Hannibal (29 page)

Livy writes that Scipio ‘considered the conquest of Spain insignificant compared with all that he had imagined in his high-minded hopes. Already his eye was upon Africa and the greater Carthage and the glory of such a war….’ His policy did not go unopposed in the senate and it is clear that there were two main parties in the debate: the one pressing for peace in Italy first, and the removal of Hannibal, and the other for carrying the war overseas. The Fabians, led by the son of the old dictator, were in favour of an Italian policy—setting their own house in order before extending the war—while Scipio stood for expansion. His father and his uncle had died in Spain and he had now achieved its conquest, but looking further ahead he envisaged the conquest of Mediterranean Africa. Most of the senate were against him. In that thirteenth year of the war, the whole country was weary, its lands devastated, its manpower dwindling, and every citizen and ally staggering under an intolerable burden of taxation. The reason that Scipio managed to succeed in his ambitious plan was that his triumphant return to Rome, preceded by hundreds of pounds’ weight of silver and many noble captives as evidence of his success, eclipsed the arguments of his opponents. On a wave of popular enthusiasm he was elected to a consulship for the year 205. He had in any case already begun to take soundings in Africa, thus anticipating the opposition.

Some months before his return to Rome, confident that all was over in Spain, Scipio had crossed to Africa to meet Syphax, the Numidian king, with a view to bringing him into an alliance with Rome against Carthage. In the harbour of Cirta (Constantine), adjoining Carthaginian territory, Scipio found enemy warships and no less a person than Hasdrubal Gisgo, against whom, with Hamilcar’s son Mago, he had recently been engaged in battle. It was a strange meeting (possibly engineered by the wily Numidian king) but since it took place on neutral territory, there could be no question of any display of hostility between the visiting Romans and Carthaginians.

Livy writes that ‘to Syphax it seemed a splendid thing—as indeed it was—that the generals of the two richest peoples of that time had come on the same day to ask for peace and friendship from him.’ He invited them both to dine with him, and ‘…on the same couch even, since the king would have it so, Scipio and Hasdrubal reclined. Moreover, such was the genial manner of Scipio, such his inborn cleverness in meeting every situation, that by his eloquent mode of address he won not Syphax only, the barbarian unacquainted with Roman ways, but his own bitterest enemy as well. Hasdrubal plainly showed that in this ‘social’ engagement, Scipio seemed even more marvellous than in his achievements in war, and that he did not doubt Syphax and his kingdom would soon be in the power of the Romans; such skill did the man possess in winning men over.’ The fact was, of course, that the intelligent Numidian could read the way the wind was blowing in the Mediterranean. ‘So Scipio, after making a treaty with Syphax, set sail from Africa….’

During that winter, while Scipio was being acclaimed in Rome, Hannibal’s brother Mago was in the Balearic islands. After making a daring but ineffectual attempt to capture New Carthage he had despaired of the situation in Spain. He had left Gades and taken the Carthaginian fleet first of all to Pityusa (Ibiza), long a Carthaginian colony, intending to recruit foot soldiers and the famous Balearic slingers among the islanders. Even at this late stage in the war it is clear that Carthage had not despaired of winning it in Italy. Mago had received orders ‘to hire the greatest possible number of young Gauls and Ligurians, to join Hannibal and not permit a war that had begun with the greatest vigour and even greater good fortune to decline now.’ The senate in Carthage had sent him a large sum of money for this purpose. Mago’s fleet was also laden with gold and silver from Gades, where he had plundered the temples and the treasury before leaving. He had even ransacked the famous and immensely wealthy temple of Melkarth (Hercules) which for centuries had been the last place where Phoenician sailors had made their offerings before voyaging out into the great ocean. That a Carthaginian, descendant of those Phoenicians who had founded this sacred shrine some nine hundred years earlier, should desecrate it is evidence of the despair that Mago and his men must have felt at the loss of Spain. Over that winter, although rebuffed in Mallorca, Mago managed to recruit some 12,000 soldiers and 2,000 horsemen in Menorca. With these troops he was to make an onslaught on the Ligurian coast in the spring of 205, in the course of which he captured the important towns of Savo (Savona) and Genua (Genoa).

