Goebbels: A Biography (92 page)

On November 20 Hitler left his no longer secure headquarters in East Prussia and went to Berlin in order to undergo a further operation on his vocal chords.
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After a few days he had recovered from the operation and once again could speak normally; during the previous months he had been plagued by a “chronic hoarseness.”
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His health problems, which included a bout of jaundice at the end of September and the beginning of October,
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were a significant reason why Hitler had made no further attempts to speak in public. Goebbels was particularly
put out by this long silence because there were evidently rumors in circulation to the effect that the Führer was either seriously ill or even dead.
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On December 1 Hitler had recovered sufficiently from the operation to summon Goebbels to the Reich Chancellery. During their conversation, which began in the afternoon and after a break was resumed during the night, Hitler, whom Goebbels found to be in “excellent” shape, outlined his plans for a major offensive in the west. Hitler told Goebbels that he would be able to “destroy […] all the enemy forces,” mount a “massive” attack on London with V-2s, and thereby once again secure a change in the direction of the war.
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As was almost always the case during such meetings, at the end of this long conversation, according to Goebbels one of the “most interesting and most reassuring” that he had ever had with Hitler, they discussed cultural issues and reminisced about the “time of struggle” they had shared. Hitler inquired after the family and in particular Magda and the children. In fact she had visited Hitler the day before and had told him “about the family.”

In recent months Hitler’s concern for Magda’s well-being had gone far beyond simply taking a friendly interest in her welfare. During a visit to Führer headquarters in September 1943 Hitler had shown a “detailed” knowledge—Goebbels does not recount where he got it—of an illness from which Magda had long been suffering: severe pains in her face caused by the trigeminal nerve. At the time Hitler had told Goebbels that he did not want a planned “operation to take place because he is afraid that it would have bad effects on her face.” Goebbels had agreed to persuade Magda not to go ahead with it, and the operation was postponed.
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In May 1944 Magda had traveled to Berchtesgaden in order for her “annoying trigeminal neuralgia” to be examined by Hitler’s personal physician, Professor Theo Morell.
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After that Magda had joined Hitler for dinner and, as she reported to Goebbels, she had spent a nice evening with the Führer.
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The operation, which had become unavoidable and was carried out by a specialist in Breslau, was successful. Goebbels had used his visit to Magda in Breslau to sort out his relationship with Karl Hanke, now the Gauleiter and provincial governor, who during their marital troubles had acted as a shoulder for Magda to cry on.
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Two days after his meeting with Goebbels on December 1, Hitler
visited the Goebbels family at home for the first time in a long while, this time in Lanke: “He’s received like a member of the family, and the children assembled in their long dresses to greet him.” Hitler had not seen the children for almost four years. The proud father noted that Hitler had admired Helga and Hilde, who in the meantime had become “little ladies,” and was particularly interested in and approving of Hedda and Hilde, while he had also taken to Helmut, who had become a “fine boy”; “the Führer stays for tea with us for two hours and we pass the time chatting and reminiscing.” Among other things Hitler talked at length about the problems of “degenerate art […] in connection with some superior pictures we had hung in the rooms in his honor”; the Goebbelses had evidently gone to some lengths to prepare for the visit.

“Our family,” concluded Goebbels, “will never forget this afternoon.”
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It was to be the last private visit that Hitler made to the family, and the emotional intensity with which Goebbels described it indicates that there was something of a farewell atmosphere hanging over it.

