Hannibal (27 page)

It is unfortunate that our ancient authorities did not enlarge upon this march made by Hasdrubal, the second greatest of that ‘Lion’s brood’ of Hamilcar’s sons who had threatened and terrified Rome for so long. His was an epic journey worthy of his brother. Evading Scipio, he left the Romans vainly watching the eastern passes of the Pyrenees while he and his Carthaginian infantry, his Spaniards, his Numidian horse, and the plodding African elephants, moved far to the west, passing by the Bay of Biscay and the great grey ocean which few Mediterranean men had ever seen. Before he left for Gaul he conferred with Mago, and this younger brother went to the Balearics in order to raise a force of those formidable ‘slingers’ who were later to cross by sea to Italy. The three sons of Hamilcar Barca, it was planned, would then meet for the first time in many years and execute that vengeance upon Rome which their vows to their father and the smoking altars of Carthage had long demanded.
 

XXV

THE METAURUS RIVER

Hannibal and Hasdrubal both knew that, with the declining situation in Spain, the year 207 must prove decisive in the war against Rome. Only by the junction of their armies and the total defeat of the Romans—something more devastating even than Cannae—could the object of the long war be achieved. From the very beginning the great enterprise was to prove hazardous and, on later reflection, almost impossible. The Romans commanding the centre of Italy had the benefit of interior lines of communication and were able to place their forces so that one part kept an eye on Hannibal to the south while the other faced to the north and the expected arrival of Hasdrubal. In those days of primitive communications the great obstacle between the two brothers was the length and breadth of Italy.

Hasdrubal wintered in Gaul, far to the west where no friends of Rome or of Massilia were to be found, and then probably crossed the Rhône fairly high up, near Lyon. Although it was no secret that Hasdrubal was intent on joining his brother in Italy no attempt, in any case, could have been made to stop him once he had cleared the Pyrenees and moved into Gaul. Massilia was far away and the Gallic chieftains were as hostile to Rome as they had ever been. Although, on Livy’s authority, Hasdrubal had escaped from Baecula with no more than 3,000 men it is unlikely that he set out for the Alps with less than double this number. (Hannibal far away in the south may have been able to muster an army of 40-50,000—but most of these second-rate troops.)
 

In the spring of 207 as soon as the snows melted Hasdrubal set out: he was not delayed in any way as his brother had been, nor apparently was he harassed by hostile tribes. Crossing the territory of the Arverni (Auvergne) he very probably followed the course of the river Isère and almost certainly did not take the difficult route that Hannibal had done. Both Livy and Appian state that he did, but it seems most unlikely, since the basin of the Isere leads into the Mont Cenis pass and the Roman historian Varro seems without any doubt to place Hasdrubal’s pass as distinct from Hannibal’s, and to the north of it. The Col du Mont Cenis would fit this well, and the suggestion that Hasdrubal followed in his brother’s footsteps is no more than metaphorical. In any case, as Livy points out, the Alpine tribes who had thought that Hannibal was intent on their own poor territory had now learned about ‘the Punic war, with which Italy had been aflame for eleven years, and realised that the Alps were no more than a route between two very powerful cities which were at war with one another….’ There was no reason any longer for them to attack the Carthaginians en route, nor to deceive them with information that might lead them into high and treacherous passes. Hasdrubal moved towards Italy at the right time of the year, with an assurance that is borne out by the fact that no mishaps are attributed to his expedition.