At this stage in the complexity of the Hannibalic War, which embraced the whole of the central and western Mediterranean and all the adjacent lands, it is comparatively easy to see the objective of Scipio. His colleague for the year was Publius Licinius Crassus, to whom was entrusted the guard over Bruttium and Hannibal, while Scipio was allotted the province of Sicily with the provision that from there he might pass over to Africa ‘if he judged it to be to the State’s advantage’. This, despite the objection of the Fabian party to any more overseas involvements, was a clear invitation to him to take the war to the doorstep of Carthage, for all Sicily was now quiet and subservient to Rome. At the same time his opponents in the Senate did everything that they could to prevent him from acting—denying him the right to take overseas any legions from Italy itself because of the threat from Bruttium (‘Where Hannibal is, there is the centre of the war’.) It was left to Scipio’s own discretion whether he took the war into North Africa. If he failed, he would be found guilty of exceeding his instructions.

While it is possible to see the Roman goals at this moment in the long conflict, it is extremely difficult to understand those of the Carthaginians. There are no records for one thing, and Livy could not have known them, and Polybius—who may well have done so and who is more reliable as a historian—cannot help, for this section of his history is lost. The instructions to Mago to proceed to the Ligurian coast after enrolling a small hard core of an army in the Balearic islands, and then to proceed to Cisalpine Gaul and enlist more Gauls, as had Hasdrubal, suggests that a duplicate type of operation was planned—a swoop from the north to join up with Hannibal coming up from the south. On the other hand, poor though communications were in those days, it would be surprising if the Carthaginian senate did not have enough evidence of how this strategy had failed under Hasdrubal. They must certainly also have known (for Carthaginian spies were everywhere) that Etruria was disaffected and potentially ripe for rebellion against their ancient enemy, the Romans. If Hannibal’s brother Mago could raise enough troops among the Ligurians and the Cisalpine Gauls to inspire this Etruscan revolt—and then consolidate it by joining up with the Etruscans—Rome would indeed be threatened as never before since Hannibal had crossed the Alps. At such a moment, Hannibal, moving up from Bruttium, would disclose the power of his generalship against the armies that watched him in the south.

Carthage and its rulers (and they, like Rome, had always two conflicting parties, one suing for negotiated peace and the other for war) did not fail Hannibal or Mago even at this late hour. During the course of the year 205 two main convoys were sent up from North Africa to Italy, the one designed for Mago and the other for Hannibal. It was evidence of Carthage’s shipbuilding capability that, even after their steady humiliation since the First Punic War, they could still send fleets across the seas. The convoy designed to reinforce Hannibal in the south was never to reach him: eighty Carthaginian ships were captured that summer as they made their way across the quiet seas off Sardinia. Once again the Romans displayed their naval superiority and showed how well they understood the importance of seapower. The convoy to Mago, however, got through and reinforced him with 25 warships, 6,000 infantry, 800 cavalry and 7 elephants. He also received a further sum of money for buying the services of mercenary troops.

While his brother was raising troops in the north, Hannibal was still held inactive in Bruttium and little took place on this front except for desultory forays into Roman territory. The quality of Hannibal’s men was now such that it is doubtful if he could have fielded an army capable of a major engagement. Proof of this can be seen in the circumstances under which he now lost Locri, one of his only two ports (and by far the best), to a seaborne attack launched by Scipio from his base in Sicily. Although Locri was technically outside his sphere of command Scipio realised that his fellow consul to the north could never fight his way down through Bruttium to capture the city, so he acted wisely and on his own judgement. Three thousand men were despatched from Rhegium under one of Scipio’s officers, Quintus Pleminius, to attack Locri overland, at the same time as—in the usual fashion—a group of dissidents within the city prepared to hand it over. The small harbour of Locri lay sheltered between two heights, both of which were defended by citadels. The Romans managed to seize one of these while the Carthaginians retreated into the other. On hearing the news Hannibal immediately marched down from the north, sending word ahead to the Carthaginians to sally out as soon as they saw his army approaching. Scipio, who had anticipated that Hannibal would move to the rescue of the town, meanwhile came round by sea from Messina in Sicily and disembarked troops, who waited in the town until the Carthaginian army came in sight. Instead of being met by the Carthaginian garrison, Hannibal found a Roman fleet in the port and fresh Roman troops drawn up for battle. His relief of Locri was foiled, and his raw troops were worsted in an early encounter. There was nothing left for him but to withdraw.