While the American troops in the Aachen area initially failed to make much progress in advancing farther into German territory, they were more successful in the southern sector of the front. By the end of November 1944 the American forces, together with French units, had advanced to the Upper Rhine, and in the Saar they had even succeeded in capturing a strip of German territory.
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On the morning of December 16 the last great German offensive of the Second World War, on which Hitler had pinned such hopes in his conversation with Goebbels at the beginning of December, was launched. Three German armies made a surprise attack through the snow-covered Ardennes, which were only thinly manned by American troops, with the aim of rapidly advancing toward Antwerp, the most important Allied supply port. Initially the offensive seemed to be going well—the weather conditions prevented the Allies from deploying their air power. The spearheads advanced up to sixty miles
into Belgian territory. To begin with, Hitler and Goebbels imposed a total blackout on the German media.
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But even after it was lifted they were very cautious about providing details of the operation.
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After two days Goebbels noted that “our military action has put the English and Americans completely off their stroke.”
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The following day he received a phone call from Hitler reassuring him that “the effect of our attacks” had been “colossal.” Although the first news of the offensive quickly produced a “complete change of mood,”
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this only posed the old problem for Goebbels of a total overestimation of what had been achieved, for during the days after Christmas the Americans began a major counteroffensive,
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and during January the Allies gradually forced the German troops back to their starting lines.
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During the last quarter of 1944 the situation on the Eastern Front had been relatively stable. But from January 12, 1945, the Red Army launched its major offensive from the bridgeheads over the Vistula. That large numbers of troops had been moved to the west for the Ardennes offensive now had fatal consequences. After only a few days Goebbels was forced to admit: “The crisis in the east is becoming increasingly catastrophic.”
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In January in the northern sector of the front the Red Army succeeded in cutting off the troops in Pomerania and East Prussia. At the end of the month Soviet forces managed to establish bridgeheads over the River Oder near Küstrin; they were now only about forty miles from Berlin. Goebbels considered the situation so critical that he moved his family from Lanke to his official apartment in Berlin.
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In addition there was the problem of the air war, against which there was effectively no defense. The Allied squadrons were now rapidly destroying in turn those cities that had hitherto been unaffected or only partially damaged. After Nuremberg and Munich had been badly hit at the beginning of January
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Berlin was targeted on February 3 by an American daylight raid, causing over 2,500 deaths.
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In January Goebbels’s Gauleiter colleague, Karl Kaufmann of Hamburg, reported to him on the investigations in Saxony that he had carried out as part of his role in the Air War Inspectorate. Kaufmann, Goebbels noted, had “discovered that the situation was generally satisfactory,” and that only in Dresden were “things still in a bad way,” which Goebbels attributed to the conflict that existed between
Gauleiter Martin Mutschmann and Oberbürgermeister Hans Nieland. Goebbels did not think much of Nieland and thought that “if Dresden were hit by massive air raids he would be useless.” During the night of February 13–14 such raids did indeed take place; the city, which was full of refugees, was bombed by the RAF. As a result of a double raid the whole of the historic center of the city was transformed into a sea of flames, and around 35,000 people were killed, almost as many as in the destructive raid on Hamburg in 1943.
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Goebbels appears to have come to appreciate the sheer scope of this catastrophe only gradually. On March 7, after visiting the head of the SS and police in Dresden, Ludolf-Hermann von Alvensleben, he referred to a “tragedy […] such as has seldom occurred in the history of humanity and almost certainly won’t occur again during the course of this war.”

In December 1944 new perspectives opened up for Goebbels in his role as Reich Plenipotentiary for the mobilization for total war. Hitler signed a decree that had been long and impatiently awaited by Goebbels
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extending his responsibilities to cover the Wehrmacht. The decree ordered the inspection of all Wehrmacht organizations based in the homeland in order to free up soldiers for frontline duty. The inspection was to be carried out by Gau commissions of which half the members would be from the Party and half from the Wehrmacht. Goebbels was responsible for setting the guidelines for the inspection.
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At the end of 1944 Goebbels had set himself the target of securing two hundred thousand men per month from the military and civilian sectors. That was the number of reserves that the Wehrmacht calculated were necessary to replace the losses that were occurring.
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However, the Wehrmacht’s losses in terms of deaths amounted to 450.000 men in January alone and in the following months to nearly 300.000 each month, not to mention soldiers who were no longer deployable because of injury or because they had been taken prisoner.
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After a few weeks, therefore, Goebbels made his target more specific. He thought that during the next period he could secure between 800,000 and one million men from the Wehrmacht alone,
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and at the end of January he claimed that as a result of the measures he was taking in the military and civilian sectors he would be able to provide 300,000 men per month for frontline duty.
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In February he desperately tried to secure authority from Hitler to “comb through” the whole of the Wehrmacht (in other words not just the homeland bases) in order to fulfill the requirements of the military, which looking ahead to the beginning of August had reached 768,000 men.
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If Hitler refused to authorize him to do this, he was determined “to resign my position.”
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It appears, however, that he failed to receive this authorization but did not resign as Reich Plenipotentiary. It is very difficult to provide details of his further activities as Reich Plenipotentiary. There is only fragmentary documentation on the Wehrmacht’s “personnel budget” during the final months of the war (indeed it is conceivable that this form of planning was simply abandoned),
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and the series of announcements of his successes as Reich Plenipotentiary contained in his diaries cease in February. Although he was not relieved of this position, it appears that his attempts to achieve the complete “combing through” of the country in search of soldiers were pushed into the background by other ad hoc measures. He was naturally not prepared to admit that they had ended in complete failure.