The Romans were well aware that this year was crucial. The Republic steeled itself, and indeed showed itself in so noble a mood that even generations later it was always regarded as an inspiration. Although the news that Hasdrubal was on the march produced scenes in Rome that were reminiscent of the panic inspired by Hannibal in the early stages of the war, the senate never faltered in wise and sensible measures to defend the state. Men had by now become so inured to war that they were hardened and trained to cope with all its vicissitudes. In some respects also they could take comfort from the general situation: Scipio had undoubtedly gained the upper hand in I Spain; there was no threat from Sardinia, and the war in Sicily had finished satisfactorily. Hannibal’s inactive ally, Philip of Macedon, was on the defensive in Greece and preparing to sue for peace; and throughout the Mediterranean Sea the Roman navy rode triumphant. Rome’s allies had scented the change of wind and those who had earlier shown themselves faint-hearted or treacherous had now learned their lesson. It was with some confidence, then, despite the double threat of Hannibal and Hasdrubal, that the Romans faced the year. Evidence of this, and of their available manpower, is shown by the fact that no less than twenty-three legions were raised. Of these only eight were required for foreign service: two in Sicily, two in Sardinia, and four in Spain. The remaining fifteen were all in Italy, representing 75,000 Roman citizens to which must be added an equal number of allies. It is hardly surprising, though, that Livy remarks that the number of young men fit for service in the field was beginning to dwindle.

More difficult than mustering troops was finding the men to command them. Fabius Maximus was now a very old man and Marcellus, the ‘Sword of Rome’, was dead. The losses sustained over the years, and particularly at Cannae, were only too perceptible in the ranks of Rome’s leaders. After much debate Claudius Nero and Marcus Livius were finally elected consuls, the former taking command of the southern army facing Hannibal at Venusia and the latter of the northern army at Senegallica on the Adriatic coast. Fulvius Flaccus, victor at Capua, supported Nero with an army at Bruttium, and another army was at Tarentum. In the north Lucius Porcius Licinius commanded an army in Cisalpine Gaul while Terentius Varro (still popular with the masses despite all) held the unstable region of Etruria.

Early that spring Hasdrubal moved south, almost certainly earlier than had been expected. If the army which he brought with him from Spain was not exhausted as Hannibal’s had been, nor needing rest to anything like the same extent, it was not of the same quality nor was it strong in that arm which had played such havoc with the Romans, the superb horsemen of North Africa. Nevertheless, reinforced by several thousand Ligurians who had risen to join them, and stirring once again the rebellious spirit in the Cisalpine Gauls, Hasdrubal moved like an ominous thundercloud over the land of Italy. Crossing the Po and mastering the Stradella pass, he marched against Placentia. Here he faltered and lost time, laying siege to this faithful Roman colony which had closed its gates against him, having taken note of the fact that, like Hannibal, he had no equipment to conduct a siege. Hasdrubal has been blamed by some historians for delaying at Placentia, instead of bypassing it and marching on to rendezvous with his brother before the Romans could collect all their forces together. He was faced, however, with the fact that Placentia seemed a very strong garrison to leave in his rear and—even more important perhaps—the local Gallic tribes were slow to rise in his favour. He needed to wait until sufficient Ligurians had reached him and as many Gauls as possible had been recruited. Finally, drawing off from Placentia, he marched by way of Ariminum over to the eastern seaboard. Porcius, who did not have sufficient troops to withstand him, retired. Such were the opening moves that spring in the north.

Hannibal, who had been wintering in Apulia as usual, moved first into Lucania to raise further troops and then back to his old stronghold in Bruttium, no doubt to pick up as many reserves as possible from this area that had long been faithful to his cause. According to Livy, the Roman troops from Tarentum fell upon his levies while they were on the march and in the ensuing struggle he lost about 4,000 men, the burdened Carthaginian troops being cut down by the unencumbered legionaries. Meanwhile the consul Claudius Nero with an army of 42,500 moved from Venusia to block Hannibal’s march from Bruttium to Lucania. ‘Hannibal hoped’, says Livy, ‘to recover the towns which had gone over to the Romans out of fear’, but he also had to march north so as to effect a meeting with his brother. The confusion of the Carthaginian movements was due to the primitive communications of the times: Hannibal knew no more than that Hasdrubal should by now be across the Alps and Hasdrubal, who was already in Italy, knew no more than that Hannibal was somewhere in the south. The Romans, on the other hand, working from their interior lines of communication and supply systems, were in an admirable position to keep their two enemies apart and to tackle them one at a time with their superior forces.