He had lost Locri, and now the only port remaining to him was Croton. For Hannibal’s remaining two years in Italy this ancient Greek city became his main base. Once the home of the philosopher Pythagoras, and of the famous athlete Milo (six times victor in wrestling at the Olympic games), Croton was now little more than an unimportant provincial town with a small harbour. Its most famous feature was the great temple to the goddess Hera, known as Hera Lacinia after the promontory on which it stood. For centuries this had been one of the chief landmarks for sailors as they neared Italy from Greece, or as they took their departure south of the Gulf of Taranto for the Ionian islands. It was here, amid the
ex votos
of mariners, that Hannibal later had set up the great bronze tablet (mentioned by Polybius) on which was recorded in Punic and Greek the strength of his army when he had crossed the Alps, and his actions during the fifteen years he had spent in Italy.

It was at Locri that Hannibal and Scipio first encountered one another as commanders. Curiously enough, it was from the ranks of other survivors of the Roman disaster at Cannae (Scipio himself had been one) that Scipio now began to prepare his attack on Africa. In Sicily, which he intended to use as his invasion base, the excellent harbour of Lilybaeum (Marsala) in the west was the nearest point of departure for the area of Carthage. The two legions in the province had been formed out of the discredited soldiers of Cannae, who had been sent there in disgrace after their defeat, and whom the anti-Scipio faction in the Senate doubtless thought would prove unsuitable for any ambitious projects that Scipio might harbour. However, these legionaries, who had been strengthened by Marcellus’ victorious veterans of Syracuse, were still smarting from their humiliation and wanted nothing better than to redress the past and take the war into the enemy camp. Scipio, who had suffered with them, understood their feelings and was exactly the right man to lead them. Furthermore, in the desire for vengeance on their ancient enemy, Scipio enjoyed the voluntary help of many of the communities in Italy, a number of whom, such as the Etruscans, were no doubt eager to prove their loyalty to Rome now that it seemed clear that the Carthaginian cause was doomed.

Livy lists the places and details the spontaneous aid that was given the ambitious young consul as he prepared to carry the war into enemy territory: ‘First the Etruscan communities said that they would aid the consul, each according to its resources. The men of Caere promised grain for the crews and supplies of every kind, the men of Populonium iron, Tarquinii linen for sail, Volaterra the interior fittings of ships, also grain….’ Arretium supplied 3,000 shields and an equal number of helmets; 50,000 javelins, short spears and lances; also axes, shovels, sickles, baskets and hand mills, sufficient to equip 40 warships; 120,000 packs of wheat, and supplementary pay for petty officers and oarsmen. A large quantity of grain came from Perusa, Clusium and Rusellae as well as fir trees for shipbuilding. Umbria and the Sabine district provided soldiers, while the Marsians, Paelignians and Marrucini volunteered in large numbers for the fleet. Camerinum sent a cohort of 600 fully armed men. Twenty quinqueremes and 10 quadriremes, ready and equipped, were launched ‘on the forty-fifth day after the timber had been brought from the forests’.

In the spring of 204 B.C. Scipio embarked at Lilybaeum with 30,000 men in 400 transports escorted by 40 warships. No longer consul, but proconsul with command over Sicily, Scipio was taking the vengeance of the Roman Republic into Africa.
 

XXVII

RECALL TO AFRICA

During Hannibal’s last years on the continent of Europe he had been able to do little more than ensure that the Roman legions remained in Italy. It was nothing but the fear of Hannibal himself that tied down so many thousands of men, for his army was by now a makeshift affair that in any other hands could have posed no threat to Rome. The focus of interest in the war had shifted first to Spain and then, after Scipio’s brilliant generalship had driven out the Carthaginians, it was to be the turn of Africa. As it became clear that Carthage itself would soon be the object of attack and that Carthaginian power was everywhere weakening, the various tribes inhabiting the Mediterranean coastline of the African continent began to prepare to shift their allegiance away from their old master.