Good Hunting: An American Spymaster's Story (40 page)

I worried about the CIA for years after I retired. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the harsh criticism that came from the intelligence failure in Iraq and the waterboarding of al-Qaeda terrorists, I found myself despairing. Would the Agency’s critics succeed in dismantling the nation’s Central Intelligence Agency and fritter away its exquisite capabilities, its unique contribution to statecraft? The new intelligence czar, the director of national intelligence, had usurped both the president’s daily brief and what had been the DCI’s coordinating role among intelligence agencies. I had come to realize, and publicly stated several years ago, that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence was, for the most part, a redundant bureaucratic overlay. Over time the office has diminished in importance and influence. Because the CIA retained the 1947 charter that authorized “special activities” (covert action), in the end it wasn’t much of a contest. With the nation fighting dual wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of a global struggle against terrorism, the White House needed the Agency more than ever.

On October 25, 2013, I was honored to receive the Hugh Montgomery Award from the OSS Society at a black-tie gala for eight hundred at the Ritz-Carlton in Washington. It is rare for a former CIA operative to receive any award in a public forum. The main event of the evening was the presentation of the Donovan Award to Admiral William McRaven, head of the Joint Special Operations Command, who directed the raid on the compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in which Osama bin Laden was killed. The award is named for General William J. Donovan, founder of the OSS, forerunner to the CIA, during World War II. In his acceptance remarks, McRaven gave a forceful presentation in support of Special Operation Forces. “Not since World War II has there been such a lethal combination of intelligence officers and special operations warriors,” he said. “Not since the fight against Hitler have we had such a talented group of government civilians, intellectuals, businessmen, writers, philosophers, engineers, tinkers, tailors, soldiers, and spies.” He delighted his audience by saying, “I’m here tonight to tell you that the OSS is back!”

The night before we had chatted at a smaller dinner about the same thing. McRaven noted that the Joint Special Operations Command had grown significantly and he underscored the military’s close working relationship with the intelligence community. When he visited CIA headquarters for the first time, he told me, he was struck by just how many senior officers had worked closely with him in the past. This was a good indication of how much things have changed since 9/11.

In my brief acceptance comments, I noted my good fortune in having met former OSS heroine Virginia Hall when I first joined the Agency. I mentioned Hall earlier for her exploits behind the lines in World War II when she helped organize the French Resistance, eventually becoming the most wanted spy in France. I told the audience that I marveled then and now at her courage, grit, and patriotism. I went on to note with more than a little pleasure that when you walk into CIA headquarters nowadays and look to the right side of the atrium, you will find a portrait of the first Stinger shootdown of a Soviet helicopter in Afghanistan juxtaposed next to a painting of Virginia Hall pumping out clandestine messages from a safehouse somewhere in central France.

In my remarks, I said that “covert action will prove to be the most important tool in our national security arsenal in the complex and unstable world that confronts us today.” Finally, I bid farewell to old and new friends with the phrase they knew well:
good hunting
. Since that night, I have reflected often about Admiral McRaven’s view that “the OSS is back” and his assertion that Special Operations Forces represent the future. That judgment is far from certain.

First, the OSS was created during World War II as an extension of the U.S. military forces opposing the Axis nation-states of Germany, Japan, and Italy. That’s not the national security world we live in today. After we exit Afghanistan in late 2014, it is most unlikely that we will be involved in another land war in the foreseeable future. Instead, we will continue to face stateless terrorist groups often in insurgency environments where we may or may not be welcome by the local governments. Ideally, we will be able to work with friendly host governments in providing equipment, training, and intelligence to eradicate the insurgents.

Second, despite DOD planning to the contrary, the sixty-six thousand U.S. Special Operations Forces will need to be reduced substantially, since most future paramilitary engagement will be reminiscent of the smaller Cold War covert actions programs. These programs were operated by the CIA with a small agency staff overseeing surrogate forces under its Title 50 authority. In the past, the U.S. military supported these efforts by “seconding” military personnel to the CIA, where they operated under a clandestine civilian umbrella. This practice of “detailing” soldiers to the Agency should be reinstated, especially since our Special Operations Forces have developed such impressive war-fighting skills as a result of their lengthy engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is the covert action world we will live in. Before the decade is out, especially as the U.S. military gradually returns to its more traditional strategy of preparing for potential conflict against hostile nation-states, the CIA should assert its traditional authority and take the lead in conducting political, economic, psychological, and, at times, armed covert action.

Three days later, I found myself on a mixed panel of actors and intelligence practitioners discussing the reality of the popular television show
Homeland
. The panel included Nazanin Boniadi, who costars as the Muslim CIA analyst Fara Sherazi; Navid Negahban, who played the terrorist mastermind Abu Nazir; and John Miller, a former senior official with the FBI and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who now serves as the NYPD deputy commissioner for intelligence. After a preliminary session with the actors, we were on Showtime’s temporary set at the downtown Sheraton Hotel responding to questions from a live audience. Three interested me most: How authentic is the show? How good an actor do you need to be as a CIA officer? And can someone like Carrie Mathison (played by Claire Danes) with bipolar disorder work for the CIA as a top operative?

The high-end technology portrayed in the movies typically exists, but what that technology is capable of accomplishing is often exaggerated, sometimes wildly. But it is surprising to have watched over the years how these over-the-horizon technical capabilities have become part of our real inventory. Edward Snowden’s leaks in 2013 exposing the National Security Agency’s ability to vacuum up millions, even billions, of e-mails and cell phone calls is a reminder of just how robust American information collection has become. Early in my career, I had disdain for what I thought was Hollywood’s trivialization of a deadly serious business. But, with the advantage of time and understanding, I began to appreciate that almost all Hollywood characterization adds to the mystique of the CIA operative and becomes a significant recruiting draw to bring top-level young men and women to the Agency. This seeming omnipotence also makes it much easier to deal with foreign counterparts and agents, as well as potential agents.

