nazi leadership.

53.
Kabinett von Papen
, no. 239 b, Tagebuchaufzeichnung des Reichsfinanzministers über den Verlauf der Ministerbesprechung vom 2. Dezember 1932, 9 Uhr; IfZ, ZS 279, Ott note of 1946, concerning the war game. On Schleicher’s soundings, see Bracher,
Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik
, 667ff.; Vogelsang,
Reichswehr, Staat und NSDAP
, 318ff.; Kissenkoetter,
Gregor Straßer und die NSDAP
, 162ff.; Plehwe,
Reichskanzler Kurt von Schleicher
, 234ff.; Strenge,
Kurt von Schleicher
, 182ff.

54.
The
Tägliche Rundschau
of 8 December estimated on the basis of the total number of votes that the Nazi party in Thuringia had lost 37.7 percent of the vote compared with the election of July 1932.

55.
Vogelsang,
Reichswehr
, 340f.; Schulz,
Brüning
, 1040f.; Strenge,
Schleicher
, 205; Winkler,
Weimar
, 561.

56.
On the notion of a “cross-front” and its continuing use in the literature, see above all Schildt,
Militärdiktatur mit Massenbasis?;
Schulz,
Brüning
, 1034ff. (with some reservations); Schulze,
Weimar
, 393ff.; Kolb,
Die Weimarer Republik
, 137, 205.

57.
In the
Kaiserhof
version Goebbels added a paragraph according to which the Nazi leadership had already been informed about Schleicher’s offer to Strasser on 5 December. “By chance we heard about the real reason for Strasser’s sabotage policy: He had a meeting with General Schleicher on the Sunday evening in the course of which the general offered him the position of vice chancellor. Strasser not only did not reject this offer but informed him of his intention, in the event of new elections, to put forward his own list of candidates.” Goebbels then added a devastating assessment: “That is the worst kind of betrayal of the Führer and the Party. I was not surprised. I never believed anything else of him. We are now simply waiting for the moment when he carries out his betrayal in public.”

58.
TB, 9 November 1932 on Hitler: “He’s furious about Strasser. I can believe it. Strasser’s always carrying out sabotage.”
Kaiserhof
, 8 November 1932: “When I’m alone with the Führer he talks about how angry he is with Strasser and his undermining and sabotage activities. Much of our failure can be attributed to the unfair behavior of his clique. I also believe that this failure [he meant the BVG] was not unwelcome to him because this means that at least it looks as though he’s been proved right and can blame us to the Party for our radical course.” 21 November 1932: “Strasser is sticking with it. So are Frick and Göring.”
Kaiserhof
, 20 November
1932: “All the sub-leaders are sticking with it, it’s only Strasser who as usual is doing his own thing.”

59.
In June 1934 Goebbels noted that his “exposing of Strasser” had been heavily criticized by some Gauleiters. Goebbels believed that naturally the “old Strasser clique” had been behind this criticism (TB, 3 and 7 June 1934.) A few weeks later Alfred Rosenberg noted criticism from Gauleiters; that the things Goebbels was writing about Strasser were like “someone who now felt he was safe triumphantly kicking a rival when he was down.”
Alfred Rosenberg
, Seraphim (ed.), 36.

60.
Although such ideas may have been contemplated by Schleicher’s entourage during the previous months, they did not play a decisive role in his policy at the end of 1932, which was influenced above all by his attempt somehow to survive the next few months through an arrangement with the NSDAP. See Turner, “The Myth of Chancellor von Schleicher’s Querfront Strategy.” Turner had already expressed previous doubts about Schleicher’s offers. Ibid.; Winkler,
Der Weg
, 116.

61.
TB, 8 December 1932.

62.
The social policy section of the emergency decree of 4 September (through which the system of wage agreements had been largely abolished) was suspended, an amnesty law was passed, motions for the introduction of winter aid for the unemployed and for the suspension of the whole of the emergency decree of 4 September 1932 were sent to the committees, all with the support of the NSDAP; Winkler,
Weimar
, 560.

63.
As early as 3 December the Schleicher cabinet was dealing with the question whether, as the chancellor formulated it, the “domestic emergency decrees” might be relaxed to a certain extent.
Akten der Reichskanzlei, Das Kabinett von Schleicher
1932/33, Golecki (ed.), doc. 1. These efforts led to the Reich president’s emergency decree for the Maintenance of Domestic peace of 19 December 1932, through which, among other things, the emergency decrees of 14 and 28 June, of 9 August, and of 2 November 1932 were suspended
(RGBl
. 1932 I, 548) and the Reich government’s decree concerning the suspension of the special courts of the same day
(RGBl
. 1932 I, 550).

64.
Kabinett von Schleicher
, no. 5, Ministerbesprechung vom 7 December 1932.

65.
At the beginning of 1927 he had already watched a dance presentation by Riefenstahl with great enthusiasm (TB, 13 January 1927: “A delightful and delicate creature.”). On 1 December 1929, after seeing the film
Piz Palü
he wrote about Riefenstahl, that she was “a marvelous child.” After seeing the Riefenstahl film “The Blue Light” he noted: “Sweet Riefenstahl” (TB, 1 April 1932).