At Grumentum in Lucania the armies of Nero and Hannibal first met in a battle notable for the fact that the Roman consul, ‘imitating the arts of his enemy’, concealed part of his troops behind a hill so as to fall on the Carthaginian rear at a suitable moment in the engagement. It was now that Hannibal felt the need of his trained Punic and Spanish troops and Numidian horsemen, who had never reached him from Carthage. His motley, semi-trained forces—outnumbered by the Romans—were no match for Nero’s disciplined legions. Furthermore it was the consul’s intelligent use of Hannibal’s own style of tactics, frowned on as un-Roman’ by Livy though this was, that secured him the victory. Hannibal lost, we are told, 9,000 men, 9 standards and 6 elephants. Even so, it seems to have been an indecisive engagement for, far from retreating, Hannibal continued his march northwards towards Canusium in Apulia, and it is significant that Nero, while dogging his heels, was unable to prevent him from moving as and when he pleased.

Hannibal at this juncture was naturally more than anxious to make contact with his brother. The latter had now reached Ariminum and intended to make for Narnia in Umbria, coming down the Via Flaminia along the Adriatic coast. It was essential that this information should reach Hannibal as soon as possible, so that the latter could sweep up north and the two armies be joined for the battle that would decide the fate of Rome. Six horsemen, four Gauls and two Numidians, were accordingly chosen to ride through the land of Italy, heavily occupied by Roman and allied troops, to take the news of Hasdrubal’s arrival to his brother and to acquaint him with the desired rendezvous. It might have been thought that such information could be contained in a simple verbal message which could easily have been memorised by the horsemen. But Hasdrubal seems to have written a letter or letters—despatches, in fact, which contained not only the position of his own army at the time, and the request for Hannibal to meet him at Narnia, but possibly also the entire composition of his army.

The contents of Hasdrubal’s letter to his brother were never disclosed, nor available for subsequent historians, so this is nothing but surmise. The fact remains that when, in due course, the information fell into Roman hands it was sufficient to enable them to move with triumphant success against Hasdrubal. Codes certainly existed in those times, yet it seems that Hasdrubal transmitted his information in ordinary Punic—something that was easily translated, Punic having for so long been one of the great trading tongues of the Mediterranean.

The messengers achieved the first part of their mission successfully, passing right through central Italy without falling foul of the armies that were everywhere moving to the defence of the Republic. Then disaster befell them. Ignorant of Hannibal’s movements, they moved south from Apulia and were intercepted in the region of Tarentum. (Hannibal at this time was down in Bruttium and it is unbelievable that his brother did not know that Tarentum itself had long since fallen to the Romans.) So, at this moment, incalculable chance or fortune, the one thing against which no man can be forearmed, took a hand. Hasdrubal’s letter was immediately transmitted to Claudius Nero, who acted with masterly speed and decisiveness. Passing the information on to the senate, he advised them to close the roads to Narnia, call out every available man and withdraw the legion that was at Capua. Nero, although he had previously failed against Hasdrubal in Spain, rightly reckoned that he was the more vulnerable of the two brothers, and it was he who at the moment posed the more immediate threat to Rome. Without waiting for the senate to confirm his choice of action, he decided to leave his army where it was, blocking Hannibal, and take a select force northwards to reinforce Livius and Porcius. His legate Catius assumed command of the 30,000 men who were left holding Hannibal in check, while Nero under cover of night took 6,000 legionaries and 1,000 cavalry on a forced march north.

His action was brilliant, showing all the marks of a man who had learned from Hannibal that it is dash and decision which often win great battles. He had already displayed something of this quality in his prior engagement with Hannibal but now, acting completely against all Roman conventions (leaving his designated place as consul), he took to the road with his chosen levies. Horsemen were sent ahead of the marching columns to arouse all the villages and townships that lay in their way to have food, water and everything made ready for men upon whom depended the life or death of the Republic. Livy gives a spirited account of that famous march: ‘They were marching everywhere between lines of men and women who had poured out from the farms on all sides, and amidst their vows and prayers and words of praise…. They vied with each other in invitations and offers and in importuning them to take whatever they wished in food or in beasts.’ The men marched day and night, arms piled on carts that accompanied them, while messengers spurred ahead to Livius to cell him that his fellow consul was on the way to join him.