During this last phase of the war Hitler was not prepared to permit the possibility of a military defeat’s being discussed among the people around him. Instead, as before, he was banking on the enemy coalition breaking up. He reckoned that this could happen if the Third Reich succeeded in achieving a military success or at least in bringing the enemy offensives to a standstill for a lengthy period. That would be the moment to agree to a separate peace either with the western Allies or with the Soviet Union and then to fall upon the remaining enemy and finish the war once and for all. However, so long as the Wehrmacht was in retreat on all fronts, in Hitler’s view it made no sense to start peace negotiations; on the contrary, in his opinion such initiatives would only be interpreted as signs of weakness.

Hitler’s position should not be confused with that of a fantasist.
His view was to a certain extent realistic. The possibility of a breakup of the enemy coalition, though very small, was not out of the question, and it remained the only chance of preventing the downfall of his regime. Hitler concentrated his thoughts on this one remaining possibility and (this is very characteristic of him) in the event of its failing to transpire had no alternative plan. At the beginning of February he told Goebbels: “The best thing to do is to burn one’s bridges, not only professionally but also personally. The person who no longer cares whether or not he lives is usually the one who wins in the end.”
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In any event the dream of a collapse of the enemy coalition recurs in almost all the conversations that Hitler had with Goebbels between January and April 1945 that the latter recorded in his diaries. And now even Goebbels’s hopes were focused on this final way out that Hitler was suggesting as a realistic option.
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Goebbels, whose September 1944 proposals for a separate peace had not been taken up, once again broached the topic in his conversation with Hitler on January 22, but was told that there were no signs that the western Allies were interested in dialogue.
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“Ribbentrop would very much like to put out feelers, at least to the British,” but Hitler had “for the time being vetoed it completely” because the current military situation offered no prospects for it. However, in principle Hitler was in favor of peace negotiations with the western powers when it was the right moment to do so. On January 25 he told Goebbels that the Soviet Union’s military successes were precisely the thing that could be used for establishing contact with the western powers. Stalin’s intention “of Bolshevizing Europe under all circumstances,” he told him, was “our big opportunity, for England and America couldn’t allow that to happen. But if they wanted to resist it then they would have to seek German assistance.”
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Two days later, on January 27, Goebbels had a long conversation with Göring,
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who was extremely concerned about the general situation but also completely confused about the intentions of the Führer, a result of his rapidly sinking prestige with Hitler, which had been going on for months. Goebbels noted: “If we don’t succeed in stopping the Soviets he doesn’t see much chance of our being able to continue fighting the war.” Göring was very doubtful that “we shall succeed in persuading the Führer to negotiate in time”; indeed, the Reich marshal had asked him “urgently” whether “I was convinced that the Führer really wanted a political solution,” to which Goebbels
responded that he was. Göring, he continued, “would be very willing to establish contact with the English via his friends in Sweden, but naturally he can’t do that without the Führer’s permission, and the Führer won’t give him permission.” Göring and Goebbels were at least agreed on one thing: It would be possible to pursue an “an active wartime foreign policy” only if Ribbentrop was dismissed.

Immediately after this conversation Goebbels again met with Hitler, who told him that “at the moment” he considered that “there was no possibility of a dialogue with the western powers.” Goebbels believed that Hitler was basically prepared “to become politically engaged,” but who was to advise him with regard to this? “Ribbentrop is too undiplomatic and at the moment Göring is not sufficiently in with the Führer to be able to approach him on such a delicate matter.” So he was the only one left. This task was undoubtedly “the most glorious […] one that has to be carried out during this decade.” He was ready to do it but “at the moment I don’t believe that the Führer will let me do it.”

