Grunts (80 page)

4
2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, Organizational History, 1966, RG 472, Box 205, Folder 1; 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, AAR, January 25 through February 16, 1966, RG 472, Records of the 3rd Military History Detachment, Box 1, Folder 1; 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing, all at National Archives; Charles Kinney,
Borrowed Time: A Medic’s View of the Vietnam War
(Victoria, Canada: Trafford, 2003), pp. 19-21; Kenneth Mertel,
Year of the Horse—Vietnam, 1st Air Cavalry in the Highlands
(New York: Bantam Books, 1990), pp. 241-42; Larry Gwin,
Baptism: A Vietnam Memoir
(New York: Ivy Books, 1999), pp. 185-89; Carland,
Stemming the Tide
, pp. 203-04; Maitland and McInerney,
Contagion of War
, p. 35; Tammy Bryant, message board post at
www.virtualwall.org
. Interestingly enough, although all the records speak of January 25 as an overcast, drizzly morning, General Moore told me that he remembers it as a sunny day.

5
3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing, National Archives; 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Operation Masher/White Wing, copy in author’s possession; 1st Cavalry Division, Artillery, AAR, Donovan Library, Fort Benning, Columbus, Georgia; Kinney,
Borrowed Time
, p. 23; Moore interview; Moore and Galloway,
We Were Soldiers Once
, pp. 403-04.

6
3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing; 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, Organizational History, AAR, all at National Archives; 1st Cavalry Division, AAR; Fesmire, oral history, USAMHI; Al Hemingway, “ ‘Graveyard’ at LZ 4,”
VFW Magazine
, January 2004; Prados, “Operation Masher”; Moore interview; Robert Mason,
Chickenhawk: A Shattering Personal Account of the Helicopter War in Vietnam
(New York: Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 266-68; Kinney,
Borrowed Time
, pp. 23-30, 42; Carland,
Stemming the Tide
, pp. 203-08; Maitland and McInerney,
Contagion of War
, pp. 36-40.

7
2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry, Organizational History, RG 472, Box 339, Folder 1; 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, Organizational History, RG 472, Box 194, Folder 2; 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, AAR, February 22, 1966; 1st Cavalry Division After Action Critique, March 9, 1966, both in Records of the 3rd Military History Detachment, Box 1, Folder 1; 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, Organizational History and AAR; 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing, all at National Archives; Fesmire, oral history, USAMHI; 1st Cavalry Division, AAR; 1st Cavalry Division Artillery, AAR, Donovan Library; Prados, “Operation Masher”; Moore interview; John Laurence,
The Cat from Hue: A Vietnam War Story
(New York: Public Affairs, 2002), p. 315; Kinney,
Borrowed Time
, pp. 29-33; Carland,
Stemming the Tide
, pp. 207-08; Maitland and McInerney,
Contagion of War
, pp. 42-46. Bruce Crandall eventually earned the Medal of Honor for his courageous actions in the Ia Drang battle. His exploits at Luong Tho are not as well known, but they earned him a well-deserved Distinguished Flying Cross.

8
1st Cavalry Division, AAR; Kinnard, oral history, USAMHI; Carland,
Stemming the Tide
, p. 203; Maitland and McInerney,
Contagion of War
, p. 46; Westmoreland,
A Soldier Reports
, p. 164; Prados, “Operation Masher.” In discussing the name change many years later, Kinnard had an interesting Freudian slip. He mistakenly said that he renamed the operation “White Feather,” which is a common term for surrender. Perhaps, in his mind, the presidential order to change the name equated to a surrender of sorts.

9
2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry, Organizational History; 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing; 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/ White Wing, RG 472, MAC-V J3 Evaluation and Analysis Division, Box 3, Folder 2, all at National Archives; 1st Cavalry Division, AAR; 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, Organizational History, 1966, Donovan Library; Moore interview; Swanson Hudson, “Deadly Fight in the Eagle’s Claw,”
Eyewitness to War
, 2002, p. 85; Edward Hymoff,
The First Air Cavalry Division in Vietnam
(New York: MW Lads Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 66-68; Mason,
Chickenhawk
, p. 292; Carland,
Stemming the Tide
, pp. 208-09; Maitland and McInerney,
Contagion of War
, pp. 40-41, 46; Hiner’s account is at
www.projectdelta.net
. Oddly enough, the Special Forces after action report is missing from the National Archives.