The question about the similarities between professional actors and CIA operatives is intriguing. I never considered myself an actor, but as I began to dissect the question I became more and more engrossed in just how much acting skill is required to be a spy or spymaster. The most obvious parallel is that when you are working literally in a false identity and alias background in a foreign setting, you have to become someone else. Also, on the psychological level you must conceal your true feelings when trying to recruit unsavory characters and sometimes upright targets. You are constantly manipulating the environment and the target as if onstage. This is also true in working with counterparts in foreign governments who do not share our values or commitment to civil rights and personal liberties. An operative often must adopt a more cordial and understanding persona than reality would normally warrant. This question even produced a vivid flashback of me telling the Haitian chief of police to get out of his town. On that occasion, I had to conjure up a very stern, no-nonsense personality who oozed sinister traits. I must confess that I enjoyed the role. When you return home you need to cast away the mask and return to your true identity and personality. Acting is very much a part of being an effective operative.

As to whether someone with bipolar disorder could work as a case officer, it is worth remembering that in 2008 bipolar disorder was officially declared to be a disability that would not bar employment in the U.S. government. There are “excepted service” positions in certain high-risk jobs (the Navy SEALs, for example) for which mentally or physically handicapped personnel may not qualify. However, this condition and the associated medicines would have to be declared at the time of employment—something Claire Danes’s character, Carrie, does not do in
Homeland
. Nonetheless, I would point out that when I first joined the CIA in the late 1960s, bipolar disorders were not classified as such, and as I think back on the colleagues I worked with through the years, I don’t doubt that there were officers at all levels in the Agency who had this disability, and functioned at the top of their game. So while Carrie the rogue operative is out of focus, the concept of bipolar personnel serving in key positions is certainly well within the range of the possible, as it should be. The U.S. intelligence service needs to be a reflection of its people, which includes gender, minority, and disability diversity.

Much has changed in the world since I reported for duty at the CIA years ago. But much has stayed the same. The Agency can still speak truth to power. It can still steal enemies’ secrets. It can still run covert operations that Ian Fleming would envy. We have proved we are fallible, to be sure. But we’ve also proved we are an indispensable force. Riding down from the seventh floor in the DO’s elevator after my last meeting with the DCI, its trim still colored with tiny red squares, I felt a surge of pride, confident that the CIA would, to paraphrase William Faulkner, not just endure, but prevail.

FOURTEEN

Good Hunting

New York, 2014–

The role of the CIA and its covert programs in the post-Iraq and -Afghanistan world will be critically important to our national security, and there is no shortage of other seriously troubled countries around the world that will require our attention for years to come. Given the supposition that the United States will not put large numbers of troops on the ground again anytime soon, and that the defense budget will be cut significantly, it is axiomatic that we will need to find a smart way to protect our interests abroad if we wish to stay involved globally and exercise our power for America’s benefit and defense. Thus, one of the key strategies by necessity in the future will be an enhanced use of covert power. As we proceed down this path, we must be mindful that these activities are carried out in a responsible and effective manner. I view successful covert action as having six common characteristics. These are principles that decision makers need to keep in mind as they consider whether to commit the United States to a particular covert action.

1. Identify a legitimate enemy.
To be successful, covert action must be in the U.S. national interest. This means that it is directed against a legitimate enemy of the United States or an “intrinsically evil” force that should be driven from power or influence. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish the target of the covert operation from the venue in which it takes place. There is no reason the CIA shouldn’t conduct covert action in nonenemy territory if it is in the service of action against a legitimate enemy. This will continue to occur across the world, in peacetime and in war. Policy makers tend to forget that almost all covert action eventually comes to light. Thus, there will be hell to pay if a program does not align with our values and interests. This is also a reason to be cognizant of the trade-offs between short-term gain and long-term consequences. If something is expedient in the short term but looks like it may turn out to run counter to our interests over time, policy makers should be very wary of making that trade-off, and not only because they may be held accountable later for damage to national security or our global reputation.

2. Determine on-the-ground conditions.
We should never undertake any covert action that does not have a reasonable likelihood of success. Thus, our goals must be consistent with reality on the ground. We cannot expect to achieve our objectives in any country where the environment is not suitable for intervention. We must be diligent in avoiding the myth that “all it takes is a spark” to overcome a nasty foreign policy problem. This myth, which essentially states that covert action can instigate change by simply setting the wheels in motion and allowing the United States to step back as history unfolds, has been the source of many blunders in U.S. foreign policy, and still looms large in our government’s decision making today. I have provided many examples of such strategies falling flat, beginning with the Nixon administration’s premature attempts overthrow President Allende of Chile in 1970. Without the support of the Chilean military and population, no amount of U.S. covert activity or influence would have convinced Chileans that Allende was not the man for them then. We had to wait for the circumstances to bring the Chileans around, helping out where we could to preserve the opposition. This is exactly what our role should be where the time is not right: we can provide support to a movement, but we can’t spark one that isn’t there.

3. Ensure adequate funding and staff.
Successful covert action requires robust funding and personnel levels that match policy goals. Otherwise, we are not only putting our people at risk and wasting valuable resources but also dabbling in potentially counterproductive activities that could have serious unintended consequences. This shortcoming has been a key reason for many failed covert programs in the past, including the initial attempts to overthrow Saddam Hussein in the 1990s with a vastly inadequate budget. Not only did this program consume significant time and effort and result in lives lost, but it also ultimately empowered a group of exiles who were neither trustworthy nor representative of the on-the-ground reality in Iraq, and who in later years reportedly helped bolster the misinformation campaign that supported the U.S. invasion in 2003.