On January 29 he met Speer, who informed him that with the loss of the Upper Silesian industrial area, Germany would probably be reduced to 30 percent of its armaments production. That would be “insufficient for her to win the war militarily,” so they must now focus on getting a political solution. This view provided the basis for the memorandum that Speer submitted to Hitler shortly afterward and which he gave to Goebbels to read.
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On January 28 Hitler once again reassured him that they would “slowly manage to reestablish strong lines of defense in the east.” Goebbels noted that it would “naturally be a fatal mistake if we clung to fantasies about our defensive capabilities.” He “sometimes [had] the impression that that is the case with the Führer.” Now he was having increasing doubts. Naturally “it [is] right that we must stop the enemy somewhere. But whether that’s possible with the limited means currently at our disposal will only become clear in the next few days.” Basically he agreed with Hitler that the enemy coalition would collapse, but at the moment there was little sign of its happening.
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Thus at the end of January Goebbels became preoccupied with the question of how to defend Berlin against a Soviet breakthrough.
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His defense of Berlin would, he wrote at the end of January, be a “masterpiece.”
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He organized the building of barricades and tank traps and
studied the Soviet preparations for the defense of Leningrad and Moscow.
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He planned the formation of four divisions for Berlin composed of Wehrmacht, police, and Volkssturm,
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but had to put up with the fact that the moment they had been established, at least in rudimentary form, they were dispatched to the Eastern Front. Hitler explained that he wanted the city defended “in the forward area.”
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Lacking strong forces, he contemplated the formation of women’s battalions and units made up of prisoners.
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Using word-of-mouth propaganda he encouraged the Berlin population to leave the city—with relatively little success, which he interpreted as “real trust in our defensive capabilities.”
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As ever he was not slow in publicizing his efforts in the media. On March 18, for example, reporting on the defensive preparations in the capital,
Das Reich
noted: “Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels is the soul of our defensive operations.”
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At the end of January and the beginning of February Goebbels undertook repeated attempts to persuade Hitler to embark on a foreign policy initiative, preferably toward the west. But Hitler responded negatively: They must “go on waiting until a favorable opportunity” occurred. “I’m only afraid that in the end going on waiting will rob us of our most valuable and perhaps last opportunity,” Goebbels commented critically.
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On February 11 Hitler told Goebbels that he was convinced that Churchill “would like to jump ship if he had the opportunity,” but for domestic and foreign policy reasons he was probably unable to do so. Goebbels then urged Hitler “at least to provide the English with a board from which to spring, but the Führer doesn’t think the time is yet right.” Hitler continued to insist that “during the course of this year the enemy coalition will break up. We must hold on, defend ourselves, and stand our ground waiting for this moment.” Goebbels thought that Hitler was now pinning his hopes more on Great Britain rather than, as had still been the case shortly before, the United States. “But I keep telling the Führer in response to all his arguments that we must take advantage of our political opportunities, which I don’t think is really happening, particularly given the current phase of the war.”
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On February 12, following the Yalta Conference, Hitler once again discussed with Goebbels the prospects for a separate peace. Now it was mainly up to Stalin whether he wanted to cause a breach in the
coalition, but in view of his military successes this was highly unlikely. Goebbels believed that Hitler was now “much more receptive to such political considerations.” He felt bound to admit that Hitler was right in thinking that “a political solution” was possible only if they had had some military successes. On the other hand, he reached the logical conclusion: “If we no longer have a military presence at all, then we can no longer exploit a change in the war situation.” But however clear-sighted his conclusion and however much he doubted Hitler’s willingness to end the war and despite all his criticism, Goebbels was not in a position to oppose Hitler’s policy, which amounted to a total catastrophe for the German Reich.

Nevertheless, Goebbels seized the initiative. The following day he discussed matters with the head of the Reich Security Main Office, Ernst Kaltenbrunner. They aimed to use a planned trip to Switzerland by the former Polish ambassador to the United States, Count Jerzy Józef Potocki, who was living in Vienna, to point out to the western powers that Germany was the only power that could prevent the Bolshevization of Europe.
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In fact, of course the whole idea was a nonstarter, and there is no further mention of it in Goebbels’s diaries.