10
2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, Organizational History and AAR; 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing, all at National Archives; 1st Cavalry Division, AAR; Fesmire, oral history, USAMHI; Moore interview; Captain Myron Diduryk, “Operations of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), in a search-and-destroy mission on 15 February 1966 during Operation White Wing (Eagle’s Claw) in Binh Dinh Province, Republic of Vietnam (Personal Experience of a Company Commander),” Career Officer Class No. 1, February 7, 1967, Donovan Library; Captain Myron Diduryk and Captain Anthony Hartle, “Momentum in the Attack,”
Army
, May 1967, pp. 35-38; Carland,
Stemming the Tide
, pp. 208-10; Maitland and McInerney,
Contagion of War
, pp. 46-47; Mason,
Chickenhawk
, pp. 299-300. Captain Diduryk was killed in 1970, during a subsequent tour of duty in Vietnam.

11
2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing, National Archives; 1st Cavalry Division, AAR; Captain Robert McMahon, “Operations of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), in the Attack upon a Main Force Viet Cong Heavy Weapons Battalion in the Vicinity of Bong Son,South Vietnam, 16-17 February 1966 (Personal Experience of a Company Commander)”; Captain Hubert Fincher, “Operations of Company A, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), in the Relief of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), in Vicinity of Bong-Son, South Vietnam, 16-17 February 1966,” both at Donovan Library; Jack Danner, oral history, Jack Danner Collection, #6052, Veterans History Project (VHP), American Folklife Center (AFC), Library of Congress (LOC), Washington, D.C.; Carland,
Stemming the Tide
, pp. 211-12; Hymoff,
First Air Cavalry Division in Vietnam
, pp. 69-70. Danner was executive officer of A Company.

12
1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing, RG 472, MAC-V J3 Evaluation and Analysis Division, Box 1, Folder 1; 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, Unit Journal, February 20 through 23, 1966, RG 472, Box 139, Folder 8; Company A, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, AAR, February 25 through March 6, 1966, and February 18 through 25, 1966, both in RG 472, Box 258, Folder 2, all at National Archives; 1st Cavalry Division, AAR; “Honor and Courage: A Combat Chronicle by the Paratroopers of Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry,” at
www.honorandcourage.net
; 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, Organizational History, Donovan Library; Hudson, “Deadly Fight in the Eagle’s Claw,” pp. 85-88; Jim Grayson, e-mail to author, circa 2007; Carland,
Stemming the Tide
, pp. 212-14. Regrettably, the official history of the People’s Army in Vietnam (called NVA by the Americans), titled
Victory in Vietnam
, is next to worthless on Masher/White Wing. It contains only a few vague, propaganda-laced paragraphs.

13
1st Cavalry Division Artillery, After Action Comments, March 3, 1966, RG 472, MAC-V J3 Evaluation and Analysis Division, Box 1, Folder 1; 1st Cavalry Division, After Action Critique, both at National Archives; 1st Cavalry Division Artillery, AAR, Donovan Library; 1st Cavalry Division, AAR; Robert Crosson, oral history, Vietnam Veterans Interviews, Box 1, Folder 9, USAMHI; Moore interview; Robert Graham, “Vietnam: An Infantryman’s View of Our Failure,”
Military Affairs
, July 1984, p. 135; Carland,
Stemming the Tide
, pp. 214-15; Laurence,
Cat from Hue
, pp. 342-52; Maitland and McInerney,
Contagion of War
, p. 48; Moore and Galloway,
We Were Soldiers Once
, p. 404. With regard to the number of fire missions and shells fired, there is a slight discrepancy between the division artillery after action report and the division after action report. I believe that the artillery report is the better source for this information, so I drew my numbers from it. ARVN forces and the Korean Marines claimed to have killed another 808 enemy soldiers.

Chapter 6

1
Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, “A Strategic Appraisal, Vietnam”; Krulak to General Wallace Greene, Commandant of the Marine Corps, no date, both in Box 1, Folder 6, Victor Krulak Papers; Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, Marine Corps oral history interview, June 1970, Box 3, Folder 22, Victory H. Krulak Papers; General William Westmoreland, oral history interview with Marine Corps Historical Center, April 4, 1983, all at U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division (USMCHMD), Gray Research Center (GRC), Quantico, VA; Victor Krulak,
First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999), pp. 195-200.

2
Westmoreland, oral history, GRC; Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Damm, “The Combined Action Program: A Tool for the Future,”
Marine Corps Gazette
, October 1998, p. 50; Captain Keith Kopets, “The Combined Action Program: Vietnam,”
Small Wars Journal
, no date, pp. 1-3; Jim Donovan, “Combined Action Program: Marines’ Alternative to Search and Destroy,”
Vietnam
, August 2004, pp. 26-29 (Jim also sent me a rough draft copy of his article); Peter Brush, “Civic Action: The Marine Corps Experience in Vietnam, Part I,” located at The Sixties Project Web site; Victor Krulak, obituary,
Wall Street Journal
, January 3-4, 2009, p. A5; Victor Krulak,
First to Fight
, pp. 195-200; William Westmoreland,
A Soldier Reports
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1976), pp. 144-46; 164-66; William Corson,
The Betrayal
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), p. 177; Gerald DeGroot,
A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War
(Essex, England: Longman, 2000), p. 156; Michael Peterson,
The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ Other War in Vietnam
(New York: Praeger, 1989), p. 19. The conflict between Westy and the Marine commanders is sometimes portrayed as an interservice rift between the Army and Marines with the Army supposedly being exclusively wedded to conventional, big-unit war, with no interest in pacification. This is demonstrably untrue. From the earliest American intervention in Vietnam to the end of the war, the Army was heavily involved in pacification, primarily through Special Forces units, embedded advisors, mobile advisory teams, and civic action teams. In some instances, Army infantry battalions even carried out combined unit operations with the South Vietnamese Army. For more on the experiences of one unit in such operations, see John C. McManus,
The 7th Infantry Regiment: Combat in an Age of Terror
(New York: Forge, 2008), pp. 115-16. The difference between the Marines and the Army is that the Corps placed a higher priority on pacification and earmarked more of its regular infantrymen for that purpose.

3
“The Marine Combined Action Program, Vietnam,” Record Group (RG) 127, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Records of Units, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC), Box 146, Folder 6, National Archives, College Park, MD; Robert Klyman, “The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken,” honors thesis, Department of History, University of Michigan, 1986, copy in author’s possession; Sergeant Frank Beardsley, “Combined Action,”
Leatherneck
, April 1966, pp. 20-24; Kopets, “Combined Action Program,” p. 4; Lewis Walt,
Strange War, Strange Strategy: A General’s Report on Vietnam
(New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1970), pp. 105-07; Al Hemingway,
Our War Was Different: Marine Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), pp. 22-25; Jack Shulimson and Major Charles M. Johnson,
U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1978), pp. 133-38; Graham Cosmas and Lieutenant Colonel Terrence Murray,
U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1970-1971
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1986), p. 139; Peterson,
The Combined Action Platoons
, pp. 23-27. The combined action units were known, during their various stages of growth, by several names, including CAC (combined action company), JAC (joint action companies), CAG (combined action groups), and CUPP (Combined Unit Pacification Program). For the sake of clarity, I have chosen to refer to them as combined action platoons (CAPs). The complicated administrative history of the program is beyond the purview of this chapter. For more on that aspect of the CAPs, see all the sources listed above.

4
“Marine Combined Action Program, Vietnam,” National Archives; Lieutenant Colonel William Corson, “Marine Combined Action Program in Vietnam,” Reference Branch Files, USMCHMD; Staff Sergeant Calvin Brown, oral histories, #707 and 1603, USMCHMD; Klyman, “An Alternative Not Taken”; David Sherman, “One Man’s CAP,”
Marine Corps Gazette
, February 1989, p. 58; Edward Palm, “Tiger Papa Three: A Memoir of the Combined Action Program, Part I,”
Marine Corps Gazette
, January 1988, p. 37; John Akins,
Nam Au Go Go: Falling for the Vietnamese Goddess of War
(Port Jefferson, NY: The Vineyard Press, 2005), pp. 51-53; Thomas Flynn,
A Voice of Hope
(Baltimore, MD: American Literary Press, Inc., 1994), pp. 32-33; Jackson Estes,
A Field of Innocence
(Portland, OR: Breitenbush Books, 1987), p. 117; Barry Goodson,
CAP Mot: The Story of a Marine Special Forces Unit in Vietnam, 1968-1969
(Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 1997), p. 10; Corson,
The Betrayal
, pp. 183-84, 193-94; Hemingway,
Our War Was Different
, pp. 49-51, 105-07; Peterson,
The Combined Action Platoons
, pp. 31-44.